The European Union in the 21st century: Perspectives from the Lisbon Treaty. CEPS Paperbacks. December 2009 by Micossi, Stefano et al.
 
 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE LISBON TREATY 
 
 
 
EDITED BY 
STEFANO MICOSSI AND GIAN LUIGI TOSATO 
 
 
INTRODUCTION BY 
SABINO CASSESE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES 
BRUSSELS  
 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy 
research institute based in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound 
analytical research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing 
Europe today. CEPS Paperbacks present analysis and views by leading 
experts on important questions in the arena of European public policy, 
written in a style aimed at an informed but generalist readership. 
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors writing in a 
personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect those of CEPS or any other 
institution with which they are associated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover: Claude Monet, Impression, soleil levant, 1872  
Musée Marmottan, Paris 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-92-9079-929-0 
© Copyright 2009, Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system 
or transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording 
or otherwise – without the prior permission of the Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: 32 (0) 2 229.39.11 Fax: 32 (0) 2 219.41.51 
e-mail: info@ceps.eu 
internet: http://www.ceps.eu  
CONTENTS 
Preface............................................................................................................................ i 
1.  Introduction: Im Zweifel für Europa 
Sabino Cassese.......................................................................................................1 
1.  The European Union: Reasons for success..................................................1 
2.  The crisis and its paradoxes...........................................................................2 
3. A  realistic  agenda............................................................................................4 
Part I. Economics and Consensus 
2. Partisan  Protectionism:  Political  Consensus, the Euro and Europe’s 
Response to the Global Crisis 
Carlo Bastasin .......................................................................................................7 
1.  A crisis in consensus.......................................................................................8 
2.  A crisis in politics..........................................................................................13 
3.  The euro as trigger – two examples: Germany and Italy ........................16 
4.  Protection versus protectionism .................................................................19 
5. Welfare ...........................................................................................................23 
6.  Beyond partisan protectionism...................................................................28 
References.............................................................................................................30 
3.  A More Social EU: Issues of where and how 
Maurizio Ferrera & Stefano Sacchi...................................................................31 
1.  The need for a more social European Union.............................................31 
2.  How to build a more social EU...................................................................34 
3.  Supplementing the internal market with social rights ............................36 
4.  Less rhetoric, more forward-looking initiatives.......................................43 
References.............................................................................................................46 
4.  Economic Policy Coordination and Failures in Europe to counter 
Recession 
Fiorella Kostoris..................................................................................................48 
Introduction..........................................................................................................48 
1.  When is coordination appropriate?............................................................49 
2.  Economic policy coordination under pressure.........................................52  
3.  A case study of the Stability and Growth Pace........................................54 
4.  Effects of the financial crisis........................................................................61 
5. Conclusions...................................................................................................62 
References.............................................................................................................65 
Annex....................................................................................................................67 
5.  Market Integration and Competition Policy: The Challenges Ahead 
Ginevra Bruzzone & Luigi Prosperetti............................................................72 
1. Introduction...................................................................................................72 
2.  Becoming closer to citizens.........................................................................76 
3.  Stable principles and integration of structural policies...........................80 
4.  The proper degree of harmonisation.........................................................81 
4.1 Supranational  regulation ..................................................................81 
4.2 Common  rules  for products .............................................................84 
4.3  Commercial relations between business and consumers.............86 
4.4  Common rules for services...............................................................86 
4.5 ...including  network industries........................................................87 
5. Coordinated  implementation .....................................................................90 
6. Conclusions...................................................................................................95 
References.............................................................................................................96 
6.  Energy and European Institutions 
Valeria Termini....................................................................................................98 
1. Background...................................................................................................98 
2.  European Institutions: A necessary but insufficient precondition. 
From Euratom to the Lisbon Treaties........................................................99 
3.  European strategy and domestic policies: Goals, conflicts 
and proposals..............................................................................................105 
4.  Europe’s relationship with the rest of the world: Energy security 
and climate change.....................................................................................111 
5. Conclusions.................................................................................................116 
References...........................................................................................................118  
Part II. The International Projection 
7.  Europe on the International Scene: A Union of necessity after a Union 
of choice? 
Cesare Merlini....................................................................................................120 
1. The  international  context...........................................................................123 
2.  The Union’s Internal Context....................................................................128 
3.  Suggested guidelines for a non-marginal common foreign policy......133 
4.  The instruments for the EU to achieve a high-profile foreign policy..137 
References...........................................................................................................140 
8.  The Enlargement of the European Union 
Rocco A. Cangelosi & Ferdinando Salleo ......................................................142 
1.  European enlargement and vision............................................................142 
2.  Recent admissions and new candidates ..................................................144 
3.  The Western Balkans..................................................................................147 
4. Turkey...........................................................................................................149 
5.  The borders of Europe................................................................................152 
6. Europe’s  identity.........................................................................................154 
7.  Enlargement in 2009...................................................................................157 
8.  After the Lisbon Treaty..............................................................................159 
References...........................................................................................................161 
9.  European defence or defence of Europe? 
Alessandro Pansa..............................................................................................162 
1.  The institutions: A past of great hopes, a future with no illusions......162 
2.  The industry: Oligopoly, foreign policy and internationalisation.......168 
3.  Europe: Cooperation, inefficiency and nationalism...............................172 
4.  Governments, institutions and investors: A changing role ..................175 
5.  Industrial structures, control systems and the equity market..............177 
References...........................................................................................................181 
10.  Europe and Global Economic Governance after the Crisis 
Pier Carlo Padoan.............................................................................................182 
1.  The breakdown of Bretton Woods II and beyond..................................182 
2.  Keeping markets open in investment and trade.....................................186 
3.  Europe and the United States as ‘global regulators’?............................188 
4. Macroeconomic  governance......................................................................192 
5. Conclusions..................................................................................................197 
References...........................................................................................................198  
Part III. The Institutional Framework 
11.  From a Community based on the Rule of Law to the European Union 
as a Community of Rights 
Mario P. Chiti....................................................................................................201 
1.  A community based on the rule of law...................................................201 
2.  Issues posited in the original 1957 EEC Treaty......................................203 
3. Developments  subsequent  to the 1992 EU Treaty.................................205 
4.  Roles played by the Council of Europe and the European Convention 
on Human Rights .......................................................................................207 
5.  The 2007 Treaty and the recent Treaty of Lisbon...................................208 
6.  The Constitutional Court in Italy and Europe’s international 
obligations...................................................................................................209 
7. Pending  issues ............................................................................................211 
8.  Protecting rights – The EU’s basic remit.................................................211 
References...........................................................................................................212 
12.  Democracy in the European Union 
Stefano Micossi.................................................................................................214 
1.  The need for democratic legitimisation...................................................217 
2.  Control and democratic legitimisation mechanisms.............................221 
2.1 Elections  and  referendums.............................................................222 
2.2  The role of national parliaments....................................................223 
2.3  Control and democratic legitimisation at the Union level.........225 
2.4 Popular  legitimisation  and constitutionalism..............................228 
3.  Legitimisation through substantive Community action.......................230 
3.1  Opening new areas for decision-making in the Union’s 
policies...............................................................................................231 
4. Conclusions.................................................................................................232 
References...........................................................................................................233 
13. Trail-Blazing  Developments  in Justice and Home Affairs 
Giacinto della Cananea ...................................................................................236 
1.  The problem: Losing control over territory and individuals...............237 
2.  The European rescue of police powers?..................................................238 
3.  An area of freedom, security and justice.................................................240 
4.  From the Laeken Declaration to the Lisbon Treaty...............................243 
5.  Issues of efficiency and safeguards..........................................................245  
6.  Future Prospects: ‘Choral’ cooperation and trail-blazing initiative.....249 
7.  Implications for checks and balances.......................................................251 
8.  Implications for the Union’s Foreign Policy............................................253 
References...........................................................................................................254 
14.  The Role of Parliaments in the Democratic Life of the Union 
Andrea Manzella ...............................................................................................257 
1.  The democratic principles of the Union and national parliaments 
within the European parliamentary system............................................257 
2.  The political nature of the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles......................................................................................................262 
3.  The irresistible political expansion of proportionality control.............264 
4.  The improper interaction of quorums......................................................266 
5.  Conclusions: Early warning for the early warning................................270 
References...........................................................................................................270 
15.  The Shape of post-Lisbon Europe 
Gian Luigi Tosato..............................................................................................271 
1.  The new Treaty’s structure........................................................................271 
2.  A simplified and re-organised system.....................................................272 
3.  The ‘constitutional’ issue ...........................................................................275 
4. Institutions  and  decision-making efficiency...........................................276 
5.  Three candidates for the role of Mr (or Ms) Europe..............................278 
6.  The market: Between competition and general interest........................279 
7.  A foreign policy for the Union?................................................................280 
8.  Two conflicting concepts ...........................................................................282 
9.  A look into the future.................................................................................283 
References...........................................................................................................285 
About the Authors...................................................................................................286 
 | i 
 
 
PREFACE 
ventually, after fifteen years of agonizing negotiations among the 
member states and at times dogged resistance by segments of 
European society, the European Union has reached a form of 
constitutional settlement with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The new Treaty brings important changes to the European 
construction, including a significant expansion of common policies decided 
by the Community method, a stable President for the European Council, a 
strengthened framework for external policies, more transparent and 
effective decision-making and strict safeguards of subsidiarity.  
Even in the wake of the new Treaty, however, the Union remains an 
entity in flux, in search of its destiny. Further institutional progress is by no 
means excluded, but it will have to be achieved explicitly rather than 
brought about by stealth. The presence among the member states and in the 
European Parliament of political forces staunchly opposed to further 
deepening of the Union makes the prospect of increased use of enhanced 
cooperation more likely. 
Ultimately, the fate of the Union depends on its ability to respond to 
the needs of its member states and its citizens in providing external and 
internal security and economic prosperity in a global context of mounting 
economic and political instability, where the centre of gravity of world 
governance and strategic decisions is likely to continue to shift away from 
Europe and towards the Pacific and emerging economies.  
Against this background, the essays in this volume analyse changing 
equilibria in common policies, institutional settings and legitimisation 
mechanisms of the European Union, which are being brought about by the 
new Treaty, and sketch out possible scenarios for the 21st century. The 
essays are organised in three sections devoted in turn to economics and 
consensus, international projection of the Union and the new institutional 
framework.  
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The contributors to this collection are all members of EuropEos, a 
multi-disciplinary group of jurists, economists, political scientists and 
journalists who first came together in 2002 to contribute to the deliberations 
of the European Convention and have developed into a permanent forum 
for the discussion of European institutional issues. 
The views expressed in the essays in this volume are not always 
concordant, but they stem from a common commitment to the European 
construction. The title of the introductory essay, Im zweifel für Europa, is 
there for a reason.  
 
Stefano Micossi and Gian Luigi Tosato 
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1.  INTRODUCTION: 
IM ZWEIFEL FÜR EUROPA 
SABINO CASSESE  
1.  The European Union: Reasons for success  
The European Union represents the most successful establishment of a 
supranational system of government since the large empires of the past (the 
Holy Roman Empire or the Spanish, Ottoman, Habsburg and British 
Empires).  
But none of these multinational structures developed in such a short 
space of time as the European Union, which in half a century has gone from 
being an association of 6 to 27 country states, from an economic union to a 
political union. And none of the structures that came before – unlike the 
European Union – was the product of a voluntary and equal association of 
nations, as opposed to a structure that coalesced around a dominant nation. 
The Union has a third original feature as well. It unites states, but not 
on the basis of their traditional functions – defence, public order, justice, 
relations with foreign countries, budget – but on the basis of an element 
that is potentially external to the state, namely the market. That said, the 
European Union ends up exercising influence over traditional state 
functions as well: thus, it may not dispose of large sums of money (in terms 
of budget, it is dwarf-like), but it sets standards regarding states’ spending 
power; it may not be responsible for public order, but it grants freedom of 
movement to European citizens; it may have little influence in defence 
matters, but it has guaranteed peace in Europe.  
A fourth original feature of European construction is its support of 
nation states that internal centrifugal forces (separatism, regionalism) 
might otherwise fragment. National unity becomes necessary because of 
the need for dialogue, the need to speak with one voice with other nations. 
From this standpoint the traditional vision of a Union perpetually in 2 | SABINO CASSESE 
 
conflict with its member states is turned around, and another emerges, that 
of a Union helping to strengthen national interests.  
Fifthly, after barely half a century, the Union has become one of the 
pillars of a multipolar world. Most of the 350 cases submitted to the World 
Trade Organisation’s Dispute Settlement Body involve disputes between 
the European Union and the United States. Conversely, in global fora, 
worldwide agreements are often based on an understanding between the 
United States and the European Union. The presence of the Union therefore 
helps preserve global plurality.  
Sixthly, despite its rapid pace, the Union’s development has been 
very much in accordance with the 19th century ‘revolution in government’ 
mode, i.e. gradual: when a problem emerges, a solution is sought that is 
then shown to be flawed and incomplete, requiring correction, etc. Or 
solutions devised for one sector are transposed to another where they 
generate effects that are in part unintended and require adjustment. All this 
occurs in a self-feeding process, provoking angry tirades on the part of 
those who see in it nothing but the progress of bureaucratisation. The 
incorporation of successive compromises has built into Europe’s legal 
system a rationale for slowness, but it has also encouraged a rationale for 
the ‘essentiality’. 
Finally the European Union crosses state barriers on a daily basis, in 
its quest to induce domestic reform. Domestic reform stems from a 
common European denominator (communications liberalisation, for 
instance), wherein it finds inspiration, but it ends up producing different 
outcomes, at a different pace. Hence the unstable balance between 
uniformity and differentiation, European solutions and domestic outcomes, 
the latter bearing the mark of local culture, style and institutions.  
“Im Zweifel für Europa” (When in doubt, favour Europe) read the 
headline of a German paper a few years back, summing up the strength 
that has presided over Europe’s development and led to its becoming the 
main point of reference for politics in Europe today. 
2.  The crisis and its paradoxes  
Despite the Union’s growing status as a world power and its increasing 
activity (evidenced by the reams of regulations produced daily by its 
numerous bodies), the standstill dealt by the Constitutional referenda held 
in France and the Netherlands and in Ireland over the Treaty of Lisbon 
induced a phase of apathy where the prevalent concerns focused on INTRODUCTION: IM ZWEIFEL FÜR EUROPA | 3 
 
fragmentation and the prospect of a 27-gear Europe (and thus, a loss of 
collective momentum).  
Yet even this critical phase is on various accounts paradoxical. There 
are those who deplore the Union’s ineffectiveness not because it does too 
much, but mainly because it does too lit t l e .  I t  i s  a r g u e d  t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  
intervene more pointedly in immigration, world trade, international 
terrorism, the environment, energy. At stake are functions that states 
cannot perform alone. Therefore, more Europe – as they say – is needed.  
There are those who deplore the ineffectiveness of the Union’s 
decision-making processes, ascribed to the facts that so many decisions 
require unanimity, the Council President’s term is too short and Europe has 
difficulty in speaking with one voice vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
European construction appears to be this machine ruled more by 
procedures than by products. But the complexity of the decision-making 
processes stems from the unavoidable compromises – as noted earlier – 
that are needed to run the machine and are what makes it stand apart. A 
driving force, not just a brake. 
There are those who deplore the elitist character of the European 
construction: it brings together politicians, bureaucrats, business leaders. 
But in recent years citizens have been called to select who will represent 
them in the European Parliament and the referenda have at the very least 
involved many citizens in a European decision. So the Union is not an 
overblown superstructure set up by the ruling classes. The people too have 
a voice, and a direct one at that. And if the people feel fear and try to slow 
the process down rather than speed it up, one should try and understand 
why, rather than lament the collapse of the whole edifice. And in the 
meantime, steps should be taken to broaden and strengthen the ‘elites’ on 
which construction has long relied, trying out at the supranational level all 
the induction and socialisation tools that have helped establish national 
elites over the last two centuries.  
There are those who deplore the re-emergence within the European 
Union of national interests, forgetting that its whole construction is based 
on reciprocal concessions, which have produced multiple benefits that no 
one can deny today. If a state decides to evade European constraints on a 
point that might damage its position, it must also be prepared to lose 
advantages specially tailored to its needs. This interplay of reciprocal 
favours is strengthened by the various ways in which costs and benefits are 
assessed by each individual nation and within each nation as well (favours 4 | SABINO CASSESE 
 
and the benefits bestowed are not uniform), not to mention the fact that all 
supranational legal systems fragment national interests (one need but 
consider the conflicting interests of the retail and the textile industry in the 
face of expanding world trade).  
 Finally, there are those who deplore the fact that the Union has two 
governments and that the Commission is not fully answerable to 
Parliament. But this disregards the fact that in so doing, one is applying to 
a new construct rules devised for the old (state legal and political) systems, 
without first having investigated whether the new construct is not actually 
generating new ways of making the executive accountable. In other words, 
the dissatisfaction stems to a large extent from a defect in viewers’ vision.   
All these ambiguities and paradoxes give rise to a tormenting doubt – 
that the slogan Im Zweifel für Europa may no longer be appropriate.  
3.  A realistic agenda 
The ambiguity with which the failings of European construction (which are 
in fact in part achievements, in part failings) are presented must not induce 
inertia.  
One may have to renounce the idea of a European Constitutional 
Charter, but on the other hand there already is a European constitution. In 
any event this does not mean that a number of improvements are not 
required: in particular with respect to closer links between the Parliament 
and the Commission, a stronger connection between the Commission and 
the Council, a longer mandate for the Council President and a greater use 
of majority (and qualified majority) voting.   
If on the one hand the Union is called upon to take on new functions 
and, on the other, it is still burdened with many other older ones, this does 
not mean that it shouldn’t unburden itself through devolution to states, 
and mainly to sub-national authorities, while retaining powers of control.  
If the composite power and joint committee system strengthens the 
Union but slows down its procedures, the decision-making process should 
be redesigned not to make it less collegial, but to make it speedier.  
If elites and the general public enter into conflict, this conflict has to 
be changed into productive competition, into a balanced system of checks 
and balances. That may produce, in other words, more guarantees, not 
more conflicts.  INTRODUCTION: IM ZWEIFEL FÜR EUROPA | 5 
 
And finally if national interests do fragment, steps should be taken to 
encourage their multinational re-aggregation, which is good for Europe 
(provided that it is not understood as a monolith, but as a network).  
In other words, optimism should not lead to inertia. The strength of 
European construction also lies in the fact that it has never stopped during 
its first half century.  
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2.  PARTISAN PROTECTIONISM: POLITICAL 
CONSENSUS, THE EURO AND EUROPE’S 
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL CRISIS 
CARLO BASTASIN 
ar from providing an opportunity for better coordination, the global 
financial crisis has accentuated national differences among the 
member states of the EU. Although in line with the principles 
enunciated in the European Economic Recovery Plan, EU member states’ 
responses to the crisis have shown a low degree of coordination. The 
impact of fiscal stimuli has not been coordinated even in the component of 
the fiscal packages (one-quarter of the total, according to the European 
Commission) carrying direct spill-over effects. In some cases, the amount of 
stimulus has been kept at a low level in order to ‘free-ride’ other countries’ 
packages. Public money has been spent with an eye to support mainly local 
domestic activities, even at the cost of lower fiscal multipliers. Non-export 
industries, especially infrastructure, even though less affected by the crisis, 
have been supported by governments, thereby increasing demand for non-
elastic production that could more easily adjust through higher prices than 
higher quantities, and actually resulting in a negative welfare effect. 
Requests for banking transparency – and supervision – have caused 
uneasiness among national regulators and policy-makers. Banking 
opaqueness has been protected by national governments. There has not 
been an agreement on stress-testing, recapitalisation or restructuring of the 
financial system. The threat is still lingering that countries with problematic 
banking systems, little room for fiscal manoeuvre and low growth 
(Belgium, Ireland, Austria, Greece and the United Kingdom) will face 
increasing difficulty to manage their financial weakness and become 
destabilising for the whole EU. First-best solutions – fiscal cooperation or 
common financing instruments (Eurobonds) – remain unheeded as they 
typically require strong political commitment. This is inducing defensive 
F 8 | CARLO BASTASIN 
 
attitudes by the banks themselves, resulting in less credit to the economy 
and less growth.  
Exiting the crisis might prove a bigger challenge for the EU than the 
crisis itself. The area is divided between fast countries and slow countries. 
There is a risk that the growth divergence will reinforce these trends. 
Countries that grow faster can reduce public debt more easily, benefiting 
from less crowding-out and lower risk premia. Their banking systems can 
finance innovation instead of simply struggling to reduce losses.  
If the implementation of short-term policies is disappointing, the 
long-term consequences of a lack of coordination are outright worrying. 
Countries without fiscal room of manoeuvre and with critical banking 
situations will need to be supported by countries with larger room of fiscal 
manoeuvre. Countries risking public-debt failure will also need support. 
Without macroeconomic coordination, current account imbalances, in an 
environment of low growth, will jeopardise public debt sustainability. All 
of this might trigger a chain effect from the weakest to the strongest links of 
the European Union. 
Why is Europe drifting towards self-defeating non-cooperation?  
The answer lies in the objectives of national governments. The system 
of national partisan politics in Europe defines itself in terms of its 
protective or, alternatively, protectionist stance with respect to 
globalisation. National consensus builds both on closure and openness. 
More precisely, it works on the basis of a principle one might call ‘partisan 
protectionism’: the protection of the constituency – labour for the left wing 
and capital for the right wing, identified with partisan ideologies of the 
past two centuries – while vigorously exposing the other constituency to 
the full duress and dynamics of global competition.  
This duplicity – far from weakening it – is strengthening the grip of 
national ideologies on the imagination of the citizens of each European 
country. Traditional – national – politics become a structural hurdle with 
respect to coordination. The euro, for its many merits, has been the catalyst 
of the contradiction between an open economy and closed politics. Now, 
lacking an open European politics, the siren song of national protectionism, 
carrying us away from European cooperation, sounds irresistible.  
1.  A crisis in consensus 
During the early decades, the European integration process elicited broad 
consensus as reflected in public opinion of the various member states. PARTISAN PROTECTIONISM | 9 
 
Historical, political and cultural reasons had fed into a generally positive 
attitude towards the early integration initiatives and their rhetoric. 
Somewhat simplistically, this has been referred to as a ‘permissive 
consensus’, i.e. a consensus not preconditioned by the concrete political 
goals set forth in the European project, but rather by benign and not 
necessarily informed support for the long-term ideals evoked.  
Prior to 1973, no statistical data were available on public opinion 
attitudes – a gap since filled by the Eurobarometer surveys, which have 
made it possible to demonstrate statistically that a significant change in 
public attitudes vis-à-vis the European Union has indeed occurred. The 
1990s are the traumatic epicentre of this change. More specifically, up until 
1991, explicit consensus among European citizens continued to rise, with 
the Single Market project marking the highest point in terms of positive 
answers to two standard questions: Are you for or against the efforts currently 
being made to unify Europe? and Do you feel that in general terms your country’s 
membership in the European Union is a good or a bad thing? In 1991, 82% of all 
Europeans replied in the positive to the first question, and 72% to the 
second as well. A few years later, around 1997, positive answers to both 
these questions had dropped by 15 to 17 percentage points.  
Public opposition to the European project emerged for the first time 
in a number of different countries during the critical years between 1991 
and 1997: the Maastricht referendum failed in Denmark and Ireland and 
quite surprisingly, only passed with the slimmest of margins in France. 
Opposition to monetary union mounted in Germany, eroding the 
customary pro-integration majority (so much so that until 1998, two-thirds 
of all German respondents stated that they opposed the euro) with the 
support of the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court, and anti-Europe 
parliamentary votes in the UK garnered much attention and broad public 
opinion support, expressed via idiosyncratic anti-European media 
coverage. New localist political groupings in Italy, Austria, the Netherlands 
and Scandinavia began to gain ground through anti-European and at times 
outright xenophobic programmes, with some obtaining government 
positions by the year 2000. As of the 1990s, dwindling support for Europe 
had become an unavoidable issue.  
But what exactly do we mean by ‘consensus’? Strictly speaking, 
consensus is a positive response to a question, a second-tier request 
following that which led to the emergence of whatever is the object of the 
consensus. This is why British observers in particular have so often stressed 10 | CARLO BASTASIN 
 
the European Union’s ability to deliver rather than to deliberate. There are 
many cases where joint achievements elicit consensus only after they have 
materialised: there are thus far fewer Germans opposed to the euro today 
than in 1998, as in this case European policy implementation has elicited 
consensus through its output. And the scope of this extra-democratic 
process subsequently extended even further, leading observers to speak of 
output-based ‘legitimisation’.  
But for various reasons, the process does not always work. In a 
number of cases, the ability of the European Union to deliver has not been 
appreciated by its citizens. Costs have remained more visible than benefits, 
and an inter-temporal balance between costs and benefits has not slotted 
into the rhetoric of politics. More specifically, according to some observers, 
the shift from negative to positive integration (ranging from the removal of 
obstacles to integration, a symbolic high point of which was the 
establishment of the Single Market, to projects establishing as European 
prerogatives that had hitherto been domestic, through institution-building 
and handouts of sovereignty) has made ‘preventive consensus’ harder to 
obtain. Telling Europeans “just wait and see, you’ll love the outcome” is 
simply not enough when the process implies highly complex cost and 
benefit offsets within countries, among countries and, indeed, over time. 
This is particularly true when the stakes involve decision-making 
processes, the outer limits of which cannot be foreseen – no more than their 
end-points and thereby the full extent of their consequences: such decision-
making processes, insofar as they are not devised for a single and specific 
project, tend to involve delegations of political sovereignty that are both 
broad and vague.  
And thus the issue of consensus has become overlaid with that of 
Europe’s democratic deficit, i.e. the lack of popular involvement and 
control that is notoriously the mark of decision-making processes within 
European institutions. Public opinion detachment has been linked to the 
issue of remove between citizens and European decisions. According to this 
interpretation, a dwindling consensus on things European corresponds to a 
demand for more democracy on the part of public opinion – handling this 
demand properly, through the appropriate institutions, would be the only 
way to grant legitimacy to European decisions.  
Sounds convincing. But it isn’t. Had this really been the case, had the 
low level of citizen support stemmed from citizens’ frustration with their 
modest involvement in democratic decision-making processes, with the PARTISAN PROTECTIONISM | 11 
 
limited openings granted them to exercise control and demand 
accountability, why did the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty 
fail when submitted to a popular vote in both France and the Netherlands 
and that of the Treaty of Lisbon more recently in Ireland? Both documents 
provided for more democratic decision-making, and one would have 
expected that European citizens would have been very approving of a 
fairly ambitious attempt at containing Europe’s democratic deficit. 
In other words, either the constitutional draft was actually not 
ambitious enough, or clearly the overlay of consensus and democratic 
deficit-based explanations doesn’t do the trick. As shown – in the negative 
– by the drop in voter turnout in elections to the European Parliament, for 
an institutional and political organisation to elicit broader popular 
consensus, institutional forms or structures are just not enough. Channels 
through which consensus can mature – typically within a domestic context 
– must find an effective way of entering into dialogue with channels used 
for European deliberations. And for this to happen domestic policies must 
absolutely be consistent with European policies. Therefore the channels 
linking domestic public opinion to government-level policy decisions and 
European policy need to be watched closely, and no sweeping conclusions 
drawn.  
A number of generic explanations have been put forth that aim to 
describe the consensus hiatus, which appeared between 1991 and 1997. A 
non-comprehensive list would include, indicatively, the following standard 
motivations: the relinquishing of too much sovereignty, Brussels’ low 
legitimacy, less advantageous trade-offs between political autonomy, social 
identity and economic benefits, the rise of localist movements in the face of 
globalisation and the crisis experienced by ideological families in the wake 
of the collapse of communism. All of these are plausible explanations. But 
taken separately, or in the absence of a broader model that would lend 
them consistency, they do not shed much light on the dilemma. In 
practically all cases, they even appear to contradict one another: the 
relinquishing of sovereignty was perhaps somewhat excessive, and yet 
surveys show that citizens would be willing to accept even more in specific 
fields such as foreign or security policy; Brussels does not appear to have 
much legitimacy, but the citizens of some countries refuse to accept deeper 
or more democratic political institutions; localist movements are now 
waning in most countries; the ideological crisis has not benefited the 
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explanations of the 1992-97 crisis, therefore, appear to be impressionistic in 
nature, and therefore are unsuitable for further analysis.  
The point I wish to make here is that the crisis in consensus primarily 
concerns domestic politics. And that in particular it has to do with the 
quality of public discourse, which to this day is still dominated by 20th 
century ideological categories in its upholding of the left/right divide as a 
leading, polarising criterion. Crossing this left/right opposition with 
another highly significant polarisation – that between closure to the outside 
world and openness – allows for descriptions of national politics in a 
context that highlights the global opening of European economies.  
To the opening of societies and economies, domestic politics both left 
and right have responded according to a criterion that I call ‘partisan 
protectionism’, which in other words protects nothing but their basic 
constituencies in accordance with the ideological habits of the 20th century 
(with the right wing endorsing capital, and the left, labour) and opens up 
(i.e. exposes to global competition or to European integration) the rest of 
society, i.e. the political opposition’s constituency. Against this backdrop – 
and it is no accident that the crisis in consensus should have occurred 
precisely between 1991 and 1998 – the euro proved to be the factor that 
revealed the inconsistencies of politics inspired by partisan protectionism. 
Because the euro did render inconsistent domestic policies anchored in the 
ideological rhetoric of the 20th century and, absent a response, a political 
vision consistent with openness, it eroded citizens’ general trust in politics.  
Partisan protectionism, in its defensive side, has been evident even in 
the public responses to the crisis. French right-wing government has 
supported businesses twice as much as jobs. British left-wing government 
has supported households three times more than firms. Germany’s Grand 
Coalition has distributed public monies almost evenly between households 
(55%) and firms (45%). Once taken account of fiscal effects, the Italian right-
wing government has supported firms more than jobs, and the Spanish left-
wing government has protected jobs more than firms (excluding the hard-
hit real estate and banking sectors).1  
As long as partisan constituency protectionism continues to inspire 
national policies in their day-to-day grammar, European principles of 
openness and shared government will not find favour at the domestic level. 
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On the contrary, their hostility to citizens’ interests will be underscored. 
Demands for constituency-based political innovation will rise, in particular 
with the challenge of aging and managing healthcare systems, and this will 
call into question the universal rights that are at the very root of European 
feelings of equality and social identity that generated forms of ‘social 
patriotism’ in Europe after the war, when any other national feelings 
seemed unacceptable. In the absence of a political vision that can tackle not 
so much the opposition between state and market, but rather their 
cooperation, there will be no developing of either ‘open’ policies (unlinked 
to national borders) or efficient public responses. To sum up: protectionist 
and populist behaviour on the part of national political establishments – 
driven by the cultural legacies that have precluded coming to terms with 
the openness of global society – has eroded the pro-European consensus 
and may jeopardise the ultimate survival of the very project.  
2.  A crisis in politics 
Even when European public opinion was at its most detached vis-à-vis the 
European Union and its plans for the future, Eurobarometer surveys 
continued to indicate that the crisis in consensus concerned domestic 
politics and institutions just as much as it did their European equivalents. 
The surveys showed that European citizens ascribed to their national 
governments and parliaments both more reliability, in terms of defending 
their interests (protection function) and more unreliability with 
discrimination being a risk: quite what one would expect when 
constituency protectionism prevails, as it posits that national governments 
do represent protection, but only for part of the country’s voters.  
Regarding national institutions, governments and parliaments, 
citizens expressing distrust have always outnumbered those expressing 
trust, whereas the opposite prevails when the same questions are asked 
with respect to the European Commission and Parliament. The greater 
degree of distrust shown for national institutions as compared to their 
European equivalents is self-evident and well known among various 
observers of all things European. Vivien Schmidt (2006) thus observes: 
“The institutional reforms envisioned in the Treaty could indeed have gone 
some way toward reducing the perceived problems of EU democracy. But 
they would not in any case have solved the real problem of democracy in 
the EU: the democratic deficit at national level.” She considers that 
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further points out, incisively, that a “policy without politics” system has 
emerged at the European level while a “politics without policies” system 
prevails nationally. This, she feels, has led to disaffected voters and 
political extremism in member states. As the Constitutional Treaty aimed 
precisely to reconnect at least in part politics and policies, the ratification 
process failure may show that resistance to the idea of reconciling public 
opinion with European politics lies precisely at the political level and 
therefore at the level at which, domestically, public opinion is formed. 
It is very often posited that in societies as complex as ours, citizens’ 
political choices no longer correspond to simple left-right divides. In actual 
fact, ever since the 1950s, these categories have been viewed as 
decreasingly relevant. Nevertheless these two flexible and dialectic poles 
continue to inform the traditional choices that determine incentives and 
punishment for national governments. Citizens quite deliberately use 
constituency politics categories when bestowing or removing their consent 
where it matters most, i.e. in domestic political competitions.  
And in actual fact, focusing on leading European Union democracies 
in the 1990s and the early years of the current decade, the passé concepts of 
right and left do provide us with a powerful key to understand 
constituency-protectionist politics and its consequences. In France, 
Germany, Italy and other countries as well, economic policies have 
highlighted the differences in stances taken by right- and left-wing 
governments. To simplify matters to a fault, the former have privileged 
labour market liberalisation while protecting the ownership of capital, and 
the latter have privileged financial market liberalisation while protecting 
labour markets. In simple terms, this is partisan protectionism.  
In the years just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the right- and left-
wing continued to identify with capital and labour, i.e. the conventional 
socio-economic categories of ideological face-off politics. French 
privatisations were thus launched by Balladur’s conservative government, 
which upheld golden share control by entrepreneurs with the right 
personal and political connections, while Jospin’s socialist government 
went on to privatise capital through a stock exchange reform that impacted 
corporate governance and stressed the need for transparency in asset 
ownership. Similarly, in Germany, Helmut Kohl’s conservative 
government launched a financial market reform, but protective networks, 
the real hallmark of German relational capitalism, were dismantled by 
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a left-wing government privatising and overhauling the tenets of corporate 
governance while the right-wing government that took over from it put an 
end to privatisations and market liberalisation, increasing the protective 
opaqueness of proprietary asset markets by passing legislation that 
favoured false accounting. The converse occurred regarding labour market 
reform: left-wing governments strengthened, in relative terms, labour 
protection and trade unions’ protective role while right-wing governments, 
on the whole, attempted labour market liberalisation. In France, for 
instance, the 35-hour work week legislation adopted by left-wing 
governments has been eroded by right-wing governments introducing 
flexibility in starter job contracts and more recently still, in tax regimes 
applicable to overtime, not to mention limitations on trade union rights to 
strike in public services (also known as the ‘service minimum’); in Italy, 
following the Treu reforms adopted by a left-wing government, the so-
called ‘Biagi legislation’ proved to be a battle-horse for the centre-right 
government and its amendment or repeal is the focus of conflict, within the 
left-wing, between reformists and radicals. In Germany, labour market 
reform was initially planned, albeit somewhat reluctantly, by the Kohl 
government, but it had to wait six years and a 60% increase in the 
unemployment rate to actually wend its way onto the political agenda of 
the centre-left. Currently France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy implemented 
explicitly right-wing protectionist policies: liberalising labour markets 
while protecting capital and national champions, and going so far as to de-
penalise corporate crime. Consistently, Sarkozy is opposed to granting 
European antitrust policies constitutional status, wishes to limit ECB 
autonomy and temper common trade policy. Looking into individual 
economic policy measures clearly yields a more subtle picture, but partisan 
protectionism remains fairly prevalent in the rhetoric of both right- and 
left-wing European politics: the left tends to protect labour and open up 
corporate equity and capital markets, while the right tends to do the 
opposite. 
With the opening of national borders to the global economy, national 
governments soon realised that opting for isolation vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world, and closing up borders, was impossible or in any event, 
counterproductive. The sophisticated response has been to protect on a 
priority basis only those segments of the economy in which vested 
constituency-based interests lie, while opening up the rest of the economy 
to the pressures of globalisation and making them bear the brunt of the 
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back to traditional 20th century categories: capital for the right, labour for 
the left.  
Partisan protectionism is at the root of a whole set of political 
paradoxes that have generated distrust of politics. By engaging in 
constituency protectionism, left-wing politics thus obtains right-wing 
results (insofar as exposing capital to competition increases its relative 
productivity as compared to that of labour) and vice versa; strengthens 
ideological confrontation (to the extent that only one voting constituency is 
made to bear the brunt of adjustment, political confrontation is 
exacerbated); challenges the credibility of politics (with one production 
factor flexible and the other rigid, the economy is bound to operate sub-
optimally); strengthens the rhetoric of isolation (as adjustment to the outer 
w o r l d  i s  e n t i r e l y  m a d e  t o  w e i g h  o n  o n e  p a r t  o f  s o c i e t y ) ;  f a v o u r s  n o n -
political solutions (with the politically disfavoured production factor going 
for either the ‘black’ economy or tax evasion) or solutions that are not 
constituency-based (centrist or broad coalition governments that aim for 
protection rather than for openness); all of which encourages the rhetoric of 
isolation or of ‘domestic’ (in actual fact, constituency-based) interest 
protection, whereas policies could be embraced that aim to open up the 
economy. 
Clearly, constituency-based protectionism stands opposed to the 
policies of openness that mark European integration and can therefore only 
make further inroads as support for Europe flags.  
3.  The euro as trigger – two examples: Germany and Italy 
It is no accident that constituency protectionism emerged in the 1990s and 
more specifically between 1991 and 1998, as ideological confrontation 
rhetoric and trust in politics were then made inconsistent by the advent of 
the euro.  
Prior to the liberalisation of capital flows, political comparisons in 
terms of income distribution were not really telling. Up until the early 
1980s, small to medium economies with their own currencies, operating 
under limited capital flow regimes (‘closed economies’ for the sake of 
keeping things simple) could singly determine economic policies favouring 
either capital (in line with preferences voiced by right-wing voters) or 
labour (in the case of left-wing governments), knowing that the benefits 
directly deriving from such political decisions would be redistributed 
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right-wing policies would probably primarily benefit capitalists’ profits, 
inter alia through lower capital taxation. But favouring return on 
investment also implies increasing the supply of investment, which in a 
closed economy in turn generates an increase in labour demand and, 
assuming production factor immobility, a subsequent increase in wage 
levels and increased income including for those who are not capitalists. 
Left-wing governments would probably adopt a different tack, supporting 
employment or wage levels, stimulating demand for consumer goods 
through increased household incentives, thereby laying the ground for 
increased yields on corporate productive investment. Setting aside for the 
moment business cycle issues, and thus remaining in a static medium-term 
world – a radical assumption that is nevertheless realistic in politicians’ 
timelines – as well as the vigorous rhetoric of ideological confrontation, in 
terms of both income redistribution effects and the boost to growth, left- or 
right-wing policies would thus most likely be quite similar (ruling out 
radically anti-capitalist or anti-democratic policies). And should we assume 
– more realistically – a dynamic equilibrium in a quasi-closed economy, i.e. 
the typical position of European countries in the 1970s, conclusions would 
hardly differ. Poor resource allocation among domestic production factors 
would lead to balance of payments imbalances, which could in turn be 
remedied through monetary or exchange rate policies.  
The economy’s quasi-indifference to constituency-based policies has 
been acknowledged by analysts focusing on country performance as 
viewed via ‘domestic models’ centred on labour market institutions, rather 
than via policies specifically determined by the requirements of given 
political constituencies. This quasi-indifference assumption is a radical 
critique of conventional political analysis, which considers the rhetoric of 
right- and left-wing dialectics as an a priori significant interpretative key, 
because of values-related differences. In the real world, however, a quasi-
indifference context presents parties with prime ‘moral hazard’ conditions, 
through which they can exercise radical dialectics as well as indulge in 
ideological proselytism, without in the end having to fear the consequences 
of their own economic policies, the potential inefficiencies of which can, if 
necessary, be offset through exchange rate-mediated balance of payments 
adjustments.  
In this framework, monetary policy instruments clearly play a central 
role. Nearly all payments imbalances generated by poor, politically-biased, 
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changes. And in some countries, exchange rate policies did indeed become 
the cornerstones of public policy.  
Two countries – Italy and Germany – are emblematic of this centrality 
of exchange rate policies in the 1970s and 1980s, despite radical differences 
in their respective monetary philosophies.  
Italy’s recurrent devaluations helped the country rebuild a 
competitive edge eroded by constituency-based agreements – whether 
capital subsidisation or labour protection – entered into by governments 
and social partners primarily to defuse domestic social conflict and 
manufacture artificial political consent.  
Germany, conversely, acknowledged that its central bank – the 
Bundesbank – was a fully independent monetary authority. While formally 
keeping a distance from the political fray, the Bundesbank in actual fact did 
interfere directly in capital-labour relationships. The German central bank 
was indeed ready to pre-empt all trade union wage hike claims that might 
have proved excessive in the light of its very restrictive inflation targeting 
through interest rate increases feeding into exchange rate appreciation, 
money supply decline and thereby a drop – in relative terms – in the 
demand for labour. The central bank played a crucial political role – rightly 
so from the point of view of Ordnungspolitik, to use the Freiburg definition – 
each and every time the balance of income distribution between wages and 
profits tended to generate inflation, or a balance of payments deficit. The 
very attractiveness of the D-mark as an investment currency helped keep 
investment flows within Germany’s borders (in a financially effective form 
of ‘competitive revaluation’, as opposed to trade-effective ‘competitive 
devaluations’).  
Both Italy and Germany’s institutional set-ups, with central banks 
operating under different mandates, provided political groupings with the 
opportunity to engage in hard-edged rhetorical confrontation, without ever 
really going for conflict: whenever conflicts between capital and labour 
would generate inefficient economic policy ‘fits’, and therefore current 
account imbalances, the exchange rate would appreciate or depreciate, 
resetting the system to the same initial conditions for political confrontation 
on income distribution. The vibrant rhetoric of political and social conflict 
was therefore to a large extent all talk. In the years that preceded capital 
flow liberalisation, ideological confrontation may have appeared to raise 
life and death issues – in practice it was largely neutralised by foreign 
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With the adoption of the euro, exchange rate policies ceased to be an 
option. Biased decisions in terms of income allocation to capital or labour, 
generating payments imbalances, are no longer inevitably offset through 
currency management in the framework of a closed economy. On the 
contrary, in open economies with no control over exchange rates, worse 
case scenarios – where a given government adopts the wrong economic 
policies – lead to forms of factor mobility that penalise the least mobile 
factor, generally labour; best case scenarios – where political decisions are 
cogent with the development of an open economy – lead to situations 
where the relative advantage enjoyed by one production factor does not 
necessarily generate medium-term adjustment in favour also of the other. 
In an open economy, political decisions that favour one factor have more 
durable and imbalanced an impact than would be the case in a closed 
economy.  
We tend to assume that we live in a post-ideological world, and that 
we are therefore sheltered from political conflict, whereas the conflicts 
implicit in right and left-wing policy decisions (both on the supply and the 
demand side) are far more loaded in terms of sustained consequences on 
equity today than was the case in the age of ideological confrontation. 
Protecting the interests of voter constituencies has taken on a much more 
concrete meaning, and has become more effective from the point of view of 
both distribution and advocacy for constituency-based policies. In other 
words, the adoption of the euro did mark the blossoming of partisan 
protectionism into an attractive electoral strategy for national politics, 
w h i l e  i t  p r o v e d  n e g a t i v e  i n  t e r m s  o f  c o n s e n t  a n d  s u p p o r t  f o r  E u r o p e ,  
insofar as it opposed the protective effectiveness of domestic policies to the 
claims to openness voiced by Europe.  
4.  Protection versus protectionism  
We have just described the process by which the link between the euro and 
national political strategies gave rise both to constituency protectionism 
and a drop in support for the European Union (obviously, not only did 
those countries that joined the eurozone renounce autonomous monetary 
policy, but all of them did). Synchronicity with the crisis in support 
revealed by surveys is self-evident.  
But can’t constituency-based policies ever have protective features? 
This is a legitimate question that nevertheless requires moving away from 
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are highly dynamic and changing, upholding the interests of a given 
constituency does not necessarily correspond to specific allocative or 
distributive policies regarding production factors. Political splits are more 
often reflected in differing formulas and weights regarding equal 
opportunities, workers’ participation in management, human capital 
investment, etc., or whether state or markets should be favoured in order to 
achieve goals of equity.  
During the initial phases of globalisation, major episodes of domestic 
economy overhaul tended to coincide with forms of economic structural 
modernisation that concerned both capital and labour markets. Margaret 
Thatcher has gone down in history for having done away with the control 
previously exercised by trade unions over British industry, but an equally 
important achievement was the renewed dynamism in capital markets, 
which opened up corporate ownership and shareholding. More recently 
the overhaul of the German economy has gone through two phases: first 
the reform of capitalism, which occurred partly spontaneously, partly 
through corporate governance reforms, and secondly, with the Agenda 
2010 reforms, which removed a number of rigidities in labour market 
regulation as well. Some economists have claimed that in order to be 
effective, product market liberalisation requires labour market 
liberalisation. Although the rule is not very well defined, non-constituency-
based economic reform (at least in the 20th century acceptance of these 
terms) does appear to be effective.  
As societies evolve towards knowledge economies, with service 
sector development and increasing dismantlement of borders in terms both 
of corporate ownership and production processes – with recent business 
theories talking of globally distributed tasks with no regard for the local 
production processes that used to ground specificity, as well as regional 
and community politics – we increasingly need a societal description that 
will not fragment around age-old splits between labour and capital: a 
society we could deem, for simplicity’s sake, an open society. In open 
societies within a globalised economy, constituency protectionism has even 
less of a functional rationale than it did before.  
Overcoming the reservations of the electoral interests/protection 
structures connection therefore requires one to spell out the true benefits to 
be derived from an open economy. If the European Union manages to 
convince voters in its member states of the political advantages and 
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the process to repair the damage that has proved so detrimental to its 
future – but this will however not happen without the input of national 
policies. Domestic constituency-based political strategies need to focus on 
investing in human capital – according to different modalities, with 
different roles bestowed on public and private sectors depending on 
individual ideological preferences – and on making the most of global 
opportunities to date unconfined by domestic borders, so as to trigger a 
race towards controlled openness. Economic benefits, openness, joint 
government could thus become the terms of a new virtuous circle.  
The whole issue of protecting citizens against economic and social 
risk cannot be swept under the carpet simply by passing negative judgment 
on protectionism, which uses it to manipulate matters politically. We 
would rather view support for the European Union as the outcome of a 
linear process: as economies become ever more open, innovation and 
productivity increase, and in turn generate jobs and prosperity which in 
turn elicit support in citizens both for national governments and for 
European institutions. This approach is reflected in the very history of 
European integration and the specific technical and economic ‘vehicles’ 
that have guaranteed its progress. In recent years, however, it has become 
ever clearer that the logical sequencing mentioned above – openness, 
reform, economic success, political support – does not correspond to the 
way most Europeans think. To quote Liddle & Lerais (2007), “the citizens of 
our countries think that globalisation, market liberalisation and the 
constant quest for competitive advantages are at least as much a threat as a 
cure”. Citizens want some sort of risk insurance and failing this, the 
demand for protectionism will continue to rise. Globalisation is the 
reference framework within which the new finalities of the European 
Union must be defined. In the face of emerging new economic powers, of 
open borders, of major global phenomena – from climate change to 
terrorism – the European Union is positing itself as an institutional 
framework where demands for openness must adequately be met, 
alongside demands for security. Should this not happen, constituency 
protectionism shall prevail domestically, and support for the EU will 
decline. We may pretend that the need for security isn’t there, but 
whenever European voters have their say we shall see that this ‘perverted’, 
obsessive search for protection does indeed exist.  
Guaranteeing openness, while providing some form of security, 
assumes the ability to govern: the ability responsibly to reach decisions on 
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or, for those who doubt that there are such trade-offs, between short-term 
insecurity and long-term growth. This inter-temporal bridging function 
also assumes the ability to govern, be it only because there is no systematic 
synchronicity between power and responsibility. It is no wonder that a 
significant number of European citizens feel that in the face of economic 
globalisation, their request for security has remained unanswered by the 
European Union. The Union, insofar as it has only integrated markets, is in 
fact perceived on a par with globalisation: that is, first and foremost, as an 
unaccountable player in the openness policy. Leaving aside a number of 
dubious initiatives such as the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 
(EGF), to date its political response to the request for security has been to 
state that the issue was not its concern, and that all it could do was wait for 
the restructuring of European economies to yield economic dividends to 
the public at large.  
Feelings of insecurity have further grown as other significant events 
have highlighted that the European Union is very often at loggerheads with 
member states when it comes to economic coordination. The need to 
engage in the structural reform of domestic economic systems has in fact 
coincided with fiscal consolidation in almost all member states, giving rise 
to financial re-balancing processes that have often proved painful and with 
no end in sight, and that have thus increased citizens’ feelings of utter 
isolation in the face of the costs of globalisation. Rationales for fiscal 
consolidation include aspects of relevance to citizen support: the need for 
long-term sustainability as populations age (which is tantamount to 
securing welfare systems); a clearly defined efficiency requirement applied 
to the use of public monies; and a preference for lower tax burdens in view 
of the increased heterogeneity of our societies. But insofar as this process 
has coincided with the single (global) market’s initial economic pressures, it 
has amplified contradictions between resource redistribution required 
locally for fiscal consolidation, and resource redistribution required by the 
opening up of our economies – which is now eliciting much (politically 
expressed) vexation.  
Faced with the social costs of economic change and financial 
consolidation, individual member states and the European Union have 
often adopted opposing attitudes vis-à-vis citizens. Domestically, citizens 
have two basic references – their welfare systems and their protection (or 
closed economy) requirements, which they put to political parties as 
markets open up, and liberalisation proceeds apace. At the European level, 
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requirements that are the very opposite of citizens’ protection requirements 
– are written into the very history of the Union. The EU has accrued long 
experience in coming to terms with issues of openness and challenges 
posed by structural reform. From the common to the single market, and 
then on to monetary union and the Lisbon agenda, the European Union has 
strengthened the dynamic vectors of border dismantlement and economic 
restructuring. And the same has obtained for fiscal consolidation: stability 
and fiscal discipline, convergence criteria, the Growth and Stability Pact all 
go to show European citizens that the political language of globalisation 
resides in Brussels, and not in their own national capitals and that 
moreover, this language is far removed from their possible control. 
However legitimate may be the criticism levelled against some national 
governments who indulge in ‘Europe-bashing’, one must acknowledge that 
a number of structural reasons do explain the fact that in the absence of a 
genuine ability to govern on the part of Brussels and therefore of an ability 
to promote both openness and security – citizens’ dissatisfaction vis-à-vis 
uncontrollable social phenomena will quite naturally target the European 
Union. 
It is therefore clear that in order not to fuel demand for protectionism, 
attention must be paid to this demand for protection: and thus forms of risk 
insurance must be provided that cover, first of all, the future of the welfare 
state. Because in the end, uncertainties in this respect may well explain the 
failure of so many polls on European issues. 
5.  Welfare 
Thinking about the future of the welfare state in Europe requires a dynamic 
approach. It so happens that the factor that defines the priority ranking of 
the European social state is dynamic, including its productive structure, 
savings parameters and aggregate demand features. Clearly my reference 
here is to population aging, with its weighty consequences in terms of 
pensions and healthcare spending. According to UN data, people aged 65 
and over will account for more than a quarter of the total population in 
2030, as against 8% in 1950 and 14% in 2000. Population aging has a 
dramatic impact on financing schemes based on workers’ contributions. In 
some European countries, such as Italy and Spain, the dependency rate of 
retirees vis-à-vis workers is going to double in less than 50 years, growing 
in Italy from 27.9% in 2000 (26% in Spain) to 64.5% in 2050 (63.5% in Spain). 
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issue of pension scheme funding. Starting off with incremental corrections 
that slightly altered or somewhat tightened pension scheme parameters, 
reforms then focused on structural features including entitlements, 
indexation rules and retirement age. Currently, official EU forecasts for 
some countries point to dramatic growth in the impact of pension-related 
payments on public spending. In Spain, estimates point to a quasi-
doubling, from 9.4% of GDP to 17.7%. Budgets will also have to contend 
with other increases in spending stemming from aging-related social 
programmes. According to estimates, the comprehensive increase is likely 
to total 3% to 10% of GDP, depending on welfare provisions and 
demographics. These fiscal consequences clearly show that unless 
measures are taken in time, the situation may well become politically 
untenable. As we know, within aging societies, voters’ interests tend to 
increase the political cost of reform. Under the circumstances the issue of 
political compatibility between European economic, monetary and fiscal 
integration on the one hand, and the political and social sensitivities 
expressed at the domestic level on the other, must thus once again be 
addressed. One can easily envision domestic political costs being shifted to 
Europe. A risk that may however conceal an opportunity: couldn’t 
European integration help member states safeguard welfare state equilibria, 
while strengthening citizens’ trust in Europe?  
Regarding the future of welfare systems there are at least three 
different possible outcomes, depending on the scope and quality of 
political initiative assigned to supranational bodies. The first is a European 
welfare system, modelled on national systems, administered by a 
continent-wide bureaucracy. The second is a system where national welfare 
schemes are not connected to European institutions, as these are not 
deemed to have any right to interfere in the social risk insurance models 
chosen by individual member states. The third is a regulated market for 
welfare schemes, where individual countries guarantee the universal 
coverage of their citizens at levels determined through regulation and 
redistribution, but where service provision by entities of all countries, both 
public and private, is allowed.  
The first of these possible outcomes is not popular and governments 
advocating such a way forward would be headed towards political suicide. 
Delegating part of the responsibility for pension scheme management to a 
supranational institution such as the European Commission might help 
individual states reduce the political cost of reform, but would increase 
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support for further European-level reform. The second outcome 
corresponds to the ‘separate track’ approach adopted so far. When the 
integration project was first launched in the 1950s, federalist discourse 
highlighting an ‘ever closer to citizens’ stance and various functional spill-
overs was underpinned by the idea that the European Community should 
focus on opening markets in economic terms, while individual states 
retained control over welfare and social solidarity schemes. Starting in the 
1980s this division of labour became somewhat unrealistic and with 
monetary union it has become downright counterproductive. To echo 
Ferrera (2006), insulating national welfare schemes from the dynamics of 
economic integration and supranational interference has long since ceased 
to be possible. This means that one should look into the third possible 
outcome, the only one that is both “realistic and European” (a point 
comprehensively addressed by Gareth Davies (2006): a European-wide 
regulated market for welfare services that would recognisably propose the 
European Union’s social model, leaving the first pillar – which remains 
symbolically so important to national identity – under national jurisdiction, 
albeit within a European coordination and control framework, while 
developing a second pillar through a truly integrated market for voluntary 
pension schemes and supplemental health care coverage, eliciting public 
and private supply of increasingly efficient services, disconnected from 
territorial origin.  
There are many forces driving market-based harmonisation of 
European welfare systems and in particular focusing on provision of 
services by both public and private players. The first has to do with the 
quest for more efficiency in public spending and is linked to citizens’ tax 
preferences as well as to the need for effective public support at a time 
when private sectors are undergoing intense restructuring. Further impetus 
stems from economic coordination at the European level with a view to 
achieving greater convergence in public spending at least in terms of public 
policy stability and, to a lesser extent, quality. Another force has to do with 
‘negative’ integration (i.e. the elimination of national protection) spurred by 
European jurisdictions wherever public services, because of their economic 
nature, come under European freedom of movement legislation, despite the 
well-known distinctions set forth in the Bolkestein Directive regarding 
welfare service liberalisation, in particular with respect to healthcare, but 
also more broadly to services targeting social objectives or presenting 
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The trend towards privatisation of a significant part of national 
welfare schemes can contribute to the harmonisation of European social 
assistance services insofar as private providers of welfare services, such as 
a German hospital, a British university or a Dutch pension fund, can 
provide similar services in a variety of different countries. These trends 
further reflect a number of other developments linked to the 
dismantlement of state economic monopolies, which has led both to an 
increase in the numbers of providers of public services and to a 
diversification in terms of quality. Thus, while continuing to uphold the 
right of all citizens to welfare coverage, an increasing number of countries 
handle health insurance and pension schemes through private providers; 
the privatisation process stems from the need for more rigor, and therefore 
more cost control in public spending. With public and private providers 
working in parallel, the former are encouraged to be more efficient, which 
corresponds to a general request on the part of public opinion. Finally, 
private providers, which are often able to break down the actual cost of 
services, allow for greater user choice.  
The European Court of Justice has considered healthcare systems to 
be an ‘economic activity’, while it has refused similarly to define higher 
education as such. But if welfare services are considered to be an economic 
activity, one can hardly shield them from the freedom of circulation of 
services rule that in practice voids the nationality requirement for both 
providers and users of such services. The real obstacle to European action 
favouring welfare system integration lies therefore not in the European 
Union’s history nor in its current legislation, but in an absolute lack of 
political will.  
In discussions on the Bolkestein Directive, which liberalises markets 
for services, the idea of including healthcare services met with quite 
considerable resistance, despite the fact that the Court had deemed them to 
be an economic activity. There appears to be considerable resolve on the 
part of both governments and citizens to retain control over individual 
welfare systems, regardless of the clear efficiency gains that might derive 
from a broader market, more specialised providers and quality controls 
that would prove efficient even vis-à-vis state monopolies.  
That said, welfare systems are one of the few fields addressed by 
politics in which each and every citizen has a concrete, direct and personal 
interest. It is quite understandable that citizens should wish to retain 
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nature, efficiency and accountability of which they only dimly see. 
Resistance on the part of national political establishments, fearful of losing 
the power and influence they currently wield, is even stronger. This means 
that politically, no proposal to engage in positive welfare system 
harmonisation is likely to come forward, which paradoxically has the effect 
that markets will be left free to circumvent the regulatory obstacles defined 
by individual member states. Lack of governance or direction thus often 
leads to situations where citizens increasingly distrust politics and 
globalisation. Unregulated welfare service provision does not however 
guarantee that the solidarity dimension of current systems will be carried 
over, regardless of the significance of this dimension within citizens’ more 
general request for security. The provision of private services of differing 
qualities actually tends to drive a wedge into the quality of social services 
on offer, but because of correlations between homogeneity and public 
solidarity, increased heterogeneity may transform the reasons for which 
citizens typically support European forms of solidarity. For changes to 
welfare systems – required to make them sustainable, efficient and ‘open’ –
to be politically neutral, these changes must be governed and steered, and 
part of the political responsibility for this – even if only regulating private, 
non-national welfare service providers – shall inevitably behove European 
institutions.  
In order to be credible in taking this responsibility over from 
individual member states, European institutions cannot avoid engaging in 
some serious thinking on how they themselves view individuals and 
societies. This is a difficult and demanding task, and it is no accident that to 
date it has failed to achieve one of its primary goals: laying constitutional 
ground for the whole structure. Positing a European welfare model based 
on regulated market services, rather than proposing a simple state model 
with monopoly over user choice, implies that European institutions have to 
become providers not only of rules and controls, but also of safeguards 
regarding citizens’ freedom to choose.  
According to Ferrera (2006), realistic approaches to the reconciliation 
of economic reform and social stability require political innovation to be 
even more structured at the common level, and demand that domestic 
welfare systems be slotted into a framework that currently lacks a multi-
level European area of citizenship, on the basis of a joint catalogue of basic 
civil, political and social rights, including a European safeguard in terms of 
minimum (or sufficient) resources that could possibly be financed directly 
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dimension of European citizenship could open avenues to pilot initiatives 
aiming to address specific societal problems in Europe: combating youth 
poverty, setting up loan systems for higher education funding, supporting 
single mothers, easing cross-border mobility.  
6.  Beyond partisan protectionism  
The framework described above assumes the ability to develop a new 
political vision that can focus on long-term goals, renounce 20th century 
social categories and encourage the opening up of a European welfare 
services market through state and market cooperation. This political 
initiative is consistent at the European level, but less so nationally. In order 
to respond to requests for innovation and political initiative, both relevant 
and accountable, a European space has to be opened up to political parties, 
so that they may reformulate their programmes at the European level in a 
consistent manner, and ultimately internalise goals of openness and inter-
temporal consistency in their domestic programmes as well.  
The fact that the European Union is still basically inter-governmental 
fuels interest in heterogeneity and keeps European parties from having a 
clear agenda. National parties that have regrouped at the European level all 
know that their preferences – and those of their voters – are essentially 
upheld by their co-nationals, regardless of party affiliation, more so than by 
their own political allies in other countries.  
The functional and segmented nature of jurisdiction within the 
European Union is one of the factors currently hindering the development 
of European parties. Such parties, insofar as they are general players, put 
forth broad visions of society that connect a variety of different interests 
and different areas of activity, and that therefore do not lend themselves 
readily to the functional nature of European initiatives. That said, when 
addressing the issue of European welfare systems, broader social visions 
are difficult to avoid. Empirical surveys have furthermore shown that 
citizen and party positions on Europe are not only determined by national 
origin, but that a form of ideological polarisation is on the rise around left- 
and right-wing lines that is not being expressed directly through 
conventional opposition between capital and labour, but upstream from 
that, as openness versus protection. Analysing voting patterns in the 
European Parliament shows that it is the opposition between ‘regulators’ 
and ‘open market supporters’ that has determined the outcome of many a 
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Integrated welfare systems require that a proper state-market mix be 
defined. This mix must be non-ideological, despite the fact that state and 
market have for decades now been the focus of ideological confrontation. 
Building a welfare service market with publicly set goals and regulations 
therefore needs to involve all major parties represented in the European 
Parliament.  
This process must start at the national political level. Earlier in this 
chapter, I posited the view that national politics, which currently play a 
determining role in the generation of citizen support for the European 
Union, are conditioned by a specific operating principle that I have called 
‘partisan protectionism’. Within this principle, the right and left can be 
distinguished from one another by the fact that they protect capital and 
labour respectively – and therefore resist openness – while exposing the 
other production factor to external competition. Careful reading of the 
positions put forth by national governments in discussions on Europe, and 
more importantly still, of the policy stances they uphold on their own 
ground, that of national parliamentary debate, illustrates the explanatory 
powers of this partisan protectionism concept, which is in fact the coming 
together of the two forms of political polarisation we observe today: the 
coming together of demands for closure as opposed to openness, and 
demands for left-right polarisation. The political maturity required to 
overcome constituency protectionism has to do with how both right and 
left define their positions. More specifically, it has to do with the fact that 
the left needs to define itself as the political power upholding an open 
welfare service provision and labour market operation model – rather than 
express protective functions solely in terms of closed economies and 
markets, while the right needs quite as provocatively to open up capital 
markets to competition. It is only through an opening up of welfare 
provision to private market players that the left will prove able to save the 
social state. Just as exposing corporations to competition is the only way 
the right can guarantee that nationality doesn’t become an obstacle. And it 
is only through the joint contribution of both left and right thus defined 
that an effective and non-national welfare provision system may emerge.  
I am basically convinced that it behoves left- and right-wing 
politicians with a vision to formulate social programmes that provide for 
welfare system reform and the comprehensive opening of capital markets 
so that state and market can work together, each serving the other, and 
then resume confrontation, without antiquated diversions, as to what 
European citizens want in terms of equity or individual freedoms.  30 | CARLO BASTASIN 
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3.  A MORE SOCIAL EU: 
ISSUES OF WHERE AND HOW 
MAURIZIO FERRERA & STEFANO SACCHI* 
Introduction 
Over the last few years, the two enlargements and the three referenda on 
new treaty texts have prompted a far-reaching debate on social Europe. To 
a large extent this debate has focused on the problems and prospects of 
national welfare regimes: their persistent difficulties, their comparative 
performance and their reform trajectories. But discussion has also focused, 
at least in part, on the social dimension of the EU proper: on what might be 
called the ‘social EU’. 
This chapter explores this second topic, the social dimension of the 
European Union as a political entity in its own right. In the process, we 
shall try to answer two sensitive questions: 
Do we need a more social EU, that is, to engage in more 
supranational activism in the social sphere? 
And if so, why and how? 
1.  The need for a more social European Union 
Our answer to that first question is straightforward: yes, we do need a 
more social EU. We believe this to be the case for three broad reasons: the 
first has to do with social justice, the second with economic efficiency and 
the last with the legitimacy of the EU polity and its ability to command 
widespread positive support among European citizens. 
                                                      
* We gratefully acknowledge research assistance by Krzysztof Nowaczek and 
warmly thank Fabrizia Peirce for her valuable help in producing the final version 
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First, we need a more social EU in order to secure a fairer, more 
equitable distribution of life chances for EU citizens, both within and 
between member states. This is the ‘social cohesion’, or ‘social justice’ 
rationale. According to the treaties, the EU has a broad mission, that of 
promoting economic and social progress (Article 2, Treaty on European 
Union). Unless one believes in a naïve version of the trickle-down effect of 
growth, the pursuit of economic prosperity through efficient and open 
markets should thus be accompanied by an agenda for social progress, 
resting on key values (such as fairness, justice or social security) that are 
widely shared and deeply rooted in Europe’s political cultures.1 While 
there can be no doubt that this agenda includes areas and policies that 
legally come under national jurisdiction, it should be equally clear that the 
EU has a role to play, both directly (by exercising its legal powers to sustain 
and complement national social justice agendas) and indirectly (by 
mainstreaming, as it were, social cohesion/justice considerations within its 
own growth and jobs agenda, more so than it seems to have done so far 
under the new Lisbon strategy). 
Second, we need a more social EU in order to improve the 
functioning of the internal market, and thus generate more growth and jobs 
(this is the ‘economic efficiency’ rationale). A wealth of political economy 
research has shown that social policies can play an important role not only 
as redistributive instruments and vehicles for social and political 
consensus, but also as ‘productive factors’. This was one of the original 
assumptions of the Lisbon strategy and the ‘modernisation’ agenda set 
forth by the European Commission in the 1990s. At the theoretical level the 
positive (i.e. efficiency-enhancing) effects of social policy can be sketched 
out relatively easily: social insurance allows for riskier educational and 
occupational choices that increase the expected lifetime income of 
individuals, regardless of the risk-taking outcome: “Under the protection of 
                                                      
1 However crude the indicator, it is telling that 17% of all European respondents 
listed the gap between the rich and the poor as one of their three main current 
concerns when offered a choice of 17 items, including pensions, terrorism, health, 
immigration, crime, the environment, globalisation and economic growth (see 
Eurobarometer, 2007b). In a more recent survey a vast majority of Europeans (87%) 
agreed on the following statement: “There should be policies ensuring that the gap 
between the rich and the poor is reduced significantly in our country” 
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the welfare state, more can be dared”, to quote Hans Werner Sinn (1995, p. 
507). At the practical level, however, identifying which policies can 
enhance productivity and competitiveness (and how exactly they do so) is a 
difficult task, as is quantifying the ‘costs of no/non-social policy’, or having 
one that is too limited, as illustrated by the ongoing debate on the actual 
effectiveness of active labour market policies. But the tasks are not per se 
impossible, and certainly such a pars construens is required (at the EU level) 
to offset the pars destruens of highlighting the negative effects that may stem 
from a status quo of social protection schemes in member states.  
Thirdly, and possibly most importantly, we need a more social EU in 
order to secure continuing support for the integration process on the part of 
an increasingly worried public (and this is the ‘social and political 
legitimacy’ rationale). Recent opinion polls have provided growing 
evidence that the EU is perceived as a potentially dangerous entity by a 
majority of its citizens, as a threat to national labour markets and social 
protection systems, as a ‘Trojan horse’ serving the malevolent interests of 
globalisation.2 Some initiatives on the part of the European Commission, 
such as the initial drafting of the Services Directive and some rulings by the 
European Court of Justice, as in the Viking, Laval and Rüffert cases, were 
received with great anxiety by large segments of the EU citizenry, 
particularly those more exposed to the consequences of economic opening. 
Mass perceptions can be factually wrong, but they do play a crucial role in 
politics. We know that post-war social protection systems and the welfare 
state have created extraordinary bonds between European citizens and 
their national institutions, bringing about a form of close allegiance, based 
on the institutionalised exchange of material benefits for electoral support. 
The EU, conversely, has been rather weak in terms of identity and 
allegiance-building. What neo-functionalist thinkers and statesmen had 
hoped for, and sometimes even forecast, never actually happened: 
European citizens have not systematically shifted their loyalties from 
domestic to supranational institutions. What binds European citizens (i.e. 
citizens of EU member states) to the EU is in fact a different kind of loyalty: 
a derived, secondary allegiance, which persists only as long the EU is 
                                                      
2 As early as 2006, over 70% of all European citizens feared that ‘the building of 
Europe’ might entail the transfer of jobs to other member countries with lower 
production costs, while 50% feared that it might entail the loss of social benefits 
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capable of providing resources to its member states, thereby reinforcing the 
direct, primary allegiance that links members of national political 
communities to their domestic institutions. The initial division of labour 
envisaged by the founding fathers of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1957 had precisely this focus: the Community was to promote 
economic prosperity by opening markets and generating economies of 
scale, thus providing member states with resources they could use to 
power their own social protection systems, to engage in (welfare) state-
building – or state-rescuing, in the wake of the Second World War, to echo 
Alan Milward (1992). As we shall see, in recent decades this division of 
labour has collapsed, and the European (economic) integration process has 
tended to encroach upon domestic social solidarity institutions, without 
rebuilding at the EU level what was being constrained domestically. Hence 
the widespread concerns that revolve around European construction. 
In short: if voters’ anxieties are not alleviated, if they are not 
convinced that ‘the EU cares’ (through direct and indirect action, or non-
action), the integration process may be seriously de-legitimised and 
jeopardised by xenophobic sentiments and neo-protectionist demands 
voiced by those social groups that are most directly affected by economic 
opening. The economic crisis has undoubtedly intensified this challenge.  
2.  How to build a more social EU 
The three rationales we have identified to show that we require a more 
social EU are analytically distinct, but they are of course interrelated and 
mutually re-enforcing. Judging by documents and official statements (such 
as the Presidency Conclusions of the 2007 Spring Council, the Berlin 
Declaration, signed on the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome or the 
new Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union – Article 3 of the 
consolidated version – which states that the Union is based on “a highly 
competitive social market economy”, promoting social justice and 
protection), they now seem to elicit a relatively broad consensus among 
both national and Community policy-makers. By the same token, opinion 
polls show that European citizens are quite unhappy with the EU’s 
performance in the social field, and combating poverty and unemployment 
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as a matter of priority.3 Recent surveys make it very clear that EU citizens 
want the EU to deliver more and better in the social field: in late 2008 
employment and social affairs was the policy area with the greatest 
discrepancy between the perceived and desired resources spent from the 
EU budget (Eurobarometer, 2008b); in the summer of 2009, 34% of 
respondents asked for greater financial commitment from the European 
Social Fund (Eurobarometer, 2009). Moreover, a European welfare system, 
whatever that may mean, is seen as the best strategy to strengthen 
European citizenship (better than, among other things, adopting a 
European constitution).4 
The problem is, where do we go from here? Answering our second 
question – provided that we need a more social EU, what purpose should it 
serve and what form should it take? – is indeed more complex. In which 
areas, exactly, should the social dimension of the EU be strengthened? 
What are the social challenges that require a response at the EU level rather 
than at national levels? In our quest for an answer, it may prove useful to 
recall a distinction often used in past debates on ‘Social Europe’, which 
remains heuristically valid: the distinction between common  and  similar 
social challenges. 
Common challenges originate from a single exogenous factor or set of 
factors (e.g. cross-border liberalisations). These challenges affect all 
member states at the same time and require some type of joint response 
(national solutions are sub-optimal). It is on this front that a stronger social 
EU is needed urgently. 
                                                      
3 “The protection of social rights” and “the fight against unemployment” are the 
two items ranked the lowest in a poll where respondents were asked to assess EU 
performance in a set of 15 policy areas including, inter alia, the protection of 
human rights, the fight against terrorism, equal treatment of men and women, and 
the promotion of democracy and peace in the world. (“Ensuring economic growth” 
also ranked poorly.) See Eurobarometer (2006). As for the steps the EU should take 
as a matter of priority, see for instance Eurobarometer (2007c) and Eurobarometer 
(2008a). Still, what the EU currently does in the area of employment and social 
affairs is positively evaluated by a majority of respondents in Eurobarometer 
(2009). 
4 See QA20, Eurobarometer (2006). 36 | FERRERA & SACCHI 
 
Similar challenges, on the other hand, originate from largely 
endogenous dynamics (e.g. demographic ageing or changing family and 
gender relations) and can be met through different, path-dependent 
national responses. On this front, a stronger social EU is less urgent, but 
can still play a crucial role, with some qualifications. 
3.  Supplementing the internal market with social rights 
What is the most pressing common challenge currently confronting national 
welfare states? Undoubtedly, it is the internal market. In recent decades, 
and in the past ten years in particular, the internal market (and more 
specifically the free movement of labour and services) has come to strain 
the social policy and employment regimes of member states. Recent 
enlargements have significantly accelerated this process. As we have seen, 
the original treaties envisaged a division of labour between supranational 
and national levels: the Community was to be instrumental in opening up 
markets and helping achieve otherwise unattainable economies of scale, so 
as to generate resources that member states could use in the 
institutionalised exchange of social benefits – flowing from their national 
welfare institutions – for regime support on the part of their domestic 
political communities. “Keynes at home, Smith abroad”, as Robert Gilpin 
(1987, p. 355) aptly dubbed this kind of embedded liberalism arrangement. 
This justified the weakness of the social provisions in the Rome Treaty: 
from equality of treatment for men and women (which incidentally was not 
meant to bestow rights directly upon citizens, but rather to ground 
supranational action and guarantee a level playing field for European 
companies) to the coordination of social security regimes. All the social 
provisions and articles contained therein were instrumental in the 
dismantling of non-tariff barriers to trade and the creation of a higher 
economic order featuring unconstrained economic trade flows. However, 
this supranational liberal order rested upon, or rather was embedded in 
national welfare states that were to be equally unconstrained in terms of 
social regulation capabilities, and in particular would not be constrained by 
the supranational authorities. This was the rationale behind the paucity of 
social provisions in the Rome Treaty, and for the economic instrumentality 
of those few included in it: social policy was the business of national 
institutions only. Put differently, this division of labour implied separating 
the jurisdiction between the supranational and national levels, thus 
establishing ‘mutual non-interference’ between market-making and 
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freedoms were not supposed to impinge upon member states’ sovereignty 
in the social sphere (Giubboni, 2003). 
This did not last. Firstly, international political economy conditions 
have changed since the 1970s, and the embedded liberalism compromise 
has floundered. Moreover, and more importantly still as regards European 
integration, the Community legal order has been constitutionalised – to 
quote Joseph Weiler (1999). More specifically, the supremacy of 
Community law over domestic legislation has, along with direct effect, torn 
the initial division of labour to pieces: if Community law trumps national 
law, then provisions geared to fostering unconstrained competition (i.e. the 
Treaty provisions) trump social regulation, as enshrined in national 
constitutions and laws, and ECJ judges, contrary to national constitutional 
judges, will be constrained in balancing economic and social interests 
whenever these clash (Scharpf, 2009). This state of affairs has of course 
become more apparent as the economic integration process has deepened: 
from the White Paper on the internal market through to the Single 
European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, and then to EMU, the integration 
of European economies has progressed at a spectacular pace, without being 
matched by anything similar in the social realm. What we have tried to 
argue so far is that reasserting the original competence allocation – market-
making with the EU, social policy with the member states – simply will not 
do the trick, since social policy at the national level is no longer safe from 
‘intrusion’ (or ‘infiltration’, as Gérard Lyon-Caen puts it (1992)) by the 
European economic constitution, as many ECJ rulings have by now made 
quite clear (Ferrera, 2005). 
When it comes to social protection systems, it is the free movement of 
labour and services that poses the greatest challenge to the viability of 
domestic social solidarity arrangements as we know them, even though it is 
noteworthy that the ECJ has not always operated as a ‘market police force’, 
and has on several occasions granted some degree of ‘immunity’ against 
European market law to national welfare institutions and practices. 
However, in the absence of a Treaty ‘hook’, it has done so on the grounds 
of legal arguments that may well be overridden in the future. In addition 
member states are investing a lot of energy in cushioning their social 
protection systems against challenges stemming from European law, 
whether by not complying with rulings, agreeing among themselves to 
change European law or even failing to introduce new social programmes 
that could subsequently become the object of European court action. This 
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fore of public debate in Europe and remain confined to insider circles: their 
potentially disruptive outcomes have so far been buffered by member 
states’ reactions. But how long can this last? Member states may be 
compared to those cyclists who track stand – expending a lot of energy in 
order to maintain their position.  
Let there be no mistake: freedom of movement for persons and 
services has opened up opportunities and brought about tremendous 
benefits for individual citizens, despite the challenges to national welfare 
systems. If unregulated, however, this enhanced freedom for individuals 
may come at the cost of severe systemic disruptions, or even failure – 
which may in turn result in diminished welfare provision for all. It is 
certainly a good thing that Mrs Watts and many in her situation all over 
Europe can now get prompt treatment abroad paid for by their own 
domestic healthcare schemes; however, when this comes at the risk of 
disrupting a basic organisational tool of contemporary health systems, i.e. 
waiting lists, clearly some direction is called for.5 
To some extent, the European Union is experiencing a ‘social 
question’ (as well as a ‘governance issue’) that is not too dissimilar from 
that experienced by European nations in the second half of the 19th 
century, when the ‘freedom to work’ became a universal civil right and 
local labour markets merged to give rise to single ‘domestic’ labour 
markets, which were then subjected to common standards (labour laws, 
unemployment and more generally social insurance, national labour 
exchanges, etc.).  
In his groundbreaking historical analysis of modern citizenship, T.H. 
Marshall (1950) suggested that the evolution of this institution involved a 
two-fold process of fusion, and of separation. The fusion was geographical 
and entailed the dismantling of local privileges and immunities, the 
                                                      
5 We refer here to the ECJ ruling in the Watts case (C-372/04, decided on 16 May 
2006). The Court ruled that a refusal to grant prior authorisation for treatment 
abroad paid for by domestic authorities could not be based solely on the existence 
of waiting lists intended to allow for the planning and management of hospital 
care supply on the basis of predetermined general clinical priorities, without there 
having been an objective medical assessment of the patient’s condition. Where 
delays arising from such waiting lists appeared unacceptable, in the light of the 
patient’s assessed condition, the competent institution could not refuse 
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harmonisation of rights and obligations throughout the national territory 
concerned and the establishment of a level playing field (the equal status of 
citizens) within state borders. The separation was functional and entailed 
the creation of new sources of nationwide authority and jurisdiction, as 
well as new specialised institutions for the implementation of that 
authority and that jurisdiction at a decentralised level.  
The present historical phase is reproducing this double challenge of 
fusion and separation under new guises. As was the case domestically 150 
years ago, freedom of movement can now be a tremendous trigger for 
growth and job creation in the EU’s internal market, and can therefore 
enhance welfare for European citizens. But without adequate supranational 
norms and governance (a stronger ‘social’ EU), this new market will not 
work effectively and in fact runs the risk of reducing individual welfare. 
Again, fusion requires institutional innovation in order to fully bear fruit 
(under the economic rationale), and to safeguard the equitable distribution 
of such outcomes (under the social justice rationale) in a context of social 
peace and political stability (under the legitimacy rationale).  
Managing the social implications of freedom of movement (or, to put it 
another way, securing the social complements of the internal market) ought 
to be the primary goal of a stronger ‘social’ EU, which would seek to 
eschew the risk of biting the hand that feeds it by not jeopardising the bond 
between citizens and their welfare states, and being made to bear the blame 
for whatever storm member states would then have to face. On the basis of 
what we have discussed so far, it is clear that only the EU can perform this 
task. But how should it go? 
There already is, of course, an acquis of hard norms that have been 
introduced over time precisely (or primarily) with a view to paralleling 
market ‘fusion’ with a modicum of social harmonisation. Some of these 
norms (such as the Directives on non-standard employment, or on gender 
discrimination) also address new social risks in a post-industrial society. 
But what are the new and further steps that should be taken in this 
direction in the current post-industrial (and post-enlargement) context – 
also considering the deep impact of the crisis? We believe that the 
following would be the most natural candidates for the task at hand: 
•  Establishing (or strengthening) a common floor of labour law 
guarantees, especially for non-standard, irregular workers; 
•  Agreeing on common definitions and criteria regarding those areas 
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particularly sensitive to greater freedom of movement, thus finding a 
proper balance between the goals of ‘dismantling local immunities 
and privileges’ and that of preserving legitimate national diversities; 
•  Establishing common rules on a minimum wage on the one hand, and 
launching a Community initiative on a generalised minimum income 
guarantee on the other, in order to protect the most vulnerable; 
•  Updating and fine-tuning social security regimes for migrant 
workers; 
•  Establishing something along the lines of a ‘European Audit Board’ 
for the oversight of contractual practices, in order to avoid social 
dumping. 
Progress on these fronts was advocated by a declaration on 
“Enhancing Social Europe” signed by the Labour ministers of eight 
member states (Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus and 
Hungary) in February 2007 – to little avail, in the end. Still, on each of these 
fronts a number of relatively detailed proposals has begun to circulate. To 
name but a few, the issue of a common floor of labour law guarantees, 
dealing with the working conditions of all workers, regardless of their 
work contract (and therefore also applying to irregular workers) was put 
forward in the 2006 Green Paper on labour law. The Lisbon Treaty, 
meanwhile, includes a Protocol on services of general interest and retains 
the so-called horizontal social clause written into the Constitutional Treaty 
Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
introduced a form of ‘social mainstreaming’ by stating that, in 
implementing its policies, the Union should take into account social 
requirements (Ferrera, 2009). 
The issue of a minimum income guarantee is also important, and 
deserves more attention insofar as it may well be a very promising way of 
securing the social complements of the internal market, according to our 
definition of the approach required. This might take the form of 
Community-wide legal provisions regulating minimum income schemes at 
the national level (a Community Directive on this topic was originally put 
forward by the Commission in 1992, but was downgraded to mere 
communication status following member states’ opposition). This would 
regulate, and possibly improve, benefit provision in countries where such 
schemes exist, and spur into action those (such as Greece, Italy and 
Hungary – ironically, three of the signatories to the plea to “Enhance Social 
Europe”) that do not have a generalised means-tested scheme. This might A MORE SOCIAL EU: ISSUES OF WHERE AND HOW | 41 
 
also take the form of a pan-European welfare scheme, locally administered 
but stemming directly from the EU. Certain concrete proposals along these 
lines have been circulating for some time in academic circles.6 It is not our 
intention to assess the pros and cons of this thought-provoking idea here, 
knowing that in any event it would need to be carefully crafted lest it 
generate opportunistic behaviour on the part of citizens and national 
governments alike. It could however be instrumental in building some 
form of direct allegiance between European citizens and the EU, thus 
replicating at the supranational level, in a sense, the formidable bonding 
tool constituted of social protection schemes at the national level. 
Another measure that addresses common challenges (albeit those 
posed by globalisation and now the economic crisis, rather than the internal 
market) and that — if well crafted and publicised — could help forge 
bonds between the EU and its citizens, thus providing legitimacy to the 
former, is the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund launched at the 
beginning of 2007. This aims at providing European workers made 
redundant because of globalisation (under trade-induced mass layoffs) 
with time-limited direct support in finding new jobs. The idea here is that 
funding is provided by the Community budget (more specifically, the 
scheme is co-funded by the EU and member states) only to active labour 
market policies. So far, the Fund seems to have been rather effective for 
those workers who have had access to the measures financed by it (some 
70% of the 10,000 workers involved in 2008 have been re-employed), but it 
has on the whole delivered very little: out of €500 million available every 
year, only less than €50 million were distributed in 2008, owing to the lack 
of requests and the slowness of the procedures. In June 2009, the Fund 
Regulation was changed in order to make it a tool to counteract the 
economic crisis, thereby lowering the threshold of layoffs necessary to 
qualify (from 1,000 to 500), raising the share of co-funding on the part of the 
EU (from 50% to 65%), extending the period for which the funding is 
granted (from 12 to 24 months) and broadening the range of its 
applicability to crisis-related mass layoffs. 
                                                      
6 See for instance, discussions published in various issues of the Journal of European 
Social Policy in 2001, with Philippe Schmitter & Michael Bauer’s (2001a) proposed 
‘Euro-stipendium’, the ensuing criticism by Philippe Van Parijs & Yannick 
Vanderborght (2001), as well as by Manos Matsaganis (2001), with a rejoinder by 
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It is to be hoped that these changes will be accompanied by a 
quantum leap in the communication strategy of the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund, as until now this strategy has been virtually non-
existent. The result is that over 70% of Europeans, when interviewed, 
declare they have never heard or read anything about it (Eurobarometer, 
2009). This is in stark contrast to the strategy of massively publicising the 
European Social Fund, which is administered through national and 
regional authorities, while the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, 
being directly administered by the EU, could be an important source of 
legitimacy for the Union as a political entity in its own right. Still, if the 
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund is simply there to co-finance 
existing national measures for which full credit is claimed by member 
states, the legitimacy return for the EU runs the risk of being negligible, if 
not outright negative (as would be the case if an application by a member 
state were to be rejected by the Community). 
Be that as it may, in addition to important – in substantive and 
symbolic terms – but rather small-scale initiatives, what really matters at 
this stage is the forging of a consensus around a general concept: that of 
putting in place a basket of basic common social standards applicable to the 
entire EU space, as well as setting up the regulatory and governance 
prerequisites for the mutual recognition of social policy and employment 
regimes across member states. Without shared requirements and reciprocal 
trust, mutual recognition is impossible, and this is all the more important 
now, since the economic crisis has sparked a return to domestic, nation-
specific interventions in the social field.  
Drawing, once again, inspiration from the history of modern 
citizenship, a new regulatory and governance regime for the EU’s freedom 
of movement legislation should be interwoven with a more basic 
institutional fabric: Fundamental Rights, as set out in the Nice Charter. In a 
way, the fact that the Charter is deemed to have the same legal value as the 
treaties can be seen as another form of ‘mutual recognition’ on a symbolic 
level. While member states reaffirm – in the Treaty of Lisbon – their 
acceptance of the EU’s freedom of movement and competition regime, the 
Charter is the tool through which the EU acknowledges the supremacy of 
rights and their centrality in the EU’s construct and mission, while 
accepting that member states may have their own legal proclivities 
concerning social citizenship, which are part of the basic EU constitutional 
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That the Charter has been given full legal status is an immensely 
valuable fact, since it will allow the ECJ to take fundamental social rights 
into account in its rulings, and thereby enable it to play its role in terms of 
constitutional balancing. One may regret the fact that this is merely recalled 
in the Treaty of Lisbon, however understandable it may be in light of 
British and Polish opposition. Symbols can go a long way in politics. A 
charter of rights that is swept under the carpet does not exactly fit the bill. 
4.  Less rhetoric, more forward-looking initiatives 
Let us now briefly turn from common to similar challenges. Here, as 
mentioned above, there is less need and scope for direct and ‘hard’ 
supranational activism, but the EU can still play a significant role in 
encouraging and facilitating the modernisation of national social models, 
primarily in the context of existing demographic challenges. To a large 
extent, this is already happening through a set of instruments, most notably 
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and its various social processes. 
One of the latest institutional innovations on this front has been the 
adoption, by the European Council, of a number of solemn ‘pacts’, in which 
member states have committed to achieving shared goals and 
strengthening cooperation in the field of youth policies and youth 
mainstreaming (2005), equal opportunities and work-life balance (2006), 
and family policy (2007).  
Even though there has been some disappointment regarding the 
effectiveness of these ‘soft’ instruments for the joint management of 
challenges of this ilk, they do provide valuable institutional capital on 
which to build, and their performance to date has been rather good, 
assuming one relinquishes the perfectionist, classic Community method 
angle.7 
Without entering into the technical debate about how to fine-tune soft 
coordination from both a substantive and procedural viewpoint, some 
general suggestions come to mind for the purpose of stimulating debate 
and further thinking on this issue. 
 
                                                      
7 The most thorough empirical assessment of social OMC processes so far is to be 
found in various chapters of Zeitlin & Pochet (2005) and Heidenreich & Zeitlin 
(2009), in particular in Jonathan Zeitlin’s conclusions to both volumes. 44 | FERRERA & SACCHI 
 
The first two suggestions regard the OMC processes: 
•  Incorporating into the draft of the Integrated Guidelines for National 
Reform Programme, alongside macroeconomic, microeconomic and 
employment guidelines, a social chapter, so as to induce both 
Community and national policy-makers to take all angles into 
account;8 and 
•  Introducing some ‘OMC+’, i.e. coordination processes supplemented 
with tangible and financial incentives. This is already at least partially 
happening with both the employment and the inclusion processes, 
but more could be done, especially as regards training and lifelong 
learning, child poverty and childcare in general.  
A third suggestion regards the new ‘pacting’ approach that seems to 
be taking root alongside (or in anticipation of) more structured forms of 
open coordination. If properly designed, properly communicated and 
properly implemented, pacts and/or alliances centred around similar social 
challenges confronting all or most member states can indeed play a 
significant role and contribute to the strengthening of a social EU. 
Assessing the actual implementation of such initiatives is premature, as 
most were only launched in the past few years. But to date their design and 
the way in which they have been communicated to the public at large have 
been extremely poor. The initiative on the European Alliance for Families, a 
platform for exchanging information and experience on family-friendly 
policies received only a cursory description in the Presidency Conclusions 
of the 2007 Spring European Council Meeting and was not supported by 
any recognisable (let alone effective) communication campaign (but there 
is, however, a dedicated website).9 This risks rapidly eroding the promising 
                                                      
8 An attempt by some member states, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament to include some ‘social’ objective in the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and 
Jobs turned out to be unsuccessful, due to the opposition of many member states. 
The only change so far has been that the member states are expected to refer to the 
flexicurity principles elaborated by the Commission when drafting their National 
Reform Programmes 2008-10. 
9 In May 2009, an Employment Summit was held with the participation of national 
ministers, which confirmed the commitment to mobilise all EU funds and 
institutions to boost employment and social inclusion in the light of the financial 
crisis. Again, however, the Summit was not accompanied by any effective 
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potential of such instruments or, worse still, turning them into yet another 
signal of the EU’s superficiality, opportunism and mere rhetoric in all 
matters that have to do with welfare and social policy. Why not take these 
instruments more seriously and re-configure them into a single “Pact for a 
New Social Europe”, that could serve as a general symbolic and 
institutional framework for all OMCs? If this scenario does not prove 
feasible, then it might indeed be advisable to renounce all further 
proliferation of pacts and alliances, in order to avoid overload, confusion 
and the possible loss of legitimacy in this field (the EU’s ‘caring’ 
dimension) – a field that should generate, rather than erode, EU legitimacy. 
The fourth and final suggestion is that of considering the launch of a 
new policy initiative at the supranational level, with a strong ‘signalling’ 
potential on the three fronts mentioned at the beginning of this chapter: 
justice, legitimacy and efficiency. The most promising move in this 
direction would be one geared towards young Europeans. As we have 
seen, the EU already has a youth agenda, but it should consider taking 
specific action, and implement ground-breaking measures. Drawing on a 
paper prepared by the Bureau of European Policy Advisers to the President 
of the Commission on “Investing in Youth” (Barrington-Leach et al., 2007), 
a number of innovative measures with a high legitimising potential and the 
ability to reconcile social justice and economic efficiency could be 
considered for direct Community action. This might involve a ‘European 
capital grant’ to all children, that is a universal grant awarded to every 
baby at birth, which could be topped up (to a certain level) by parents and 
made available for use when the child reaches the age of 18; or a ‘European 
Early Childcare Fund’; or a European student loan scheme, which could be 
made available through the European Investment Bank. 
One rather alarming indication stemming from the latest 
Eurobarometer polls is that there is a widespread belief among all 
respondents that young people’s life chances will be worse than those of 
their parents (Eurobarometer, 2007b). In the summer of 2009, almost half of 
respondents expressed strong concern about the prospect of their children 
losing their jobs in the wake of the recession (Eurobarometer, 2009). A 
stronger social EU should see to it that this does not happen: investing in 
youth should indeed become its flagship cause, its leading and most clearly 
recognisable priority. 46 | FERRERA & SACCHI 
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4.  ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION 
AND FAILURES IN EUROPE TO COUNTER 
RECESSION 
FIORELLA KOSTORIS* 
I had too often observed the limits of coordination. It is a method which promotes 
discussion, but it does not lead to a decision. It does not allow us to transform the relations 
between human beings and between countries when union is necessary. It is the expression 
of the national power, as it is; it cannot change it, it will never create unity. 
J. Monnet, Mémoires, Vol. I, 1976 
Introduction 
Economic policy coordination is not a clear-cut concept. This chapter first 
examines the different kinds of economic policies that are currently 
considered subject to coordination pursuant to Article 99 of the European 
Treaties and those which, according to the subsidiarity principle, should be 
common policies, being the exclusive competence of the Union, or should 
be coordinated between member states, being shared competences. 
Secondly, it shows under which conditions economic policy coordination is 
strong or weak, using the Stability and Growth Pact as a specific case study. 
It then analyses the implications of these general conclusions in order to 
show whether economic policy coordination in the EU is able to meet the 
challenges of the current recession. It concludes that European monetary 
policy – a common action in the single currency zone – is well-suited to 
                                                      
* Two previous versions of this paper were presented respectively in Berlin, at a 
seminar at the Freie Universität in May 2009, and in London, at a breakfast speech 
at the Business Club Italia in July 2009. The author is grateful to the participants of 
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addressing the systemic negative demand shock we see now. But European 
fiscal policy coordination is inadequate, because its basic instrument, the 
Stability and Growth Pact, is ill-conceived and needs urgent reform. The 
coordination of financial policies also needs to be much improved. 
1.  When is coordination appropriate?  
Economic policy coordination within the European Union has increasingly 
come to be considered as useful, if not necessary, in debates among experts 
and in the public mind. Economic policy coordination has always been 
considered favourably in the European Treaties. Article 99 of the Treaties 
states that member states’ policies are all “a matter of common concern” 
and are coordinated “within the Council”. The same formula is repeated in 
the unapproved draft of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and 
in the newly approved Lisbon Treaty. In particular, European federalists, 
who support the political union of the Community and think the best way 
to achieve it is by acting through Parliament from an institutional 
perspective, and through the single market/single currency from an 
economic viewpoint, complain that many Council decisions must be taken 
unanimously. Unanimity is of course difficult to reach so coordination is 
sometimes impossible.  
But this fact need not affect the well-being of Europe. For instance, in 
setting tax rates, if unanimous coordination is reached, the outcome is 
worse than without it because, in the absence of unanimity, competition 
prevails. If it is not implemented in an incorrect and illegal way, 
competition is better than harmonisation, which would imply tax rates at 
an intermediate level between the minimum and the maximum in Europe, 
while the minimum rates, consistent with given public expenditure goals 
(themselves related to market failures), would be obtained by competition. 
The latter does not meet with the favour of member states, as they 
prefer spending to please their electorate, whether they have to do it for 
rational economic reasons or not. Thus, it is no coincidence that, among the 
12 points of the Global Legal Standard OECD (2009) paper approved at the 
2009 G8 L’Aquila Summit, there is one inhibiting any ‘race to the bottom’ in 
labour markets or in social and environmental standards, while 
international agreements are longed for. In fact, this formula hides a sort of 
protectionism favouring residents versus immigrants, insiders versus 
outsiders, national rather than foreign investments. It limits incentives to 
attract both capital from abroad – as, for example in Ireland with 50 | FIORELLA KOSTORIS 
 
detaxations – and workers from other European countries or from 
marginalised parts of the society – by adopting mutual recognition and 
country of origin principles, or by offering lower wages and potentially 
smaller welfare provisions, which might nonetheless be desirable as they 
are better than unemployment subsidies. 
As a consequence, competition is often labelled as ‘unfair’ or ‘wild’ 
without explanation. It is so described in spite of the fact that the condition 
of voluntary exchange holds true, no law is evaded and no objective moral 
principle (as in the 10 commandments) is violated. True, the level playing 
field between different European member states or between different 
components of social systems is missing, but the essence of competition is 
precisely to use those differences to the advantage of the most efficient 
agents, inducing the others to find counterbalancing, compensating factors, 
able to reduce their weaknesses, while favouring the well-being of all. 
Economic policy coordination, in the current European jargon, is an 
‘umbrella concept’ being applied to a very wide range of interventions. It 
ranges from the exchange of information (sometimes partial, as has been 
the case up to now in banking supervision), to multilateral monitoring on 
the basis of commonly recognised best practices (as in the Lisbon Agenda). 
It may concern agreed principles of a philosophical nature (such as those 
on ethics and economics, as illustrated at the 2009 G8 Summit of L’Aquila 
by the Global Legal Standard, echoing Benedict XVI’s Encyclical Letter 
Caritas in veritate on matters like CEOs’ bonuses, which should be 
sustainable and consistent with an appropriate degree of risk aversion).  
It further concerns more practical principles expounded in proposals 
regarding European institutions, for example those on Eurobonds supplied 
by the EIB, tending to finance the TransEuropean Networks managed by 
the EBRD. Conversely, economic policy coordination may become slightly 
more factual when it is the expression of agreed intentions regarding the 
management at member state level of some macro policy, such as the still-
national stabilisation actions (for example, the Council Decision of 11-12 
December 2008, in line with the Commission Communication of 26 
November 2008, defines the European Recovery Plan with its major 
budgetary impetus worth 1.5% of GDP – about €200 billion – 1.2% of which 
is provided by member states; but those are mere intentions, because EU 
countries may avoid any intervention consistent with that Decision, as 
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Finally, economic policy coordination ranges from co-decided rules 
for fiscal deficits (as in the Stability and Growth Pact), or, more recently, for 
financial policies (as in the Euro Action Plan of 12 October 2008), to truly 
common actions (as is the case with monetary and competition policies).  
The aim of this chapter is not to describe all these policies in detail, but 
rather to identify under what circumstances European coordination is 
strong and effective. Referring to the latter, the distinctions usually made 
are related to the degree of rigidity observed in the corresponding 
regulation, established by primary or secondary norms. For example, the 
Lisbon Agenda and the open coordination method of a qualitative nature 
are generally thought to be weak, while the Stability and Growth Pact and 
its numerical rules are supposed to be ‘hard’ forms of coordination. It 
might be said that they are both weak, perhaps not equally weak, as in this 
respect the fundamental difference in European policies is between those 
that are realised by the Council and those that are managed by the 
Commission or by some other European technical institution, like the 
European Central Bank or the European Court of Justice; this distinction 
being based on the subsidiarity principle. 
When externalities beyond national borders are large and require a 
higher level of government capable of activating a policy, there is the 
necessity of a supranational intervention and the exclusive competence of 
the European Union leads to a truly common policy, which is not managed 
by the Council. When cross-border spillovers or redistributive purposes at 
the Community level are limited, the national public intervention is shared 
with the Union and policies are merely coordinated by the Council. Finally, 
in the absence of any significant cross-border externality, competences are 
exclusive to member states, remain local and presumably uncoordinated. 
The Council responds to national, not to European interests, as it is 
composed of national policy-makers subject to the tyranny of democracy: 
in a European perspective, coordinated policies are weak. Conversely, the 
Commission, the European Central Bank, or any other European institution 
managing a common policy, are technical authorities that do not have to be 
chosen equally by voters and are independent from the executive power. 
Their governing board being protected by the democratic deficit, common 
policies are much stronger as a result.  
Two examples of this are worth examining: monetary and 
competition policies, which seem to be pretty effective, even under the 
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Monetary policy, since the birth of the euro in 1999, has been able to 
keep inflation under control, thus establishing the reputation of the ECB. 
During the whole recent financial crisis, expansionary monetary policy has 
performed brilliantly in the eurozone. It has alleviated both euro and non-
euro countries’ cyclical downturns, particularly in the second half of 2008 
and in the current year. The ECB has been capable of reducing the recession 
effects and sustaining economic activity by massively increasing banks’ 
liquidity in the eurozone, reducing discount rates, lengthening from 6 to 12 
months the duration of banks’ refinancing at fixed rates and for unlimited 
amounts and inventing new bank funding formulas, particularly through 
covered bonds (debt securities issued by them and backed by mortgages). 
Competition policy, since the Rome Treaty, has been a fundamental 
pillar of the construction of Europe. By preventing abuses of dominant 
positions in the Single Market and state aid distortions, the Commission 
has been operating as an antitrust authority. Some of the Commission’s 
recent actions monitoring competition have been much criticised but in fact 
have turned out to be flexible and rather intelligent. For example, in 
September-October 2008, Ireland appeared to violate the European rules on 
state aid by guaranteeing banks’ debt issuance. The Commission did not 
intervene here and rightly so, since, immediately after Ireland, Greece 
passed the same policy and a few days later other member states also 
followed suit. This was certainly easy to forecast, as there is full 
competition in capital markets and banking, current accounts can quickly 
be transferred to other eurozone member states. Finally, on 12 October 
2008, a European Summit decided to adopt the same policy of guaranteeing 
bank debt for the whole Union. In the end, therefore, the Commission was 
extremely effective in not sanctioning Ireland and Greece for distortionary 
state aid policies, knowing that competition would achieve the same 
outcome as its regulatory interventions.  
2.  Economic policy coordination under pressure 
Exclusive EU competences are logically derived from the subsidiarity 
principle appearing in the Union primary norms, and are pragmatically 
defined by the European Treaties as well. There is some inconsistency 
between the principles and their practical application, but neither the 
former nor the latter can be easily redetermined and so for the time being 
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As indicated above, other competences, listed equally in the treaties 
with some analytical inconsistency, are shared between the Union and 
member states and the corresponding policies have to be coordinated by 
the Council. The idea that this institution is always a source of weak 
coordination finds an exception when all member states have a common 
identical interest and decide to pursue their goals with a unanimous, co-
decided intervention. In this case, ex ante coordination is not necessary, 
while ex post coordination is easy and sufficient, or, to put it another way, 
ex ante rules become self-enforcing. 
A typical example of this condition is what happened over the 
weekend of 12 October 2008. The world’s stock exchanges were fearing 
extreme volatility after September 15th when Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy, but in a matter of hours European countries managed to find a 
new governance formula to address their problems, namely an Ecofin 
Summit consisting not of finance ministers but heads of state and 
governments, for the occasion enlarged to include the British (eurosceptic) 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown. They agreed on three major solutions: state 
guarantees of bank debt issuance; banks’ recapitalisation and governments’ 
commitments to avoid their bankruptcy by buying, if necessary, all their 
assets; and transitory abandonment of the market-to-market formula, in 
order to strengthen the trust message of the first two initiatives, 
considering that this kind of transparent evaluation may lead to confusion 
between short-term liquidity and long-term solvency. The successful 
political outcome was certainly facilitated by the dramatic context of the 
European partners’ meeting. As indicated by the Italian Minister of 
Finance, Giulio Tremonti (Sensini, 2009): 
At the IMF in Washington, on October 9, which was Friday, we 
understood that the London Stock Exchange could not open on the 
following Monday. During the night of May 9 Iceland declared 
bankruptcy. The turning point came on October 12 in Paris, when 
Governments and Politics took the right initiative.  
But this rapid and efficient ex post coordination would have been 
impossible had each member state not had the same interest to back bank 
debts and boost market confidence in a unanimously coordinated way, all 
being well aware not only of the risk of contagion, but also of the threat 
represented by other European partners potentially able to provide even 
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3.  A case study of the Stability and Growth Pace 
In more ‘normal’ circumstances, Council coordination is generally mild, 
irrespective of what might be suggested by hard regulations. Moreover, it 
becomes even weaker the more ill-conceived is the governance of the 
institutions that have the duty to control the stakeholders’ behaviour 
involved in coordination. The less effective are sanctions and incentives 
directed to those agents, the more mistaken are the intrinsic rules of the 
coordinated policy.  
The Stability and Growth Pact can be taken as a case study to show 
the importance of these three elements. The rigidity of the Pact’s rules are 
well-known, from the famous ceilings of 3% in the deficit-to-GDP ratio and 
60% in the debt-to-GDP ratio (Article 104 of the Treaties), to the two 1977 
Regulations shedding light on four further aspects (medium-term 
objectives, derogations to the excessive deficit procedures, mitigating 
factors to start the early warning procedure and sanctions), concluding 
with the 2005 Pact reform. Derogations, as reformulated in 2005 by two 
new Regulations, are particularly relevant in the current economic crisis: 
the excessive deficit procedure does not start if there are ‘exceptional’ 
economic conditions, such as when the annual GDP growth rate is negative 
or the output gap relative to the potential level is persistent, while the 
distance of the deficit-to-GDP ratio from the reference value is temporary 
and small.  
To analyse the first of the three relevant aspects, it should be noted 
that the governance of the Pact is ill-conceived, mainly because the decision 
on whether a country is a fiscal delinquent is assigned to other, at least 
potentially, fiscal delinquents. Indeed, supervised finance ministers 
coincide with the supervisors and – in Juvenal’s words – who shall guard 
the guards themselves?  Such conflicts of interest seemed to arise in 
November 2003, when the Commission wanted to start an excessive deficit 
procedure against France and Germany, abundantly exceeding the 3% 
ceiling, while the Council decided not to intervene, probably influenced by 
the Ecofin President of that semester, Giulio Tremonti. Presumably a sort of 
implicit ‘do ut des’ (reciprocity) was implemented, exchanging a current 
favour towards Paris and Berlin for a future favour towards Rome. In fact, 
Italy received an early warning on its excessive deficit only in July 2005, 
while in four out of the five years since 2001 its deficit had exceeded 3%.  
As for the sanctions system, it proved even less effective after the 
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mentioned 2003 controversy: on the one side, it agreed with the Council 
against the Commission but, on the other, it asked the Council to revise its 
Decision, considering it to be inconsistent with its previous ones. The 
reputation and credibility of the Pact have consequently been diminished 
because, admittedly, it appeared to be strictly applied to small countries 
and freely interpreted for large, powerful ones, thus lessening the moral 
weight of any sanction. Besides, the probability of sanctions decreases as 
the actual number of fiscal delinquents increases, as is happening at the 
moment. Finally, incentives to behave well from a deficit and debt 
viewpoint are correctly identified by the Maastricht Treaty in the 
convergence phase, as the member states’ ability to satisfy convergence 
parameters is rewarded by entry into the Eurogroup, offering many gains 
in terms of nominal stability. On the contrary, once a country is in the club, 
the latter becomes non-inclusive in the sense that the treaties do not 
provide any rule to exclude a fiscal delinquent from the club, and the carrot 
of entering the euro area has already been eaten, while the stick of 
exclusion is substituted by unlikely and ineffective sanctions.  
Third, the formula of the Pact is ill-conceived. To resume its basic 
rationale, described in the 1989 Delors Report, two underlying hypotheses 
can be recalled. First, member states’ fiscal policies create small cross-
border spillovers, not requiring common action but only some European 
coordination. While this assumption does not seem to be disproved by the 
empirical evidence, the second is factually more controversial. Accordingly, 
national fiscal policy spillovers are negative because, within a group of 
countries sharing the same currency, each member state hit by an 
asymmetric shock does not take into account the effects of its expansionary 
fiscal policy on the common reference interest rate. This creates a deficit 
spending bias, which is opposed by the European Central Bank. The latter 
ultimately succeeds in targeting European inflation, but this action raises 
interest rates and brings no advantage to anybody: it is therefore better to 
agree on an ex ante maximum deficit, avoiding free-riding problems. 
A very simple mathematical model (presented in the Annex) conveys 
this message. It shows, however, not only the Delors Report rationale for 
the Stability and Growth Pact, but also its weaknesses. In particular, it 
clearly indicates that an optimal ex ante fiscal policy coordination in the 
Eurogroup cannot be set if three distinctions are missing: between demand 
and supply shocks and between weak and strong demand shocks; between 
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Indeed, in the optimal solution, the 3% constraint appears to be too 
large when facing a negative supply shock – when essentially no deficit 
spending should be allowed. It may be correct, when facing a mild 
asymmetric negative demand shock, i.e. when automatic stabilisers are 
sufficient to restore output at the potential, but it is finally suboptimal 
when there is a strong and/or a systemic negative demand shock, hence a 
discretionary expansionary fiscal policy is called for, beyond automatic 
stabilisers. The coordination failure in fiscal policy is particularly absurd 
when there is a systemic demand shock, because each country is then 
positively, not negatively affected by the budgetary stimulus of other 
partners. A good proposal would therefore consist of a further reform 
under the Stability and Growth Pact, whereby the Commission and the 
Council should take into consideration whether a country faces a supply or 
a demand shock (strong or mild) and a common-systemic shock or an 
asymmetric one.  
In order to make this proposal operational, one should avoid impossible 
changes to the Treaty. One should therefore amend the present formulation 
of the Pact either through a different informal interpretation of the 
‘exceptional’ economic conditions inducing derogations to the excessive 
deficit procedures and/or through an innovative formal concept of 
‘exceptionality’, defined by a new Council Regulation. Moreover, from a 
political viewpoint, a double question immediately arises. How hard is it 
for the European Commission and the Council to identify the nature of the 
country-specific (or of the systemic) shock? And is it possible to adopt a 
common methodology and harmonised European data to detect this in 
every member state?  
Three data sets are currently available in the Union for the guardians 
of the Stability and Growth Pact, which have already been homogenised by 
the European Commission Services for all EU27 countries, and have existed 
for many years, though they have not been much exploited. They allow the 
quick supply (although still discretionary) of measures on qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of economic cycles. A negative demand shock can then 
be identified by the simultaneity of the increase in the unemployment rate, 
combined with the decrease in the inflation rate, while, on the contrary, a 
negative supply shock is characterised by rising inflation coupled with 
growing unemployment. In addition, a negative demand shock is identified 
as strong, if the inverse correlation between unemployment and inflation is 
accompanied by a percentage of firms declaring problems with insufficient 
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strongly negative demand shock has to be considered systemic or common 
to all countries belonging to the same area, if each of them shows the same 
three features simultaneously. In Table 1 and Figure 1 below (with annual 
frequences except for the last quarters), a strong demand shock is detected 
when there is a contemporaneous upward movement in (u), a downward 
movement in (π) and (D-C)/Average (D-C 1997-2008) > 10 (it should be 
bigger than 1, but the variable is multiplied by 10, so as to make the graph 
more easily readable).  
Looking at Table 1 and Figure 1, it is immediately apparent that we 
are living in the middle of a severe economic crisis. By mid-2009, firms 
were constrained in their demand 50% more than in the average trend of 
the previous 12 years, particularly in the eurozone. In the last 3-4 quarters 
and in the current year, unemployment is increasing and inflation is 
declining everywhere in the EU27. Starting with the second half of 2008, we 
observe not only that the cyclical downturn is larger than those emerging in 
other critical years of the period under consideration (1997-2009), but also 
that this strongly negative demand shock is, for the first time, common to 
all European countries. Germany, France and Italy are now all suffering 
from the same disease. This was not the case in 2002-03, when a country-
specific shock hit some of the member states: the three combined 
quantitative indicators, used in Table 1, suggest that in those years 
Germany was the only big partner to bear a strongly negative demand 
shock, unlike Italy and France. In its most critical years, the latter was 
affected by a strongly negative supply shock. No doubt, if the Commission 
had adopted the distinction between demand and supply shocks, it would 
not have requested the early warning procedure against Germany, thereby 
separating the destinies of Paris and Berlin. Perhaps a joint viewpoint 
between the Commission and the Council could have been reached then, 
without damaging the reputation of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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Table 1. Detrended demand-constrained (D) relative to capacity-constrained (C) business regime, unemployment and inflation 
rates in some European areas (1997-2009) 
  Euro Area  Germany  France 
Years (D-C)/ 
Average 
 (D-C 1997-
2008)  (x 10)1 
u (%): 
Unem-
ployment 
rate2 
π (%): 
Inflation 
rate3 
(D-C)/ Average  
(D-C 1997-2008)  
(x 10)1 
u (%): 
Unem-
ployment 
rate2 
π (%): 
Inflation 
rate3 
(D-C)/ 
Average  
(D-C 1997-
2008) (x 10)1 
u (%): 
Unem-
ployment 
rate2 
π (%): 
Inflation 
rate3 
1997  14.3 10.6  1.6  16.2  9.9 1.5  16.2  11.5  1.3 
1998  11.7 10.0  1.1  11.5  9.3 0.6  11.5  11.1  0.7 
1999  12.9 9.1 1.1  10.9  8.5 0.6  10.9  10.5  0.6 
2000  7.6 8.5  2.1  4.2  7.5 1.4  4.2  9.0 1.8 
2001  10.4 8.0 2.3  6.9  7.6 1.9  6.9  8.3 1.8 
2002  13.6 8.4 2.2  12.1  8.4 1.4  12.1  8.6 1.9 
2003  14.1 8.8 2.1  14.3  9.3 1.0  14.3  9.0 2.2 
2004  9.7 9.0  2.1  9.9  9.8 1.8  9.9  9.2 2.3 
2005  9.9 9.0  2.2  10.9  10.6 1.9  10.9  9.3  1.9 
2006  6.2 8.3  2.2  8.7  9.8 1.8  8.7  9.2 1.9 
2007  3.3 7.5  2.1  7.4  8.4 2.3  7.4  8.3 1.6 
2007-Q1  3.0 7.7  1.9  10.0  8.7 1.9  6.7  8.7 1.3 
2007-Q2  3.2 7.5  1.9  9.3  8.5 2.0  6.2  8.7 1.3 
2007-Q3  3.1 7.4  1.9  5.7  8.3 2.0  3.8  8.2 1.4 
2007-Q4  3.8 7.3  2.9  5.0  8.0 3.0  3.4  7.8 2.5 
2008  6.2 7.5  3.3  7.0  7.3 2.8  7.0  7.8 3.2 
2008-Q1  3.5 7.2  3.4  5.1  7.6 3.1  3.4  7.6 3.3 
2008-Q2  4.8 7.4  3.6  4.1  7.4 3.0  2.7  7.7 3.7 
2008-Q3  6.7 7.6  3.8  6.7  7.2 3.3  4.5  7.8 3.6 
2008-Q4  9.4 8.0  2.3  11.3  7.1 1.6  7.6  8.2 2-0 
2009  14.4 9.9 0.4  14.5  8.6 0.3  14.5  9.6 0.2 
2009-Q1  13.5 8.7 1.0  13.6  7.4 0.8  9.1  8.6 1.5 
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  Italy  European Union 
Years  (D-C)/ Average  
(D-C 1997-2008)  
(x 10)1 
u (%): 
Unemployment 
rate2 
π (%): Inflation 
rate3 
(D-C)/ Average  
(D-C 1997-2008)  
(x 10)1 
u (%): 
Unemployment 
rate2 
π (%): Inflation 
rate3 
1997  11.3  11.3 1.9  12.9 9.8  1.7 
1998  10.8  11.3 2.0  10.8 9.4  1.3 
1999  11.8  11.0 1.7  12.7 9.1  1.2 
2000  8.1  10.1  2.6 8.8 8.6  1.9 
2001  9.7  9.1 2.3 10.6  8.4  2.2 
2002  11.1  8.6 2.6 13.2  8.8  2.1 
2003  12.7  8.4 2.8 13.6  9.0  2.0 
2004  10.0  8.0 2.3 9.5 9,0  2.0 
2005  10.0  7.7 2.2 9.4 8.9  2.2 
2006  7.3  6.8 2.2 7.2 8.2  2.2 
2007  7.2  6.2 2.0 4.5 7.1  2.4 
2007-Q1  5.5  6.1 2.0 4.4 7.4  2.2 
2007-Q2  5.8  6.1 1.9 4.3 7.2  2.2 
2007-Q3  8.6  6.2 1.7 4.0 7.1  2.1 
2007-Q4  8.8  6.3 2.6 5.1 6.9  3.0 
2008  10.0  6.8 3.5 6.9 7.0  3.7 
2008-Q1  8.9  6.6 3.3 4.7 6.8  3.5 
2008-Q2  9.7  6.7 3.8 5.8 6.8  3.9 
2008-Q3  10.1  6.9 4.0 7.3 7.0  4.3 
2008-Q4  11.4  7.0 2.9 9.6 7.4  2.9 
2009  13.9  8.8 0.8 13.6  9.4  0.9 
2009-Q1  14.0    12.8  8.1  1.5 
2009-Q2  13.8    14.4     
Note:  Both numerator and denominator are given  in detrended terms. 
Sources: (1): Elaboration on Business Survey Data. Empirical evidence on 2009-Q2 is based on April data. (2): Eurostat data up to 2009. The 2009 annual data are 
provided by the European Commission in European Economy, Economic Forecasts, May 2009. The 2009-Q2 data, if data are available at least one month in the 
quarter, correspond to the latest observed. Eurostat data are integrated with information on the eurozone derived from Banca d’Italia, Bollettino Economico, n. 56, 
April 2009 and information on the EU27 coming from the Bureau of Labour Statistics, Unemployment Rates in the European Union and Selected Member States 1995-
2009. (3): Eurostat data up to 2009. The 2009 annual data are provided by the European Commission in European Economy, Economic Forecasts, May 2009. The 
2009-Q2 data are based on April data provided by the European Central Bank. 60 | FIORELLA KOSTORIS 
 
Figure 1. Indicators of demand shocks in the euro area, 1997-2009-Q2 
(Quarterly data since 2007) 
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4.  Effects of the financial crisis 
The origin of the present crisis in the real economy is elsewhere in the 
financial sector, when it started in summer 2007 with the bursting of the 
speculative bubble in the American housing market and the difficulties in 
debt repayment on subprime mortgages. The securitisation of these assets, 
made in complex and opaque ways, later induced a general diffusion of 
partly unobservable risks, with a consequent loss of confidence in the 
financial markets. Due to the globalisation of capital markets, the derived 
lack of liquidity and credit crunch reached all stock exchanges, from Wall 
Street to London, from Japan to Brazil. The existence of leads and lags 
explains why the real economy was hit approximately a year later. And it 
also explains why unemployment will keep rising even when GDP starts to 
recover, although it did not deteriorate immediately after the beginning of 
the cyclical downturn. Indeed this phenomenon is already being tested in 
some countries, like France and Germany, where the recession would seem 
to be at an end by the second quarter of 2009 and yet labour market 
performances are still worsening, even though they were improving up to 
the second semester of 2008 when a fall in output was starting to emerge.  
In developed countries, the aggregate demand contraction observed 
since mid-2008 stems from a decrease in the incomes of firms and 
households, from a decline in confidence and from a credit crunch, with a 
consequent contraction in funding for the purchase of durables and non-
durables and a delay in investment decisions. The fact that this happens at 
the same time in Europe and in the United States – which constitute major 
consumer markets for each other – means that foreign demand is also 
adversely affected. On the other hand, the fall in world trade leads to a 
cyclical worsening in BRIC and other developing countries, while OPEC is 
also suffering from the extreme volatility in oil prices. Everywhere, the 
recession in the real economy is caused by a systemic, strongly negative 
demand shock. 
Focusing more on Europe, the recession began in the second quarter 
of 2008 in Germany and Italy, but later in other major countries like Spain, 
the United Kingdom and France. Indeed, on average, the euro and the EU 
economic systems started to observe a recession only in the third quarter of 
last year and the severity of the slowdown appeared particularly worrying 
after 15 September 2008. Not only was 2007 still a boom period for the 
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vast majority of member states (the notable exceptions being Italy and 
Ireland), in spite of the fact that all European countries have experienced a 
recession since the second semester of last year. In some cases, the 2008 
GDP dynamics seem remarkable (1.3% in Germany – slightly bigger than in 
the US, 0.7% in France, 0.8% and 0.9%, in the eurozone and in the EU). 
Forecasts for 2009, however, are worrying, despite clearly improving 
performances in large European countries since the second quarter of this 
year: estimates for 2009 growth are -3% in France, -4.4% in Italy, -5.4% in 
Germany, -4% both in the euro area and in the Union, also due to the very 
poor prospects of the Spanish and British economies. On the contrary, 
expectations for 2010 are generally positive. Looking ahead, it is to be 
hoped that the recession in the Union will only last 12-18 months, implying 
a much smaller cumulative GDP decrease than during the Great 
Depression, of a size similar to that measured during the first oil shock of 
1973-74, the latter being, however, of a totally different nature (an 
asymmetric, strongly negative supply shock).  
The 2008 average inflation rate was still growing (3.3% in the 
eurozone, 3.7% in the European Union). But the overall picture has 
deteriorated dramatically since the last quarter of 2008 and more so in 2009. 
The most recent data for the eurozone indicate a negative inflation rate in 
the three months since June 2009.  
5.  Conclusions 
We should ask ourselves whether economic policy coordination in Europe 
is indeed apt to fight the recession that started in mid-2008. We know that, 
when faced with a strong and systemic negative demand shock, macro 
policies in the Union should be expansionary and decided upon and 
managed jointly in order to obtain the most effective results. While 
monetary policy is well-suited to these needs, fiscal policy in Europe is not, 
for reasons already outlined in the discussion about the Stability and 
Growth Pact, which is the only instrument available for budgetary 
coordination. Due to the Pact being ill-conceived, there is an explicit 
limitation on proper fiscal expansion: according to the Pact’s rules, for 
example, but contrary to any economic rationale, on 18 February 2009, six 
EU countries (France, Spain, Greece, Ireland, as well as Malta and Latvia) 
were affected by an excessive deficit procedure due to their negative 
balance in 2008. The same procedure will presumably concern 13 out of 16 
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able to avoid useless, indeed harmful sanctions foreseen by the Pact, unless 
the latter is quickly reformed – be it in a formal or informal way. 
Unfortunately, for the time being, this would seem to be difficult, as France 
and Germany do not agree on the direction to be taken: the former wants to 
spend more in order to oppose the current cyclical downturn, while the 
latter is sticking to the old rules, as it fears the inflation-boosting effects of 
deficits. Germany, moreover, is generally afraid of having to ‘foot the bill’, 
which is why Berlin is against many other innovative proposals, including 
the supply of Eurobonds. 
A quick and successful exit from recession also requires some 
changes to financial markets: their performance is still less satisfactory than 
before the summer of 2007 and continues to suffer from excessive volatility. 
No doubt, public guarantees on bank debt and recapitalisation operations 
concerning financial and sometimes non-financial companies (as in the 
automobile sector) have played a positive role. Presumably the housing 
bubble is almost over and the subprime mortgage crisis is all but over, but 
the diffusion of toxic assets through risky securitisations is still considered 
as very dangerous; financial companies are supposedly not yet totally clean 
and full trust in transactions is still lacking. To restore ‘initial conditions’, 
two further public interventions would appear to be necessary: 
•  Bad assets should be completely eradicated from financial companies, 
particularly large multinationals. Up to now, governments have tried 
to set a conventional price for toxic assets that have no market. The 
problem is that if this price is too low, companies do not sell them, 
but if it is too high, tax-payers do not pay for them. Maybe it is 
necessary to use public money to buy the entire financial companies 
under critical conditions, whose market price is revealed on the stock 
exchange, and later separate the good from the bad, selling back the 
latter once finally cleaned up. It is not known, however, whether 
markets and agents would like these temporary forms of 
nationalisation, even though at least in the European Union they 
were explicitly agreed on 12 October 2008.  
•  The capital markets being globalised, the best corrective and 
preventive solutions to the problems of the financial sector should be 
decided at supranational level. European coordination would then be 
necessary, but probably not sufficient. The quality and extension of 
the supervision of financial markets should improve. Markets should 
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controls (beyond national borders if companies are multinationals), 
conflicts of interest should be eliminated, particularly in rating 
societies and the existing rules should be strictly implemented. Some 
steps forward are currently being taken both in the European Union 
and the United States in an uncorrelated, though possibly non-
divergent way (Hamaui, 2009). Yet, fundamental changes on this side 
of the Atlantic appear to be difficult. This is because big European 
partners have always had different opinions on the optimal 
governance for microeconomic and macroeconomic prudential 
supervision: Paris feels that bank m o n i t o r i n g  s h o u l d  b e  p a r t  o f  
monetary policy (thus implicitly tending to assign such tasks to the 
ECB), while Berlin thinks it should be better managed by an 
institution having no control over monetary policy and reference 
rates. London considers that monitoring should be simultaneously 
extended to all financial intermediaries and insurance companies. As 
a consequence, the European Council Conclusions of June 2009, 
rather than imposing some Union coordination on financial 
supervision, only pay lip service to “the need to improve the 
regulation and supervision of financial institutions both in Europe 
and globally”, de facto exclusively supporting the creation of a 
European Systemic Risk Board (previously envisaged by the 
Commission Communication of 27 May 2009). This new instrument 
should monitor any threat to financial stability caused by macro 
phenomena and risks of contagion, thereby providing a first partial 
answer to macro, but certainly not to micro, prudential supervision 
coordination problems.  ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND FAILURES IN EUROPE AGAINST THE RECESSION | 65 
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Annex 
Using an extremely simple model, itself an extension of a previous one 
(Kostoris, 2006), the rationale of the Stability and Growth Pact is shown, but 
also its main analytical weaknesses (which cumulate with those concerning 
its governance and its system of sanctions and incentives).  
All variables are defined in terms of percentage deviations from their 
long-run values, except for the nominal interest rate, i, and are described by 
capital letters. All other small letters are parameters, assumed positive. The 
output differential of country a, Ya, is assumed to depend only on the 
deficit gap of that country, Defa, on the expected real interest rate, (i - Πea) 
with Πea equalling the expected inflation rate in country a and on a demand 
shock, Ea. The inflation rate, Πa, is an increasing function of the output 
differential and of a supply shock, Ua.  
First consider in isolation the equilibrium of country a. Aggregate 
demand is 
Ya = ca Defa – va (i - Πea) + Ea .  (1) 
The relation between the deficit and the structural deficit (Defsa) 
depends on the economic cycle in two ways: the deficit increases when 
there exists an output gap in country a (Ya<0) and, if negative shocks are 
common to other countries, when a similar shock arises elsewhere (the E 
shock concerning other countries has the same sign as Ea, unless there is an 
asymmetric shock, whereby EaE=0). This is indicated by 
Defa = Defsa - maYa + da (EaE) ,   (2) 
where maYa shows the automatic stabilisers and da(EaE) indicate the 
externalities created by a common (or systemic) demand shock. The latter 
element is usually ignored, as it is usually supposed that shock Ea is 
asymmetric. 
Thus, the equilibrium output of country a is 
Ya = fa Defsa – ka (i - Πea) + haEa + qa (Ea E)  ,   (3) 
where 
fa  =  ca/(1 + ca ma) ;  ka  =  va/(1 + ca ma) ;  ha  =  1/(1 + ca ma); qa = ca da / 
(1+ca ma)= da fa; (ha + qaE)>0. 
Aggregate supply of country a is 
Πa = n Ya + Ua      .  (4) 
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The nominal interest rate is supposed to be determined by the central 
bank so as to ensure expected price stability in the medium run, i.e. in the 
absence of shocks. Hence, Πea = 0 and i = faDefsa/ka. This implies that in the 
medium run monetary policy is able to offset any effect of fiscal policy on 
output and prices via an appropriate level of the interest rate. 
Let us assume that the government of country a fully internalises the 
reaction function of the central bank and the increase of i due to deficit 
spending. Let us also suppose that the government cares both about output 
stabilisation and about the fiscal rule, concerning Defsa (hence also Defa), as 
it wants to minimise the following quadratic loss function La: 
La  =  ½ [Defs2a + la Y2a]  ,  (5) 
where la captures the relative preference for output stabilisation 
relative to the fiscal rule. 
Optimisation leads country a to the following decisions: 
Defsa = 0  ,    Defa = - ma ha Ea + daha (EaE),     (6) 
with  
Ya = haEa + qa (EaE);    Πa = n [ha Ea + qa (EaE)]  + Ua (7) 
The optimum solution is a structural balanced budget, combined 
with a deficit spending in the short term, utilising automatic stabilisers to 
counterbalance any possible negative asymmetric demand shock (Ea< 0, EaE 
= 0). Under these circumstances, the output gap becomes negative and 
inflation declines. The latter condition arises also with a positive supply 
shock (Ua< 0). Notice that, when the asymmetric demand shock Ea is 
negative, the deficit gap has to be positive and any numerical constraint on 
the deficit spending under the level - ma ha Ea is not a first best: indeed, if 
there exists a strongly negative asymmetric demand shock, there may arise 
a logical inconsistency between Defsa = 0 and Defa < 3% of GDP. On the 
other hand, no logical inconsistency arises if the asymmetric negative 
demand shock is smaller, so that -ma ha E a < 3% of GDP, or if there is a 
supply shock, given that in this event no deficit should be optimally 
chosen. Finally, if the negative demand shock hitting country a is common 
to other countries, a logical inconsistency may emerge with Defa < 3% of 
GDP, even if the shock Ea by itself is not so strong: this is because the 
common shock determines a non-linear effect. 
Let us now suppose that two countries, a and b, have a single 
currency and a common nominal and expected real interest rate (i - Πe); 
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in setting the nominal interest rate, they do not coordinate their fiscal 
policies, playing a Nash non-cooperative game. 
Their aggregate demand and supply are functionally similar, but 
their parameters differ (i.e. fa  ≠ fb; ka  ≠ kb; ha  ≠ hb; da ≠ db; however, n is 
common to both countries in order to simplify calculations). The monetary 
policy is now determined in a slightly more complicated way, so as to 
make the average expected inflation rate equal to zero, in the absence of 
shocks, i.e.  
(αYea +  β Yeb) = 0 ,  (8) 
where the superscripts e indicate the expected values, α and β 
identify the weights of country a and b respectively, with α + β = 1 and 
both positive. Hence the central bank sets  
i = (αfa Defsa + βfb Defsb) / (αka + βkb)   (9) 
Countries a and b, taking into account the central bank reaction 
function (9), minimise their loss function La, as in (5), and similarly Lb, as 
follows: 
Defsa = Defsb A – Ea (ha + qa E) C         ,   (10) 
Defsb = Defsa B – Eb (hb + qb E) D   (11) 
where 
                                  β2fa kbfb ka la                                    faβkb (αka  + βkb) la 
                     A = ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯  ;   C =  ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ ;     
                              (αka + βkb)2 + la(fa βkb)2                   (αka + βkb)2 + la(fa βkb)2 
 
                                  α2fa kbfb ka lb                                      fb αka (αka  + βkb) lb 
                   B =   ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯  ;   D =   ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯  
                             (αka + βkb)2 + lb(fb αka)2                    (αka + βkb)2 + lb(fb αka)2 
 
                                        - EbAD (hb + qbE) – EaC (ha + qaE) 
          Hence Defsa  =   ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯     (12)  
                                                      1 - AB                
 
with 0<AB<1  
and similarly, Defsb i s  c a l c u l a t e d .  T h e y  b o t h  d e p e n d  o n  d e m a n d  
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Equations (10), (11) and (12) show why there are negative spillovers 
created by the existence of a single monetary policy, without any 
coordination between fiscal policies. Each country attaches only limited 
importance to the impact of its deficit on the interest rate, effectively free 
riding in its fiscal decisions. On the other hand, each country reacts to the 
deficit change of the other country, leading to an excessive structural 
deficit. This bias is, however, lower if there is a systemic shock, as this 
provides a positive externality. In fact, the structural deficit spending of 
other governments does not only induce negative spillovers, but possibly 
also positive ones.  
Each country’s structural deficit is not set to zero any longer and this 
is due to a coordination failure. To show why this is indeed the case, it is 
sufficient to see that, if the quadratic loss function (L) where calculated on 
the basis of a common target, consisting of minimising the joint preference 
for a fiscal rule and for output stabilisation, as in  
L = ½ [(α Defsa +  β Defsb)2 + l (α Ya + β Yb)2]  ,  (13) 
with l equal to the average of la and lb, the optimal solution of (13), 
given (8), would be Defsa = 0 = Defsb. 
Consequently, (6) and (7) would hold true for country a and similarly 
it could be calculated for country b. This consideration is supposed to 
provide the rationale for setting the limits on deficit spending in the 
eurozone through the Stability and Growth Pact. Indeed, according to 
Uhlig (2003): 
Ideally fiscal policy should respond to the country-specific ‘fiscal 
demand shocks’, leaving it to the European Central Bank to 
respond to the average of the country-specific cost-push shocks. 
However, each fiscal authority will be tempted to try to improve 
the situation for its own country by, for example, expanding 
government demand or government deficits precisely when the 
ECB needs to combat cost-push shocks via higher interest rates. 
With all countries doing so, the ECB ends up combating not only 
the cost-push shocks, but the additional fiscal demands as well. 
Institutions need to be found that will ensure that country-specific 
fiscal policies stick to the task at hand and avoid this free-riding 
issue. The Stability and Growth Pact can be seen as doing exactly 
that: by limiting country-specific deficits, the temptation in each 
country to seek an improvement in its situation at the expense of 
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However, further elements emerging in (10), (11) and (12), which are 
ignored in the Stability and Growth Pact, should be taken into 
consideration: a distinction in the binding constraints on the fiscal 
behaviour of member states belonging to the single currency should be 
made, depending on whether there exists a negative supply or a negative 
demand shock, whether it is strong or mild and asymmetric or systemic. 
First, in the optimal solution, the ceiling on deficit spending should be 
different in the case of a supply and of a demand shock. The 3% constraint 
may be too large, facing a negative supply shock, i.e. when essentially no 
deficit spending should be allowed, according to equation (6). It may be 
correct, when facing a mild asymmetric negative demand shock – when the 
automatic stabilisers restore output at the potential level within the limits 
of the 3%; it may finally be sub-optimal when there is a strong and/or a 
systemic negative demand shock (hence automatic stabilisers are not 
sufficient and a discretionary expansionary fiscal policy is called for). The 
coordination failure is particularly absurd when there is a systemic 
negative demand shock, because each country is positively affected by the 
budgetary stimulus of other countries.  
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5.  MARKET INTEGRATION AND 
COMPETITION POLICY: 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 
GINEVRA BRUZZONE & LUIGI PROSPERETTI 
1.  Introduction 
While several objectives have been assigned to Community institutions 
since the very beginning and new targets and tasks have been added over 
time, the establishment of a single market in which competition is not 
distorted is still the core of the European project. It has been and remains 
an extraordinary experiment of integration that is respectful of national 
diversities.  
There are good reasons to keep a central role for market integration in 
the EU of the 21st century. Indeed, the European project cannot dismiss its 
freedom-oriented compass without losing much of its identity. The 
incentives for European undertakings to increase efficiency in order to meet 
world competition would become muted and the prospects of economic 
growth would dim.  
The accomplishment of the single market requires both negative and 
positive integration, i.e. the elimination of obstacles to the free movement 
of goods, services and factors of production and the adoption of common 
policies to ensure the proper operation of market forces.  
The objective has not been fully attained yet. The ratio of intra-US 
states exports to GDP is around 70% higher than the ratio of intra-EU15 
exports to GDP. For services, which account for some 70% of GDP and 
employment in advanced countries, markets are still organised along 
national lines and cross-border trade remains relatively underdeveloped. MARKET INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION POLICY | 73 
 
Only 22% of public procurement in the EU is published for tender and 
therefore open to competition.1 The establishment of a Community patent 
is still blocked by apparently insurmountable linguistic obstacles, although 
it is widely acknowledged that it would substantially reduce the costs for 
protection of intellectual property rights in Europe. The transposition of 
directives is slow and of low quality. The implementation of Community 
rules, contrary to what would be expected in a truly integrated area, leads 
in some cases to highly divergent results.  
It may be argued that the attainment of a single market where 
competition is not distorted is a moving target, which will never be reached 
definitively. It is necessary not only to remove barriers that still hamper the 
fundamental freedoms, but also to ensure that new barriers are not created, 
that competition rules continue to be applied so as to avoid distortions 
resulting from the conduct of companies or from state measures. Common 
policies have to be adapted to changing market conditions and 
technologies. And yet there is room for improving the current situation 
with new distortions arising from national interventions to cushion the 
impact of the economic slump.  
As to the political economy of regulation, it has long been recognised 
that removing barriers to open markets must confront a fundamental 
difficulty: the costs of greater market freedom inevitably fall on 
incumbents, who will therefore resist liberalisations, whereas those likely 
to benefit from them are usually less aware of the attendant advantages 
and therefore will not make their voice heard.2  
Over time, there have been several waves of low popularity of 
economic integration in the EU internal market, owing either to legitimate 
concerns regarding the protection of social values and cohesion, or to the 
lack of visible benefits, or, naturally, to the impact of market opening on 
vested interests. When the economy is down, the problem worsens, as 
many recent examples confirm once again.  
In autumn 2008, the outburst of the economic and financial crisis was 
followed by widespread calls for a suspension of the application of EU 
state aid policy so as to allow member states more room for manoeuvre in 
                                                      
1 See Ilzkovitz et al. (2007). 
2 On these issues, see Amato & Laudati (2001). 74 | BRUZZONE & PROSPERETTI 
 
managing the crisis. In the main the European Council managed to resist. 
However, the member states have taken quite a few measures designed to 
protect domestic industry and employment; in a number of cases they have 
notified the Commission aid measures which clearly discriminate in favour 
of national companies and therefore required adjustment before being 
considered compatible with the common market.  
A paramount example was provided by the process which led, in 
2006, to the adoption of the Directive on services in the internal market.3 In 
the context of the enlargement of the European Union, the initial proposal 
by the European Commission, aimed at removing residual obstacles to the 
fundamental freedoms in the services sector, was perceived as threatening 
social dumping within Europe and therefore met strong opposition by 
trade unions in several member states. Prolonged negotiations led by the 
European Parliament eventually succeeded in reaching an acceptable 
compromise, but numerous amendments weakening the original text were 
required before the Directive could become politically acceptable.4  
More generally, in recent years the demand for protectionism 
mounted in several member states.5 In this perspective, it has been widely 
debated whether some of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty 
imply a weakening of competition policies.  
As is well known, following strong pressure by the French 
government, undistorted competition is no longer included among the 
objectives of the EU, although it has maintained its place among the 
instruments necessary to achieve integrated markets. Article 3 of the new 
Treaty on European Union states that the Union shall establish an internal 
market and shall work “for the sustainable development of Europe based 
on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and 
a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment”; the promotion of scientific and technical progress is also 
mentioned, but the protection of competition is not. In order to find the 
statement whereby the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the EU 
                                                      
3 Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market. 
4 See Micossi (2006). 
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Treaty includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted, one has 
now to turn to a recital of Protocol 27.6  
One argument playing down the anti-competitive signal implicit in 
the removal of undistorted competition from the Treaty goals maintains 
that the protection of undistorted competition never was an end in itself 
(but is the promotion of technical progress an end in itself?). Furthermore, 
all the substantive rules on competition and the internal market contained 
in the EC Treaty have survived in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
Union,7 which in addition requires that the economic policy of the Union 
and the member states be based on the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition, and explicitly acknowledges that this 
principle favours an efficient allocation of resources.8 
Importantly, Article 86 of the EC Treaty remained untouched: 
therefore, services of general economic interest remain subject to the rules 
on competition “in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct 
the performance in law or in fact of the particular tasks assigned to them”, 
although in its application the Courts will also have to take into account a 
new Protocol 26 on services of general interest, which emphasises the 
importance of services of general interest in the interpretation of the rules 
of the Treaty.9 
                                                      
6 In Protocol 27 the High Contracting Parties specify that, to this end, the Union 
shall if necessary take action under the provisions of the Treaties, including Article 
352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. Under that article, the Council, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.  
7 It remains to be seen whether, without an express mention of the target of 
undistorted competition in the EU Treaty, Community courts will still be willing to 
adopt an extensive interpretation of the illegality, under EU law, of restrictions of 
competition resulting from state measures. In the past, several important 
judgments in which the Court of Justice upheld the alleged illegality of anti-
competitive measures adopted by member states referred to Articles 3.1.g and 10 of 
the EC Treaty as a legal basis. See, for instance, Court of Justice, judgment of 9 
September 2003, case C-198/01, Consorzio industrie Fiammiferi (CIF). 
8 Articles 119 and 120 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (formerly Articles 
4 and 98 of the EC Treaty). 
9 Interestingly, Article 16 of the EC Treaty, introduced by the Amsterdam/Nice 
Treaty, and now transposed in Article 14 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
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A pro-competitive single market agenda requires an active marketing 
effort vis-à-vis citizens and stakeholders so as to make the resulting 
benefits visible and understood by the public. There is also a need for 
effective measures supporting those who find it more difficult to cope with 
the consequences of integration. These measures will have to give 
particular attention to creating the conditions for enhanced flexibility of 
economic structures and factor markets, including appropriate support for 
human capital investment and employability. 
In this paper we focus on four main challenges that must be met by 
European market integration policies in the coming decade: i) becoming 
closer to citizens; ii) keeping stable principles while avoiding unjustified 
rigidities that can feed opposition to pro-competitive policies, and 
improving the integration of structural policies in Europe; iii) reaching the 
right level of harmonisation of common rules; and iv) improving the 
institutional arrangements for their implementation.  
2.  Becoming closer to citizens 
In principle, the protection of competition and the completion of the 
internal market are viewed favourably by European citizens. However, 
there are differences between member states. For instance, the responses 
provided by citizens of the larger countries to the assertion “Free 
competition is the best guarantee of economic prosperity” (Table 1) show 
heterogeneous social welfare functions, and these are quite stable, being 
only weakly affected by the financial crisis.  
Moreover, in responses to the question “Which aspects should be 
emphasised by the European institutions in the coming years, to strengthen 
the European Union in the future?”, the European internal market ranks 
tenth, after economic affairs, social and health issues, immigration, the fight 
against crime, environment, energy, solidarity with poorer regions, the 
fight against climate change and education (Figure 1). 
                                                                                                                                       
EU, was weaker since, while requiring the Union and the member states to take 
care that services of general economic interest operate on the basis of principles 
and conditions that enable them to fulfil their missions, it expressly recalled the 
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Table 1. Responses to the (2009) Eurobarometer assertion “Free competition is the 
best guarantee of economic prosperity” (%) 
  I agree  I do not agree  I do not know 
EU-15 63  26  11 
Germany 75  21  4 
France 48  40  12 
United Kingdom  63  22  15 
Spain 57  27  16 
Italy 69  23  8 
Source: Eurobarometer, September 2009. 
Figure 1. Responses to the question: “What aspects should be emphasised by the 
European institutions in the coming years, to strengthen the European 
Union in the future?” (%) 
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Looking at the very different policy areas, this ranking is no surprise 
and clearly reflects the increasing demand for security by European 
citizens. However, it also shows that proactive measures are needed to 
create a sense of ownership by European citizens as far as the policies for 
the market are concerned.  
There are several ways in which Community institutions can try to 
make such policies closer to stakeholders and, more generally, to citizens. 
They include, for instance, better regulation initiatives aimed at improving 
the quality of Community legislation, including extensive use of public 
consultation and ex-ante and ex-post impact assessment.  
It is also useful to try to quantify the costs of non-integration and 
restrictions of competition so as to increase awareness of the potential 
benefits of pro-competitive policies. Since publication of the authoritative 
Cecchini report on the ‘costs of non-Europe’ in 1988, increasingly 
sophisticated empirical studies have been undertaken for this purpose by 
the Commission and private researchers. For instance, when the discussion 
on the services Directive was raging, economic analysis usefully pointed 
out that the productivity gap between the EU and the US is largely 
explained precisely by the obstacles to the establishment of a single market 
for services.10 In preparation of the recent Single Market Review, it has been 
stressed that, as a result of the progress made over the period 1992-2006 in 
achieving an enlarged internal market of 25 member states (including 
liberalisation of network industries), “GDP and employment levels have 
increased significantly. The estimated gains from the internal market 
amount to 2.2% of EU value added and 1.4% of total employment (or 2.75 
million jobs). Moreover, these gains could be doubled with the removal of 
most of the remaining internal market barriers.”11 
Other empirical studies have purported to assess the effects of 
competition policy in promoting productivity growth, again with evidence 
of positive effects.12 
As to the enforcement of competition policies, in the last decade the 
Commission has strived to ‘modernise’ the system, with the ultimate aim of 
                                                      
10 Micossi (2006); van Ark et al. (2008, p.38). 
11 See Ilzkovitz et al. (2007).  
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increasing the awareness that enforcing competition rules is not a matter 
reserved to antitrust experts, but produces important economic benefits 
ultimately accruing to European consumers. Both in antitrust and the 
control of state aid, several notification requirements have been eliminated. 
In antitrust, the Commission placed an increasing emphasis on clear 
priority-setting by public enforcers, so as to focus on the infringements 
more likely to harm consumers, notably cartels. 
Under the new approach, the Commission is also making intensive 
use of fact-finding sectoral investigations in sectors that are crucial to 
European consumers, such as retail banking, gas, electricity and the 
pharmaceutical industry. Recent conferences promoted by the Directorate 
General for Competition address issues that, only ten years ago, would 
have appeared odd, such as “How has competition policy benefited 
European consumers?” or “How can we deliver continuous improvement 
in consumer relations?”13 Community institutions have also undertaken to 
make the control of state aid more intelligible to laymen. Procedures have 
been made more transparent and the Commission has started to explain its 
strategy concerning state aid in plain language, unprecedented in this area. 
Notably, it has tried to convey the message that EU member states should 
tend towards a system with “less and better targeted state aid” and that 
state aid measures can be justified only when they aim to remove clear 
market failures. It has also begun promoting private actions for damages 
arising from state aid.14 
Although it remains unlikely that policy areas such as antitrust and 
the control of state aid will ever become truly popular among European 
citizens, the efforts to make pro-market policies perceived by citizens as 
less distant from their private interests are indispensable, in order to avoid 
that the single market and competition policies continue to be viewed as 
matters for Eurocrats.   
                                                      
13 See the programme of the Conference on Competition and Consumers in the 21st 
Century, 21 October 2009, on DG Comp’s website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/events/2009/index.html).  
14 See the study conducted for the European Commission on these questions by 
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3.  Stable principles and integration of structural policies  
As anticipated, with the outburst of the economic and financial crisis, 
European control of state aid risked being set apart, and this scenario 
would certainly have had permanent consequences. The challenge for the 
Commission was to keep the basic principles unchallenged, while showing 
sufficient flexibility to meet the demands for state aid that were justified by 
the need to address a crisis of unprecedented gravity. The Commission was 
sufficiently capable of meeting the challenge. It founded its criteria for the 
assessment of state aid during the crisis on a special legal basis, namely 
Article 87.3.b of the Treaty, which allows the Commission to consider 
compatible with the Common market state aid measures needed to 
“remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. In so 
doing, it was able to rely on more flexible assessment, without prejudice to 
the normal criteria that will continue to be applied to state aid when the 
system will return to normality. The Commission, although proceeding 
amongst harsh criticisms and, somehow, also by trial and error due to the 
novelty and complexity of the economic environment,15 succeeded in 
avoiding wrecking the system. Member states have always notified aid 
plans, the Commission has swiftly examined and generally approved them, 
in some cases requiring some changes and the removal of clearly 
protectionist measures. Not only has the system of state aid control held 
out, it has also helped governments to discriminate on the merits between 
requests of aid during the economic turmoil. Unexpectedly, although 
several problems remain unresolved, the European regime has come to be 
viewed as a best practice internationally. 
A call for flexibility in the enforcement of pro-competitive policies 
also emerges from the requests for a better exploitation of the synergies 
between different European structural policy instruments.16 It can be 
                                                      
15 Some changes are evident, for instance, in the position taken in the December 
2008 Communication on the recapitalisation of banks, compared with the October 
2008 Communication on State aid in the banking sector. 
16 For instance, Ilkowitz et al. (2007) argue that “internal market policies contribute 
towards creating the appropriate framework conditions for European firms to be 
competitive at world level. Other policies, including in particular competition 
(state aids, merger control and antitrust) and innovation (R&D, education, ICT) 
policies, have similar objectives. Potential gains from integrating these different 
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argued that the quest for integration of policies entails the risk that 
industrial policy objectives will systematically prevail over the objective of 
maintaining an open market economy based on undistorted competition. 
But it is not necessarily so: a more integrated approach to structural policies 
can also be undertaken without weakening the fundamental principles of 
each policy area.  
For instance, the need to reconcile competition policy with the 
promotion of efficiency and competitiveness does not necessarily require 
external constraints, but only the application of proper competition 
principles. In modern competition policy, it is clear that the goal is not the 
maintenance of a fragmented market structure, but the protection of the 
competitive pressures that are essential to the operation of the market 
process. Efficiency is seen as a value, not a risk for competition. 
Competition rules are not, in themselves, an impediment to the growth of 
European companies, even through mergers and acquisitions. 
Acknowledgement that cooperation among competitors may, under certain 
conditions, produce positive results, for instance in standard-setting, is also 
fully compatible with a modern approach to the application of antitrust 
rules.  
On the other hand, when requests of weak enforcement of market 
principles are justified on the basis of social concerns, giving up the 
objective of a single market with undistorted competition does not seem 
the right response, because of the negative impact it would have on growth 
prospects. A much better strategy is to support further progress in market 
integration, including the removal of still high barriers to the mobility of 
labour, with a renewed social agenda and better functioning welfare 
regimes.17 
4.  The proper degree of harmonisation 
4.1  Supranational regulation 
From the very beginning, the search for the proper degree of harmonisation 
in the definition of rules for the internal market has been a matter for 
discussion. In order to assess these issues, it may be useful first to address 
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the more general question of regulatory models in a multinational context 
such as that of the European Union. Considering our goals here, we will 
refer to the very broad definition of regulation set forth by Stigler in 1981, 
whereby regulation is any “attempt on the part of government to use its 
authority to influence the economic behaviour of non-government 
agents”.18 
There are three main economic reasons for supranational regulation: 
i) the need to remove barriers among states that reduce trade flows and 
therefore welfare, ii) the presence of domestic market failure spillover 
effects towards other countries and iii) the greater effectiveness of 
supranational, as opposed to domestic, regulation stemming from 
regulatory economies of scale.  
The first of these reasons underpins the whole Treaty. Article 5 
perfectly captures the other two, in stating: 
in areas which do not fall within its executive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and 
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community. 
As pointed out by Pelkmans (1998),19 regulatory effects of scale and 
cross-country effects are therefore two necessary preconditions for 
Community regulation.  
Where these conditions are met, supranational regulation can 
therefore be efficient, assuming one does not underestimate the extreme 
complexity of the general backdrop: market failure-derived problems can 
indeed take on varying degrees of severity depending on the country 
concerned, just as perceptions of said severity by different national 
communities may vary widely. 
As for the instruments of supranational regulation, they can be 
analysed as coming under two main categories: ex-ante regulation and ex-
post regulation. Ex ante regulation is generally based on Articles 94 and 95 (1) 
of the Treaty, traditionally used to remove obstacles to the exercise of 
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fundamental freedoms, as well as to eliminate significant competitive 
distortions. According to Barnard’s taxonomy (2004),20 this type of 
regulation can take on different forms:  
•  Full harmonisation uses regulation to set mandatory standards, the 
adoption of which prohibits member states from introducing 
different standards, including more stringent ones. Typically, these 
are ‘slow’ harmonisation measures, with member states attempting to 
negotiate instruments to defend their own firms, as the harmonising 
regulation may be good or bad for them. 
•  Minimal harmonisation sets minimum standards and leaves member 
states free to adopt more stringent ones. 
•  Optional harmonisation sets standards that producers in any given 
country may adopt for sales in their domestic markets, but which they 
must adopt for sales in other countries. 
Article 94 empowers the Council to issue directives “for the 
approximation of regulations which directly affect the establishment or 
functioning of the internal market”; it requires unanimity and produces full 
harmonisation. It proved cumbersome and ineffectual, and was eventually 
superseded by the Single Act (in force since 1987) with Article 95, a far 
more flexible instrument.  
Article 95 empowers the Council, acting by qualified majority voting, 
to adopt measures for the approximation of regulations of member states 
“which have as their object the establishment of the internal market”. It was 
underpinned by the famous 1979 Cassis de Dijon decision by the Court of 
Justice,21 which had strengthened the presumption in favour of freedom of 
circulation of goods, services, capital and people, under the principle of 
mutual recognition of national legislations and had subjected the 
introduction of restrictions to the strict tests of imperative need, adequacy 
and proportionality of the restrictive measures. From that moment onward, 
the Commission could concentrate its attention in harmonising legislation 
on the measures that were required to eliminate restrictions that could be 
justified under the Cassis de Dijon test. 
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Article 95 achieved a delicate balance between the requirements of 
freedom and the protection of legitimate national interests of protection of 
consumers, workers and the environment; it was revised by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in order to strengthen these protections. Thus, the 
Commission, in its proposals to the Council concerning health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer protection, must take as a base a 
high level of protection. After the adoption of a harmonisation measure, a 
member state can maintain national provisions for major reasons 
pertaining to public policy objectives recognised by Community law,22 but 
has to notify the Commission and the other member states, setting in 
motion a review procedure that can approve or reject the measure. New 
measures can also be introduced by member states in harmonised areas, 
but only on the basis of new scientific evidence relating to the protection of 
the environment or the working environment. All Community measures 
are subject to safeguard clauses that make it possible to reassess their 
adequacy in the face of evidence of insufficient protection.   
The Court of Justice made it clear that Article 95 can be used to 
eliminate likely obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms as 
well as appreciable distortions of competition in the internal market.23  
Recourse to these instruments has evolved over time. 
4.2  Common rules for products 
Initially, full harmonisation measures under Article 94 were used 
extensively to standardise all products from a technical standpoint, and 
their application would be sought whenever a country barred the goods of 
another from access to its domestic market, with obvious costs in terms of 
competition and innovation.  
As was mentioned, the Court of Justice’s Cassis de Dijon ruling 
represented a turning point. It clearly stated that full harmonisation was 
normally unnecessary, and that different countries could legitimately opt 
for different forms of regulation, provided that regulatory restrictions 
complied with necessity and proportionality criteria for the pursuit of 
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regulatory goals recognised by Community law.24 The ruling thus 
sanctioned a principle of mutual recognition for regulatory regimes, subject 
however to green-lighting on the part of the country receiving goods 
regulated in their country of origin. The principle obviously allows for 
regulatory competition, insofar as national regulations that do not meet the 
criteria of necessity and proportionality are made to compete against those 
applied in other countries.25 
As of the 1980s, the focus of full harmonisation measures was thus 
gradually restricted to product security purposes, and flexible 
harmonisation based on essential requirements of protection became the 
rule. This evolution was favoured by the so-called ‘New Approach’ to 
internal market legislation developed by the Commission after the entry 
into force of the Single Act. The New Approach was aimed at limiting the 
scope of harmonising directives to the task of defining the essential 
requirement of protection, while leaving the determination of technical 
details to voluntary standards, prepared under Community procedures by 
official standardisation bodies and published in the Official Journal, the 
adoption of which gives rise to a compliance presumption.  
Therefore, as far as the features of products are concerned, there has 
been a clear trend away from full harmonisation in favour of increased 
flexibility.  
                                                      
24 In the case in point, Germany was ruled against for having imposed, absent 
adequate justification, limitations to the sale of goods that had received all the 
required authorisations in their country of origin.  
25 This principle is however far from implying a home-country rule, insofar as the 
verification of the equivalence of the levels of protection is performed by the host 
country, and not by the country of origin. A country-of-origin rule would 
conversely assume that compliance checks have been performed once and for all 
by the product’s country of origin. This distinction assumed great relevance in 
discussions on the Services Directive, as the Commission initally tried to push 
through a country-of-origin principle, while the solution ultimately adopted was 
that of mutual recognition under the control of the country receiving the service. 
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4.3  Commercial relations between business and consumers 
It would be misleading, however, to view the evolution of Community 
regulation as a one-way trend towards flexibility of regulatory choices at 
the national level. The most prominent counter-example is in the area of 
consumer protection and pertains to commercial practices aimed at 
reaching consumers in the different member states. In this area, the absence 
of common rules, including the minimum harmonisation approach 
followed by the 1984 Directive that set common rules on misleading 
advertising, led to significant divergences in member states which 
increased the cost to business of exercising internal market freedoms and 
made consumers uncertain of their rights. Therefore, Community 
institutions decided to shift to a maximum harmonisation approach: 
uniform rules establishing a high level of consumer protection are adopted 
at Community level and member states are prevented from adopting 
stricter rules. A maximum harmonisation approach has already been 
followed in the 2005 Directive setting common rules for unfair commercial 
practices in relations between business and consumers.26 The same 
approach also inspires the recent proposal of a broad Directive on 
consumers rights, which will consolidate four different directives in the 
area of consumer protection.27  
4.4  Common rules for services  
Since the 1980s, the Court of Justice acknowledged that the mutual 
recognition principle can also be applied to services. However, it soon 
became clear that the barriers to the establishment of a single market for 
services cannot be removed solely on a case-by-case basis, by relying on the 
direct application of the rules of the Treaty on the freedom of establishment 
and the freedom to provide services. The removal of barriers required 
coordination of national regulatory models, i.e. common rules.  
Most directives follow a sectoral approach. They cover, for instance, 
the regulated professions, insurance, banking and financial services, 
services relating to travel and tourism, television broadcasting, air and rail 
                                                      
26 Directive 2005/29/CE. 
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transport, electronic communications, electricity and gas and postal 
services.  
The sectoral approach, however, was not able to tackle the barriers to 
the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services existing 
for a myriad of ever-evolving services that would never be covered by ad 
hoc directives. Therefore, the 2006 Framework Directive on services was 
adopted with the aim of removing all remaining barriers to the internal 
market for services through horizontal framework rules.28 The Directive 
requires member states to adopt measures of administrative simplification 
and to remove unjustified regulatory restrictions. For restrictions included 
on a black list, there is a irrefutable presumption of incompatibility with 
Community rules. For restrictions included on a grey list, the presumption 
is rebuttable. As for the provision of services, the Directive introduces a 
statutory requirement for member states to apply the mutual recognition 
principle and allows them to impose additional requirements only for a 
narrow set of public policy reasons. Moreover, it strengthens 
administrative cooperation mechanisms. 
4.5  ...including network industries 
The experience of Community rules in network industries provides 
important hints on the preconditions that must be met for a successful 
setting of common rules.  
Pro-competitive Community regulat i o n  o f  s u c h  i n d u s t r i e s  h a s  
traditionally met strong opposition due to the influence of public 
ownership and the political weight of employee unions, and therefore 
common rules aimed at opening markets to competition, as a rule, have 
progressed slowly.  
A relevant exception is provided by telecommunications, but it is 
easy to show how the success of European regulatory policies in this area 
should be attributed to rather unusual occurrences in the first half of the 
1980s. In that period, at the international level, the fall in prices and the 
very high growth of the US telecommunications industry, unleashed by the 
structural separation of AT&T in 1982, were worrying developments to 
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already covered by specific Community regulation and some specific services such 
as, for instance, gambling activities or services provided by notaries.  88 | BRUZZONE & PROSPERETTI 
 
European policy-makers, who feared for Europe’s competitiveness. The 
very same developments were worrying for European producers of 
telecommunications equipment, who feared falling irremediably behind 
their American competitors, who were enjoying such exceptional market 
growth. These parallel worries helped to foster a highly effective alliance 
between the Commission and hardware producers, which was successful 
in overcoming the strong resistance of telecommunications services 
incumbents. Such a success was greatly facilitated by the widespread 
perception that these operators were highly inefficient, as it became 
immediately obvious in the UK, when the privatisation of BT and the 
partial liberalisation of the market yielded immediate benefits in terms of 
price and quality. Nothing succeeds like success, and this convinced even 
the countries that were initially most reluctant towards liberalisation, such 
as France and Italy, to gradually accept these policies. 
The policy mix put in place to liberalise the sector was an interplay 
between Council directives, based upon Articles 94 and 95, and 
Commission directives, based on Article 86, which were politically feasible 
because of the lack of significant opposition to the liberalisation measures. 
Regulatory policy in telecommunications was strongly supported by the 
antitrust provisions of the Treaty. In the early 1990s, the European 
Commission indeed clearly signalled that it intended to extensively use 
Article 82, together with Article 86 of the Treaty, in order to promote 
competition in network industries. In the Sealink/Stena case, in which it 
developed its ‘essential facility’ doctrine, it – unusually – decided to 
publish the full text of a decision, despite the fact that the companies 
concerned had in the meantime settled the controversy, and in so doing, it 
naturally set an effective precedent. 
Experience in the telecoms sector continued to provide important 
hints in the following years. The new regulatory framework for electronic 
communications, enacted with five directives in 2002, endorses the 
principle whereby regulation should be used only where the application of 
competition rules is insufficient, includes rules for the access to the network 
and establishes common minimum rules concerning universal service and 
consumer protection. The package of proposals was very well prepared by 
the Commission, with a clear indication of the objectives and the proposed 
measures. It has been observed that “this greatly helped to put the debate 
on a concrete track for a constructive solution, which was acceptable to all 
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European Parliament, the basic structures for a solution had largely been 
accepted and the debate could be based on this common ground”.29   
The experience in the energy sector, whether gas or electricity, was 
completely different. For a very long time there was no convincing threat 
that procedures would be opened by the Commission against incumbent 
operators on the basis of Article 82 of the Treaty, with reference to the 
essential facility doctrine. A few attempts were made at national level, but 
these were rather rare, and often late: in the E.ON Ruhrgas case, the 
Bundeskartellamt’s objection was not endorsed by the German authorities, 
and elsewhere no significant case occurred prior to 2000. This time lag 
proved very costly in terms of regulatory policy, as it allowed incumbent 
operators in the energy sector to prepare for liberalisation (it should be 
remembered that drafting the various versions of the gas and electricity 
Directives took about a decade), by thoroughly saturating existing power 
and gas lines through the simple expedient of renegotiating take-or-pay 
supply contracts, while extending their duration and increasing their 
amounts.  
Not having intervened during such a drawn-out ‘bottleneck 
engineering’ phase, the Commission was subsequently faced with 
considerable difficulties when new competitors repeatedly met the 
objection by incumbents that they couldn’t access the grids because of near-
total capacity saturation. Following an extensive sector inquiry, the 
Commission published a not particularly incisive Green Paper still 
identifying – nearly 15 years after the submission of the first draft Directive 
on the electricity market – harmonisation measures as the main way 
forward, and proposing a goal, that of “developing a European grid”, to be 
furthered through the setting up of a European gas and electricity 
regulator.    
Now, although the advisability of Community intervention in this 
field is hardly challenged in theory, since there are clear cross-country 
effects and equally clear economies of scale to be achieved in regulating 
these sectors, a number of obstacles exist. In a strategic situation where 
security of supply is all but certain, both for gas and electricity, different 
national communities will no doubt react quite differently to the risk of 
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supply disruption, and for that matter have different degrees of tolerance 
vis-à-vis competition-distorting measures in energy markets.  
Moreover, it isn’t immediately clear that (let’s say) French consumers 
would be willing to ration their own electricity supply in order to provide 
power to (let’s say) Italian consumers, should the latter be in need. In this 
framework, where the calls for market and policy harmonisation strategies 
are morally uplifting but devoid of any concrete impact, the Commission 
finally concluded to resort – on a much larger scale than it had done 
previously – to antitrust policy. After a detailed sector inquiry in electricity 
and gas,30 the Commission has initiated foreclosure cases against E.ON, 
EDF, ENI, Electrabel, Distrigaz and other companies, thus supplementing 
possible local regulatory and antitrust slackness.31  
5.  Coordinated implementation  
The application of the subsidiarity principle involves not only the level at 
which rules have to be established (Community versus national versus 
local), but also how centralised the application of Community rules should 
be.  
In its recent recommendation on measures to improve the 
functioning of the single market, the Commission stresses that it is essential 
for a well functioning single market to have a proper system of 
transposition, application, enforcement and monitoring of the common 
rules and that further work is still necessary in this area.32 Internal market 
scoreboards show that timeliness and quality in the transposition of single 
market directives are still scarce. Even when directives have formally been 
transposed, the frequency of infringement proceedings against member 
states is a signal of bad implementation. Supplementary provisions that are 
not necessary to transpose a directive are often added in the implementing 
legislation, well beyond cases of shared competence where this is justified 
by Community rules setting only minimum requirements.  
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31 On the policy challenges in the energy sector, see the chapter by V. Termini in 
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32 C(2009) 4728 final. See also the Commission Communication, “A single market 
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The Commission therefore recommends that member states take a 
more pro-active role in managing the single market, ensuring that it 
functions well. In particular, it advocates a better coordination on single 
market issues within member states, as well as initiatives aimed to facilitate 
coordination and promote closer links between the administrations of 
different member states. It envisages exchanges of officials responsible for 
single market issues between national administrations and active cross-
border cooperation on single market issues becoming part of the national 
administrative culture. These can be viewed as the embryonic stages of an 
integrated European public administration. 
Further steps have already been taken in specific policy areas. An 
important reference is provided by the institutional architecture for the 
application of Community competition rules. For the control of state aid 
and for merger control, enforcement is fully centralised, i.e. the 
Commission has exclusive competence; for the application of Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty, on anti-competitive agreements and abuse of 
dominance, however, the task of public enforcement is shared by the 
Commission and the competition authorities of member states. The 
Commission and national competition authorities operate as a network 
(European Competition Network), with its own rules for the allocation of 
cases. For instance, the Commission is considered well placed to deal with 
cases involving more than three member states and when a new 
competition issue arises, since only Commission decisions are subject to the 
scrutiny of the Court of Justice. The European Competition Network also 
works as a forum for ‘soft harmonisation’ in the use of instruments and 
procedures for the implementation of competition rules, i.e. in an area that 
has not been harmonised by Community law.  
While European Community agencies have been established in 
several technical areas and for specific scientific or managerial tasks,33 so 
far neither in network industries nor in financial sectors have proposals 
aimed at full centralisation of supervisory and regulatory tasks at the 
European level met a sufficient consensus. The idea to set up a European 
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regulatory authority for telecommunications meets the opposition of a 
number of leading countries (United Kingdom, France, Germany). For 
similar reasons, the proposal of a European regulator for gas or electricity is 
unlikely to succeed, at least in the near future. Also the need to strengthen 
prudential supervision in financial markets, strongly highlighted by the 
recent financial turmoil, led to new institutional arrangements but not to 
the establishment of fully centralised European authorities.  
In most sectors, however, there is a clear trend towards closer forms 
of coordination for the implementation of Community rules. The 
arrangements emerging in the different areas are worth studying.  
Groups or networks linking up the regulatory or supervisory 
authorities of member states have been established in areas as different as 
electricity and gas,34 consumer protection,35 public procurement36 and the 
protection of personal data.37 More ambitious institutional arrangements 
have been developed for electronic communications and financial services.  
In electronic communications, the 2002 framework regulatory 
package established a dynamic relationship between the Commission and 
national regulatory authorities. It is not the Commission alone who decides 
what markets should be regulated. The Commission issues a list of 
candidate markets, which it periodically updates, but the decision 
concerning whether, and with what instruments, to regulate each of these 
markets in any country, is bestowed upon the national regulatory authority 
(NRA). 
The NRA needs to assess each of the candidate markets in order to 
ascertain if they are sufficiently competitive. If they are not, it must impose 
obligations upon operators having a significant market power; the 
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35 Enforcement network for consumer protection, established by regulation (EC) 
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36 Public procurement network. 
37 Data Protection Working Party, set up by Directive 95/46/EC with an advisory 
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appropriateness of such obligations must be assessed in the light of the 
competition provisions of the Treaty, and of relevant jurisdictional 
precedents. The draft decisions of the national authorities must be notified 
to the Commission, which has one month to analyse them, and, if it feels it 
necessary, to send its comments to the national authority. If the 
Commission considers that the proposed measures create barriers to the 
internal market, or has doubts concerning their coherence with Community 
law, it can undertake an in-depth analysis for two more months, and it may 
eventually request that the proposed measure is cancelled. The 
Commission’s view of this consultation mechanism is that it has ensured a 
consistent approach, in particular regarding market definition and SMP 
analysis across Europe, brought sound economic analysis to the market 
review process and resulted in increased transparency. Overall, this form of 
cooperation between the Commission and NRAs led to better regulation 
based on competition principles and contributed to the development of a 
common European regulatory culture.  
The Commission's comments on the proposed remedies gave 
guidance towards a consistent regulatory approach across Europe, whilst 
taking into account specific national circumstances. The Commission 
focused on ensuring that remedies are appropriate, i.e. based on the nature 
of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the 
objectives laid down in the Framework Directive. Implementing a similar 
approach in the electricity and gas markets would probably be quite useful, 
especially if we consider the fact that national regulators in such sectors 
have to bear strong pressures from their national incumbents, which often 
limit their effectiveness. Moreover, it could help to reduce divergences in 
the way national regulators are proceeding on a number of relevant 
matters, such as network access and the rules to be applied to customers 
that become eligible. 
For financial services, since 2000 a new decision-making structure has 
been established under the ‘Lamfalussy approach’ with the aim to improve 
regulation across the EU. Initially it concerned only the security sector, but 
afterwards was extended to banking, insurance and investment funds. 
Under the Lamfalussy approach, framework directives set out broad 
regulatory principles (level 1), while detailed secondary legislation is 
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governments and chaired by the Commission (level 2).38 Further sectoral 
committees composed of national supervisory authorities39 play an 
advisory role on secondary legislation and monitor the implementation of 
common rules in the member states, with the task to ensure convergence 
but without binding powers (level 3). 
Recently, the Commission has approved a new package of draft 
legislative proposals aimed at strengthening the European system of 
financial supervision following the financial crisis.40 As far as the 
implementation of Community rules is concerned, three sectoral European 
Supervisory Authorities,41 which will be composed of representatives of 
national supervisory authorities and of the European Systemic Risk Board, 
will take over all the functions of the previous level 3 committees with key 
additional powers, including the power to issue binding technical 
standards in specific prudential areas, as well as binding interpretations of 
EU rules and orders to comply in individual cases. They will also be able to 
settle disagreements between national supervisors and will play a 
coordination role in emergency situations.   
Interestingly, even in the much less technical area of the Directive on 
services in the internal market, special institutional arrangements have 
been deemed necessary to ensure an effective and coordinated 
implementation of Community rules. In particular, each member state is 
required to present a report to the Commission on the authorisation 
regimes and the potentially restrictive regulatory provisions that it intends 
to maintain, demonstrating their compatibility with Community rules. 
                                                      
38 European Banking Committee, European Insurance and Operational Pensions 
Committee, European Securities Committee and Financial Conglomerates 
Committee. 
39 Committee of European Banking Regulators, Committee of European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, and Committee of European Securities 
Regulators.  
40 The proposal provides for a two-tier system, with a totally new upper level 
focusing on systemic risk and macro-prudential supervision (European Systemic 
Risk Board – ESRB) and a lower level for micro-prudential supervision (European 
System of Financial Supervisors – ESFS).  
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Each report will be forwarded to all member states and will be subject to 
mutual evaluation. Moreover, the introduction of new restrictions has to be 
notified to the Commission and reviewed under a Community procedure. 
The notification and mutual evaluation procedure is essential to bring out 
in the open and subject to review all measures potentially violating 
Community law. Notably, the provisions of the Directive do not entail any 
new legal principle since they basically incorporate general principles 
already established by the case law of the Court of Justice. However, by 
imposing transparent procedures and a systematic review of restrictions, 
which have to be notified to the Commission and member states and 
justified one by one, they strengthen the presumption in favour of free 
movement and open access.  
6.  Conclusions 
Any supranational regulatory activity faces a highly complex scenario, 
where market failure problems may be rather different, and of different 
degrees of seriousness, from country to country. Furthermore, there are 
bound to be substantial differences across national communities concerning 
the perceptions of such seriousness. Citizens of different countries will also 
have different stances vis-à-vis regulation, because they will have different 
value systems, and different views concerning the correct degree of 
consumer protection. 
Supranational regulatory intervention dictated by the overall aim of 
defending free trade among member states cannot ignore the fact that there 
are potentially relevant trade-offs between such aim and other relevant 
objectives of economic policy. It cannot ignore, either, the costs of 
regulation: if it's true, in general, that free trade fosters welfare, social 
welfare can be negatively affected also by regulatory intervention.  
Trying to implement extensive harmonisation policies is bound to 
foster diffuse resistance to regulation. In some instances (e.g. popular 
English press), this can be explained with historical factors, such as the 
remaining fragments of imperial culture and the insularity of the policy 
debate in the United Kingdom. In others – such as for services publics in 
France – it can be explained by differing political-economic traditions.  
But a quick search on the internet concerning European regulation 
quickly reveals hundreds of sites, blogs and discussion fora, airing violent 
opposition to one or more Community regulatory measures, and it seems 96 | BRUZZONE & PROSPERETTI 
 
doubtful that they can be liquidated by simply labelling them as the result 
of ignorance or manipulation. 
Over-regulation at Community level is certainly not the answer to the 
current challenges. The strategy for internal market and competition 
policies in the 21st century requires a more sophisticated combination of 
measures: better regulation initiatives to make Community policies closer 
to citizens and their benefits more easily perceived; the safeguard of the 
fundamental market principles without undue rigidities; appropriate 
flanking measures to meet social concerns and a careful pursuit of the right 
degree of harmonisation in the different policy areas. Finally, it requires the 
search for more effective forms of interaction between EU and national 
public administrations, with a view to eliminate the current weaknesses in 
transposition and application which undermine the establishment of a true 
single market. 
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6.  ENERGY AND EUROPEAN 
INSTITUTIONS 
VALERIA TERMINI  
1.  Background 
As was the case at the end of the 1950s, Europe today faces an 
extraordinarily difficult situation in the energy sector. The Rome Treaties 
had then provided a solution and long-term prospects to the energy supply 
problems of the previous decade. The European Atomic Energy 
Community Treaty entered into force on 1 January 1958, with the aim to 
guarantee a shared approach to energy security. These institutions not only 
provided Europe’s civilian nuclear energy industry with a common 
strategy: they also contributed to the launching of the European Economic 
Community.1 
Today, for the European Union, the energy issue is even more 
complex. Externally, the issue involves negotiating with primary-source 
producing countries ‘with a single voice’ and facing competition from high-
growth countries that are currently the largest energy consumers. Between 
now and 2030, over 87% of the incremental demand for energy will be 
accounted for by emerging economies, and just over half of the increase 
                                                      
1 Together with the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the 
participants in the Rome Conference also signed, on 25 March 1957, a Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) which entered 
into force on 1 January 1958. Subsequently, at the Rome Summit convened for the 
10th anniversary of the EEC and the EAEC (or Euratom), held 9-30 May 1967, a 
decision was reached to unify the bodies of the three communities: ECSC, EEC and 
EAEC (initially separate, with the exception of the Assembly and the Court of 
Justice); on 1 July 1967, the Treaty merging the executive bodies entered into force.   ENERGY AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS | 99 
 
will be represented by China and India (International Energy Agency, 
2008). A further difficulty is that of negotiating with countries and regions 
whose use of energy sources is basically political, as is the case with Russia, 
Venezuela and Nigeria.  
Measures must also be taken internally. The EU countries’ industrial 
development strategies require innovation; the huge investments needed to 
develop alternative energy sources have to be planned and implemented; 
the transmission infrastructure has to be developed and cross-border 
connections strengthened so as to broaden the spectrum of potential 
primary source supply, inter alia in terms of countries, and interconnect 
domestic markets. Policies are also needed to contain energy demand 
growth (European Commission, 2007).2 
The role and mandate of European institutions remain crucial in this 
respect. Experience has shown that long-term European energy policies 
readily revert to wishful thinking when European institutions are not given 
a clear mandate.  
True, the Lisbon Treaty is innovative. It stresses the need for 
European solutions regarding energy and environment, especially 
considering the urgent need for global strategies. But if we focus on the 
ability to implement a common energy policy, we see that unfortunately 
the Treaty is only innovative in terms of recommendations to national 
governments. Also, this is not enough to overcome the major contradiction 
between domestic policies and the European energy strategy – a 
contradiction that continues to jeopardise the emergence of a European 
market. And that explains the limited effectiveness of policies and the 
consequences described below. Before analysing policies in substantive 
terms, section 2 will however attempt to recall the main institutional phases 
that have led Europe from Euratom to the Lisbon Treaty.   
2.  European Institutions: A necessary but insufficient 
precondition. From Euratom to the Lisbon Treaties 
With the 1958 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC), the six founding countries, including Italy in a 
significant momentum-giving role, aimed to share – in the new nuclear 
                                                      
2 Under a business as usual assumption, European energy demand is scheduled to 
increase at an annual rate of 1.7%.  100 | VALERIA TERMINI 
 
industry – the definition of joint safeguard and security criteria, and the 
implementation of an investment policy no single state had ever 
contemplated. Furthermore, the Treaty aimed to “ensure that all users in 
the Community receive a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear 
fuels”, to quote the fourth mission listed under Title I of the Treaty, and 
defined measures to this end.3 The achievement of this goal was to be 
guaranteed through the newly set up International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). The IAEA was granted a right of option on ores, source materials 
and special fissile materials produced in the territories of member states 
and an exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to the supply of ores, 
source materials and special fissile materials coming from inside the 
Community or from outside. 
In the face of this institutional architecture, the European energy 
policy outlined in the Lisbon Treaty appears to be a more or less ordered 
set of wishes and invitations to show goodwill towards member states.  
Institutions, however, are only a precondition, necessary but not 
sufficient, for the development of a common energy policy strategy. Even 
then, in the wake of the original treaty, a contradiction had quickly 
appeared between the domestic policies of a number of member states, 
such as France and Italy, and the European strategy for a common nuclear 
policy. Interestingly, this contradiction inevitably ended up weakening not 
only Europe’s energy policies but also its very institutions.  
In particular, the European medium- and long-term strategy soon 
entered into conflict with the foreign policy of President De Gaulle, who by 
1958 had significantly dampened the French push for European political 
integration. He opposed in fact the United Kingdom’s entry in 1963 and 
refused to bind France to the pact on civilian uses of atomic energy. It was 
also De Gaulle who opted for the ‘force de frappe’: a nuclear arsenal aimed at 
granting French foreign policy the power of nuclear deterrence. France thus 
embarked on its nuclear testing programme: starting with Gerboise Bleue, 
tested in the Algerian Sahara in 1960, through to the first H bomb in 1968, 
and the explosion in the Polynesian atoll of Mururoa in 1995.4 Euratom’s 
role was thus made weaker.  
                                                      
3 Article 52 of the Treaty. 
4 This approach was reaffirmed in 2006, when President Jacques Chirac, addressing 
military staff stationed at a nuclear submarine base in Brittany, stated that France, 
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As we know, France’s opposition was at the time compounded by 
Italy’s difficulties. Italy was then at the vanguard of research and 
development work for the first facilities implementing the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy. Following projects launched in 1953 by the National 
Committee for Nuclear Research (Comitato nazionale per le ricerche 
nucleari – CNRN) with the United States and with World Bank funding, 
following the building of the first nuclear power plants in Garigliano, 
Latina and Trino Vercellese, in the early 1960s Italy was forced to scale 
down its role for domestic reasons5 until the referendum eventually put a 
‘final’ stop to Italy’s nuclear policy. The dismantling in Italy of transatlantic 
nuclear research projects, together with France’s attitude and De Gaulle’s 
opposition, gradually led to a scaling down of Euratom. Having come into 
conflict with the domestic policy of two of the leading founding states, the 
Community’s energy strategy shattered and since then has proved difficult 
to rebuild.  
The oil crises of the 1970s, with the inflation, industrial restructuring 
and even lifestyle changes they brought in their wake, were contended 
with individually by the European countries. Given the lack of a common 
policy, industrialised countries found themselves singularly deprived of 
bargaining power when faced with the new primary energy producers’ 
cartel, and were thus vulnerable to severe consequences for their economic 
growth. To this the Germans responded by adopting policies geared to 
major industrial restructuring and currency revaluation, while the Italians 
and the British conversely went for a set of competitive devaluations.  
In other words, during the first energy crisis, Europe did not speak 
with one voice. Euratom’s Agency was still there. But its history had 
already shown how difficult it is to set up institutions capable of giving 
Europe this one voice in terms of energy security, while avoiding conflict 
with member states’ domestic strategies.  
                                                                                                                                       
if threatened with a terrorist attack, could resort to nuclear retaliation. According 
to Chirac, “the vital interests to be protected would include both the security of 
strategic supplies, such as energy, and the defence of allied nations”.  
5 See Rigano (2002) for a review of the changes in Italy’s strategy, which led it from 
front-line involvement in early civilian nuclear projects to their scrapping in the 
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The issue was to arise again, albeit with different connotations, after 
signing the Maastricht Treaty. Europe decided to go for deregulation of 
both electricity and gas markets in order to develop a European energy 
market, contain energy prices and improve member states’ security of 
supply. But European institutions were given no mandate regarding 
energy; the project of bringing together domestic energy policies in order to 
liberalise electricity and gas markets was ultimately watered down, 
yielding a general stance, sanctioned by directives as of the mid-1990s, and 
the hope that the Competition Authority would contribute to the ex novo 
emergence of competitive markets, thereby making up for other 
institutional deficiencies.  
At the institutional level, Directives on the liberalisation of domestic 
power and gas markets6 focused on promoting national mechanisms to 
ease liberalisation in diluting the market power of dominant operators and 
introducing elements of competition. In particular, they called for the 
setting up of independent domestic sectoral supervisory authorities to 
support the liberalisation process; the creation of wholesale electricity 
exchanges to provide markets with transparent pricing and a platform 
accessible to new producers; and finally – underpinning the whole process 
– they required that natural monopoly activities (managing the electricity 
transmission grid and gas transport) be unbundled from the potentially 
competitive activities both upstream and downstream of the grid (energy 
production and sale). This entailed a fragmentation of activities pertaining 
to the production, transmission, distribution and retail sale of electricity 
and gas, which had traditionally been carried out in an integrated fashion 
by major public utilities with national monopoly powers in these sectors.   
Europe’s stance carried on in the decade following 1996, the year of 
the first Directive; new targets were added – liberalising consumption, 
promoting energy conservation, suggesting improvements in energy 
efficiency and compliance with new environmental criteria – but the 
European energy policy remained unchanged, anchored to the role of 
                                                      
6 Directive 96/92/CE of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 December 
1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, Italian 
Gazzetta ufficiale n. L 027 del 30/01/1997; Directive 98/30/CE of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas, Italian GU L 204 del 21.7.1998. ENERGY AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS | 103 
 
existing European institutions and the setting up of national mechanisms to 
promote energy market liberalisation, against a backdrop of considerable 
diversification.7 
A break in the institutional set-up only occurred in 2007: 
environmental issues were directly introduced in the stance, goals and 
mechanisms of European energy policy through the ‘third energy package’ 
and the signing of the Lisbon Treaty which modified segments of the Rome 
Treaties relating to energy and the environment.  
With the Lisbon Treaty,8 European institutions did not actually make 
any significant step forward to develop the instruments required for a 
common European energy strategy.  
The Lisbon Treaty includes new articles concerning energy and 
climate change, in both the revision of the Treaty on European Union and 
in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Euratom 
Treaty is added thereto, in a partly revised version that had not been added 
to the Constitution. Energy is introduced through the solidarity provisions, 
by which states agree to support one another in case of need.9 The need to 
fight climate change through international action is also specified. 
Competition, however, is no longer included in the Union’s fundamental 
goals, and is mentioned instead in an additional protocol. This latter 
provision meets a request put by France, which had asked for the 
elimination of references to a common market subject to free competition.10 
                                                      
7 The institutional architecture gained an additional dimension with the 
establishment of the EU emissions trading scheme or ETS, which is part of the EU’s 
commitment to comply with agreed targets under the Kyoto Protocol (see 
Directive 2003/87/CE of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 
2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within 
the Community). 
8 Signed by Heads of State and Government, 13 December 2007.  
9 See Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
10  Title XX has been replaced by a new title and by a new Article 176A on energy, 
which reads: “1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, 
Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, 
to: (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy 
supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the 
 104 | VALERIA TERMINI 
 
Despite these provisions, the authority and ability to act effectively in 
the field of both energy and the environment remain quite modest.11 There 
is still no mandate and no authority conferred to Council regarding energy.  
Furthermore, on the institutional structure, discussions still focus on 
the need to provide the European Union with a regulatory authority 
entrusted with supporting liberalisation in the energy sector. Some have 
claimed that the institutional vacuum could be filled by assigning a more 
extensive and incisive role to the antitrust authority, but this step would 
not help resolve a glaring contradiction between market liberalisation 
policies and energy security policies, to be analysed in greater detail in 
section 3 below. Realistically, in order to overcome this contradiction, what 
is needed is an explicit mandate regarding energy policy that would allow 
the European Union to negotiate supply contracts on behalf of all member 
states. Moving forward with liberalisation is indeed difficult without the 
support of a European sectoral authority or a board of national regulators 
with a European mandate and the right authority. What is at stake is both 
the institutional dimension defining the relationship between the Union 
and the member states in the field of energy, and the ability to stimulate 
and coordinate member states’ industrial strategies regarding energy; but a 
significant factor is the spectrum of possible mechanisms.12 
Integrating national markets into a European energy market does 
indeed require adaptation to common rules on the part of countries or 
                                                                                                                                       
development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the 
interconnection of energy networks.” 
11 Article 4 of the Treaty thus reads: “The Union shall share competence with the 
Member States in energy, as in the following principal areas (…)e) environment, f) 
consumer protection, g) transport, h) trans-European networks.” 
12 These range from the definition of concerted strategies in the guise of Council 
recommendations, directives or regulations, to the activation of the enhanced 
cooperation modes taken up and redefined in Title IV of the Lisbon Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union regarding energy and the environment (see 
contribution by Giacinto della Cananea elsewhere in this volume). Title IV takes 
over the heading of Title VII, “Provisions on Enhanced Cooperation” and Articles 
27A to 27E, 40 to 40B and 43 to 45 are replaced by Article 20, which also replaces 
Articles 11 and 11A of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The same 
articles are also replaced by Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
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governments starting off from starkly different positions. As regards 
primary source availability, for instance, some countries have access to 
considerable supply: either because they have nuclear power plants, as do 
France and Finland, or because they have oil, as does Norway and to a 
lesser extent the UK, or because they have coal, as does Poland, or yet again 
because they have opted for renewable sources of energy, as have 
Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. But other countries, such as Italy 
or Spain, are conversely far more dependent on external supply. From 
another point of view, that of market openness, the reality shows large 
differences, which translate into highly asymmetric public policies and 
corporate strategies.   
The issues raised in Ferdinando Salleo’s contribution to this volume 
regarding European identity in connection with enlargement policies are 
quite relevant here as well. Is the Union in the process of building a model 
that will feature a variety of different levels and densities? Will Europe end 
up having a variable geometry, based on enhanced cooperation schemes? 
Or in an attempt to break the standstill on institutions and authority that is 
currently jeopardising the construction of a European energy market, will 
we witness in the field of energy and environment the same granting of 
opting-out rights that the UK and Ireland have insisted upon in justice and 
home affairs?  
In all these issues, European policy has to deal with a genuine conflict 
between the definition of its own energy strategy and the national demands 
that undermine its effectiveness. Brussels has been calling for liberalisation 
and market openness as a first step in the construction of a common 
European energy market. But national states, which have to bear the 
burden of singly ensuring security of supply, cannot sign on to this in the 
required fashion. This induces divergence among domestic policies, as they 
are necessarily involved in more or less explicit support of their national 
champions. This leads to free-rider behaviour in negotiations with 
producers. Which in turn generates a vicious circle that weakens both the 
Union and all its member states in international negotiations – as we will 
see in the following section.  
3.  European strategy and domestic policies: Goals, conflicts and 
proposals  
The starting point is that the European Union has never had a mandate to 
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been forced to adopt a gradual and indirect strategy, at times resorting to 
general policy statements, at others to the definition of shared rules.13 
And precisely because both instruments and institutions were 
indirect and inappropriate, the path ended up being unnecessarily 
tortuous. As mentioned above, an initial approach was outlined by the 1996 
and 1998 Directives on domestic market liberalisation, which aimed to 
reduce internal barriers within the Union’s markets for electricity and gas 
in order to develop a European market. But the European Commissioner 
for energy did not have an explicit mandate to do anything more than 
indicate a general stance and address recommendations to member states.  
Member state responses have proved quite asymmetrical. At one 
extreme, France, with its very strong state sector, was keen on defending its 
national champions, with their vertically integrated production structure. 
At the other extreme, the UK and to some extent Italy as well, from 1999 to 
2007, subjected their electricity markets to significant change, involving 
unbundling, production break-up, market liberalisation and supervision by 
a sectoral authority.  
On the other hand, in the absence of a European regulator 
empowered to impose unbundling rules, in order to dissociate upstream 
monopolies from downstream distribution and sales of gas and electricity, 
the only way forward was to suggest that governments and if applicable, 
industry-level authorities, consider separating grids from service provision: 
in terms of ownership, functions, corporate structure or simply from an 
accounting standpoint.14 
In reality, at the beginning of the process, there was indeed a strong 
liberalisation push: electricity exchanges were set up by most member 
states, although unevenly and with quite varied fortunes. The UK’s ‘Pool’ 
was thus highly liberalised, with initial guidelines in 1990 making it 
mandatory for all wholesale electricity contracts to be brought to the 
                                                      
13 See Article 249 (former Article 189) of the EC Treaty.  
14 Of the two modalities set forth once again in the Commission’s recent 
Recommendation (2007) – namely the corporate separation of companies owning 
the grid/network from those entrusted with operations, or the setting up of an 
Independent System Operator or ISO (under which the vertically integrated utility 
retains grid/network ownership and receives an administered return rate, but is 
not responsible for grid/network management or development). ENERGY AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS | 107 
 
exchange; ten years later, in 2001, it was closed down and replaced by a 
number of platforms for the bilateral exchange of energy contracts (Neta).15 
The Spanish Exchange has conversely retained largely administered pricing 
for wholesale transactions. And finally Italy complied completely and 
relatively quickly to all the European directives, but it then reverted to 
unified management and ownership of the national electricity grid with 
distinctly unsatisfactory governance.  
The unfavourable international context at the beginning of the new 
millennium – such as the Enron failure in 2002 and the Californian 
electricity crisis of 2001, even if caused by bad management and/or control 
and regulatory mistakes – increased government reluctance to renounce 
tried and tested practices such as entrusting security of energy supply to 
major public monopolies. Support for the European single market 
development strategy, to be achieved through domestic market 
liberalisation, thus dwindled to a bare minimum. And gas market 
development experienced even more difficulties, inter alia because of 
Europe’s notable dependence on Russian gas fields. 
This push to liberalisation occurred at the end of the 1990s, at a time 
when fossil fuel prices appeared to be contained – notwithstanding the fact 
that 53.8% of Europe’s consumption is met by fossil fuel imports (see 
European Environment Agency, 2008).16  
The contradiction between liberalisation policies and energy security 
strategy has eventually blown up. It has blown up with the rise in oil 
prices; it has blown up with the Russian gas crisis, triggered by Putin both 
for reasons of domestic politics and to raise his bargaining power 
internationally. By this token, the Russia-Ukraine dispute regarding natural 
gas provision in January 2006, and the further dispute involving Russia and 
Belarus in January 2007 are just the tip of an iceberg that could in the end 
dramatically highlight Europe’s vulnerability (Stern, 2006 and 2007). 
                                                      
15 Neta was introduced in March 2001, and Betta (British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements) on 1 April 2005.  
16 Europe’s dependence on hydrocarbon imports is growing. Under a business-as-
usual assumption, primary source imports are forecast to rise from 50% of current 
consumption to 65% in 2030; more specifically as regards gas, imports are 
scheduled to increase from 57% of total gas consumption today to 84% in 2030; for 
oil, the rise will be from 82% to 93%.   108 | VALERIA TERMINI 
 
It was only then that the contradictory nature of asking member 
states to break up their major public utilities appeared for what it was 
worth. Or rather, the contradictory nature of asking them to do so prior to 
having set up the institutions, authorities and mandates needed to ensure 
the European Union’s security of supply through unified negotiation. A 
process, the incompleteness of which became obvious with the gas crisis 
and even before that, with the fallout from the 9/11 attacks and the 
subsequent increase in oil prices, heralding ever more uncertain trends.  
It has become terribly obvious that neither Brussels’ incentives nor its 
recommendations ever yielded the desired outcomes. But hoping they 
would was unreasonable. And the outcome of a number of policies 
introduced by the European Commission shows that it wasn’t only the 
instruments that proved inadequate, but the general strategy.17 A few 
examples suffice to highlight the consequences of this contradiction 
between European strategy and domestic policies, as in the case of the 
plans for the Trans-European Networks (TEN-E) – those cross-border 
networks designed to facilitate the interconnection of domestic markets.18 
And the strategy aimed at improving gas supply by building liquid gas 
vaporisers highlights similar problems in the gas sector.  
The TEN-E has a complex procedural architecture: it involves an 
incentive policy aimed at strengthening cross-border connections between 
electricity transmission grids on the European continent, so as to broaden 
the benchmark electricity market. Ten years after inception, it has yielded 
one-tenth of its expected outcome. And attempts at importing liquid gas 
via sea, supported by the widespread building of vaporisers, with a view to 
freeing gas-importing countries from their dependence vis-à-vis a small 
                                                      
17 The reference framework is provided by amendments to Directives 54/03 and 
55/03, amendments to the Electricity and Gas Regulations (1228/03 and 1775/05) 
and by the European Council decisions of March and December 2006. Currently, 
Directive 2005/89/CE requires that national regulatory authorities report annually 
to the Commission on security of supply in electricity; Directive 2004/67/CE 
introduces this same reporting requirement for gas supplies as well as for legal 
frameworks aimed at developing investment in infrastructure.   
18 Trans-European Networks (TEN-Energy) concern projects of common interest 
defined and regulated in 1996 with subsequent updates in 1997, 1999 through to 
2003. See “Trans-European Energy Networks. Policy and Action”, Lux. 1997 and 
http: //europa.eu.int/comm/ten/energy/legislation/index_en.html. ENERGY AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS | 109 
 
number of producers – in particular Russia – and transportation systems 
have yielded equally minimal results.   
Setting utopia aside, it is clearly difficult to convince utilities to invest 
in cross-border transmission infrastructure with a view to broadening the 
domestic markets from which they currently derive significant oligopoly 
profits. The only way to do this would be to involve these very same 
utilities and national governments by having them espouse the medium-
term advantages they stand to derive from a unified European energy 
market: in terms of security strategy, joint bargaining power, more 
competitively priced supply, increased growth opportunities, corporate 
synergies beneficial to innovation, research and transfer of cutting-edge 
technology. All in all, these are all long-term benefits that would accrue to 
Europe’s industry, upon completion of the liberalisation process, including 
in terms of competitiveness.   
However, the real difficulties concern Europe’s energy security policy 
and the lack of a corresponding mandate. If responsibility for ensuring gas 
supply – an essential tenet of energy security – rests exclusively with 
national governments, which in recent economic history, since the end of 
World War II, have shifted this responsibility to domestic utilities (the 
former public monopoly incumbents), the utilities end up representing 
citizens in the negotiation of contracts with non-EU producer countries 
such as Russia, Nigeria, Algeria, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. And 
governments must then, together with their utilities, assume the full risks 
of political uses of primary sources and political instability in transit 
countries. Add to this the absence of supranational rules and guarantees 
regarding network/grid access. Even the Energy Charter, designed to 
guarantee state reciprocity and third-party access to networks/grids, is 
pending ratification by Russia. And Russia can thus decide to not tie itself 
down in its bilateral negotiations with European countries’ utilities. So far 
these utilities’ strategy has been to enter into bilateral contracts with the gas 
monopolies in the upstream segment of the production stream, especially 
in Russia. And this is a strategy shared, more or less openly, by their 
governments.  
The political insecurity is now compounded by economic insecurity 
regarding supply availability. Faced with Putin’s new programme to 
diversify exports by increasing Asia’s share, one is beginning to wonder 
whether Russia will be able to deal with growing internal demand while 
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wonders whether Putin’s strategy, which involves nationalising and using 
energy as a priority foreign policy instrument, is compatible with the 
investment policy required to develop this sector. The low level of gas 
prices, strictly correlated to those of oil, in the 1990s has not encouraged 
any significant investment to improve the extraction efficiency and 
network infrastructure functionality. Similarly, even when prices were 
high, the additional profits accrued by the gas industry were used to offset 
low-income growth (Gaddy & Ickes, 2002).19  
Faced with these difficulties, European governments and their 
utilities have attempted to negotiate an increase in supply contract 
duration. Putin has in fact granted European countries 10- to 15-year 
extensions, thereby ensuring in 2006 additional profits of about €39 
billion.20 However, as these contracts have a take or pay structure, they 
require rigid long-term buyer programming: the amounts acquired will in 
any event have to be paid for, regardless of whether they are actually 
taken.  
For this reason too, the opening up of the gas market that can be 
activated through the building of vaporisers does represent, in the long 
run, an alternative programming model, that may introduce supply 
flexibility and competition, by diversifying both sources and suppliers. But 
in the short run, by introducing demand flexibility, it would go against 
national energy security policies, weakening the bargaining power of major 
utilities – having to pay in any case the predetermined offer – compared to 
a small number of producers, the leader of which is Gazprom.  
In this context, the way in which vaporisers fit into a highly 
sophisticated process requires further thinking to devise a comprehensive 
strategy covering all the phases of player and country involvement in the 
gas industry. Initially devised to make gas supply more flexible, vaporisers 
have in fact yielded quite disappointing results in terms of unifying the 
European energy market through virtuous and incentive-driven processes, 
as has been the case with TEN-E. In this case as well, the problem was not 
                                                      
19 The situation is similar with respect to oil, where Russia ranks second in terms of 
global output after Saudi Arabia, with a 2007 average output of about 9.5 million 
barrels a day. 
20 While it has maintained a policy of annual contracting with CIS states, at 
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only inadequate funding. What really emerged was a radical conflict 
between Europe’s medium- and long-term vision on the one hand, and the 
goals pursued by players assumed to orient their corporate strategies to the 
achievement of common objectives, on the other.  
4.  Europe’s relationship with the rest of the world: Energy security 
and climate change 
A third crisis dimension – that of environmental sustainability – has latched 
on to the above-mentioned difficulties, which may nevertheless open up 
new prospects. This is an issue where Europe has conquered a leadership 
role even though so far results have been more significant in political terms, 
with the driving role taken on by Europe in the Kyoto Protocal process, 
than in strictly environmental terms, i.e. that of containing emissions levels 
globally.21 
It is therefore essential that we now reflect on the EU’s interests, but 
without losing track of the role it may play in the emerging multipolar 
scenario and the promotion of multilateral negotiations.  
At the international level, as well, the issue of which institutions to 
empower with responsibility for process support is crucial. Clearly there is 
a need to move beyond the ‘divide and conquer’ policies that often 
characterise US bilateral negotiations with primary source producers in 
Latin America and Asia, or its strategic and military approach to Middle 
Eastern producer countries.  
It is equally essential to further the development of the world’s 
poorest countries. It is a known fact that today 2.5 billion people produce 
energy by burning wood, plant waste and dung, in a very damaging use of 
biomass, while another billion is totally deprived of any access to energy. 
                                                      
21 The United Nations Fourth Report on Climate Change, a reference for policies 
aimed at improving climate conditions, indicates that by mid-century global 
emissions of gas pollutants will need to be reduced by at least half as compared to 
1990 levels in order to halt the increase in global warming. The contemplated 20% 
unilateral reduction in European emissions by 2020 corresponds to less than 4% of 
the reduction called for globally. According to computations, by 2020 CO2 
emissions will exceed the 1990 levels by over 60%, especially as a result of rising 
energy – and in particular fossil fuel – demand, with China, the United States and 
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Not even towards Africa does the EU have a unitary strategy capable of 
standing up to China’s new aggressive policy (consider for instance the 
close political connection to Angola, thanks to which China has acquired 
offshore exploration rights in exchange for loans; or to Nigeria, which has 
granted off-shore exploration rights to the Chinese state utility in exchange 
for roads and infrastructure).  
Even the flexible mechanisms provided for in the Kyoto Agreements 
(Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanisms), which aim to 
promote investment in clean energy production and use through 
partnerships between businesses based in the industrialised countries that 
have ratified the Kyoto Protocol (and that are therefore listed in Annex I), 
and in developing countries (not in Annex I), would require dedicated 
structures and institutions, in addition to a far more active and coordinated 
European Strategy.  
According to the World Energy Outlook 2008, investments totalling 
$22,000 billion, nearly $4,000 billion in China alone, will be required by 
2030 (see IEA, 2008). Clearly, this raises the issue of where the money is to 
come from, considering that major uncertainties regarding both political 
context and primary source rules and prices are likely to distort very long-
term decisions. International financial institutions will obviously have to be 
the first to provide answers.  
In this field as well Europe tends to put forth the multilateral 
approach it embodies. This was clear in Bali where for the first time 
Finance Ministers had been invited to take part in negotiations aimed at 
defining financial rules and instruments for the post-Kyoto period. This 
was equally clear in the agreement sig n e d  l a s t  O c t o b e r  i n  L i s b o n  b y  a  
subset of European countries that has given rise to the International Carbon 
Partnership (Icap). The idea underpinning the agreement is precisely that 
of setting up a joint fund on the basis of a broader emissions market than 
the one we currently have, so as to gain access to significant funding for 
both technology transfers and climate change mitigation and adaptation 
measures for the least developed countries. That said, it also reflects 
economic principles according to which the negative externalities of 
emissions generation must be priced a n d  f a c t o r e d  i n  s o  a s  t o  r e d u c e  
industrial free-riding. The multilateral approach has been well received: 
significantly, the agreement was also signed by a number of US states (in 
particular New York, New Jersey and California) that have been exerting 
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agreements launched by Europe, and thereby correct its refusal to 
participate in the Kyoko Protocol.  
By its very nature the energy/environment problem calls for 
concerted global solutions. This method, supporting multilateralism and 
the United Nations’ role for the management and direction provided to 
global negotiations for the post-Kyoto period, has proved positive; it has 
inter alia allowed for the participation in the negotiations of industrialised 
countries that had not signed on to the Kyoto Agreements, such as the 
United States and Canada,22 and the active involvement of China and India, 
countries that are contributing the most to emissions growth globally, as 
well as that of Indonesia, Malaysia and African and Latin American 
countries. It was the latter in actual fact that forced industrialised countries 
to give serious attention to the slotting into the negotiations of 
programmes, in particular financial, for adaptation and mitigation in the 
face of climate change, and support for the transfer of low-emissions 
technology and combating deforestation.  
The European Union has therefore scored points in terms of 
methodological process and leadership, but it is proving to be much 
weaker in terms of content and policy efficiency. As a result it is unclear 
whether it will manage to preserve its ‘multilateralist’ leadership position 
vis-à-vis countries such as Japan and Canada, or vis-à-vis Asia.  
The US administration for its part is currently involved in developing 
various alliances, based on a corporate approach, through bilateral 
agreements and pragmatic action, the development of public-private 
partnerships to support the feasibility of investment in new technology and 
the promotion of environmentally-compatible industrial development, 
directly activated by private sector businesses.  
The issue of process governance is clearly highlighted by the 
comparison between the US bottom-up and Europe’s top-down approach 
to the ongoing adjustment process. Will the post-Kyoto process elicit 
interest in the United States, the Asian countries and the poorest countries 
for a multilateral agreement approach, by way of a strategy shared with the 
United Nations (through the UNFCCC – United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change) that aims to define a joint responsibility 
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with differentiated obligations and burdens? If so, Europe will have 
contributed to significant change. The adjustment process can indeed not 
be separated from the role played by dedicated institutions, even 
internationally. But it is precisely internationally that Europe risks in the 
meantime losing credibility, for not having managed to restore order 
within its own borders and for not having figured out how to put an 
industrial development spin on environmental issues.  
In other words, the European Union has to contend with two issues 
at one and the same time, while not remaining anchored to old paradigms. 
It must, first, put its own institutional house in order. That is, provide 
Council with powers and a mandate regarding energy; set up a European 
regulators coordination mechanism; and develop the control instruments 
required to make a single market possible. Secondly, it must define not 
only the role to be played by Europe in international negotiations but also 
the basic tenets of an industrial strategy involving businesses and investors 
in post-Kyoto developments. Time has really run out on unilateral, EU-
wide commitments to reduce GHG emissions, and this last aspect warrants 
some further words of analysis.   
Using its own unilateral commitment to promote the design of joint 
responsibility and differentiated burdens, Europe has shown its leadership 
capability in its very best light, with its wish to promote sustainable 
development in the poorest countries. This vision, underpinned by the 
need to promote integrated policies with respect to energy and the 
environment has filled the vacuum created by the US administration’s lack 
of interest in pollution issues; it has helped overcome the divide and 
conquer policy in the US security of energy supply strategy, based on the 
one hand on the ramping up of military relationships in the Middle East, 
and on the other on bilateral negotiations, in Latin America and the Pacific, 
with primary-source producer countries.  
It is important that this action continue, strengthening the role of 
international institutions, including financial ones, in order to launch both 
the technology transfer process and coordinated support for the 
development of the poorest countries. But once these political outcomes are 
achieved, Europe will still have to contend with the issue of policy efficacy. 
It is a known fact that the Kyoto Agreements’ contribution on this is quasi-
nil. As regards instruments and policies, Europe risks making a serious 
mistake if it does not broaden the spectrum of what it considers acceptable ENERGY AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS | 115 
 
action along the lines of what the US administration, for example, has done 
to develop cooperation among businesses.  
Technological innovation appears to be the keystone in terms of 
addressing and solving the problems of energy and environmental security 
now facing the industrialised economies. Businesses’ contributions will 
prove essential. Market instruments such as emissions trading, especially if 
extended on a global scale, will no doubt prove important in the short and 
medium term to price carbon emissions and force businesses to internalise 
these negative externalities. But this approach has to be implemented in 
conjunction with strategies to promote and facilitate long-term investment, 
in order to activate the engine of industrial transformation and 
development. This will require huge funds and cooperation between 
enterprises, public and private sector and European and developing 
countries. And it involves much more than the cap-and-tax mechanisms 
devised by the Commission.  
Environment, calling for focused technological development, is a 
growth opportunity that Europe cannot neglect.  And this is a road that 
industrialised economies could in part travel together, cooperating in order 
to allow countries such as China and India to accomplish the technological 
shift demanded by the protection of our planet, and to help move the 
poorest countries out of poverty. But to date there have been but occasional 
signs of a shared awareness of these issues.  
The crucial problem is that a rigorous and for the time being 
unilateral (in terms of content) European strategy, neglectful of its impact 
on corporate competitiveness, opens the door to industrial relocation 
solutions favouring countries that do not yet have binding environmental 
targets, such as China or India, and are far less efficient in complying with 
environmental criteria. Their industrial processes, for the same goods, 
generate more emissions than Europe’s. Consequently, taking the global 
view that environmental issues necessarily require, this policy – very costly 
for a number of European industries – may well lead to no progress 
whatsoever in terms of goal attainment, and no containment of global 
emissions.  
In other words, the energy/environment package just launched by 
the Commission, however careful in using objective and unchallengeable 
indicators such as per capita GDP in computing national commitments, 
seems to stem more from an administrative logic than from efforts aimed at 
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renewal in Europe, by fostering partnerships for research, transfers of 
technology, and the testing of new industrial models likely to get a boost 
from environmental challenges.  
Finally, in terms of policy efficiency, even if this costly and unilateral 
effort on the part of the European Union were to be on target in 2020, and 
assuming improbable zero growth for the rest of the world’s emissions, its 
impact on global targets aimed at stabilising environmental pollution 
growth and global warming, as uniformly computed by international 
agencies and the United Nations’ experts, would be under 4%.   
5.  Conclusions 
The issue of European energy policy governance has become ever more 
central, as a result of the emergency affecting security of supply of primary 
energy sources and the environmental emergency of global warming 
deriving from excessive GHG emissions. Speaking with one voice, the 
European Union has managed to exercise leadership in sensitising the 
planet to the Kyoto Agreements and in suggesting a method and a vision 
based on multilateral agreements. But this has not been matched by 
corresponding effectiveness and results at the policy level. For these to 
materialise, the Union still requires institutions with powers regarding 
energy.  
The Union will have to strengthen its institutions if it wishes to move 
beyond the contradictions that currently plague it and are in practice 
jeopardising the construction of a single market. As a first stage in a 
security of supply strategy, the Union has pushed market liberalisation and 
opening, so as to construct a European energy market. But this 
liberalisation and this opening up cannot elicit sufficient support from 
those states that have had to bear the full burden of ensuring security of 
energy supply for their citizens. This has led to diverging national policies, 
as governments became involved in supporting, more or less explicitly, 
their national champions. And this has also led to free-riding in 
negotiations with producers. In short, this is a vicious circle that is 
weakening the European Union’s international bargaining power.  
On the other hand, only the awareness that a single market will 
provide value added is likely to convince governments they should sign on 
wholeheartedly to a European plan to open energy markets, convinced that 
this single market will represent a positive externality for domestic markets 
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institutions to support and coordinate domestic market liberalisation, to 
provide guarantees as to rules and stances to those utilities that will be 
called upon to face up to competition and invest in the market.  
Recent years have shown quite clearly how disappointing it is to 
think that one can offset the institutional vacuum of a mandate-less Council 
and a European regulator that is simply not there, simply by extending 
inappropriately the missions and functions of the antitrust authority.  
The second message is that the European Union, however significant 
the role it has played in promoting and supporting internationally a 
multilateral vision of energy policies and climate change, will not be able to 
continue playing this role, if it hasn’t beforehand put its own house in 
order. Nor will member states be in a position singly and separately to face 
up to Asian competition, the growing demand of which is putting pressure 
on the very same primary sources they use. European institutions will 
therefore have to play an essential role over the next few years if they wish 
to avoid having piecemeal interests prevail in energy policy.  
However, institutions are a necessary but not sufficient precondition 
for cooperation in the field of energy. The outcome so far shown by the 
European Commission’s policies demonstrates that their focus remains far 
removed from one target: that of starting up the engine of industrial 
development, inter alia in the energy sector.  
Technological innovation, and this is the third conclusion, appears to 
be the keystone to address the issues of energy and environmental security 
with which industrialised and developing countries alike now have to 
contend. Business contributions will prove essential. Such is the approach 
that underpins the bilateral negotiations between governments and 
businesses that are at the heart of US policy. But it is also a road that 
industrialised countries could travel under the aegis of a necessary form of 
multilateralism, cooperating to allow countries such as China and India to 
accomplish the technological shift required for the protection of our planet, 
and to help the poorest countries pull out of poverty.  
This is also a growth opportunity for industrialised countries – and 
one that Europe can ill-afford to ignore.  118 | VALERIA TERMINI 
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7.  EUROPE ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SCENE: A UNION OF NECESSITY AFTER 
A UNION OF CHOICE? 
CESARE MERLINI 
European foreign policy will only come into being when capitals 
acknowledge that relinquishing jurisdiction to Brussels doesn’t weaken 
them, but makes them stronger, because the policy shift increases the 
influence of all EU States worldwide. (…) The European option - “make 
law not war” - could however turn into a lie worthy of social 
romanticism, if Europe’s security policy rules out a military component.  
Ulrich Beck1 
 
hus far the role of the European Union (formerly, the Community) 
on the international scene has been largely passive, in the sense that 
it has been less the outcome of policies or political will than the 
consequence of its very existence. The EU has been a conspicuous and 
expanding reality, an area of prosperity and the sum of important or at 
least not irrelevant states. Moreover the Union has been an atypical player 
in the world system, because of the implicit, irreversible peace among its 
member states, and because of its unparalleled and unprecedented hybrid 
of federal and intergovernmental institutions – a model possibly to be 
copied in other contexts. The magnetic effect on neighbouring states has 
been remarkable and has led to the view that the EU has so far exerted its 
geopolitical influence mostly through enlargement, in particular with the 
latest accession of ten plus two countries. 
                                                      
1 Ulrich Beck, Das kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden, Suhrkamp Vrelag, 
Frankfurt aM, 2004. 
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With respect to enlargement to include Eastern European countries 
formerly belonging to the Soviet empire or even the Soviet Union itself, it 
may be noted, by the way, that it has taken place while the West has seen 
its global presence and influence shrinking and/or declining. This applies 
particularly to the Asian continent, with the unsuccessful wars the US has 
fought in it, following the historical demise of the European empires. In 
other words a sort of counter-cyclical Western expansion has been achieved 
through the attractiveness of its institutions, above all the EU but also 
NATO, rather than through the action of its armies. 
The perception of the EU as an international player by its shear 
existence, not only in economic terms (the euro, trade, competition law) but 
also, at least potentially, in political terms is also gaining ground abroad. 
Robert Kagan, for instance, an analyst not generally known for his softness 
vis-à-vis the Europeans, who he famously said are from Venus while the 
Americans are from Mars (Kagan, 2002), subsequently wrote that the 
European Union is a “geopolitical miracle” that “in its own way, expresses a 
pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, channelling 
German, French and British ambitions (…)” Kagan (2007). Former Italian 
Foreign Minister D’Alema likes to recall a meeting he had, together with 
two other European leaders, with Chinese President Hu Jintao, who told 
them, “We are a great power that will be called upon (during the first half 
of the 21st century) to manage Chinese-American bipolarism” – at which 
point, realising he was addressing a group of Europeans, he added, 
“Obviously, Europe will also be there,... if it is united” (D’Alema,  2007a). 
To stay with the United States, the expectation that an integrated 
Europe will take a more active role internationally is also remarkably high 
in the public opinion. In this respect, data recently published by 
Transatlantic Trends – an annual survey conducted by the German Marshall 
Fund of the United States to measure broad public opinion in the United 
States and 12 European countries – are worth noting: in 2009, 63% of 
Americans surveyed have a positive view of the EU and seven out of ten 
believe that its leadership in international affairs would be desirable. This is 
only marginally down from the 77% who, being asked the same question in 
2007 had answered “yes”, with 30% adding “very”, while only 16% 
answered “no”.2 This apparent US “enthusiasm”, particularly high among 
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registered Democrats, has remained fairly stable over the last seven years 
(and is consistently higher, by the way, than that shown by the British in 
similar surveys). 
In contrast with this passive, but relevant role, is the EU’s formal 
foreign policy, which has been conducted prevalently with a technocratic 
approach, drawing from mechanisms, almost as if the real world and its 
power plays did not exist. The results have not been entirely negligible, as 
demonstrated by the various small and medium-scale missions in the areas 
of security and defence, and by the activity of the High Representative, 
whether independently or jointly with the Ministers of member states, but 
they have been marginal. 
The saying currently goes that there has been a re-nationalisation of 
various European policies over the last decade or two, including foreign 
policy. However it would be hard to say that national initiatives and 
strategies have achieved much more. Sarkozy’s activism has had limited 
impact, except possibly for the second half of 2008, when France held the 
rotating EU Presidency (in application of the Kagan paradigm of the 
European ‘multiplier’ of national ambitions). The UK foreign policy seems 
not to be at one of its highest points. Italy’s unsolicited mediations have not 
met with success. Neither have, so far at least, the efforts of such groups as 
the so-called EU-3 (the British, French and German foreign ministers with 
or without the EU High Representative) or 5+1 (the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council plus Germany), both marking the 
dominant diplomatic aspiration of re-unified Germany, i.e. of being 
formally recognised again as a great power and consequently becoming a 
permanent member of the UNSC – a prospect that seems to have become 
more remote with the current US administration. 
That said, the ambition for a shared, or at least coordinated, 
capability in the fields of foreign affairs, international security and defence 
is seldom denied openly and appears as a corollary to the more or less 
sincere acknowledgement that the member states, even the big ones, taken 
separately do not carry enough weight on the world scene – as another 
current saying goes with little consistency with the previous one of re-
nationalisation. Moreover European public opinion has predominantly 
shown substantial support for a more active role by the Union in the world, 
although consistency is once more limited when such support finds itself 
associated with reluctance to shoulder diplomatic action with military or 
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It is in this light that that the prospects of an enhanced role by the 
European Union with its current size and borders and in the new 
international context must be assessed – if they exist. The compromise 
agreement grudgingly reached in 2007 was a substantial step back vis-à-vis 
the draft Constitutional Treaty initially devised by the European 
Convention (a more democratic forum, incidentally, than a diplomatic 
conference), but the Lisbon Treaty, in which it was translated, has been 
nevertheless seen as a framework for the EU institutions to resume 
progress, particularly in the field of external action, for which a few more 
tools are being made available. The external challenges that such 
international action face and the internal constraints will be discussed 
successively, followed by a suggested policy strategy and a succinct 
analysis of the tools provided for by the Treaty. 
1.  The international context 
One important reason for Europe being more exposed to international 
responsibilities is that the United States is less in control of both the general 
situation and potential crises than it was a decade or two ago. The past 
administration has left behind a number of legacies that weigh heavily on 
the present one. Three are of direct relevance to the transatlantic 
relationship more than others. The first is the encouragement given to 
nationalism in general, and more specifically on our continent, when 
promoting bilateral security agreements with countries of the so-called 
‘New Europe’ and thus eliciting age-old attitudes and feelings that came 
out as an obstacle to the draft Constitutional Treaty and later to the Lisbon 
Treaty. The second is that much of the fallout from the G.W. Bush 
administration’s policies in third areas is significantly greater for Europe 
than it is for America: of the many possible examples, I shall only mention 
the Middle-Eastern frustrations that help infiltration of immigrants by 
fundamentalist Islamic terrorism and the exacerbation of relations with an 
increasingly nationalistic Russia, such as to make it an even more difficult 
interlocutor than it possibly would have been. The third negative legacy 
concerns the weakening of the multilateral system, either of general 
competence (the UN) or of a sectoral one (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol or the 
International Criminal Court), that remains a European priority, at least in 
principle. 
At the end of 2008 the geo-strategic context featured an extreme 
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despite US presence (as in Iraq and Afghanistan) or possibly in gestation 
(as in Pakistan) to cases of hostility among states, from the continuing 
nuclear proliferation challenges (by Iran and North Korea) to the revived 
tensions between the US and Russia. The diffuse threat of terrorism 
complemented all that, with its various motivations (ethnic, national or 
religious) and manifestations (from guerrilla warfare on the edges of 
military conflict to attacks exclusively targeting civilians, be they Muslim or 
Western, through the ever more common resort to suicide fanatics). Some 
of these crises seemed to be on the brink of a status shift from unresolved to 
irresolvable, and not only in the Middle East. Add to that the abysmal state 
of the American image around the globe, particularly in the Muslim world, 
but also elsewhere (with only two exceptions, Israel and India, not without 
significance). 
Paradoxically, this state of affairs, which in some respects went 
somewhat close to American impotence, came as result of a two-decade 
period of solitude of the United States at very top of the global power 
hierarchy after the end of the cold war and the ensuing sense of 
omnipotence, which made the comparison with Rome at the apex of its 
empire so popular among pundits and commentators and, at the same 
time, so superficial – as I argued in my essay “The US Hegemony and the 
Roman Analogy”, back in 2002 (Merlini, 2002). 
In the eyes of most Europeans, the new administration, besides the 
extraordinary initial popularity of President Obama, has started on the 
right foot as far as foreign policy is concerned. The new commitment to 
international institutions, the suggested ‘resetting’ of relations with 
Moscow, the open hand offered to antagonistic powers such as Iran and 
Syria, the less unconditional support for Israel, etcetera, all have brought 
the guidelines of the US action internationally closer to the European 
preferences. More importantly the Obama-Biden-Clinton team seems 
consistently more inclined towards transatlantic cooperation, counting on 
European support and sharing of decisions than their predecessors were. 
This does not reduce the requirements for a more active and coherent 
European contribution to crisis prevention and management in the 
framework of the historically reduced Western influence, let alone 
dominance. It rather makes it more imperative. At the same time, the 
substantial foreign policy turn taken by the new administration since its 
inception is unlikely to bring about visible fruits in resolving the various 
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illusions in this respect, there have been people in Tehran, Jerusalem, 
Moscow and elsewhere who care to dispel them. Thus the risk is that of 
substituting the past conflict of orientations between the sides of the 
Atlantic with a conflict of expectations. The Europeans, who are under 
severe budgetary and political constraints domestically, tend to wait for the 
outcome of the US foreign policy changes and see whether they will 
improve those many critical situations that are proliferating in the broad 
arc that surrounds Europe from the East. The Americans now expect 
prompt and sizable European cooperation in order to help such a positive 
outcome to come about, lest to be disappointed and take unilateral 
approaches back into consideration. 
The above complex picture of actual or potential geo-political 
instability has in fact been building up over the last two decades or more, 
while until the summer of 2007 the geo-economic picture had been 
consistently rosy and stable, despite a number of warnings voiced here and 
there. Then came the subprime mortgage crisis to trigger a recession, which 
is being discussed in other chapters of this collection of essays. Suffice it 
here to express two considerations. First: ways to reduce the impact of the 
global economic slowdown and to allow each country to come out of it 
sooner rather than later have taken priority attention by all governments, 
while the critical hot spots do not allow for much distraction. And second: 
the global distribution of power will likely look different, once the 
recession is over, to an extent that is not easy to predict at this stage, while 
the conflicts and instabilities of the ‘wider’ Middle-Eastern area seem to be 
only marginally affected by the contingent global economic troubles, as 
they spring out of roots that are predominantly local, historical, ethnic and 
religious. 
It is in the light of all this that attention is now turned to the other 
players on the international scene, and in particular to those that, contrary 
to the United States, still ranking first but declining, rank second or third 
but are rising, such as China and India, or have declined already (and more 
than the US), such as Russia, which however still ranks as a major power 
both because of the past legacy (nuclear weapons) and current leverage (oil 
and gas). All these powers basically hold ambivalent views about the 
situation – or at least this is the way it looks to us in the West. On the one 
hand, they are aware that their current status has been the result of a long-
lasting economic expansion, mostly driven by the West and marked by a 
high degree of global interdependence. The recent downturn, which has 
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come as a confirmation of global interdependence. Now, geo-political 
instability may entail additional obstacles to the global recovery, for one 
reason or another. 
On the other hand, the Chinese are not insensitive to the relative 
decline of US power in the world, as their thinking remains well attuned to 
balance of power, the dynamics of which appear to them to suggest a 
return to a grandeur lost for centuries (see Hu Jintao’s confident prediction 
to D’Alema); nor indeed are the Russians,  whose nostalgia of a past 
superpower status has more recent points of reference. Furthermore, both 
countries detect with some satisfaction the dilemmas facing Western 
policies, and primarily that of the US, torn between the imperatives of 
fighting against terrorism and insurgency on the one hand, and the legacy 
of supporting democracy and human rights on the other. In this respect the 
Obama administration seems inclined to resort more to diplomacy than to 
ideology, along the preferences of most capitals on this side of the Atlantic. 
China is for Europe a very important partner, although more exclusively 
for economic reasons than is true for the US. Russia is an even more 
important partner, since geo-strategic motivations combine with economic 
ones, as a consequence of geographical proximity. 
India was able to reach a nuclear agreement with the G.W. Bush 
administration, which was broadly deemed negative for the global non-
proliferation regime, but which was to take the country out of the pariah 
status it had suffered. Hence the high ranking of the US in Indian public 
opinion, similar to the situation in Israel, as mentioned above. Moreover, 
Indian nationalists were not disconsolate at the problems experienced by 
the privileged relationship between the US and Pakistan, their hated arch-
rival. They did not win, however, in the last elections, to the relief of 
everyone, beginning with President Obama. A civil war in Pakistan, with 
the Taliban involved and the control of a nuclear arsenal possibly at stake, 
is a great regional concern hardly compatible with India’s aspirations to 
resume economic growth and consequent broad power status. 
Such a potential chain reaction in the South-Asian region affects 
Europe in two respects. India is also an important economic partner, 
although not as much so as China. Several European countries are engaged 
in Afghanistan, not so much because of the size of the interests they have 
there but because of the solidarity they felt for America after 9/11 and now 
because the future of NATO, and more broadly the credibility of the West, 
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Afghanistan, let alone of an eventual Pakistani explosion (whatever 
meaning this word may one day acquire) is of great concern to them. 
However the leverage that even the major European states, let alone the 
EU, have there is not remotely comparable with that of the US. Hence, 
there appears a lack of adequate commitment in the eyes of some 
Americans. 
If we come to those critical situations that are high on the 
transatlantic agenda and are at the same time geographically closer to 
Europe, we find that the very proximity to the EU space becomes a decisive 
factor. Cases in point are of course Turkey, Georgia and Ukraine. They are 
seen by the United States as ‘border countries’, in the sense that the former 
is key in the West’s relationship with Islam, and the latter two are key with 
respect to Russia,. As a consequence the Americans believe that Europe 
should continue in the longstanding and successful process of expanding 
its area of intrinsic security and contemplate the inclusion also of these 
countries sooner or later, in the conviction that the prospect will have a 
stabilising effect by itself both regionally and domestically. 
The Europeans find themselves in a bind. Most of them think they 
have given enough in terms of inclusion, the cost of which has been higher 
and higher, and tend to consider these cases – as several others around 
them – as the object of their enhanced foreign policy, which however is 
lacking. Even the intermediate step of including Georgia and Ukraine into 
NATO, by the way, is seen with hostility, not so much because of the 
Russian sensitivities, as many in the US suspect, but because the alliance 
would end up being in serious jeopardy. Moreover, if further EU 
enlargement has to be contemplated, other candidates, such as the Balkan 
countries, seem to enjoy geographical priority and they are difficult 
enough. 
Different from what happens in relatively distant areas such Asia or 
even the Middle East, the policy choices the Europeans make concerning 
their ‘near abroad’ carry a more decisive weight, but such weight is often 
connected with the perimeter of the common institutions rather than with 
the existence of a common foreign policy. It may also be revealing that as 
far as the external action in the economic domain is concerned, the EU’s 
response to the recent global recession has been unsatisfactory in terms of 
cohesion, but the crisis did generate a new application to join, that of 
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2.  The Union’s Internal Context 
Let us now turn our attention to within the EU and try to shed some light 
on the obstacles preventing the shaping and implementation of a foreign 
policy sufficiently active and common. First, nationalism has to be 
mentioned, which has been seen as rising throughout the continent. Among 
the 27 member states, various expressions and claims emerge on a daily 
basis, including in the new members, egged on – as mentioned earlier – by 
the two Bush presidencies. But even a country such as the Netherlands, 
once a founding father and Europe’s champion, became inward-looking as 
shown by the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in 2004. In Belgium, 
another traditionally pro-European country, there are two strands of 
nationalisms that risk breaking up the country, its limited size 
notwithstanding. We focus here however on two of the more important 
and possibly paradigmatic cases, that of the United Kingdom and Poland. 
British nationalism is aristocratic and decadent, born of a great 
history made up of victories – some more those of others than its own – 
which have led to the UK’s current formal status as a great power. But 
there have been defeats as well, in some cases cleverly concealed, which led 
to the demise of an Empire that once spanned from ocean to ocean. 
External to Europe, Great Britain tends to take from integration what suits 
its needs, with English pragmatism, and to throw spanners in the works of 
the rest, to hinder progress when it is deemed to infringe on its sovereignty. 
While it takes advantage of the past enshrined in its permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council, it keenly views its role as the closest, although rarely 
rewarded ally of the only superpower left. But it has tried also to be 
forward-looking, with its flagship stance on the new seas of globalisation, 
where the slower and more timorous ships of the rest of Europe’s fleet 
follow in its wake. That made the UK even more affected by the economic 
downturn and its currency more vulnerable without the euro shield. The 
partly consequential dramatic weakening of the Brown government and 
the likelihood of an eventual return of the conservatives to 10 Downing St, 
with several euro-sceptics among them, suggest that this nationalism and 
the related obstacles to European integration and joint action outside are 
here to stay.  
Polish nationalism, conversely, is less sophisticated and the product 
of a history of defeats, often heroic, nurtured by a culture that is 
prevalently romantic or religious or both. Located at the heart of the old 
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have treated it harshly – occasionally with the support, within the country, 
of authoritarian, or religious or simply naïf circles. Too often Poland looks 
at its past where it finds fodder for its frustrations and recriminations, both 
domestic and international, under which it seems inclined to bury the 
generous and forward-looking political class that accompanied the return 
to democracy and the accession to the EU. The change sanctioned by the 
2007 elections was a positive development, however. With time Poland, 
which has resented the global recession less than the other Eastern 
countries, will move closer to Europe, thanks also to lavish EU funding of 
agriculture and infrastructure, the benefits of which public opinion has 
begun to acknowledge. By the way, the experience of various previous 
accessions shows that even culturally, assimilating participation in the 
integrated system takes time. In the field of external action, EU relations 
with Russia, a country that understandably touches on the nerves of the 
Polish, have been under constant pressure from Warsaw and will remain a 
test case.  
After two countries at the periphery of the Union, let us turn to two 
countries at its heart, beginning with France under the now consolidated 
leadership of the new President, whose international activism has already 
been hinted at. One however should not be misled by it. In fact, despite the 
Gaullist heritage Sarkozy claims to be faithful to, his main role has been so 
far one of reducing the very French specificity the Général was so proud to 
have brought about. The return to the military structure of NATO is 
probably the most evident example. As far as Europe is concerned, Sarkò 
has to deal with the legacy of his predecessor, who wrought irreparable 
harm to French leadership in it, from the Nice Summit to the call of a 
referendum that for all practical purposes “a tué dans l’oeuf”, as the French 
say for killing at the start, the Union’s Constitutional option. The 2004 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty was certainly very negative for the 
Union, but France’s future position in Europe may also bear its mark in the 
long run. 
Something similar had happened exactly half a century earlier, with 
the Assemblée Nationale’s “non” to the European Defence Community, 
which not only killed the European army at its start, but also prevented the 
founding of a community devised along French lines, modelled on its 
institutions, that would have spoken French. Germany at the time was one 
step down the ladder and the UK one step off the European system as it 
was taking shape then. Later, with the Common Market, the Community 
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German reconciliation then entente, joined first by Italy and Benelux, and 
later by the subsequent entrants, including the UK. Over fifty years, in the 
management of this so-called ‘axis’, Germany has basically stood for 
European integration (and Atlantic solidarity) while France alternated 
playing the other pole, and giving more or less free rein to its national 
autonomy. Meanwhile, the Germans have fully come up that one step 
down, and the British have, at least partly, come across that step off, and 
this has changed France’s relative position. Perhaps voters in the French 
referendum were not fully aware of this new situation. 
Time will tell the long-term consequences of 2004, but I would tend to 
think that Paris will have problems maintaining the Paris-Berlin axis with 
the same division of labour as previously. In 2006, I wrote in an article that 
the foreign policy of united Germany, the Union’s largest member state, “is 
moving on a biga, the Roman two-horse chariot, where one horse is 
European, and the other stands for the aspiration to become a de facto great 
power, even without the de jure sanction of a permanent seat on the 
Security Council” (Merlini, 2006, p. 1120). The Germans have now more 
choice when it comes to deciding which horse to prod. The French, 
conversely, while obviously still decisive, will have less leeway. It may be 
fitting such perception the care the current occupant of the Elysée has taken 
in mending relations with his partner on the other side of the Atlantic, to 
balance its loss of weight vis-à-vis his partner on the side of the Rhine. 
Possibly the German response to the French “no” to the referendum 
that would have substantially reformed the institutions of the Union has 
come this year with the ruling of the federal Constitutional Court, by which 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty has been given a green light, but with 
an accompanying chorus of conditions and provisions that will make the 
future working of the Brussels machinery, let alone the famous “ever 
closer” integration more problematic. Among other things this applies to 
German participation in the development and conduct of common foreign 
and security policy actions, especially when a military component is 
involved, which is likely to happen frequently. Evaluations of the 
Karlsruhe court ruling are still under way, but the suggestion that it comes 
to express the rebirth of a German nationalism deserves some 
consideration. 
The description above of the context inside the Union is meant to 
help us identify the national obstacles that stand in the way of Europe 
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said, comes as a further drawback. Hence it might be appropriate to ask a 
preliminary question: Does the EU today identify with Europe? 
Geographically and in terms of image, the question has to a large extent 
ceased to be one. As emphasised above, from the outside the Union is 
broadly perceived as a potential state entity covering the continent, so 
much so that it is surprising to foreigners that we, from the inside, should 
not feel the same. The fact is that politically and domestically the question 
still arises. 
Internal advocates of autonomous national identities and interests are 
more vocal than ever. Their voices are heard on two levels, principally: a) 
in the defence of national interests within the Union’s common institutions, 
the safeguard of which appears to be less of a priority (as if a zero sum 
game were favoured over a positive sum game); and b) in the pursuit of 
separate interests and preferences, proximities or distances vis-à-vis third 
parties, independently of, or in contradiction to, the stance prevailing 
among EU partners. “Les Etats restent au coeur du système international” 
said Sarkozy, fully mirroring in this case the teachings of De Gaulle.3. 
That view is widely shared. But it is not terribly new, one may say. 
An earlier expected return of the nation state to the heart of the 
international system occurred just after the end of the Cold War. Also at 
that time there was a widespread perception of weak systemic ties, as a 
consequence of the blocks’ demise. While this meant to some that the 
Atlantic Alliance had lost its purpose and to others, on the contrary, that it 
needed to change into a political community, to many it simply spelled the 
return to full-fledged national sovereignty. European integration was 
supposed to be one of the casualties, being sidelined by the fall of the Iron 
Curtain and the consequent reunification of Germany. None of these 
scenarios has materialised: NATO has survived as a military alliance (its 
current problems not withstanding) and Europe has moved from the 
European Monetary System to the euro, and from a Community of 12 
members to a Union of 27 (same).  
Today the problem is that the strenuous defence of separate interests 
and preferences seems to have failed to a large extent to enhance the 
national standing of separate countries in the world, as we have seen 
earlier in this chapter, and the degree to which it has brought home sizable 
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returns and specific gains is questionable. According to a number of 
opinion polls in the EU member states, not only does a broad albeit variable 
majority favour a common foreign policy, but both the general population 
and European elites are voicing fairly consistent, if not uniform, 
assessments and opinions on the issues of concern to them.4 
Country-to-country differences remain, of course. A recent poll looks 
at those differences that can be identified according to the location of the 
considered country in Western or Central and Eastern Europe.5 It has to be 
taken into account that, besides geography, the polled countries belonging 
to the former group (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK) have been members of the EU for a longer time those of 
the latter (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). Well, President Obama 
enjoys more favour and generates more expectations in the first group than 
in the second one. That may be not surprising, in so far as the situation was 
the opposite last year, when Bush was in the White House. More 
unexpected is the fact that concerns about Russia seem to be sizably lower 
in the neighbouring East than in the West. 
Differences should not conceal similarities. Attitudes are in fact not 
that distant as to the question of desirability of EU leadership in world 
affairs: 76% in the Western part and 70% in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Both sets of data are substantially higher than those concerning the 
desirability of a US leadership: 56% and a meagre 44%, respectively. The 
result concerning the European Union fits with the preference of three out 
of four European respondents for a more active role of Brussels in the 
present global economic turmoil, but is in a striking contradiction with the 
low popularity of common institutions and the mounting ‘euroscepticism’ 
in most of the member states, including those traditionally in favour of 
European integration, such as Italy. One is brought to draw the conclusion 
that while the ‘European project’ is now on a decline, possibly irreversible, 
the ‘need for Europe’ seems to be on the rise. To borrow from the language 
currently used for the American wars in Asia, it may be said that a ‘Union 
of choice’ is being replaced by a ‘Union of necessity’ in the way Europeans 
perceive it. 
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3.  Suggested guidelines for a non-marginal common foreign policy 
The dimension, the economic weight and the historical legacy of Europe, 
both as a collection of national states and as a common institutional body, 
are such as to make the array of problems to be confronted when relating 
with the rest of the world very ample indeed and full of challenges. Dealing 
with all of them is beyond the scope and space of this chapter. Attention is 
focused on the role and opportunities for the European Union in global 
multilateralism and broadly speaking in a world in which a number of 
systemic ties remain. The related political debate is the one between 
ambitions and capabilities. The related cultural debate is one between 
interests and values or between realism and idealism. The choice of the 
multilateralist approach is made in the assumption that the consequent 
priorities are the best outcome of both these debates, an assumption that I 
will try to demonstrate. 
Praising multilateralism may sound like an ‘idealistic’ refrain 
somewhat passé these days, after the blows it suffered at the hands of 
Bush’s unilateralism and in the face of the above-mentioned widespread 
‘realistic’ assumption of the sovereign states dominating the world scene. 
Realism does not necessarily view institutions and multilateral agreements 
as flights from reality, but tends to assign them ancillary roles. The issue is 
whether that suffices in the current international system. My point here is 
that it does not. First of all, let us bear in mind that, despite the many 
setbacks, multilateralism made some progress during the last decade: take 
the case of the International Criminal Court or of the Kyoto Protocol, 
possibly, the first steps of the kind achieved without or against 
Washington’s wish. Now the Obama administration seems inclined to 
resume constructively the dossiers of the global environment and of the 
international law. 
Secondly, a multilateral system appears to be the most promising 
solution. It would be compatible on the one hand with the growing 
interdependence that stems from globalisation, both in its heyday and in 
the current economic slump, and on the other hand, with hierarchical 
multipolarism, given the large numbers of very different states in the world 
today. Multipolarism is not a strategy, but rather is a state of affairs. So is 
hierarchy, which is not quite vertical enough to allow for empire, but 
possibly not sufficiently horizontal either, so as to suggest a return to the 
balance of power of yore, whose historical record for generating 
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appears to be the most effective approach to address global problems with 
a high degree of transnationality, starting with global warming. 
Betting on multilateralism continues to be in Europe’s best interest. 
Out of necessity, first, because the option of Europe turning into a power 
that can stand in for a declining America, traditionally dear to the French,6 
simply isn’t there. In fact, absent sufficiently strong ‘systemic ties’ between 
them, the Europeans are weaker and more exposed to contradictions 
between member states and the Union. But out of choice as well, i.e. out of 
the vision that in a world so extraordinarily composite (with states and 
international institutions, globalisation and localism, nuclear arms and 
fanatic terrorism, unbridled secularism and the return of religion, etc.) a 
new conceptual approach is required. The so-called ‘post-modern’ 
European governance system based on shared sovereignty may be a useful 
precedent to help to identify such a new approach. The EU does not 
harbour the ambition of projecting its power at large. The congenital lack of 
what one may call ‘integrated chauvinism’ and the irreversible constraints 
voluntarily accepted on continuing or resurgent nationalism by partly 
submitting national sovereignty to common institutions should be turned 
into an asset rather than a liability when dealing with the rest of the world. 
In other words, even if we adopt the realistic assertion that the world game 
is still largely a power game, the aforementioned European bet is 
tantamount to changing the rules of the game while playing according to 
them, for the time being. 
Playing the game requires facing commitments and responsibilities. 
That is why the strategy advocated here is bound to be civil and armed at 
the same time. The residual influence of the cultural and social dimensions 
of the European way of life must not be neglected, while economic 
instruments such as aid, trade pressure and concessions, the single 
currency, etc., must be put to use. Then the capability to help build states 
by training people in the various branches of their institutional setup, must 
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be enhanced. In other words, first and foremost, ‘soft power’. However, 
effective international policy on the part of the Europeans should not 
hesitate to resort to the use of force – military or police manpower – in the 
framework of broader international institutions, insofar as possible, but 
also, whenever necessary, in lieu of or in addition to them. 
The multilateralist method is therefore to be applied with conviction 
as well as pragmatism in order to pursue the primary goals of high-profile 
policies to further Europe’s common interests. When looking for the 
necessary associates in this venture, attention obviously turns first to the 
United States, all the more so with the Obama administration. The current 
debate among the foreign policy community in Washington shows a 
substantial return to the traditional dialectics between idealism and 
realism, as illustrated also by some repositioning of think-tanks. 
Multilateralism is in the picture of both schools of thought, albeit in a 
different scale of priority.7 Both schools contemplate transatlantic 
cooperation in dealing with either crisis situations (such as the wider 
Middle East) and systemic problems (such as global warming), although 
possibly in somewhat different terms, again. Hence the need for Europeans 
to interact with both. 
An area of apparent overlapping between the two approaches is the 
idea of promoting a League of Democracies as a Western strategy, a 
proposal that may yet elicit bi-partisan support in the US. Caution is 
advisable here because it forces us to divide those countries whose 
cooperation is needed by the West between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Where does 
that leave Egypt, for instance, or Saudi Arabia or Pakistan? What about 
Russia? or China?). Moreover, by advocating a sort of ‘ideological 
multilateralism’, we risk undermining institutional multilateralism (the 
UN, in particular) as well as functional multilateralism (the G8, G20 or 
whatever Gs, including the newly contemplated G2). The banner of 
democracy should be substituted with that of the rule of law. This means 
supporting and defending human rights, helping the adoption and the 
implementation of domestic laws that are compatible with them both in the 
established partner countries and in the failed states we are trying to put 
back on their feet. Electoral democracy is the last chapter in the process, as 
history teaches us. Rule of law also means further developing the systemic 
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value of global justice, of properly legitimated rights of international 
institutions to interfere in unacceptable situations, and the like. 
America is certainly not foreign either culturally or historically to this 
approach. Thus the partnership with the US in pursuing it has great 
potentials, besides being necessary. Things are more difficult with others. 
Let’s limit ourselves to the main powers already mentioned. Europe’s 
interdependence with China, India and Russia has been systemically 
growing and it may turn out to be even higher after the economic recession. 
Thus policies vis-à-vis these countries, whether initiated separately by 
member states or coordinated within the Union, are inevitably determined 
by the pursuit of interests involved in this interdependence. At the same 
time the limitations, conditions and ambiguities of these countries are well 
known when dealing with systemic solutions such as treaties or institutions 
and what has become fashionable to call global governance. In other words, 
their reliability as stakeholders in the global corporation is limited, to use 
business terminology. The effort to involve them should not be abandoned, 
however, beginning with culture (current multilateralism is to a large 
extent a Western concept that must adapted so that it can be shared by 
other civilisations) and ending with interests (multilateralism implies 
constraints for the West as well as for the rest of the world and it can 
provide stability to global interdependence). 
Islam is an even more difficult interlocutor. There are Muslim 
countries and countries with a strong Muslim presence, often divided on all 
issues save for anti-Israeli rhetoric. In recent years there has been a decline 
in the power and influence formerly wielded by Arabs, to the benefit of the 
Shiites. Moreover fundamentalists often have the upper hand over 
secularists. Neither development is in Europe’s best interest and its strategy 
should aim to reverse both. Hence a consistent initiative aiming to elicit 
regional multilateralism from the rubble of the Middle East could reflect 
positively on the strengthening of the Arabs and the secularists. Israel, had 
it preserved some of Shimon Peres’ past vision, could perhaps understand 
that this would be in its best interest as well. For the time being, however, 
the Jewish state has chosen to fight almost exclusively for its own strength, 
including territorial expansion, relying on the spirit of the Bible and a lay, 
armed Realpolitik. 
The Europeans should join what appears a new policy by the Obama 
administration aimed at helping Israel to redirect its role towards working 
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seem to be in favour of a regional arrangement but know that it is basically 
up to Washington to call the shots. That recognition should be reciprocated 
by the US accepting that their allies on this side of the Atlantic have a 
decisive word to say in dealing with Moscow and on the issue of whether 
or not to further expand NATO, let alone the EU. 
4.  The instruments for the EU to achieve a high-profile foreign 
policy 
Finally, let us briefly recall the main provisions of the Lisbon Treaty (TEU) 
regarding Europe’s foreign and security policy.8  
Under Article 1, para. 3 of the TEU, “the Union shall replace and 
succeed the European Community” and “the EU shall have legal 
personality” (Article 47), which means it shall have the ability to negotiate 
and sign in its name international agreements of a binding nature for its 
institutions and member states. 
A permanent President of the European Council, elected by qualified 
majority for a two-and-a-half year term that is renewable once, is 
contemplated (Article 15). The President’s duties include ensuring the 
external representation of the Union for matters relative to the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, alongside the High Representative (see below). 
The intent is obviously that of conferring the continuity and consistency not 
provided by the current six-month rotating presidency, especially in the 
field of external relations.  
The other innovation is the High Representative for the Union in 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Article 18), to take on the roles, 
competences and resources of the High Representative for CFSP and those 
of the Commissioner for External Relations (and therefore to have specific 
funding in the budget). Nominated by the European Council, ruling by 
qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, 
he/she shall be entrusted with directing the Union’s foreign, security and 
defence policy and with contributing, through his/her proposals, to its 
implementation in his/her capacity as representative of the External 
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Relations Council (now independent from the General Affairs Council) 
which he/she shall chair. His competences include coordinating the EU’s 
existing policies and bodies, taking political initiative, implementing crisis 
management and external representation. 
Finally there is the European External Action Service (Article 27) to be 
adopted by the Council, following a proposal by the High Representative. 
Made up of Council and Commission staff as well as staff on secondment 
from national diplomatic services, this unit shall operate in close 
cooperation with the latter, with possible conflicts of competence looming 
on the horizon. The Lisbon Treaty, for that matter, does not specify 
deliberately the organisation and operation of the Service, to be finalised by 
Council decision on the basis of proposals put forth by the future High 
Representative. What will also have to be decided is who will chair the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC, also known by its French acronym, 
COPS), an existing body in charge of monitoring international 
developments, formulating opinions for the Council and exercising 
political control and strategic direction in Union peacekeeping operations.  
Let us turn to the Lisbon Treaty clauses pertaining to European 
Security and Defence Policies (ESDP). 
1) There are, first of all, a number of solidarity-focused provisions, 
including reciprocal defence. This means that “if a member state is a victim 
of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have 
towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter (Article 42, para. 3 
of TEU). This text is similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the 
‘compliance’ with NATO obligations being for that matter explained a bit 
further down in the text. The obligation is extended to traditionally 
“neutral” countries, which showed gratitude by having the text specify that 
“this shall not prejudice the specific character of the Security and Defence 
policy of certain member states” (a good exercise of ambiguity). Another 
solidarity-focused provision of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFU) mentions measures to be taken should a member 
state suffer a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster. There is 
one caveat, however: the provision that states that action shall be joint and 
bring to bear all available means, including military, will not apply in the 
event of anti-terrorist operations outside the EU. 
2) And then there is another provision (Article 42 TEU) that was 
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Treaty now replaced by the Lisbon Treaty. It refers to the European 
Defence Agency, set up as CFSP action in July 2004, in order to identify and 
if necessary implement all measures likely to strengthen the defence 
sector’s industrial and technological base (the potentially larger part of the 
remit) and contribute to the definition of a European armaments policy. 
3) Finally all provisions relative to Enhanced Cooperation have been 
taken on board almost in their entirety. The one single exception – not 
marginal – is that the exclusion of initiatives with military or defence sector 
implications has been removed. This is due to the fact that it is precisely in 
this sector that the Lisbon Treaty says that member states with adequate 
military capabilities and the desire to enter into more binding commitments 
in this field may set up among themselves a Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (Article 46), formally open to all, with the purpose of 
organising clusters of national and multinational forces, developing 
equipment programmes in the framework of the EDA, and achieving 
agreed spending and investment targets. In contrast to Enhanced 
Cooperation, which requires the participation of at least one-third of the 
member states, no floor has been set here. But more importantly, decisions 
are taken by qualified majority, which waives the general principle 
requiring unanimity in security and defence policy matters.  
All these instruments, the potential impact of which is not negligible, 
have been tacked on to the existing base of those devised for the CFSP and 
the ESDP, both in terms of declarations, official procedures, common 
action, etc., and in terms of joint operations such as the several ongoing 
civilian operations and the one military (EUFOR Althea, in Bosnia).9 These 
instruments have been used to implement what was called, in the 
introduction, the low-profile common foreign policy so far performed by 
the EU. In shifting from the Constitutional draft, the Lisbon Treaty has not 
undergone any major mutilation in this respect, if one discounts symbols – 
the flag, the ‘foreign minister’, etc. – ideal targets of nationalistic 
reservations. 
Before closing, I would like to mention briefly the CFSP’s younger 
sister, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which has mainly 
stayed under the Commission’s jurisdiction. It is a little sister indeed, but 
not one to be underestimated, as it connects almost without separation with 
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the CFSP’s more difficult challenges (Russia, the Middle East, Africa). 
Moreover it deals with illegal immigration, possibly the most difficult issue 
in the area of justice and home affairs, and with enlargement, i.e. the 
problem of the Union borders, the political relevance of which was 
discussed before. Thus ENP appears squeezed, almost asphyxiated, on the 
one side by the problem of Mediterranean cooperation including the hot 
issue of Palestine, and on the other by the problem of the inflow of 
migrants. A finally further enlargement looms over most attempts of the 
ENP to establish more or less special partnerships with this or that 
‘neighbour’. 
In conclusion, once the remaining dominant unanimity rule is taken 
into account, the ‘technical’ limitations to the achievement of an ambitious 
foreign policy on the part of the Union remain in the Lisbon Treaty. These 
limitations do not pose insurmountable obstacles, however, if a strategy is 
adopted and the appropriate instruments to implement it are defined. Of 
course, all depends on the famous ‘political will’. 
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8.  THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
ROCCO A. CANGELOSI & FERDINANDO SALLEO 
he institutional standstill that followed the referendums in France 
and the Netherlands also shelved the enlargement of the European 
Union to the Western Balkans and Turkey, causing a temporary halt 
in a process that had completed a number of stages and aroused 
considerable expectations. The formal reason that brought the process to a 
halt was the pause for reflection Europe granted itself in order to re-
consider its configuration and overcome the stumbling block of the 
interrupted ratification process.  
1.  European enlargement and vision  
In addition to this standstill on the fate of the Treaty, the postponement of 
new admission procedures seems to be closely connected to the dilemmas 
that institutional review and enlargement policy have spawned for the 
Union and its members. The first dilemma hinges on what kind of Europe 
can realistically be built and managed with more members than the current 
27, with new candidates that are unlike either the core Union countries or 
the elusive ‘European average’ – even more unlike those admitted in the 
so-called 10+2 enlargement of 2004 and 2007. The second dilemma, which 
stems from the first, relates to what kind of Europe can be proposed to 
candidates when accession negotiations resume. As European citizens 
show increasing awareness of future Union developments, public debate 
has been marked by a level of popular political participation that is higher 
than that regarding government decisions.  
In fact, both conceptually and more importantly politically, the 
referendums brought home to European governments two long-avoided or 
talked-away truths. Firstly, as is particularly the case in foreign policy 
when the feared or real consequences for citizens of important political 
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decisions are under consideration, the issue of admitting new member 
states to the Union confirmed the rule that sooner or later, governments 
have to face up to public opinion and the deep-rooted and often 
unexpressed feelings prevalent in any given country. 
Similarly, debates on institutions and Union enlargement also show 
that to some extent the future of Europe is burdened by the anticipation of 
a looming, continually postponed ‘hour of truth’, which signals a need to 
emerge at long last from the ambiguities skilfully juggled by governments 
and diplomats alike. The continuing differences are basically between two 
schools of thought: the original vision of a political Europe and the much 
less innovative one of Europe-as-a-market, or a free trade area. Although 
borders have always been somewhat unclear, there has always been a great 
political and conceptual distance between the two major camps – 
integrationists and minimalists – not to mention the many undeclared 
intermediate positions.  
Although attitudes to enlargement have often been dictated by 
special relations to this or that candidate country, or by alignment 
considerations, enlargement advocates have always had the minimalists on 
their side, whereas traditional supporters of integration and the political 
model have always viewed with considerable perplexity the potential 
consequences of dishomogeneity on the nature of the Europe they were 
building: there is, intuitively, a reverse relationship between the breadth of 
the European Community and the degree of integration between member 
states. Community, and subsequently Union enlargement has from the 
outset had two main terms of reference: on the one hand, completing the 
founding fathers’ European design – political and institutional and not 
simply economic – and, on the other, attempting to achieve convergence 
and cohesion between diverse countries, proud of their history and jealous 
of their identity but willing to move rationally towards forms of shared 
sovereignty. These ideals dictated the principle according to which the 
deepening and widening of Europe should proceed in parallel. The 
principle is still to be found among the pre-requisites to European 
enlargement alongside the so-called ‘criteria’ for aspiring members. 
Although at first sight redolent of a political oxymoron, the close link 
between widening and deepening was designed and understood as a 
hendiadys, a two-for-one, as the belief that the two approaches would 
strengthen one another and make a robust and harmonious European 
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Europe has gradually grown from its initial area, improperly termed 
‘Carolingian’, to cover a vast region extending from the Atlantic to the Elbe 
and to Thessalonica. In the process it succeeded in digesting both a fair 
number of incongruities in its common institutions and significant legal, 
political and economic differences between members. The European 
Community’s enlargement process was thus moving ahead according to an 
internal logic based on radically geo-political assumptions of 1989, when 
European scenarios and global balance were radically transformed by the 
collapse of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war. The implosion of the 
Soviet Union revived an ancient idealistic drive for a Europe that was ‘one 
and free’, to be established in a continental area sharing freedom, 
democracy and progress. This political premise triggered a process which, 
despite a general awareness of the objective difficulties involved, drove the 
European Union towards the East and the Baltic Sea as soon as continental 
‘re-unification’ became possible, as signalled by the unification of Germany 
within a European and Atlantic process and the return to Europe of 
peoples who had been kept away from the heart of the civilisation to which 
they felt they belonged – first by century-old events and subsequently by 
Soviet domination.  
The fact that countries subjected for almost 50 years to Soviet 
domination and the straitjacket of centrally-planned economies were 
actually able to restore representative democracy, the rule of law and the 
protection of human rights and market economics were to a large extent 
made possible by the support provided to their political and economic re-
construction – first by the promise of membership, and subsequently by 
Europe’s concrete assistance as they returned to the fold. But the experience 
was not equally positive for all concerned, which explains why further 
enlargement is a contentious political issue in both new and old member 
states, with criticism ranging from the rational to the visceral, from 
nostalgia for the greater cohesion of the past and contempt for the red tape 
and slowness of Brussels’ officialdom, to the revival of ancestral diffidence 
vis-à-vis outsiders, and the nationalist and populist drives that have 
resurfaced on the extreme political fringes of various countries under new, 
often irrational and xenophobic guises.  
2.  Recent admissions and new candidates 
With the successful admission of neighbouring countries from north-west 
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countries sufficiently similar to the founding members to be subsequently 
absorbed into the European institutions – at varying speeds and intensities 
according to the political, social and economic specificities of each new 
partner – but with an approach marked by realism and cooperation.1 
Coming from state-party regimes, command economies and state-
controlled production systems, they found it a challenge to reconstruct civil 
societies, democratic and pluralist political systems with Western-style 
parties and unions, public jurisdiction and administration, human rights 
and environmental protection. Economically, they were as different from 
the rest of Europe as they were politically and socially. While the Union’s 
surface area and population have grown by about one-third with the 
admission of Central and Eastern European countries, its GDP has 
increased by only about 5%, and per capita income in the enlarged Union 
has fallen by around 18%. These figures show that among the governments 
and public of the ‘old’ Union, the ethical and political aspirations that 
drove enlargement outweighed all considerations of national selfishness 
and accounts-based resentment. These resurfaced with a vengeance in the 
two referendums and are paradoxically also emerging in the more recently 
admitted member states with regard to new candidates. 
Central and Eastern Europe presents a diverse and varied picture, in 
which commendable and laborious progress has not been linear. Initially 
the larger countries, with national income levels that stood at around 40% 
of European averages, recorded faster growth rates than the older Union 
members – and (with the exception of Hungary) also showed acceptable 
macroeconomic outcomes and positive structural adjustment, in 
conjunction however with high unemployment rates (above 15% in Poland 
and Slovakia) – and attracted significant flows of foreign direct investment 
(Dlouhy & Emmott, 2006). 
While some new members achieved clear political and economic 
progress, the larger countries’ initial economic progress was not matched 
by overall stability in the political structures of their recent democracies: in 
actual fact, the establishment of post-communist public order appears to 
have made both citizens and domestic political systems prone to 
widespread restlessness that has at times erupted into loud protests, 
rocking local political systems. Instability has already raised issues of 
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governability in many of the Union’s more recent members and if 
uncontained by systematic dialogue, may well worsen these countries’ 
general and specific economic vulnerabilities and whittle down the 
comparative advantages (low labour costs, high levels of technical 
education, young executives) which the Central and Eastern European 
countries have so far used to boost exports and attract investment from 
other, offshore Union members. Today there are fears that the inflows of 
foreign currency that bolstered public accounts may dry up, leading to 
major financial imbalances. 
Following the adaptation period heralded by the introduction of 
democratic institutions, signs of a revival of nationalism and populism are 
now visible in several countries, which can only be considered as a retreat 
from European ideals. By the same token, the fragilities and uncertainties 
of several Central and Eastern European countries may make it difficult for 
them to stay the course of the progressively stringent rules for economic 
and fiscal policy on which the development of the European process and 
convergence of member states hinge. 
In other words, after a promising start, the EU’s main new members’ 
convergence with the mainstream is now faltering. The picture today is 
very different from that surrounding the entry of Central and Eastern 
European countries, due to the no doubt overly simplistic expectations of 
European public opinion and governments. The belief was that 
membership in the Union would stimulate a linear political, economic and 
social process with interdependent effects and beneficial outcomes for the 
various components of each new member’s society. The process was 
actually posited somewhat abstractly as a kind of paradigm for 
forthcoming admissions – currently in abeyance – but evidence drawn from 
the experience of recently admitted members sheds doubt on its validity. 
Consequently, insofar as new candidates are similar to recently admitted 
members, decisions concerning their entry and the conditions to be 
attached to accession agreements will also be scrutinised on the basis of 
lessons learnt from the larger countries in the 2004 batch, filtering out 
external factors and the impact of the global economic situation in assessing 
their respective results and progress.  
Although the various enlargement negotiations have so far been 
formally framed on the basis of considerations specific to each case, it is 
from a general political standpoint that Europe must contend with a series 
of decisions on enlargement that affect its whole edifice. In actual fact, as a THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION | 147 
 
result of the momentum built up with the 2004-07 big bang, the approach 
to future enlargements to the Western Balkans and Turkey has already 
been sketched out, despite underlying controversy, currently expressed in 
stronger terms and more openly than before. The generous idealism 
underpinning such decisions failed to take into account that recent 
experience has shown the need to base the process on a thorough 
assessment of actual circumstance; in addition, the Union’s growing size 
has gradually begun to tell on its shaky structures, already in need of an 
overhaul if they are to provide effective governance for the current 
membership of 27. In any case, voters in current member states will need to 
be convinced of the desirability of further enlargements. In the meantime, 
momentum has clearly waned as the constitutional standstill has halted the 
enlargement process and forced Europeans to be more realistic in assessing 
the gist of the venture, i.e. which Europe do they want and what kind of 
geographical, economic, political, cultural and social configuration would 
best suit their goal. Conversely, should the minimalist approach win out, 
European construction will perhaps require adaptation to accommodate 
future enlargements.  
3.  The Western Balkans 
Problems related to Europe’s external relations and security are among the 
most pressing issues concerning the enlargements temporarily on hold. 
First and foremost among these is the stabilisation of the Balkan region, 
which occupies a geopolitical position of great strategic significance at the 
very border of the Union. The Western Balkans, which encompass 
Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo (the 
latter two having a hybrid state structure) and Croatia, which is close to 
concluding its own negotiations and is a different case, occupy a territory 
that is wedged deep into the Union and, as far as we are directly 
concerned, contiguous to Italy, from which it is separated by a narrow 
stretch of sea. There is no need to stress how important the stability, 
security and prosperity of this region is for Europe (and particularly for 
Italy). Mindful of the recent post-Yugoslav wars and their effect on Europe, 
one needs to be aware of how porous the borders separating the Western 
Balkans from the Union are – particularly with the free circulation of 
people that applies in the contiguous area of the Union under the Schengen 
agreement. We also need to be aware in general terms of the potential 
‘contagion’ of political instability and insecurity that can, through 
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sometimes channel success. The Western Balkans are actually an 
historically and ethnically diverse region, made up of countries that have 
difficult relations with each other, most of which are small and unstable, 
imbued with nationalism – even sub-ethnic nationalism. They are still 
wounded by the memory of a recent bloody past and worried by the multi-
ethnic make-up of the region and the national and religious minorities it 
has harboured for centuries – the Islamic presence is a case in point. Their 
institutions are often untested and their political structures fragile; there is 
no reliable rule of law or protection of civil rights, internal security is shaky 
and their economic dimensions are far from optimal. Their economies are 
perhaps not even viable because of fragmentation, as illustrated by 
inadequate, incomplete and un-integrated infrastructures. Finally, they 
have high unemployment and low per capita income, even compared with 
the rest of the Balkans.  
The most important of the region’s countries, Serbia, has also fallen 
prey to nationalism. It is economically backward, politically divided and in 
addition still entangled in a contentious relationship with the Tribunal 
established by the United Nations in The Hague to judge crimes committed 
in the post-Yugoslav war, which has been demanding that Belgrade hand 
over the Bosnian Serb criminals to be brought to justice. Most of all, it is in 
the throes of political upheaval at the idea of losing Kosovo, that ‘cradle of 
the Serb nation’, an inevitable territorial mutilation that it cannot bring 
itself to accept. 
Bosnia – which to all intents and purposes is divided between a Serb 
‘republic’ and a Croat-Muslim ‘federation’ – and Kosovo are still under 
international protection with a significant military and administrative 
European and NATO presence, which has so far prevented worst-case 
scenarios. Kosovo is also the focus of political disputes that led to 
protracted arguments within the United Nations on the prospects and 
terms of its separation from Serbia. The United States has recognised an 
independent Kosovo as did many – not all – European countries despite 
hesitation prompted both by fears of a chain reaction throughout the 
former Yugoslav region and by national minority restlessness in Romania, 
Slovakia and Hungary. Russia does not recognise Kosovo’s independence, 
believing it will establish a precedent for restless nationalities within its 
own borders, particularly in Chechnya, and has hit back in the separatist 
regions of Georgia, i.e. Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In practice, Russia’s 
veto has led to a deadlock that compelled the Kosovars to declare 
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a ‘European’ roadmap bringing Kosovo and the whole region closer to the 
Union, which includes guarantees of admission subject to the attainment of 
political, legal and economic goals and the protection of the Serb minority, 
but makes the prospect of entry into Europe an outcome applicable to the 
Balkan region as a whole, at the end of a long-term process.  
Can Europe whole-heartedly welcome into its midst and absorb 
within an acceptable timeframe a group of peoples and societies so foreign, 
complex and dangerous and at the same time so close geographically? Will 
the citizens of the prosperous and distant North accept these new and, for 
them, incomprehensible and rowdy ‘new Europeans’? Will it be possible to 
make room for them within common institutions geared to achieving the 
integration called for by the pro-Europeans, or should one devise some 
other compromise and pay the price in terms of European political 
cohesiveness and institutional progress? Will this not deal a final blow to 
the principle of deepening as a condition of widening? On the other hand, 
all governments are aware of the dangers that continuing instability in the 
Western Balkans poses for the Union’s equilibrium and international role. 
T h e y  k n o w  t h a t  m a t t e r s  m a y  w o r s e n  further if the Union rejects these 
countries and that there are in any event real risks of deterioration that may 
go as far as the re-eruption of only recently quelled local conflicts. The 
insecurity and political unrest of the 1990s, the horror of the post-Yugoslav 
wars, and the massacres and repressions committed at the Union’s borders 
are still alive in our collective memory. Large segments of European public 
opinion as well as political leaders and decision-makers are now 
wondering what methods could be adopted, how much time would be 
required and what kind of Union status could be conceivable for these 
countries, and which compromise solutions could realistically be advanced 
without endangering the pursuit of Europe’s grand design. The time factor 
that appears to dominate possible developments in the Western Balkans 
inherently and strongly defers the basic dilemmas of enlargement: it may 
actually turn into a factor for stability over and beyond current issues of 
Union development, as well as a major obstacle to much-needed 
clarification between two basic visions of Europe. 
4.  Turkey 
Security of the Union’s Eastern borders leads us to the complex issue of 
Turkey, NATO’s Anatolian bulwark, abutting onto the Near and Middle 
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Iran, Iraq and Syria. Looking at Turkey’s geopolitical position recalls the 
opposing arguments that have always been advanced with regard to 
Ankara’s entry into Europe. While it is natural for a political and military 
alliance to have a common border with potential adversaries, it is much less 
so for an innovative political and economic union, an integrated society 
designed with the special features and purpose the community of 
European peoples are committed to developing.  
Several contradictions are inherent in Turkey’s current political and 
cultural situation: a Muslim country with the history and tradition of a 
great power, with a capable establishment, Turkey has made considerable 
efforts to adapt to the Copenhagen criteria and implement the civil 
liberties, human rights and transparency provisions the Union requires its 
candidates to embody in their laws and everyday practice, although much 
remains to be done. 
It is true that admitting Turkey would show the Islamic world that 
Europe is not an exclusively Christian club and is open to peoples of all 
religions and cultures. It is equally true that Turkey is also a political and 
cultural bulwark against radical Arab Islam and a concrete demonstration 
of the viability of a secular and democratic Muslim state, although its 
Kemalist secularism is guaranteed by the not particularly democratic 
supervision exercised by the military high command over Ankara’s civilian 
power, which recent elections have clearly handed over to an Islam-
inspired party. In addition, from a geopolitical standpoint, should the 
Union extend its borders to the Near East, the most unstable and turbulent 
area of the Mediterranean, it would find itself directly involved in the said 
area’s endemic crises and regional conflicts, which are not just territorial 
and political, but also economic – relating as they do to energy and water 
supply – as well as ethnic and cultural. If Europe were to admit Turkey and 
extend to the conflicting states’ borders, it would somehow become a party 
to matters there, and in so doing lose its ability to act as an intermediary 
and broker of agreements, a role it rightly aspires to and which in practice 
it has so far been denied. 
Another point to bear in mind is the regional perspective as seen 
through Turkish eyes, even disregarding traditional ‘pan-Turkic’ 
aspirations towards Central Asia. Turkish pride often spills over into 
nationalism, as demonstrated by recurring and bitter arguments on the 
long-standing issue of the Armenian genocide perpetrated by the Ottomans 
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topical issue, that of the Kurds, has recently acquired a higher profile in 
Turkey’s international political and military stance, as well as in domestic 
policy, with threats of military intervention to destroy Kurdish terrorist 
bases located in the north-eastern provinces of Iraq (and actual raids took 
place), a prospect that has aroused deep concern in Washington as well, 
insofar as it could lead to Mesopotamian Balkanisation. For although Iraq’s 
possible disintegration conversely highlights the relatively good 
performance of self-governing Iraqi Kurdistan, this in itself contains the 
seeds of destabilisation for south-eastern Turkey where a Kurdish 
population harbours hopes of an independent Kurdistan and can feel the 
attraction of the statehood their fellow Kurds, on the other side of the 
border, have been informally but effectively enjoying, counting as they do 
on a division of Iraq into three separate entities.  
In any case, what with the institutional standstill, the postponement 
of negotiations on several ‘chapters’ for which criteria implementation was 
deemed inadequate by Brussels, followed by the recent re-opening of 
negotiations on three, as well as the very modest progress achieved in the 
Cyprus issue (still outstanding through the fault of both sides and of 
Europe itself imprudently admitting Nicosia to the Union prior to the re-
unification of the island planned by the United Nations), Europe’s 
relationship with Ankara is in a state of uncertainty marked by mutual 
recrimination. In both Europe and Turkey, those hostile to Turkey’s 
accession to the Union – even played out over a lengthy process and 
postponed by a decade at least – have recently gained new strength.  
Following the two referendums, as pointed out earlier, domestic 
political considerations have weighed in more heavily on all issues 
concerning the Union and in particular on enlargement: their impact is 
even stronger with regard to Turkey than it is for the Balkan candidates. 
There are renewed fears over the possible entry into Europe of 70 million 
Muslims and the integration of an economy which, although dynamic, 
remains very unbalanced; which has shown strong growth but is still far 
from the income levels prevailing in Europe, even compared to the ‘ten’ 
who entered in 2004 (but not Romania and Bulgaria); and which is saddled 
with high inflation and recurring financial imbalances. In addition to this 
Turkey would potentially elect the largest national representation in the 
European Parliament.  
Furthermore, Sarkozy, who had already spoken out against Turkey’s 
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doubts, which boil down to outright opposition, and are redolent of 
Chirac’s earlier pledge to submit any treaty of accession to a referendum. 
Chancellor Merkel has expressed a strong preference for establishing a 
special relationship with Turkey rather than granting it membership. 
Conversely, London and other minimalist countries are in favour of 
admitting Turkey with the guarantees provided by a lengthy process and 
verifiable targets. All in all, several countries would appreciate alternatives 
to full Turkish membership, but Ankara has so far refused to entertain 
these possibilities.  
5.  The borders of Europe 
On the whole, alongside recurring references to compatibility and 
convergence among economies, integration of tax and corporate 
regulations, standards extension and the adoption of broad European 
policies, discussions on enlargement are currently increasingly dominated 
by problems and questions that are essentially political, cultural and 
psychological. After two periods of geographical expansion, the first driven 
by geopolitical concerns with the pursuit of stability and balance in the 
Western part of the continent, and the second powered by the emotional 
and cultural thrust to recover Eastern Europe, the new accessions are now 
considered in light of Europe’s own strategic interest and how it can 
realistically work towards the goals it has set itself. Bearing this in mind, 
discussions on the limits and borders of Europe, often deemed an exercise 
in pure speculation, appear increasingly meaningful. Europe’s external 
borders and its identity, the Union’s institutions and a common vision of its 
role in the world, internal compatibility among members and compliance 
with the duties, rights and values of a community of fates, all make up a set 
of interdependent issues that cut across both institutional and 
organisational dimensions and the issue of geographical make-up.  
There is an understandable reluctance to discuss Europe’s external 
borders in current terms, not only because Europe itself is extremely hard 
to define, beyond the borders traditionally plotted by geographers and 
historians, but also because there is a reluctance to draw lines that would 
exclude countries with which there are often deep and cooperative 
relations or cultural proximities. Another reason to refrain from defining 
frontiers is an awareness of the interdependence specific to today’s 
globalised world, amid the decline in exclusive state sovereignty and 
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From a political and cultural standpoint, any attempt to mark out an 
external border might seem to imply that Europe really wants to define 
itself by contrast to those beyond its borders, who are ‘other’, in a revival of 
the ancient Hellenic dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Gress, 2004). In 
economic terms, borders conjure up external tariffs and the restrictions that 
were ubiquitous until quite recently, feeding recurring bouts of 
protectionism, and that still pursue us from one trade round to the next. 
Finally, borders revoke the concept of security: a very clear point is made 
by laying down a border in the real sense of the word – a line where 
external defences, the walls protecting a given demos  are traditionally 
placed. Nor should one overlook the sacred and almost timeless character 
extended to the concept of border by the political, cultural and also 
geographical shape given to Europe in 1648 by the Treaties of Westphalia, 
at the close of a series of conflicts that climaxed in the Thirty Years War and 
brought to an end a lengthy period in which sovereignties of various kinds 
and strengths had co-existed, overlapped and intersected.  
On the other hand, can one really avoid an issue as basic as the 
definition of a clear external border, more grounded in recognisability and 
fellowship than in geography? However much trust one may have in the 
demiurgic nature of the force des choses, is it really thinkable to leave the 
definition of Europe’s borders to unfurling events, external and random 
factors, or the slippery slope of Brussels bureaucracy when one knows how 
vague the original treaty was in limiting eligibility to Community 
membership to European countries – without however attaching the map? 
Today there is widespread popular demand for clear borders and the 
territorial definition of what is to become Europe: the question is not just 
where and how the European edifice will be completed, but also in which 
terms and with which features its boundaries will be established. In the 
end, the Union’s enlargement policy will have to meet public demand: it is 
axiomatic that in a democracy government decisions have to be guided by 
due consideration for the attitude and will of the people.  
Europe’s external borders are first of all defined by two political 
benchmarks, the external and the internal. The external or ‘foreign policy’ 
benchmark corresponds to a comprehensive dimension covering Europe’s 
security, the protection of its interests, the scope of its interventions and the 
foreign policy the Union wishes to uphold in a multi-polar scenario, as well 
as the political image it wishes to project in its relations with major entities 
such as states and intergovernmental organisations or the bodies and 
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into debates on soft and hard power and their relative effectiveness, or their 
recommended mix in the management of international relations, one 
should point out that Europe currently projects itself mainly through its 
political and social decisions. Europe’s main features are a mature and 
participatory democracy, the rule of law and the upholding of civil liberties 
and human rights, tolerance and pluralism, the pursuit of prosperity 
combined with social justice, freedom of enterprise and trade, the defence 
of European security and a commitment to peace, the advocacy of 
multilateralism on the basis of agreed rules, a humanistic vision of relations 
between states and the belief that aid to poorer nations is a prerequisite for 
world stability and security.  
Adequate political, economic and military resources will have to be 
made available to this end. Europe’s political strength derives from the way 
in which it projects these values, as demonstrated by the attraction it 
exercises globally, something that is perhaps more clearly perceived by the 
outside world than it is within Europe, where debate is often glum, 
negative, ‘declinist’ and tainted with ideology and scepticism. Europe’s 
international stance is in any case the frame within which its short-term 
goals are ordered: the pursuit of stability in contiguous European regions 
and security along its borders with areas of deep unrest. As stated earlier, 
future enlargement is linked to these goals.  
The ‘internal policy’ benchmark hinges on the institutional issue and 
the inevitable adaptations its members, candidates, and the Union as a 
whole will need to accept in view of the legislative, political, cultural and 
value differences between candidate countries and the Union’s core 
member states. This inevitably shifts the discussion back to the basic debate 
underpinning the whole European process, from the Treaties of Rome to 
enlargement, a debate featuring two opposing political views and focusing, 
in the final analysis, on Europe’s very identity.  
6.  Europe’s identity 
In fact, looking beyond the slew of arguments and theories, what is at stake 
in Europe’s political debate on institutions and enlargement is basically its 
very identity, insofar as external borders and identity are one and the same. 
This is an inescapable issue, not only because it is clearly defining for the 
overall European design, but also because principles of democracy and 
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regardless of whether accession treaty ratification is entrusted to 
parliaments or referendums.  
One can easily argue that deliberate vagueness on issues of European 
identity was a decisive factor in the French and Dutch rejections, as pointed 
out in the interpretative controversies and ex-post rationalisations that 
followed the referendums. The controversies were fuelled by a number of 
biases, either genuinely felt to be important, or stemming from overly 
simplistic argumentation – inter alia because of a lack of communication on 
the part of national governments and Brussels – or from yet other 
controversies based on reasoning and arguments echoing ancient 
misunderstandings. Alongside reasons of a general nature – a 
disappointment with Europe voiced by those who seemed unable to recall 
the distressed circumstances of yesterday from their current position of 
prosperity largely ascribable to progress achieved by the whole continent, 
or growing hostility to the Commission’s perceived over-regulation – one 
prominent and widespread feeling was so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’, a 
dwindling belief in the ideal, a lack of trust in the future, risk aversion and 
a set of fears linked to enlargement. Today, other member states have 
followed the French and the Dutch, months after the fact, in expressing 
anxiety at the idea of letting into their common home other poorer and 
politically unstable countries, economically weak and lacking in 
infrastructure. There is also dread of a massive inflow of immigration (the 
‘Polish plumber’), fear that new members will be granted priority access to 
structural funds that will end up being directed to their poorer regions, as 
well as lurking trade protectionism, ever suspicious of whoever manages to 
produce more competitively. And to that one must add a visible concern at 
the ‘otherness’ of Islamic values and the Muslim way of life, as compared 
with European traditions. 
Beyond these specific reasons, the underlying cause for rejection 
seems to be a deep and widespread fear of what the Germans call 
Entfremdung, the loss of identity. For Europe, a voluntary union of different 
peoples and states that have decided to share a large part of their 
sovereignty, modern self-awareness does not equate identity with race or 
unifying ethnicity, any more than with geography, language or religion. 
Europe includes countries with a clear awareness of their identity but 
where a number of different languages are spoken, elsewhere languages 
and cultures spread beyond national borders, people share a language and 
a culture but not a religion, states have lost or gained vast territories and in 
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and yet their identity has remained unchanged. These are all-important 
ingredients in a people’s self-awareness and self-image, whether true or 
distorted by legend, and therefore an integral part of their self-perception 
(Barzun, 2000; Le Goff, 2003). Further basic components of identity are a 
common history and great and illustrious traditions, often tragic and 
weighty – with the seeds of war, misuse of power and disaster – to be 
prevented.  
Since the Enlightenment, there has been a growing awareness that the 
keystone of social groups’ ‘republican’ (Viroli, 2002) identity is their 
decision to live together, that conscious will of citizens, that ‘everyday 
plebiscite’ referred to by Ernest Renan and others, that state citizens have 
devised for themselves, the basic law of the country, the social contract and 
the institutional arrangement consciously and freely chosen by the people. 
In the case of Europe, where strong member state identities coexist with the 
Union’s developing identity, the latter is particularly to be sought in the 
‘comun diritto’ (or acquis communautaire) as expounded upon in this 
volume by Mazzini. As it develops it will increasingly be embodied in the 
Union’s institutions, its shared freedoms and duties, the common 
principles and values around which the social contract and political 
institutions have been shaped as well as in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights – which, despite having been legally sidetracked in Brussels, mainly 
because of the United Kingdom, is still referenced in the Treaty. The 
broader the range of human activity governed by common rules, the clearer 
the borders of Europe will become to its citizens and the outside world.  
In this sense, the issue of enlargement and institutions intersect each 
other in such a way as to require that they be dealt with together. 
Intuitively one sees that the Union will in any case require a clear definition 
of its nature, its legal identity – the international personality of Europe has 
been retained in the Lisbon text – through its institutional arrangements 
and strategic goals, so that candidates can knowingly decide in what kind 
of regulatory and organisational context they wish to view their future. 
What is at stake is no longer simply accepting the acquis communautaire, but 
rather finding a position within a specific institutional system, internalising 
the consequences domestically, adapting laws and culture as required, 
signing on to the sharing of a number of areas of Westphalian sovereignty, 
and devolving allegiance for each of these to the Union or to the Union 
component candidate countries are able and willing to adopt. The societal 
paradigm deriving from this shall be based on a free and conscious choice, 
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advantages or striving solely for prosperity would soon lead to 
dysfunctions that endanger the whole system.  
Conversely, in deciding what type of Europe they want in the future, 
members will have to consider future enlargement and have a basic idea of 
the type of candidates they feel could be accommodated within their 
geopolitical and ideal vision of the Union. We know that this will not be an 
easy choice, considering the differences in approach upheld by minimalist, 
sovereigntist and integrationist member states, so far reconciled by 
deliberately reduced ambitions. It is also obvious that different countries 
have different attitudes to the outside world and there is widespread 
concern about the required ratifications. For this reason too, it would be 
better to avoid confronting European states and peoples with a stark choice 
between two extreme positions, in a take it or leave it alternative. 
Candidate countries will also need to choose what kind of Union to accede 
to or, put differently, which European identity they are willing and able to 
identify with, and what timeframe and procedures they realistically think 
they can commit to as candidates for accession, without running the risk of 
being rejected, be it only by a single member state refusing ratification.  
In view of the current standstill, one wonders whether it was wise to 
put the cart before the horse and give rise to unwarranted expectations. 
One also wonders how much time we have left and how we should make 
use of it. More importantly, what kind of complex diplomatic activity will 
be required to prepare a resumption of enlargement while avoiding hasty 
decisions that might damage European construction? Such haste might lead 
to the possible rejection of countries drawn into ill-fated negotiations and 
end up creating areas hostile to Europe at our very borders – an outcome 
diametrically opposed to the original intentions of the Union’s 
governments.  
7.  Enlargement in 2009  
Whatever one’s verdict on the Treaty of Lisbon, there is something of a 
temporary nature to it, as in all compromises with built-in obsolescence, 
because of the need to accommodate two visions of Europe that are 
increasingly at odds. It is impossible to tell whether, with time, Europeans 
will go for: ‘one’ European Union or several entities and bodies, concentric 
or partly overlapping, a Russian doll or a set of different levels or different 
‘densities’. Clearly if the Union were to be reduced to its lowest 
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this would mean one kind of pact, whereas a more markedly integrationist 
model would entail something quite different. Concentric circles and 
different speeds would require yet another approach, and a variable 
geometry system or the hub and spoke model of enhanced structural 
cooperation would entail something else again. Not to mention the 
additional intricacies of opt-outs and other complex mechanisms. The 
enlargement policy will have to adapt to these unknown quantities.  
Approaches to negotiations and negotiation methods have also 
undergone considerable changes following the European Council and in 
view of the Lisbon Treaty. Even though its political significance has been 
diminished by British reservations, in particular, and its terms of reference 
are not clearly defined, the ‘long’ European Council presidency will 
certainly play a leading role in the resumption of enlargement. 
Furthermore, the new text of Article 49 of the European Union Treaty states 
that in regard to eligibility criteria and procedures for accession to the 
European Union, reference shall be made to the values of the European 
Union and European states’ commitment to promote them. New Article 49 
has also been made to include a pre-existing provision whereby the 
European Parliament and national parliaments shall be informed of 
membership applications. 
There is also a new mention of the accession criteria agreed by the 
European Council, as defined in Copenhagen in 1993 and modified in 
Madrid in 1995. These require the presence of stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for 
minorities and their protection (the political criterion); the existence of a 
reliable market economy and the ability to cope with market forces and 
competitive pressure within the Union (the economic criterion); the need to 
accept obligations deriving from accession, and in particular the goals of 
political, economic and monetary union (the community acquis criterion). 
For accession negotiations to begin, the political criterion must be met. 
Amendment of the criteria by the European Council therefore requires 
unanimity. These changes will have an impact on the Union’s very ability 
to define its own boundaries and in many respects will provide an implicit 
response to the call for clear border definition. Within the complex system 
of international relations, the type of interaction between the High 
Representative (the de facto Foreign Minister, who will also be Vice-
President of the Commission) and the Commissioner responsible for 
enlargement remains to be seen. The matter is not simply one of form, as it 
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Commission, where the balance has so far fluctuated over time depending 
on the personalities involved and the political positions prevailing in 
capitals, not to mention the need to adapt in terms of timeliness and 
geopolitical analysis to the complex relationship between foreign policy 
and new member admission.  
8.  After the Lisbon Treaty 
Confidence in the ability of candidate countries and their citizens to move 
closer to the European Union and its political and economic standards 
seems to suggest that the intermediate stages of the process leading to full 
membership can be outlined. In order to manage enlargement realistically 
while avoiding the dual pitfalls of total closure – for which time has 
probably run out – and of a complete watering down of the European 
concept into a mere economic area, what is required is an approach that 
combines stringent compliance with the requirements for full membership 
i n  E u r o p e  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  c a n d i d a t e s  able and willing to do so, and the 
possibility of alternative flexible or partial models of participation in the life 
and activities of the European Union. These could include a vigorous 
‘neighbourhood’ policy as well as initiatives under consideration for the 
Mediterranean area, an area of free circulation as well as open-ended 
enhanced cooperation or closed initiative-based groups, all of which, 
however, would be connected with the core institutional set-up.  
Regarding cooperative relations with contiguous regions, the 
Mediterranean should be returned to its central place in European policies, 
which currently seem to lean increasingly towards the East and the 
Caucasus as a result of biased or short-term perspectives likely to involve 
Europe in areas far removed from its centre of gravity. After the failure of 
the Barcelona process, a strengthened Mediterranean policy requiring 
innovative fleshing out to overcome the predictable reservations of many 
members would restore some balance to Europe’s geopolitical position and 
help the Union consolidate its interests in contiguous regions. The prospect 
of a structured Euro-Mediterranean organisation begs the question of 
whether this should entail an alternative status for some of the enlargement 
candidates so as to connect them in a stable but evolving manner to 
Europe.  
Despite its many limitations, the Lisbon Treaty, which although 
simplified does preserve the essence of the Rome text, could signal an 
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able and willing, as long as the good faith of its signatories is more robust 
than that of those who signed in Rome. For the time being it would appear 
that we have dispelled the prospect of a neo-sovereigntist victory – with its 
advocates not only in the East but in Paris as well – and avoided a 
resurgence of British minimalism.2 The upcoming British elections will tell 
us more. 
Interests may however yet splinter not only politically but also in 
terms of greater single market design. Without stronger institutional 
power, this market might become a wholesale battleground or the premise 
for an unregulated free-for-all; instead of a market-place coordinated by 
competition, a locus of substantive anomy that would only benefit the 
strongest. If that were to occur, launching a two-speed Europe would 
become the only solution for those who feel more integrated and effective 
policies need to be developed around the central core represented by the 
Eurogroup.3 
                                                      
2 The positive aspect lies in the fact that the most significant aspects of the 
Constitutional Treaty have been retained: in particular, the legal personality of the 
Union, the Minister for Foreign Affairs (although the term used will continue to be 
High Representative), the European External Action Service, permanent structured 
cooperation in the defence sector, a stable European Council president, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (despite waivers for the UK), the extension of majority 
voting, voting modalities (dual majority as of 2014), the hierarchy of rules, the 
elimination of the ‘pillar’ system, the new policies. 
3 The negative aspects are first and foremost the definitive abandonment of the 
term Constitution, of the Union’s symbols (flag, hymn, motto) and the various 
concessions granted to the Poles, the British and the Dutch in order to reach an 
agreement. Particularly regrettable is the removal from the text of the primacy of 
Community law and its transfer to a declaration by the Inter-governmental 
Conference to be attached to the Treaty; the decline in the Commission’s powers of 
initiative following the strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity and the power 
granted to national parliaments to challenge Commission proposals, greater 
rigidity in conferring new competences to the Union and the possibility of 
renationalising common policies. Equally noteworthy: the opt-outs granted to the 
UK and Ireland in the judicial and home affairs sectors, and the special system 
whereby the Charter of Fundamental Rights will not be fully applicable with 
regard to the UK and Poland (although Poland’s position might change as a result 
of recent elections there). The IGC also granted the UK the unprecedented 
possibility of opting out from the acquis of the so-called ‘third pillar’ if, after a 
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The common institutional system, Europe’s main heritage, will in any 
case need to provide assurance against an à la carte Union, overseeing the 
special formulas worked out among members and protecting instead the 
overall grand design. In this perspective, the enlargement policy will to 
some extent be a litmus test of whether the minimalist outlook or the 
outlook supporting gradual political integration will prevail. Those 
institutions that stand at the cusp between membership and various forms 
of association and which coordinate and provide consistency to the 
system’s various component parts will therefore require strengthening. 
How the Union moves towards an institutional arrangement that meets 
today’s needs and allows for progress towards integration will in turn be 
influenced by whichever concept of enlargement prevails – not in abstract 
terms, but with specific political reference to current candidates and others 
that can realistically be considered as prospective partners in the European 
venture.  
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transition period, the country were to decide against being subject to the power of 
the Commission and the Court of Justice in this area. Finally, following a French 
request, competition has been deleted from the list of Union goals and transferred 
to a protocol annexed to the Treaty. As far as voting procedures are concerned, the 
dual-majority system – again following Poland’s request – will enter into force in 
2014, with a transition period running to 2017 and with a strengthened safety net 
(the so-called Ioannina compromise, to be defined by an ad hoc decision, subject to 
amendment or revocation by European Council consensus decision). 162 | 
 
 
9.  EUROPEAN DEFENCE OR DEFENCE OF 
EUROPE? 
ALESSANDRO PANSA 
1.  The institutions: A past of great hopes, a future with no illusions 
Europe’s commitment to defence and security dates back a long way and is 
also a recent phenomenon.1 
It dates back a long way as the attempt to create a European Defence 
Community (EDC) arose in the 1950s in response to US pressure (plus ça 
change…), but was abandoned in 1954 when it failed to obtain ratification 
from the French Parliament. 
It is also recent, however. Following lengthy discussions and the 
creation of institutions with little political and military importance, it was 
only in 1999 that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was 
created. Even now, European defence capabilities are still being 
implemented (some are still at the assessment stage). 
The concept of European defence is closely linked to the issue of 
sovereignty, part of which must be ceded in any joint security initiative. 
The failure of the EDC – perhaps a too ambitious project for its time – 
led to the abandonment of attempts to limit the sovereignty of countries 
and to create an ‘organic’ European structure using a problem-based 
approach, much favoured by Jean Monnet. Thus the issue of European 
defence was not discussed for a long period. 
NATO was at that time responsible for European defence, based on 
the collective defence principle set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. After the EDC failed, the call by the Eisenhower administration for 
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a European defence angle was superseded by the creation, following a 
proposal by the UK, of a new organisation: the Western European Union 
(WEU). The WEU had little political and military importance, but it did 
create an agency for armaments cooperation, the Western European 
Armaments Group (WEAG).  
The role of NATO has always generated a great deal of debate ever 
since President Charles de Gaulle’s initiative in 1966 to withdraw France 
from NATO’s integrated military command structure in peace time, in 
support of a European defence structure independent of NATO, while the 
UK remained loyal to the idea of a North Atlantic alliance. These actions 
gave rise to the complex situation that still influences European decisions 
today. 
At the end of the Cold War, the changed international situation 
provided an opportunity to go down the path of a common security and 
defence policy; it was time to reorganise NATO, which until then had been 
based on the defence of European territory against the Soviet threat. 
Moreover, in 1991, the first Gulf War highlighted the inadequacy of 
European armed forces compared to the technological capabilities and 
projection of the United States, while the start of the war in the Balkans 
highlighted the issue of European intervention in crisis-hit areas. The need 
thus arose for European military capacity to enable it to intervene beyond 
its borders in support of humanitarian assistance. 
The European Union’s Maastricht Treaty in 1992 created the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – the second pillar of the 
European Union – as well as the first draft of a defence policy. The CFSP 
represented a compromise between the positions of France, Germany and 
the UK. While France and Germany supported the need for a common 
policy, the UK did not want to create competition with NATO. The result 
was that the CFSP had many good intentions, limited instruments, but no 
military capability. The Treaty declared that the CFSP included “the 
eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a 
common defence” (Article J4). The WEU, meanwhile, was responsible for 
defence. 
To achieve a common defence, NATO had to become more European. 
The North Atlantic Council that was held in Berlin in June 1996 advocated 
the creation of a European security and defence identity within NATO. 
Agreement was reached on measures to grant planning capacity, military 
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military missions of crisis management. President Jacques Chirac therefore 
decided on France’s partial return to NATO’s integrated military 
command. But controversy on the appointment of a European commander 
to the NATO command AFSOUTH in Naples2 blocked France’s definitive 
return and any hopes that the alliance would become more European. 
The WEU therefore again formed the nucleus of a European ‘armed 
wing’. The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 provided for the incorporation of the 
WEU into the CFSP, the inclusion of the Petersberg missions (humanitarian 
and rescue, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management including peace-making) and the possibility of reciprocal 
cooperation between member states in the armaments sector. 
From this came the beginnings of multilateral cooperation in the 
armaments sector. In July 1998, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Spain and 
Sweden signed a Letter of Intent with the aim of restructuring the 
aerospace and defence sector; while in September 1998, France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK founded the Organisation for Joint Armaments 
Cooperation (OCCAR) to manage joint industrial projects. 
The arrival of Tony Blair in Downing Street in 1997 paved the way for 
a reconciliation with France and a more credible European defence policy, 
given that the new British prime minister seemed to be in favour of 
European integration, which he considered an unstoppable phenomenon. 
The first step towards a European Security and Defence Policy was 
taken at the Franco-British summit at Saint Malo in December 1998, where 
it was proposed that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by military forces, in order to respond to international crises. 
The word “autonomous” was chosen as a compromise between the 
positions of France (“independent”) and Britain (“complementary to 
NATO”).  
There was, however, agreement on one issue: Europe needed a 
strong, competitive industrial and technological defence base. The 
agreement between France and the UK was a necessary but not sufficient 
condition: external events also contributed to the creation of a defence 
policy. 
                                                      
2 See Dassù & Menotti (1997).  EUROPEAN DEFENCE OR DEFENCE OF EUROPE? | 165 
 
1999 was a decisive year. NATO intervened in Kosovo in March, and 
the failure of the Rambouillet agreement again convinced Europeans that 
the capacity to use military intervention as well as diplomacy was needed. 
The aerial campaign once again showed how Europe as a whole was 
technologically inferior to the US.  
The Cologne European Council meeting in June established the first 
principles of the ESDP, incorporating the decisions taken in April at the 
North Atlantic Council in Washington, which – as previously established 
for the WEU in Berlin in 1996 – extended access to NATO capacity by the 
Union for autonomous European3  missions according to the formula 
subsequently renamed the ‘Berlin Plus’.  
Concrete objectives for autonomous capacity were established at the 
Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999: the Helsinki 
Headline Goal required member states to make 60,000 personnel available 
for Petersberg missions by 2003. 
The ESDP inherited the WEU’s crisis management systems. In 
October, as stipulated by the Amsterdam Treaty (Article J8), Javier Solana 
was appointed Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative 
of the EU for the CFSP. He also became Secretary-General of the WEU. It 
was decided that the WEU would cease its activities by July 2001 and 
transfer to the European Union its functions and organisations, with the 
exception of the WEAG, which would remain active for the time being. 
This development began to meet with early success: in the ‘Force 
catalogue’ – prepared at the conference on military deployment in 
November 2000 – some 100,000 men, well in excess of the stipulated 60,000, 
were made available by the member states for the Helsinki objectives. In 
December 2000, the French Presidency approved the Treaty of Nice, and 
defined the Berlin Plus agreements and the politico-military structures of 
the ESDP. The Capabilities Improvement Conference of November 2001 
instituted a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) to bridge the gaps in 
military capacity, thereby rationalising member states’ defence 
programmes.  
                                                      
3 Washington Summit Communiqué, NAC-S(99) 64 of 24 April 1999 (available on the 
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The year 2003 was critical for the ESDP. In January the first mission 
(the European Union Police Mission, or EUPM, in Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
was launched, while the start of the first military mission (Concordia in 
Macedonia) in March was made possible by the implementation of the 
entire package of Berlin Plus agreements via a framework agreement 
contained in an exchange of correspondence with NATO. However, in 
order to respect the civilian nature of the organisation and avoid 
controversy between member states, most of the ESDP’s missions are still 
non-military, such as police missions or the restoration of the rule of law.4 
The European Council of December 2003, which ended the six-month 
term of the Italian Presidency, was a decisive moment for the future of the 
ESDP, which saw the adoption of the European security strategy, “A secure 
Europe in a better world”, drafted by the Solana administration. This 
represented a genuine strategic conception of the identification of 
scenarios, threats, objectives and concepts for the ESDP.  
It is opportune to note that this Council is mainly associated with the 
breakdown in negotiations to finalise the Constitutional Treaty. The 
unsuccessful attempts to implement the treaty have parallels with the EDC. 
As is well known, the treaty was redrafted by the European Convention 
(Convention on the Future of Europe) and amended by the member states 
at the Intergovernmental Conference but was not approved, as anticipated, 
by the December Council. It was then adopted in June 2004, only to be 
rejected by the French and Dutch referenda in 2005. Following a period of 
reflection of around two years, a new Reform Treaty was signed in Lisbon 
in December 2007. The Treaty of Lisbon will come into force in December 
2009. 
The Treaty of Lisbon envisages the convergence of national defence 
policies: member states no longer have the objective of developing a 
common military capacity, but must make their national military 
capabilities available to the European Union (Article 28A). The Treaty is 
strongly inter-governmental; national security, in particular, is considered 
to be the exclusive responsibility of individual countries. 
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The Treaty of Lisbon seems to accord a greater role to NATO at the 
expense of autonomous defence. NATO is still the bedrock of a common 
defence for the allied countries. The Berlin Plus agreements are the pillar of 
cooperation between NATO and the EU, and the Union’s best tool for 
implementing a common defence and contributing to the restructuring of 
NATO.  
The Treaty of Lisbon preserves the main provisions of the ESDP 
stipulated by the Constitutional Treaty, which are currently being 
implemented by means of permanent structured partnerships such as battle 
groups (tactical groups) and the European Defence Agency. 
The idea of battle groups was first proposed in February 2004 by the 
British, French and Germans as a package of autonomous multinational 
forces of around 1,500 men to lead out-of-theatre military missions at the 
request of the UN. Battle groups became operational in January 2007, and 
the concept has been incorporated into the 2010 Headline Goal, the current 
objective for military capabilities. 
The European Defence Agency (EDA) – established by a Joint Action 
of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004 – is tasked with supporting 
member states in their efforts to improve European defence capabilities to 
bridge any gaps identified by ECAP; to promote research and technology, 
and to harmonise European purchasing, armaments policy and military 
procurement. The Agency took over all the activities of the WEAG, which 
ceased operations in 2005. It also liaises with OCCAR.  
Is the Treaty of Lisbon a step backwards compared to previous 
decisions? From a decision-making and legislative point of view, this is 
undoubtedly the case. It talks about a common defence and ‘sharing’ 
security initiatives. 
But it looks like a compromise – perhaps the only one possible – 
between countries that have gradually developed differing perceptions of 
the role, and even the ‘essence’, of Europe. It may be the only way forward 
at a time when Europe seems less likely to be able to ‘lead’ Europe than in 
the 1990s. 
However, initiatives such as the creation of the European Defence 
Agency is one of the positive results in recent years on the issue of defence. 
As we will go on to see, this Agency can effectively be considered the 
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The Agency attempted to create a European defence procurement 
market – using the 2005 procurement code of conduct – thereby increasing 
competition and improving transparency in European procurement.5 The 
Agency acts to improve the defence industrial and technological base, both 
by preparing projects and strategies for research and technology and 
through funding programmes, such as the Joint Investment Programme on 
Force Protection, which is currently the only major joint programme. Many 
of the initiatives proposed in the EDA’s documents remain on paper. 
The European Commission has now issued an interpretative 
Communication on Article 296 of the Commission’s paper6 – intended to 
reduce the number of restrictions on competition that member states apply 
in the sector, under the article – and in December 2007, published the 
anticipated Communication on the defence package, the effects of which 
have still to be seen.  
The EU is finding its way again, but the European defence industry 
must develop the military and technological capacity required. 
2.  The industry: Oligopoly, foreign policy and internationalisation 
Where and how does the European defence industry fit in the political and 
institutional context that we have described? Does it have a future, whether 
as a vital component of security policies or as an important part of Europe’s 
economic and industrial landscape? And if it does, under what conditions?  
To answer these questions, we have to first of all understand what we 
are talking about: we should clarify immediately that the term ‘European 
industry’ is an expression more of hope than of reality, as otherwise we 
would talk about the ‘industry of European countries’. An industry that has 
the characteristics of an oligopoly: 70% of defence systems worldwide 
(which represent 1.2% of global GDP, or just over €400 billion in 2006) are 
produced by the ten largest industrial groups, which operate in an 
environment that is at the same time both cooperative and competitive, 
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especially in Europe. Companies work together to develop technology and 
products, but compete when marketing them.  
Like all oligopolies, the defence sector has high barriers to entry. 
These can be technological (acquiring expertise is a long and complex 
process); financial (huge resources are required to develop, manufacture 
and market products); and political/regulatory, since the authorisation 
procedures, necessary to operate and to export, and contract negotiations 
require extended timescales, as well as costly skills and resources. In 
addition, the more powerful members of the oligopoly adopt strategies to 
prevent new businesses entering the market (including acquisitions) or 
assuming important roles and positions, which can lead to changes in the 
rules of the game, and force the incumbents to review their manufacturing 
and investment decisions. There are many such examples in the defence 
industry.  
Barriers to exit are equally significant. These are also financial in 
character (adequate returns on investment in the sector are only realised in 
the medium to long term) but also political/regulatory: a manufacturer of 
products relating to national security – financed by public funding over 
many years – is not in a position to exit the industry without incurring 
costs. Similarly, it is inconceivable that a company’s shareholding structure 
would be changed without formal and/or informal checks being 
undertaken by the public administration.  
The relationship with the public administration does not end there. 
Since the end of the 19th century, the energy and defence sectors have 
continually been the most important, listened-to and influential partners of 
the governments of industrialised countries. But, while in the past, 
government decisions and budgetary policies influenced industry, the 
comparatively recent globalisation of production and the growing 
informational asymmetry associated with increasing technological 
complexity (which we will discuss later) mean that the sector is less 
influenced by political decisions and more able to influence them. This is 
particularly important for Europe, where industry can influence the 
decision at either national or EU level. 
The relationship with the public administration does not end there. 
The relationship between industry, defence and industrial foreign 
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The use of companies as a foreign policy tool by the governments of 
large countries is well-known. Moreover, a strong, cohesive industrial 
structure is clearly a powerful international policy tool. Medium-sized 
countries with a significant industrial base are a very interesting case. 
Foreign policy in these countries is, of course, based on compliance with 
treaties, the management of partnerships and participation in international 
initiatives: but it consists to a large extent of safeguarding the international 
economic and industrial interests of its companies – so much so that the 
foreign policy of these countries could be described as “made by 
multinationals, backed to the hilt by their governments”.7 
The body of interests to be safeguarded thus becomes crucial, and the 
foreign policy of a country will vary according to the industrial nature of its 
economy, and its international influence and role. The more technologically 
advanced a country’s industry is and the greater its international influence, 
the more the country’s industrial foreign policy is (or should be) geared 
towards its companies in an attempt to influence the technological 
standards of other economies, thereby having a lasting influence not only 
on the production system of other industrialised countries, but also more 
generally on the development model. This creates a virtuous circle between 
the technological development process, and a country’s industrial policy 
and foreign policy.  
In this context, the importance of the defence industry lies as much in 
its technological content as in the fact that its activity relates to a sector that 
retains its own decision-making and technological models of production 
systems, especially defence and foreign policy, long-term decisions and 
models that could only be abandoned at great cost. 
The defence industry is therefore a crucial element of a country’s 
industrial foreign policy; but it is equally important for the development of 
production systems in advanced economies, given its contribution to a 
country’s technological assets. The ratio between R&D activity and 
revenues in the industry is around 8%. Although not the biggest investor in 
relative terms, the pharmaceutical industry is the only one that invests 
more heavily than defence in absolute terms.8 This shows the importance of 
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the absolute value of investment in research by defence companies, an 
importance that is increasing due to the growing significance of dual-use 
technology that has both military and civilian applications. 
Moreover, there is a technology gap of 10 to 20 years biased towards 
the West compared to defence systems developed in the rest of the world. 
Some commentators maintain for example that Chinese military technology 
is 20-30 years behind that of Europe and the US.9 Such a gap, together with 
the low price elasticity of high-tech goods, makes defence-industry 
products one of possibly the few areas where, in the long term, Western 
economies enjoy a clear competitive advantage in exports compared to the 
aggressive production and marketing of emerging economies.  
The future influence and role of Europe’s security industry will also 
depend on its ability to successfully ride out the ‘denationalisation’ of the 
sector at various levels (technological, commercial, manufacturing and 
shareholding), a process involving many factors: some exogenous and 
others largely endogenous. Exogenous factors include the spread of 
technology and changes in global demand for military equipment, while 
trends in European military procurement policies would fall into the latter 
category.  
Up until the fairly recent past, the development of military 
technology took place in locations and under conditions that allowed limits 
to be placed on its use and forced innovation in the civilian field to take a 
secondary role to that in the defence sector. The expansion of scientific and 
technological expertise, the significant investment in technology in civil 
industries (e.g. semiconductors, telecommunications, bio-engineering and 
bio-genetics) and the increase in the skills base in many countries – due 
both to the relocation process in some important sectors and the training of 
new classes of technicians and scientists – set in motion the gradual spread 
of military technology and a growing fusion of military and civil 
technology. The much-feted concept of ‘dual technology’ is a clear 
admission that military technology is no longer circumscribed knowledge.  
Running alongside the ‘internationalisation’ of know-how is the 
growing importance of changing global demand for military products. 
Estimates agree on the growth of the latter, with some analysts putting the 
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real annual rate at 1.5-2% over the long term (from now until 2035-40). But 
the main boost to growth in demand will come not from Europe or the US 
but from two other groups of countries. The first is made up of the oil-
producing nations (in the Middle East and Asia) that have to balance a 
growing perception of geo-political instability with substantial trade 
surpluses generated by high oil prices. The second group comprises the 
three big non-Western economies: Russia, India and China. Budgets for 
defence equipment are growing at more than double the rate in these 
countries than in Europe and the US. Clearly, they are trying to secure 
Western industrial technology through supply contracts, the acquisition of 
shareholdings and the creation of joint companies.  
The situation is therefore changing rather quickly. The defence 
industry will never be global in terms of product standardisation or the 
structure and localisation of activity: the technology and goods it develops 
are considered too sensitive to be produced and marketed in the same way 
to all clients. But the sector has rapidly evolved towards a ‘multi-domestic’ 
model, in which although there are still significant restrictions on the 
circulation of technology and other limits on production standardisation, 
companies derive an increasingly large share of orders from overseas 
customers and tend to localise (if not transfer) some of their operations to 
commercially attractive economies (i.e. to countries with large defence 
systems budgets), which also have the appropriate infrastructure and high-
quality human resources.  
The defence industry is thus experiencing significant and rapid 
growth in competition (a word that was virtually unknown in that sector 
until a few years ago) with companies facing pressure on prices, margins 
and financial structures. In order to compete effectively, companies must 
first obtain economies of scale and scope in the use of their manufacturing 
base and technology (the home-oriented policies of the 19th century, known 
as the piede di casa, still have some importance, despite globalisation). 
Secondly, they must secure adequate access to the capital markets required 
to finance strategic and industrial projects, which owing to their size and 
technological content, are becoming increasingly costly. Such opportunities 
are not open to European industry.  
3.  Europe: Cooperation, inefficiency and nationalism 
Many commentators maintain that European investment in defence 
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Europe as a whole has the largest budget for investment in defence systems 
in the world after the US (over €60 billion in 2008), but the industry is not 
able to take full advantage of this due to the limited integration of the 
procurement activities of the individual countries, which still make the 
decisions and hold the purse-strings. In reality, the maintenance of cost 
centres that are both limited in their financial capabilities and largely 
independent from each other accentuates the effects of the relatively scarce 
resources. The Centre for Defence Economics at the University of York 
estimates that if the investment decisions of the six main EU countries were 
integrated, savings of around €6 billion a year, or 13.5% of Europe’s total 
budget for 2005, could be achieved: it would be as if Germany doubled its 
investment in one fell swoop. It is by no means certain that the problem 
could be solved through multilateral programmes, if it is true, as the 
Swedish defence minister maintains, that defence programmes managed by 
more than three countries are generally less efficient.10 Estimates put 
efficiency losses associated with the different procurement systems and the 
product differentiation required in multilateral programmes at around 23% 
of output cost when two parties are involved in procurement. The figure 
jumps to 30% when there are three. This is due both to the different 
configurations required for the same product by individual countries and 
the varied remuneration systems of production companies. The UK, for 
example, uses ‘cost plus’ criteria aimed at minimising the business risk 
borne by the contractor, which in turn will have fairly low profit margins, 
after allocating a share of the profits to the client. Conversely, continental 
European countries generally use ‘fixed price’ methods of remuneration, 
which can theoretically lead to higher income for contractors in return for a 
greater assumption of risk.  
The disadvantages of the lack of integration (or the economic 
advantages of a possible greater integration) therefore seem obvious. First 
and foremost, it would lead to a more efficient use of financial resources. 
The average return on invested capital for European companies is around 
12%, which is higher than their cost of capital (8.5%) but lower than that of 
their US competitors, whose average return is 16% and cost of capital 
around 8%. This gap is partly due to the fact that US companies are able to 
take relatively greater advantage of existing economies of scale in the 
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industry and partly because they do not have to find complex and costly 
corporate structural solutions or accept sometimes inefficient compromises 
in production structures in order to manage the funds of several countries 
relating to specific programmes. 
Moreover, the relatively limited return on assets means that it is less 
efficient for European companies to obtain funding from the financial 
markets. In reality, this fundamental springboard for development is not 
generally accessible to many European defence companies, as their 
shareholder structures do not allow them to raise large amounts of risk 
capital on the market. This is often the norm with government-owned or 
family-run companies, but is even more specific to French companies (the 
cornerstone of any likely reorganisation of European industry), which are 
bound by a shareholder structure chiefly designed to prevent them from 
being taken over.  
The integration of both procurement and industrial activity is a vital 
element for any European ambitions regarding defence policies. It goes 
without saying that this could not be efficiently undertaken without the 
integration of the armed forces. But such integration could only occur if the 
technology required for defence products could be made available to all. 
What’s more, over and above the incentives arising from the actions of 
companies (the integration of which have facilitated greater progress than 
any policy since 2002), the effective completion of such a process is highly 
political. As such, developments are not always linear, but subject to 
political and regulatory resistance.11 
While it is true that the industry today seems more proactive than 
policy in pushing for integration – and that due in no small measure to the 
combination of technological advances and the discipline imposed by the 
financial markets on listed companies – it has not always been this way. In 
the 1990s, European policy stimulated the integration and restructuring of 
an industry that to all intents and purposes was still self-sufficient: the 
Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence in Saint-Malo 
(December 1998) and the declaration of the European Council in Helsinki 
(December 1999) seemed to have ratified the Europeanisation of EU 
countries’ military capabilities that would have inevitable repercussions on 
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industry. It seemed as if Europe was about to launch that virtuous circle of 
“active foreign policy – public investment – manufacturing and technological 
expertise”, which until then had only worked in the United States. An active 
foreign policy requires the public administration to plough huge 
investment into the defence sector, investment that will fuel the growth of a 
country’s technological expertise, enabling it to strengthen itself against 
other countries, play a more important role on the international stage and 
therefore be more involved in international relations. This process did not 
take place.  
4.  Governments, institutions and investors: A changing role 
If integration and restructuring initiatives today seem to be more in the 
hands of industry than politicians, this is not only due to political inertia, 
but also to structural developments that are rapidly changing the role of the 
players involved in the relationship between the defence industry, public 
administrations and financial markets in Europe. It is therefore opportune 
to reflect on possible future developments.  
At first glance it might seem strange that European governments will 
see their role gradually diminish over the medium term. The main reasons 
for this are four-fold: the informational asymmetry stemming from 
increasingly complex technology and the risk of making decisions on the 
basis of an inadequate information set; the cost of this technology and the 
budgetary difficulties that individual European countries (including even 
France and the UK, the two biggest investors in defence systems) will face 
in financing its development; the gradual internationalisation of the market 
and the greater influence that foreign interests will have on companies’ 
decision-making as a result; and the trend towards consolidation and 
bigger shareholder bases. In this case the adage “strength in union” is more 
appropriate than ever: the European Union could play a greater role to 
compensate for the diminishing influence of individual countries.  
The military capabilities required for a joint defence policy cannot be 
built overnight. The starting point must of course be a joint technology 
base: this could be the role of the European Union. The decision to provide 
the European Defence Agency with sufficient funds to undertake the kind 
of work performed by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) – responsible for identifying civil or military technologies that 
could be used for national security and promoting their development – 
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first time a supranational European body would operate alongside the 
procurement bodies of individual countries) and in respect of the EU’s 
budget, which would have a new ‘defence’ category.  
Beyond financial considerations, if the EU could influence investment 
and strategic decisions by directly allocating funds to defence-related 
activities, it would have a direct role in strengthening and restructuring the 
industry, and have bargaining power with member states. 
So why is this not happening? It is not possible to identify a single 
reason for this umpteenth missed opportunity, but clearly legal and 
regulatory difficulties, European bureaucratic inertia and vested interests 
played their part. But the fact remains that if a defence category were 
effectively added to the EU’s accounts and the EDA were to assume a role, 
this could have significant consequences both on the relative influence of 
individual European countries on defence policy (individual national 
budgets would become less important over time) and on arms procurement 
decision-making. The existence of a European institution with financial 
powers would require an increase in joint investment decisions, and the 
countries with the greatest propensity to spend would be partly affected by 
it. The UK and French approaches to defence industrial policy (which we 
will refer to later) show how difficult it would be for these countries, in 
reality and behind the public declarations, to accept the effective launch of 
a European arms procurement policy. Thus there is a risk that the Agency, 
far from becoming a driver for European technological development, 
would join the list of useless and expensive EU bodies. 
There is, however, another initiative that could facilitate the 
integration of European defence and also significantly strengthen the 
industry. Moreover, it is directly linked to individual countries’ budgets: 
the national accounting criteria currently established in Europe through 
Eurostat (and confirmed by a resolution in March 2006) includes defence 
systems investment in current expenditure. Apart from being questionable 
at a conceptual level (military aircraft, warships or cost control systems are 
not exactly comparable to photocopiers or service cars), it does not permit 
the costs of purchasing goods with a period of use not normally less than 
15-20 years to be allocated to more than one financial year. Methods of 
accounting more appropriate to the nature of and criteria for the 
development, production and use of military vehicles, which often have 
fairly lengthy timescales and considerable research costs, could, and in our 
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have a significant impact on both the cost borne by the public purse in any 
one year and the option to introduce funding systems for defence 
investment that would make it possible to fully exploit available 
procurement resources without recourse to creative accounting of dubious 
acceptability. Once again, this would assist the countries that have the most 
difficulty in increasing their budgets for military equipment, and hence the 
entire procurement system.  
In recent years, private equity funds also seemed to be able to play a 
role in the European defence industry. These investors were supposed to 
bring a more scrupulous application of financial discipline and 
management criteria strictly geared towards the creation of value – an 
important element for an industry that still seems, on many fronts, to be 
much less efficient than a more business-like management would allow.  
5.  Industrial structures, control systems and the equity market 
But here again, we believe that the equities market will play the lead role in 
the future of the European defence industry, regardless of its performance 
and its short- and medium-term trends. This might seem a strange and 
risky assertion, considering that until a few years ago, the majority of 
defence companies in EU countries were not listed and generally had no 
relationship with the capital markets, but we don’t think it is.  
In Europe, there are two fairly typical models – the UK and the 
French model. The UK model is extremely pragmatic and based essentially 
on three principles: collaboration between companies makes sense only to 
the extent that it enables them to develop and manufacture competitive 
defence systems; the state must remain outside companies’ shareholding 
structures, or it would be inconceivable to talk about integration between 
European companies. In this scenario, the identity of the UK companies is 
relatively unimportant; it is much more important that they develop 
research, technology and products on UK territory. (One wonders, 
moreover, whether this British pragmatism hides not only an unwillingness 
to take part in European aggregation but also a desire to prevent this from 
happening and the EU having a greater influence than it does currently on 
procurement policy.) Conversely, the French approach, which we could call 
‘dominant autosegregation’ or ‘competitive autonomy’, is based on a 
labyrinthine network of defence company shareholder structures, which 
seems to have been created to ensure that the state retains control of the 
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industry seems willing to participate only in mergers that allow it to gain 
control of foreign assets without sharing control of its own, and 
furthermore, does not allow overseas strategic investors to hold a 
significant stake in the capital of its own companies. This approach is not 
conducive to integration, especially since the French system is undoubtedly 
the cornerstone, in terms of size and technology, of virtually any 
restructuring or consolidation of European industry. The French attitude to 
maintain a strict control over its defence industry has recently increased, as 
a response to the financial and economic crisis. 
The equities market plays an important role in both models: 
managing changes in ownership and management in the UK case, and 
ensuring sufficient liquidity for investment without jeopardising the 
shareholder structure in the French model. But only an expansion of this 
role could ensure a successful long-term future for European industry.  
The structure of the industry does not require the government to be a 
shareholder in sector companies in order to control one of the country’s 
vital resources, national security. The methods of assigning contracts 
(favouring companies that maintain or plough investment into the 
country), their financial structure, the availability of funds and public 
structures (or funding by the public sector) for the development of 
technology are also incentives to maintain and expand the national 
industrial base. The UK ministry of defence, for example, has adopted a 
definition of national defence industry on the basis of the place where the 
technology was developed, the site of the intellectual property, the location 
of new jobs and the destination of investment. This definition to a large 
extent excludes companies’ ownership structure.12 
Conversely, the distribution of most (if not all) of European defence 
companies’ capital on the market – this is what is meant by the “greater 
role of the market” – could promote a different, more efficient and stronger 
industry structure, without diminishing the indirect control that the public 
administration has over them. This could lead to more efficient (albeit not 
necessarily more generous) financing of companies’ growth, a 
strengthening of the financial discipline to which they are subject and a 
drive to implement streamlined processes of restructuring and integration. 
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The effects of an expansion of the shareholding base would be seen both in 
companies’ business structures and in their monitoring and control criteria.  
From the first point of view, with stricter financial control stemming 
from an increase in ‘public company’ status, companies vie for leadership 
in their reference markets. In the defence sector, leadership can only be 
achieved through technological superiority and the ability to exploit 
economies of scale and associated economies of scope. By manufacturing 
goods with a high technology content, companies can effectively reduce the 
price elasticity of such goods, thereby increasing profit margins and the 
cash flow available for investment aimed at strengthening technological 
leadership, which enabled them to generate such investment in the first 
place. It is therefore likely that we are seeing a concentration of companies 
in those areas that allow better capital allocation alongside a gradual 
reduction of their activities in sectors where an allocation does not optimise 
the risk/return profile of the asset portfolio. Defence companies, in other 
words, will tend to “do fewer things” but will have greater influence in 
sectors in which they will maintain a presence. 
The expansion of the shareholder base and the ability to take over 
companies would also root out at source the problem of the control of 
assets that, in today’s climate, is a real concern for some European 
countries, and especially for the French industrial system. The absence of 
key shareholders would facilitate company mergers, triggering a process of 
greater integration between national procurement procedures, a process 
that, in order to be efficient and effective, also requires considerable 
political will. This would also benefit the managerial structure. Here too, 
increased competition in the leadership of companies could facilitate 
innovation and changes in a sector that is somewhat resistant to integration 
with other industries, and enable senior managers to be brought in from 
outside. 
Put simply, European industry will be able to operate between four 
extremes: on the one hand consolidation versus specialisation; and on the 
other, tight control versus a more open and dynamic shareholder base. 
While different combinations of industrial and shareholder structure would 
theoretically be possible (including a powerful process of consolidation that 
is not only stable but completely ‘closed’), it is likely (we might even say 
“to be hoped”) that companies will become increasingly specialised, open 
their ownership structure and subsequently regroup by production sector 
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Are there dangers inherent in this potential opening up of the market 
and reduction of power currently held by the controlling shareholders, 
which are often public or at least influenced by the will of the public 
administration? Is there not a risk in letting financial democracy determine 
the ownership structure of companies that develop and own technology 
that is important for the security of a country, and at least 10 to 20 years 
ahead of that of some countries, which harbour foreign policy ambitions 
and therefore have an interest in undertaking active defence policies? 
We don’t think so. Or rather, we think that if there is a risk, it’s one 
worth taking, essentially for two reasons. The first is, strictly speaking, 
defensive: control of specific technologies – and increasingly the control of 
their use – is clearly important, but there are many formal and informal 
tools with which to achieve it, other than the rigidity of the ownership 
structure. We referred to this above. In this sense, proposals to institute 
procedures to limit the investment of important financial players from 
outside the EU do not seem appropriate. The change in the conditions of 
financial democracy – one of the key competitive advantages of Western 
economies – which would enable this, would go in tandem with an 
approach that would maintain the status quo in the defence industry, 
which is structurally inefficient (too nationalistic and fragmented) and 
unstable in terms of shareholder base.  
The second reason is more prophetic. Perhaps only the transfer of 
defence companies’ control mechanisms to the market can usher in a phase 
of definitive industry reorganisation (following that which occurred at the 
beginning of the century), encouraging fundamental integration, which 
would create companies of a sufficient size, asset base and technological 
expertise to achieve a position of leadership, and foster the launch of pan-
European defence policies.  
Finally, in this environment, the role of the sovereign wealth funds as 
a potential shareholders of some defence or, more general, high-tech 
companies could be considered more an opportunity than a risk. These 
institutions have until now showed more an interest towards financial 
returns of their investments (actually v e r y  l i m i t e d  i n  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t  
periods) than the intention to play a more “political role” in the companies 
where they are shareholders. Their role as providers of capital as well as of 
business opportunities in their home countries could well be compatible, 
through an adequate system of regulations and corporate governance EUROPEAN DEFENCE OR DEFENCE OF EUROPE? | 181 
 
provisions, with either the protection of the technology or the 
independence of the companies. 
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10. EUROPE AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE CRISIS 
PIER CARLO PADOAN 
ven before the global crisis, all long-term scenarios confirmed that 
over the next 15 to 20 years, Europe’s relative economic weight 
would shrink as that of new emerging economies – China, India, 
Russia, Brazil (the so-called BRICS) rose. The crisis has done nothing to 
alter this scenario, but it has made clear that the global economy is 
suffering from a governance gap. 
The crisis itself is proof of this statement, and is the result of both 
market and policy failure. The international macroeconomic aspect of such 
a twin failure is reflected in the inability to address the global payment 
imbalances that have accumulated over a decade or so, (also) in the belief 
that markets could finance such widening imbalances, thanks to their 
resilience and efficiency. The post-crisis reconstruction requires a serious 
reconsideration of how to deal with global macroeconomic imbalances, 
now and in the future, and how to maintain the global economy on a 
balanced and sustainable growth path through cooperation among all 
major players, including the large emerging economies. To this effect, in 
addition to macroeconomic governance, trade and capital market openness 
and stability are essential prerequisites for a stronger global governance, as 
has been stated repeatedly by the G8 and G20 summits. Is Europe willing 
and able to contribute actively to meeting this challenge?  
1.  The breakdown of Bretton Woods II and beyond  
Most crises are drivers of change because they often lead to the breakdown 
of key mechanisms and institutions and create the need for new ones. The 
crisis that started in the US subprime mortgage market is the most severe in 
eight decades and is also truly global. When it ends, the international 
economy will never be the same again. 
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The crisis has destroyed the fundamentals of the so-called ‘Bretton 
Woods II model’ (BWII) on which global growth has been based for the 
past decade or so. In the BWII world, excess savings in emerging 
economies, including oil-producing countries, were reinvested in the centre 
of the system, as the US economy was considered the ‘safe haven’ par 
excellence. The crisis has destroyed the credibility of the centre and, with it, 
the main engine of growth and the financing of growth. It is highly 
unrealistic, not to say unthinkable, that in the foreseeable future the main 
engine of global growth will still be US household demand, fuelled by 
sophisticated but opaque financial instruments.  
Growth will resume after the global recession but it will most likely 
be a structurally lower growth. More importantly, global growth will be 
driven by several engines rather than by a single engine, and each of these 
engines will be individually less powerful than the one that has collapsed, 
as well as being partially disconnected from the others. Household demand 
in the US will be partly replaced by American exports driven by a weaker 
dollar, and also by the still powerful US productivity engine. It remains to 
be seen if US investment and innovation will be able to generate, at least in 
part, a productivity cycle as long and intense as the one that lay behind the 
‘new economy’ of the 1990s.  
One key question is whether the BRICS will move into the driver’s 
seat of the world economy and become global engines of growth. As 
mentioned above, long-term projections see China and India (although 
much less so) as the top economies 20 to 30 years from now. But most of 
these projections extrapolate into the future a scenario that may no longer 
be there; a relatively stable world economy in which global markets are 
open, economic integration continues to progress and there is no major 
crisis. For this scenario to materialise, the post-BWII economy will have to 
be based on two pillars – more domestic demand in emerging economies 
and more ‘investment integration’ globally.  
Concerning the first pillar, emerging economies both large and small 
will, sooner or later, have to face the challenge of their own internal 
transformations as domestic demand will have to be given more space and 
export-led growth will be less relevant. This transformation will need to be 
accompanied by high and sustained growth rates; necessary conditions for 
these countries to raise the standard of living of a large part of their 
populations who still live below the poverty line. Needless to say, such a 
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The ‘investment integration’ pillar will have to offer a major 
contribution to global growth. In BWII excess investment in the US led to 
America’s growing current account deficit, while excess savings led to the 
accumulation of international reserves in many emerging Asian economies 
and in oil-producing countries. The scenario that worries countries like 
China is the risk that their reserves will lose value because of the US 
dollar’s depreciation and/or capital losses in the US treasury market. The 
request for reform of the international monetary system and the creation of 
reserve currencies as alternatives to the dollar – something increasingly 
suggested by top Chinese officials – reflects this very real concern.  
But this is only part of the story. A look at gross rather than net 
capital flows shows that in BWII, while China exports capital that is 
invested in US financial markets, it also imports capital from the US and 
elsewhere that adds to its physical, knowledge, and human capital 
resources. China has become a fast-growing base for international R&D and 
a key component of global value and innovation chains, which could not 
have taken place without a massive inflow of capital from the world’s 
advanced economies. Much the same can be said of India and a number of 
other Asian economies. A more sophisticated interpretation of the BWII 
growth model therefore suggests that the massive investment of Chinese 
reserves in US Treasury bills is a way of providing ‘collateral’ so as to 
attract the levels of investment from American and other multinational 
companies in China, which are essential to sustaining its high per capita 
GDP growth. This interpretation also underpins the idea that China sees its 
own best interest in the long-term profitability of its invested resources, not 
in short-term gains. Of course, this works both ways, as China increasingly 
values long-term capital outflows, as can be seen in the increasingly 
important role of its Sovereign Wealth Funds. These, in China as in other 
emerging economies, are instrumental in directing huge reserves towards 
long-term investment and thus boosting the long-term growth rate. 
A sustained long-term growth rate of the Chinese and other Asian 
economies is fully consistent with a post-BWII model, where stronger 
growth in emerging Asia would compensate for lower growth in the US, 
especially if increased productivity growth in China is accompanied by a 
gradual slackening of the propensity to save. This largely reflects structural 
rather than short-term factors as the high-saving propensity of Chinese 
households reflects the need to counter the absence of social protection. 
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China’s domestic financial sector, which has led to high levels of retained 
profits.  
What about Europe? During the BWII years Europe was a slow-
growth economy, which could grow even more slowly in the future. The 
massive use of fiscal measures to deal with the last financial emergency and 
with the recession loosening fiscal disciplines, the sustainability of long-
term debt will be made more difficult still, as is also the case in the US. 
More flexibility in the application of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact is 
welcome and needed, but there is a risk that the credibility it has earned 
over the past decade could evaporate. On the other hand, a long-term 
European growth strategy based on a revamped and ‘green’ Single Market, 
as well as the Lisbon Agenda for competitiveness, has yet to be 
implemented to any large extent. Such a strategy could benefit greatly from 
a more open global investment regime encouraging both inward and 
outward long term capital flows.  
In a post-BWII scenario, we could and should see smaller global 
imbalances, and smaller current account deficits and surpluses in the US 
and China respectively, but we might also see larger gross capital flows 
between the world’s main economic regions. These flows would transfer 
both physical and knowledge capital and thus drive productivity growth 
on a global scale. This would be all the more so if climate-related and green 
technologies were transferred much more than they are at present. But to 
be really effective, these gross flows would have to be complemented by 
flows of goods and services, whose role in a knowledge-driven economy is 
essential. Open markets will be more important than ever.   
What international institutions will we need to support a post-BWII 
world? The post-crisis response led by the G20 includes a commitment to 
major reform of the IMF and a strengthening of the Financial Stability 
Board (formerly the Financial Stability Forum). The IMF has received 
substantial additional resources, and its governance is to be reformed to 
give more room to the emerging economies. It will also carry out, together 
with the FSB, the enhanced monitoring of systemic stability. The FSB is 
leading the reform of the regulation and supervision of the financial 
system, even though it remains to be seen whether this will lead to a truly 
global framework. But this may not be enough. If not, the BWII system will 
have to rely, even more so than in the past, on open markets for both trade 
and investment, which will also require stronger global governance and 
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A stronger post-BWII world is in the interests of Europe. How can 
Europe contribute to the post-BWII world, and what role should Europe 
play in reformed international institutions?  
2.  Keeping markets open in investment and trade 
The post-BWII world should be based on more open economies and on 
stronger long-term capital flows. For this to happen we need a ‘global 
investment regime’ based on shared regulation and standards related to 
investment activity so as to complement the FSB’s sound ‘financial regime’ 
and the IMF’s stable ‘macroeconomic regime’. Investment will go where 
there is a transparent relationship with governments and where the cost of 
doing business is low, where sound corporate governance prevails, where 
there is no corruption, where reliable and possibly cheap skills are 
available, where a level playing field does not discriminate against foreign 
companies, where competition policy lowers barriers to entry and supports 
innovation and where a free flow of goods and services complements 
investment flows.  
But such a regime does not yet exist globally, and an agreement 
between all major economies, both developed and emerging, on  these 
points still needs to be established. Such a regime would require an 
institutional framework to update and monitor rules and standards that are 
shared by all the major players. From this point of view, what is needed for 
the post-BWII world is an enlarged and reinforced OECD, for the OECD is 
the only international organisation that brings together all the expertise 
needed for a global investment regime to operate effectively, whether alone 
or in collaboration with other international organisations. The present-day 
OECD would clearly have to expand its membership to all major emerging 
economies so that a new regime can be built on a shared view of the post-
BWII world. Europe should act forcefully to expand the role and 
membership of the OECD. 
Let us turn to trade. At the time of writing, we still do not know what 
will happen to the Doha Development Round and whether multilateral 
trade negotiations will be successfully concluded. Whatever the outcome, it 
is generally acknowledged that over the next few years trade relations will 
be dominated by a proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements 
known as PTAs, or preferential trade agreements. To date, over 200 of these 
have been signed, of which many share a common feature – a focus on 
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negotiations, i.e. services, intellectual property rights, investment, 
competition policy. In a context where both growth and competitiveness 
are increasingly based on innovation and the dissemination of knowledge, 
as well as the development of global value chains through relocation and 
outsourcing, these areas define the terms of global competition. In other 
words, whatever the fate of the Doha Round, both Europe and other 
countries will have to define policies to support growth on the basis of 
preferential agreements while leaving open, and possibly strengthening, 
the prospects for a multilateral agreement.  
In recent years the European Union has been, at least in part, an 
agenda-setter in international trade; if and when it chooses to do so, its 
impact as a single entity is by far greater than the sum of its parts.1 
Europe’s single voice on trade has prevailed, also in the presence of 
different national preferences linked to different national specialisations 
(on agriculture, textiles, advanced services, etc.) and different approaches 
to the organisation of national welfare systems. In multilateral negotiations 
Europe is a member of the G4 along with the United States, India and 
Brazil, i.e. a member of the group that during the critical phases of the 
Doha Development Round attempted to hammer out an agreement.  
Global trade architecture today bears a significant European mark, as 
does the architecture of regional agreements, and Europe’s commitment to 
a gradual opening of markets remains intact (regardless of the CAP). 
Should global imbalances not be settled adequately, one cannot however 
rule out Europe displaying some propensity to protectionism too, 
especially in conjunction with lasting euro appreciation and as an ill-
advised response to the request for security that is currently being 
expressed by European citizens who are fearful of globalisation. 
Europe has defined its own strategy for a trading system where PTAs 
prevail. In December 2006, the European Commission launched its ‘Global 
Europe’ Communication, which defines guidelines for the Union’s trade 
policy in a framework of proliferating regional and preferential 
agreements, where topics not taken up by the Doha Round are going to 
become increasingly significant. The document clearly defines European 
philosophy in this context:  
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Our core argument is that rejection of protectionism at home must 
be accompanied by activism in creating open markets and fair 
conditions for trade abroad. (...) There are two core elements in 
pursuing this agenda: stronger engagement with major emerging 
economies and regions; and a sharper focus on barriers to trade 
behind the border. (European Commission, 2006, p. 6).  
The message is clear and the line adopted echoes the ‘strategic trade 
policy’ principle that emerged in the eighties, when non-tariff barriers and 
market access policies became increasingly relevant.2 
What remains to be seen is how this strategy will be implemented, 
and whether it will indeed lead to more openness and integration. Among 
the many possible future scenarios, the one in which this strategy is used to 
consolidate transatlantic integration, especially in the field of market access 
regulation, and where a shared vision of competition policy helps define 
technical standards, would clearly yield such a ‘critical mass’ of 
harmonisation as to become a standard-setter for all international trade 
relations. Moreover this strategy could be used more closely to involve new 
players in international governance.  
This is all the more important in the framework of the response to the 
global crisis. The protectionist responses to the crisis that were feared have 
been very limited or non-existent. As we move forward in a protracted 
slow growth scenario, however, and with massive unemployment ahead, 
pressures for protection may be on the rise and it should be Europe’s role 
and interest to resist them. But in order to resist protectionism effectively a 
convincing growth strategy must be designed and implemented.  
3.  Europe and the United States as ‘global regulators’?  
Open capital markets require stability. The response to the financial crisis 
has triggered a massive action to reform financial market regulations on a 
global scale. Yet, in spite of significant efforts led by the Financial Stability 
Board and supported by the G20, it is highly unlikely that at the end of the 
process we will see the rise of a single global regulatory and supervisory 
system. 
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In principle one should expect that moves towards this scenario 
could be led by a joint US European initiative. The United States and 
Europe together account for 40% of the world’s GDP but they generate 80% 
of all regulation. Their converging on the definition of standards and 
institutional architecture would decisively impact world market regulation. 
Considering the role increasingly played by investment from emerging 
economies, financial and otherwise, defining a global regulatory 
framework would be key to supporting a multilateral framework and 
resisting the temptation of protectionism in investment. Is this in Europe’s 
interest and capacity?  
As noted by Becht & Da Silva (2007), the 27-member state European 
Union boasts the largest banking sector, the largest insurance industry and 
the largest payments system in the world. It also has the largest private 
market for fixed rate securities, and its derivatives and equity markets are 
comparable to those of the US. Despite this, Europe’s influence as a major 
player in financial system regulation remains limited. In this field, as in that 
of monetary relations, Europe’s voice appears to be weak and fragmented. 
In this area too, unexploited externalities require a single regulatory policy. 
The technical difficulties involved in defining joint regulatory 
standards should not be underestimated, especially in light of the fact that 
regulation is per se a complex endeavour that concerns a variety of 
different fields, ranging from investor protection to technical standards, 
market supervision, and combating financial crime. But, as pointed out, 
Europe would have the ‘critical mass’ not only to identify common 
standards but also to gain their acceptance as global standards, all the more 
so if these standards were shared with the United States.3 At the same time, 
a regulatory framework developed at the behest of the world’s leading 
economic areas would be the most effective antidote to the (possible) 
political and ‘non-market’ use of resources controlled by SWFs. It would be 
a major contribution to the establishment of a sound ‘investment pillar’. 
Before the outbreak of the crisis, what was standing in the way of 
deeper cooperation between the US and Europe in this area was, on the EU 
side, the inability of European countries to overcome national visions, 
define European interests and policies, and to identify common rules for 
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the European market. Faced with this problem Europe’s response has been: 
harmonisation where possible and mutual recognition, otherwise. But even 
mutual recognition, tantamount to a multiplicity of bilateral agreements, is 
not a workable solution if it is not supported by efficient implementation 
and enforcement, putting all participating countries on an equal footing. 
Despite a push to complete a European financial market under the 
Financial Sector Action Plan, gaps and redundancies still remain in the 
governance of Europe’s financial stability, with over 80 agencies involved 
in financial market supervision and regulation. This is an obvious case of 
inefficiency that increases compliance costs for intermediaries.  
Despite all these limitations, financial market integration has been 
moving on. Through a market-led process, a ‘European bias’ has slowly 
emerged in EU financial markets following the introduction of the euro and 
the subsequent removal of exchange rate risks, not to mention regulatory 
harmonisation and product-market integration. Intra-European Union 
cross-border capital flows have increased significantly. London has become 
the inter-bank market hub and this has, inter alia, elicited ever more UK 
investor interest in the euro. Finally, eurozone intermediaries are funding 
investment in the new member states.  
Even before the crisis the general context was tending to push 
towards greater integration and increased uniformity in regulatory 
systems. New players emerging, not only in trade but increasingly in 
financing and investment, would have speeded up the identification of a 
shared European interest in participating, alongside the US and new 
members, in the definition of a regulatory framework tailored to the 
demands of globalisation.  
The crisis has changed the scenario dramatically, accelerating it but at 
the same time showing the limits of European action.  As a response to the 
crisis both the US and Europe have launched ambitious reforms of financial 
regulation and supervision within the G20 process. While these reform 
processes are independent, they do present a number of similarities, as well 
as inevitable differences.4 
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Both reform blueprints present proposals that are based on very 
similar if not identical principles: stronger bank capital requirements, less 
pro-cyclicality, more control over rating agencies, a more relevant role of 
the concept of ‘fair value’ in accounting procedures, ‘parallel’ market 
institutions such as hedge funds and private equity have to be made more 
transparent and subject to regulation, OTC derivatives should be 
intermediated through clearing systems, managers’ compensation must be 
tied to long-term performance, more effective crisis resolution mechanisms  
must be put in place, fragmentation in regulatory architecture must be 
reduced and central banks must be given more power in surveillance while 
a stronger role must be played by the Basel Committee, the Financial 
Stability Board and the IMF. 
There are, however, also significant differences. Starting from the role 
assigned to central banks. The Federal Reserve has full responsibility of 
surveillance of the financial firms, both banks and non-banks, which have 
systemic relevance and can affect the stability of the system. The European 
Central Bank is assigned the more limited role of ‘hosting’, coordinating 
and chairing the European Systematic Risk Council (ESRC) which is made 
up of the members of the ESCB (European System of Central banks), the 
European Commission, and the chairs of the three authorities set up 
following the recommendations of the Lamfalussy report: the European 
Banking Authority (EUA), the European Insurance Authority (EIA) and the 
European Security Authority. The ESRC will have only macro-prudential 
responsibility looking at the system’s overall stability, while micro 
prudential oversight will remain with the single national authorities. It will 
only be able to issue recommendations related to systemic aspects of 
stability. Its governing power will be limited to say the least. The US has 
also created an authority to oversee surveillance, the Financial Service 
Oversight Council, which includes the Fed, the US Treasury and other 
surveillance authorities. The Secretary of the Treasury will have a 
coordination role of both macro and micro surveillance.  
In case of financial turbulence the different degrees of coordination 
could well prove essential. It is true that at the peak of the financial crisis 
Europeans showed an exceptional degree of coordination in facing the 
emergency. However, this ad hoc response required exceptional 
circumstances and can hardly be taken as a model for more effective 
governance. 192 | PIER CARLO PADOAN 
 
A third difference is related to the creation of an agency for consumer 
protection in the US, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, which 
will oversee products and processes in the credit, savings and payment 
system segments. 
Finally, it is important to note that in neither of the two jurisdictions 
do we see a full consolidation of surveillance structures. The European 
System of Financial Supervision, which includes EBA, EIA and ESA, as 
well as the national surveillance authorities, is only a network of 
decentralised structures. Daily surveillance will remain with national 
authorities that are closer to the intermediaries. The EU-level agencies will 
act as standard setters and coordinate their implementation. The US will 
maintain six authorities in addition to the Fed and Treasury (the SEC, the 
National Bank Supervisor, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency).  
To conclude, while both strategies fall short of full reform and take 
with them considerable institutional inertia, the European strategy suffers 
more deeply from such inertia, and we are long way from a truly European 
system of surveillance, which goes along with a still largely incomplete 
financial market integration. This suggests that in post-BWII there will still 
be regulatory differences among jurisdictions, and arbitrage. In short, a 
reformed US financial system will most probably prove to be the best 
option for global capital flows, looking, as in the past, for profitable and 
politically reliable investment opportunities.  
4.  Macroeconomic governance  
Macroeconomic relations are different from trade relations but similar to 
financial regulation, with European presence largely devolved to 
individual states. There are four EU member states in the G8, but it would 
be hard to contend that the G8’s agenda is clearly set by the Europeans. A 
similar yet even stronger case can be made for the G20. Attempts at reform 
of macroeconomic governance have been launched in the recent past. In 
trying to deal with global imbalances, and in the context of its Medium-
Term Strategy review, the IMF has introduced an informal consultative 
group made up of the US, Japan, the eurozone, Saudi Arabia and China, i.e. 
all the major players in global imbalances, including those who are not G8 
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Ever since the issue of global imbalances came to the fore, the 
International Monetary Fund has supported a coordinated adjustment 
strategy which, in line with official G7 statements, provided for a cut in 
public deficits and an increase in private savings in the US, more exchange-
rate flexibility in Asia (and especially in China), structural reform in Europe 
and Japan to increase growth potential and more spending and absorption 
capacity in oil-producing countries. The IMF in this context was to 
implement more effective surveillance, both multilateral and bilateral, in 
individual countries,5 with particular focus on those where performance 
has systemic implications. The crisis has shown that this initial attempt was 
not successful. At the time of writing, the G20 has called for a more 
coordinated and long-term oriented surveillance mechanism to ensure 
balanced and sustained global growth, where the IMF should play a 
leading role.  
It is too early to say if the proposal will be implemented and if it will 
be effective. It is difficult to deny that, if more effective coordination among 
key players, including Europe, does not take place, the issue of managing 
payment imbalances and global growth will be addressed within US-China 
bilateral relations, with Europe (or rather, the eurozone) adopting an 
attitude of (benign?) neglect.  
The time is also ripe for a rethink of the relationships between major 
currencies, as is necessary in a post-BWII scenario. Changing this 
relationship requires both flexibility and orderly burden-sharing in the 
adjustment and transition to a new monetary regime. Several measures are 
on the table that would, for instance, link the Chinese yuan to a basket of 
currencies, or identify ‘target zones’ or allow for the Chinese exchange rate 
to be fully flexible and even promote the role of the yuan as a global 
currency. Whatever the solution, the crux of the matter is that the eurozone 
should define its position much more clearly and uphold it in multilateral 
and bilateral fora. Europe’s limited voice in this respect runs the risk of 
being interpreted as a lack of interest or worse still, as passivity in the face 
of events. All of this also suggests that Europe, or at least the eurozone, 
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should opt as soon as possible for single representation in international 
financial institutions and in unofficial groupings (such as the ‘G’ summits).   
Both the IMF and the World Bank are governed by boards on which 
24 members sit with different share holdings, representing 185 countries. 
The United States has the single largest share, with a little over 17%. Taken 
together member states of the European Union have a larger share than the 
US. France, Germany and the UK represent a single country constituency 
each. The other European Union member states are distributed over six 
other constituencies, and in several cases also hold the executive director 
positions. The Fund and Bank boards operate on a consensus basis. This 
means that what happens upstream, most often in the framework of the 
G7/G8 for the advanced economies and the G11 for emerging economies 
(including China), and possibly in the G20 from now on, is of essential 
importance in establishing consensus. Although they do not have an 
absolute majority, historically G7 countries have had a predominant 
position in the decision-making process. In recent years, European 
countries have also developed a coordination method, in Brussels and in 
Washington, on the basis of which some of their board decisions are taken 
jointly. Interaction between the G7 and the European coordination group is 
complex, sometimes fraught, and at times European members of the G7 
have upheld positions different from those of other EU governments.  
A single EU, or at least eurozone, representation in international 
financial institutions would increase Europe’s clout in global governance 
while at the same time improving global governance by enhancing the 
involvement and accountability of new emerging economies. A single EU 
(or eurozone) representation, if set on the same level of the US, would 
command more authority than the current sum of EU representatives6 
while at the same time making space available for a larger share of 
emerging economies. But there is more to this. Europe is currently faced 
with a paradox. Computing Europe’s weight as a ‘swing-voter’, one can 
conclude7 that if Europe were to speak as one voice, it would carry the vote 
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in practically all cases. But, and therein lies the paradox, Europe has so far 
proved largely incapable of using its economic and political clout in global 
governance, precisely because it has spoken with multiple voices.  
Why hasn’t Europe taken the decisive step towards single 
representation? Two possible explanations can be offered, which are partly 
complementary: different preferences and dysfunctional governance. 
Differences in national macroeconomic policy preferences would stand in 
the way of European countries arriving at joint positions in international 
fora just as different trade policy preferences would weaken EU positions 
in WTO negotiations. This assumption is not very convincing if we think to 
the euro, which implies a single monetary policy, regardless of the fact that 
a single monetary policy may at times yield differing outcomes in different 
eurozone member states. One could argue that having single IMF 
representation would imply speaking with one voice, also regarding fiscal 
issues, a field that has remained the purview of individual member states. 
But this is not a fully convincing argument either. On the one hand the 
Stability and Growth Pact requires fiscal policy convergence and shared 
policy criteria for all countries. On the other, through surveillance the IMF 
is already assessing the euro area’s fiscal policy both in terms of internal 
consistency and operation, and in terms of global macroeconomic impact. 
This leads us to the dysfunctional governance or decision-making 
inefficiency assumption.8 Regarding macroeconomic relations, this 
describes EU countries’ difficulties in identifying an internal decision-
making mechanism that would yield joint positions in international fora. 
Put differently, there is no point in setting up single representation with the 
IMF if the executive director for Europe is not given clear and timely 
guidance by his or her authorities (while executive directors for individual 
European countries do receive such guidance from their capitals). Up to 
now there has been no such handing over of sovereignty and many 
European governments remain opposed to concrete steps that might lead 
to single representation. The reason this is not happening is simple. Moving 
to single representation would involve redistributing power within the 
European countries group. The larger countries would need to relinquish 
part of the clout they currently wield including in G groups, whereas 
smaller countries (who are not G7 members and are therefore fearful of 
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losing even more visibility and voice) are even more fearful of ceding 
power to larger countries.  
Pressure for single representation (or rather, single voice) is 
nevertheless increasing. This stems first of all from the changes that have 
occurred globally. Shifts in economic power and the move to regional or 
bilateral governance models have reduced the clout of individual European 
countries, none of which can aspire to global player status. Pressure comes 
equally from the fact that single eurozone representation in financial 
institutions would free up space to increase the shares assigned to new 
emerging economies, thereby allowing for their increased involvement and 
consequently for more balanced international relations governance, which 
would facilitate the reform of the said institutions.  Such a goal should be in 
the European Union’s interest. Asian countries, including China, would 
carry more weight but also more responsibility as shareholders. And it 
would be easier to involve China in multilateral solutions, including those 
aiming to correct global imbalances, if responsibility for their management 
were more equitably shared. The response to the financial crisis has 
significantly added to this pressure.9 While it is still too early to see how the 
process will evolve it is important to note that pressure for a single Europe 
voice is very strong from countries outside Europe, most notably the US, 
with the purpose of giving more voice to emerging economies.  
Pressure, thirdly, stems from the role of the euro. The single 
currency’s weight as a key currency is on the rise, regardless of what 
monetary union member states may wish. The euro is increasingly being 
used as an invoicing currency for trade among and between third party 
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countries, as a denominator for financial transactions, as a reserve currency 
held by third party countries. Finally, this is instrumental to making the 
euro area increasingly attractive as a location for foreign investment, all the 
more so with the setting up of SWFs by emerging economies. This raises 
the issue of defining a common policy regarding both macroeconomic 
relations and the supervision of financial markets, consistent with the 
establishment of a strong investment pillar in post-BWII.  
Fourthly and finally, pressure is coming from the EU’s enlargement. 
This provides not only for new member states adopting the euro, but it also 
implies that ‘euro-isation’ phenomena will proliferate more or less 
explicitly in countries wishing to join the Union or somehow coming under 
its economic influence. This strengthens the need for a ‘key currency’ policy 
that has repercussions on relations with other currency zones.  
5.  Conclusions 
Globalisation implies growing interconnection between markets and 
growing policy interdependence: in trade, in investment, in the supervision 
and regulation of international financial markets, and in monetary 
relations. The global crisis has brought to light significant governance 
failures in most if not all such policy areas. So a durable response to the 
crisis and a return to sustainable and balanced growth requires stronger 
global governance. This, in turn, requires agreement and shared 
responsibilities of all major players, including emerging economies, and a 
new role for Europe. In Europe, competition and trade policies have been 
entrusted to the European Commission, Financial market policy has so far 
mainly been dealt with nationally, and macroeconomic policy comes under 
the jurisdiction of the Eurogroup Finance Ministers. The global financial 
crisis has produced a dramatic acceleration in global governance. Europe 
can take advantage of the crisis response to strengthen its voice in 
international fora and contribute to a more balanced global economy: an 
objective that should be in Europe’s firm interest. If this opportunity is 
missed there might be a loss of European influence in international 
economic relations over the long term. Europe’s influence is, in any case, 
set to decline further as the relative weight of individual European 
countries also declines, in addition to that of the EU as a whole. 
Contributing to shape a global investment regime, speaking in a single 
voice in monetary and financial matters, in addition to trade policy issues, 
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Europeans to devote more energy to figuring out where their interests lie in 
the global system, and what can be done to further them.  
Despite the institutional and substantive differences in different 
policy areas, Europe’s difficulties in identifying a common and effective 
economic policy harken back to a common trait that stems from the very 
principle at the root of its recent history. Europe’s economic policy was 
devised as a mechanism to achieve a common goal, in terms of growth and 
welfare through increased internal integration. And this continues to obtain 
as Europe’s policy takes on an external dimension, as is the case with trade 
policy. This mechanism assigns a central role to national preferences and 
works best when such preferences can converge in the definition of a 
‘European preference’. But that is precisely the point. If in the post-war 
years a European preference could be defined, keeping in mind internal 
goals such as peace among member states and economic welfare, Europe’s 
preferences must necessarily be defined differently in the new global 
environment.  
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11. FROM A COMMUNITY BASED ON THE 
RULE OF LAW TO THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AS A COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 
MARIO P. CHITI  
1.  A community based on the rule of law 
Outside institutional and legal circles, few are aware of one of the more 
relevant and forward-looking definitions once given to the European 
Economic Community (EEC): “a community based on the rule of law”. Its 
author, the first President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, 
mentioning it in a 1965 debate at the European Parliament, intended to 
apply the gist of the RechtsStaatsPrinzip to the recently established 
European public authority. At the same time, he also wanted to underscore 
the fundamental and unprecedented role played by law, the keystone of 
the EEC, thus characterised in a totally original fashion as compared with 
states and the international organisations that had come before it. The 
Community did not then have, nor does it have today, its own power of 
coercion; as summed up by Jean-Victor Louis (1989) in a groundbreaking 
study of Europe’s legal system, “the law it develops is its only force”.   
T h e  i d e a  o f  a  c o m m u n i t y  b a s e d  o n  t h e  r u l e  o f  l a w  w a s  o n e  t h a t  
underpinned the constitutional case law of the Court of Justice throughout 
the 1960s. It later took hold in explicit terms in the ruling for Parti ecologiste 
“Les Verts” v. European Parliament (case 294/83, 23 April 1986) and became a 
constant connotation for all European Community/EU institutions in 
subsequent case law.  
Forty years later, Biagio de Giovanni (2002), in order to explain 
“Europe’s ambiguous power”, referred to “the law, laws, and then rights, 
and the connected principle of the humanity of man”. Similarly, Tommaso 
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published a 2001 collection of essays under the title Europa forza gentile in 
homage to Scotsman David Hume, who first introduced the concept of 
gentle force, and with a view to defining the European Union as a public 
authority exclusively based on voluntary acceptance, the sharing of a novel 
“supranational sovereignty” and the renouncing of coercion.  
The road travelled over the 50 years since the first Rome Treaty – 
preceded by the essential although to date unknown threading of European 
integration through the European Coal and Steel Community, a genuine 
supranational organisation despite its mission-oriented mandate – would 
indeed have been to Hume’s liking and to that of his Enlightenment 
contemporaries. It has led to an outcome involving a claim to a single legal 
space, centred on freedom, security and justice, to be implemented through 
a united Europe (a fundamental goal for the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), Art. 2.1). In just a few years, this outcome has attracted in an 
apparently irreversible way states long governed by dictators or shaken by 
democratic crises, or left for a number of decades on the far side of 
Europe’s wall.   
Clearly, the European integration process has been neither linear nor 
constant. On the contrary, it has had its moments of stasis and very genuine 
crises (especially in the wake of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty), and has 
constantly evaded the rigid framework of institutions and principles.  
Despite these limitations – or better yet, features, as there appears to 
be no benchmark for the EU’s development, a truly unprecedented 
experience – Hallstein’s insight has certainly been proven true, and the 
community based on the rule of law has played the role of a ‘gentle force’ 
and does so to this day.  
How did this come to pass with no bill of rights, without Community 
or Union primary law having anything resembling a catalogue of rights? 
How do things stand today, and what is likely to occur now that the Lisbon 
Treaty has entered into force? Such are the questions this chapter intends to 
address, however briefly.  
The interpretation offered here – and explained in the following 
sections – is that the features of the European Community (EC) and then 
the EU, along with the specific constitutional traditions of European states, 
have had direct consequences for individuals’ fundamental rights. 
Regarding the nature of the EC, its qualification as a community based on 
the rule of law not only implies that its institutions and member states are 
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with the basic constitutional charter that is the Treaty, but also that 
individuals’ rights (and obligations, obviously) may under certain 
conditions directly derive from this same source. Individuals come directly 
under the new legal system, as subjects thereof, and this makes the system 
stand apart from all other international legal systems. The EC of course 
operates in a context of highly ‘constitutionalised’ European states – 
especially following the dramatic events of the Second World War – where 
fundamental rights are seen as an inalienable constitutional heritage, early 
on (from 1950) transmuted into a shared heritage through the Council of 
Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
An inherent characteristic of the EC/EU system is that individuals 
can assert rights directly and immediately, starting clearly with 
fundamental rights, vis-à-vis their respective states (the judges of which are 
obliged to apply relevant EC law) and European institutions. As the Court 
of Justice summed up in its most recent ruling in this field (case C-305/05, 
Belgian Bar Associations v. Council of Ministers, 26 June 2007), “fundamental 
rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose 
observance the Court ensures, drawing inspiration from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and in particular the Rome 
Convention”.  
2.  Issues posited in the original 1957 EEC Treaty 
The 1957 EEC Treaty assiduously avoided any reference to fundamental 
rights and liberties, in accordance with functionalist criteria that sought to 
achieve as much as possible in concrete terms without strong institutional 
or political premises, whose time was deemed not yet to have come.  
This same Treaty nevertheless provided for the economic liberties 
essential to the emergence of the single market (establishment, circulation, 
etc.), which were soon to be viewed by the Court of Justice as genuine 
constitutional freedoms.  
In addition to these functional freedoms required for the common 
market, the Court of Justice set out to mark the absolute originality of the 
EEC (destined to increase further with the later shift to the EC and the 
subsequent establishment of the EU) through the case law it developed in 
the early 1960s. Notable in this respect is the Court’s claim (in case 26/62, 
Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 5 February 
1963) that not only states but also their citizens are the subjects of 
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agreement setting up reciprocal obligations among contracting member 
states, because of the direct repercussions on Community subjects.   
The individuals mentioned by the Community judges cannot but 
have rights with respect to the Community, in addition to those they have 
with respect to member states. This stance was taken with the knowledge 
that the ever-growing sphere of Community law leads to legal situations 
regarding individuals and that these individuals may invoke the principle 
of direct effect (another original creation of the Court of Justice) in order to 
have such situations appropriately taken into consideration by national 
judges.  
With economic liberties equated with fundamental rights and an 
increasing number of rights deriving from Community law (considered in 
the broader acceptance specific to European law, as legal situations 
entailing benefits), the new legal system could no longer avoid re-positing 
the issue of fundamental rights, as had the constitutions of the last two 
centuries in various states.  
The method adopted by the Court of Justice for the definition of 
“general principles of Community law” followed this same orientation – 
and one cannot overstress the fundamental role played by the institution in 
the development of the legal grounding for European integration, 
unparalleled in any known legal system. This method centred initially on 
the identification of legal traditions common to member states. Clearly, in 
identifying such general principles – source law with cogent legal force – in 
the legality principle, the finality of law, equality and other principles as 
well, the Court was moving progressively closer to the issue of 
fundamental rights. These were indeed an essential part of the common 
constitutional traditions of member states, furthermore asserted by the 
Council of Europe’s ECHR, to which all EU member states had acceded.  
It was therefore not unexpected that the Court of Justice should state, 
as of 1969, in Erich Stauder v City of Ulm (case 29/69, 12 November 1969), 
that “the fundamental human rights [are] enshrined in the general 
principles of Community law and protected by the Court”. As of a 
subsequent ruling, in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (case 11/70, 17 December 1970), 
this position became a constant in the case law of the Court of Justice.  
As pointed out by Federico Mancini (1989), “reading in Community 
law an unwritten Bill of Rights thus constitutes the most incisive of the 
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The Court was not solely interested in the development of 
individuals’ rights, however, knowing that an essential aspect of its 
innovative case law concerned the ‘communitarisation’ of a significant part 
of national constitutional law, while stressing the ‘primacy’ of European 
law and of the integration process of national and European legal systems. 
This is already evident in the abovementioned Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft ruling, which reads “that the protection of fundamental 
rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the 
member states, must be ensured within the framework of the structure and 
objectives of the Community”. Otherwise, recourse to the legal rules or 
concepts of national law “would have an adverse effect on the uniformity 
and efficacy of Community law”.  
3.  Developments subsequent to the 1992 EU Treaty 
With the establishment of the EU in 1992, fundamental rights (inevitably 
one could say) were to find acknowledgement in the Maastricht Treaty. 
After the Preamble’s confirmation of the “attachment to the principles 
of…respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of 
law”, Art. F (now TEU Art. 6) asserts that the EU is based on the 
aforementioned principles. 
But with the shift in the appraoch to the issue of fundamental rights 
away from one essentially based on case law and towards a 
constitutionalisation of these same rights in the EU Treaty, problems 
deriving from their triple dimension (national, EU and ECHR) were to 
come to the fore, along with issues of enforcement. One should bear in 
mind that so far, the EU has not acceded to the ECHR, partly because of the 
Court of Justice (which stated in opinion 2/94 that there was no jurisdiction 
for accession to the ECHR, an expression of a different international legal 
system). In addition, fundamental rights are acknowledged as part of the 
“general principles of Community law”, with a specific location in the 
sources of the legal system, and member states’ constitutional courts have 
been reluctant to renounce their authority over the protection of 
fundamental rights (recent rulings 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian 
Constitutional Court are a case in point, as analysed in greater detail 
below).   
The solution found to these problems was the convening of a 
Convention, a special ad hoc body, unprecedented in European law, the 
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Although not yet imbued with the significant distance vis-à-vis the 
‘intergovernmental method’ that was to be the hallmark, soon after, of the 
Convention that in 2003 produced the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, this first Convention worked quite autonomously from member 
states and produced a text of considerable significance.  
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union signed in 
Nice in 2000 – although controversial and on some counts, such as its final 
“general provisions”, unconvincing – bears witness to the evolution of a 
number of ‘first generation’ rights: the right to engage in work is 
supplemented by the right to seek employment and to pursue a freely 
chosen occupation (Art. 15). The Charter also formalises rights that have 
emerged in recent decades (such as the protection of personal data, in Art. 
8; the rights of the child, in Art. 24; and the rights of the elderly, in Art. 25), 
and reasserts original rights, such as rights vis-à-vis public administrations 
(Art. 41, on the right to good administration), that give substance to EU 
citizenship.   
The atypical nature of the Charter drafting process was mirrored by 
an equally atypical adoption, eschewing the forms provided for by the 
Treaties, with an unprecedented “proclamation” on the part of the 
European Parliament, the Commission and the Council in December 2000. 
After the negative epilogue of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, a number of 
formal changes were introduced and in November 2007, the revised 
Charter was adopted by a huge majority in the European Parliament. In 
another atypical development, it was then once again “proclaimed” in the 
Plenary Hall of the European Parliament by the Presidents of the 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission.  
As expected, the Charter’s originality – as a constitutional seal 
appended to the new EU – elicited resistance and reactions. Indeed, no 
specific value was ascribed to it and its insertion into the 2004 
Constitutional Treaty, of which it formed Part II, contributed to the 
subsequent crisis.  
In spite of these difficulties, one could easily foresee that the Nice 
Charter was to represent an irreversible outcome, and a part of the 
Community acquis. It may not be binding, but advocates-general have often 
referred to it with a view to substantiating their conclusions; court judges 
have deemed it to be ‘a source of inspiration’; national courts have on 
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Constitutional Court has acknowledged its interpretative significance 
(ruling no. 349/2007). 
4.  Roles played by the Council of Europe and the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
In parallel with developments in the EU, the role played by the European 
Court of Human Rights, designed to guarantee the rights addressed by the 
ECHR, has considerably strengthened.  
Following the 1994-99 reforms, the Strasbourg Court has become 
more accessible to individuals and the range of issues it addresses has 
broadened. The outcome of this has been particularly significant with 
respect to states that have acceded to the ECHR, but on many points they 
are still far from full compliance. The case of Italy is especially telling: over 
recent years it has been ‘obliged’ to reform Art. 111 of its Constitution on 
‘fair trial’, introduce subsequent legislative innovations (such as law no. 
12/2006) and change its stance radically on property rights and 
expropriation. (This last matter has for the time being been concluded with 
the 29 March 2006 Scordino ruling of the Strasbourg Court and 
Constitutional Court ruling nos. 348 and 349/2007.) 
The ECHR appears to be a wedge driven between the Nice Charter 
and national constitutions. As regards EU law, the issue is not so much one 
of differing approaches (although that is partly the case) but rather the role 
played by the Strasbourg Court, and its crowding out of the Court of 
Justice. The latter’s case law attempts to combine the outcomes of the 
former with its own, autonomous approach, but the end-product is not 
always convincing. In any event, the Court of Justice has to consider the 
Strasbourg Court’s case law as a given, insofar as the latter has sole 
jurisdiction over interpretation of the ECHR.  
More significant problems emerge in conjunction with national 
legislation. The Italian case is typical in this respect, as a number of glaring 
asymmetries have appeared, despite efforts to demonstrate that the ECHR 
is substantively in line with corresponding national provisions. The most 
obvious example is that of property rights and expropriation powers, 
where various segments of Italian legislation – on many occasions deemed 
compatible with Art. 42 of the constitution – have appeared to conflict with 
property guarantees provided for in the ECHR (in Art. 6 and in Art. 1 of the 
1952 Additional Protocol). To put it briefly, while the constitutional rule on 
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adaptations regarding modes of acquisition and use, the ECHR – as 
interpreted by the Strasbourg Court – does not allow for fragmented 
protection of property rights.  
Yet the relevance (and primacy) of the ECHR is not matched, in the 
Italian legal system, by a formal role, and the ECHR was inserted into the 
system through a regular adaptation law, as is the case with all 
international treaties. Although the ECHR addresses issues that are 
objectively constitutional (fundamental rights, for instance), until the 
reform of the Constitution’s Art. 117.1, one simply could not raise serious 
questions about the specificity of the ECHR in comparison with other 
international obligations. Only recently have some judges, in order to 
acknowledge the primacy of the ECHR, attempted to stretch general rules 
through the construct (of Community origin and specific solely to that 
system) of a disapplication of domestic law conflicting with the ECHR’s 
provisions. Still, the means chosen do not hold water legally, insofar as 
ECHR’s rules cannot be characterised as having ‘useful effect’.  
5.  The 2007 Treaty and the recent Treaty of Lisbon 
Luckily the system is now moving towards clarification of its more 
significant points under the combined impact of European and domestic 
factors.  
As regards the EU, the Lisbon Treaty includes – in the section 
modifying the Treaty on European Union – a number of provisions that 
clearly set out the new centrality of the rights issue. A second paragraph 
has been added to the Preamble, according to which from the inheritance of 
Europe “have developed the universal values of the inviolable and 
inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and 
the rule of law”. 
Then comes a definite clarification that the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union “shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties” (Art. 6, replacing TEU Art. 6). The Charter thus remains an 
autonomous text with respect to the two new Treaties – thereby 
accommodating a mainly British request, aimed at attenuating the 
constitutional form of the new EU Treaty. But this may well have a 
paradoxically positive effect, insofar as it positions the Charter as 
something that comes before and stands aside from the TEU, similar in that 
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Other elements of clarification concern the EU’s commitment to 
accede to the ECHR (Art. 6.2, new) and the (re)-positing of fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR within the general principles of EU law 
(Art. 6.3, new).  
All issues have not been solved by the Lisbon Treaty (the 
enforcement of rights and the role of the Court of Justice, in particular) and 
others have emerged (the peculiar in/out position granted to the UK and 
Poland, for instance). Even so, European observers are used to compromise 
solutions and the new Treaty in any event includes a number of innovative 
provisions.  
6.  The Constitutional Court in Italy and Europe’s international 
obligations 
With ratification and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty through a 
political and institutional process that was less daunting – on paper – than 
the one for the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, the most topical and 
controversial issue for Italian law has to do with the reciprocal interplay of 
constitutional rights and those rights guaranteed by the ECHR, in light of 
the aforementioned reform of Art. 117.1 of the Italian Constitution.  
The issue was finally addressed frontally by the Constitutional Court 
in its rulings of 2007 (nos. 348 and 349), the significance of which are 
inversely proportional to their media coverage (discounting the 
conclusions regarding expropriation, on which the debate was based), 
almost as if fundamental rights were a topic so arcane as to be reserved to 
the most exclusive of sects.  
The two rulings in question are complex, inter alia because the 
general disquisition regarding the scope of Art. 117.1 was entrusted to two 
separate rapporteurs who used similar, but not identical arguments. The 
rulings are addressed here from the sole point of view of their general 
implications.  
The Constitutional Court put forth the following main arguments:  
a)  At the time of the ruling, the legal system underpinning the ECHR 
was still legally distinct from that of the EU (the Court was 
nonetheless well aware of the imminent absorption by the EU of the 
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b)  The ECHR is legally particular compared with other international 
agreements, if only for its uniform guarantee of all fundamental 
rights.  
c)  The relationship between the ECHR and national legal systems 
remains “robustly governed by each national legal system”.  
d)  The reform of Art. 117.1 finally fills the gap and “connects, from its 
systemic position within the Constitution, to the framework of 
principles that even previously guaranteed compliance, at the 
primary level, with a number of international obligations taken on by 
the State”.  
e)  The new provision establishes a flexible reference to the ECHR, 
operating as an interposed rule. 
f)  The European Court of Human Rights retains jurisdiction in terms of 
the centralised interpretation of the ECHR, but in the last resort it 
shall behoove the Constitutional Court to check that rules specified in 
the ECHR, and referred to on occasion, do indeed provide a degree of 
fundamental rights’ protection at least equivalent to that provided by 
the Italian Constitution.  
Legal arguments are shared on a variety of points, such as the 
erroneous use made by some Italian judges of disapplication regarding 
domestic laws, and the originality of the new Art. 117.1 compared with Art. 
10 and other ‘internationally-geared’ provisions contained in the 
Constitution. Overall, however, these arguments give the feeling that the 
legal system of the ECHR has been viewed as a variant of international law 
that may well be significant, but has been qualified as a mere ‘interposed 
rule’ with respect to the constitution. The specific features of the ECHR, 
both per se and in light of the use that EU law makes of them, should have 
led to the ECHR being slotted in differently from what is the rule for other 
international obligations. And the same can be said of the power the 
Constitutional Court has retained in terms of “checking that the 
appropriate balance is struck between the need to guarantee compliance 
with international obligations as set out in the Constitution and that of 
ensuring that so doing entails no vulnus for the Constitution proper”.  
On the whole, these two rulings leave one with the sense that after 
having digested the position taken by the Court of Justice on EU law – 
painfully, and only partially at that, as evidenced by the issue of legal 
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principle, a ‘defensive’ role with respect to rights grounded in the 
Constitution. It did so notwithstanding that it will in the end have to accept 
the conclusions of the Strasbourg Court, even on issues where the two 
approaches are objectively different. Expropriation, which prompted the 
two above-mentioned rulings, illustrates the point.   
7.  Pending issues 
That being stated, there are still a number of unresolved issues and 
applicative difficulties within EU law. In the context of the new EU Treaty 
(as modified by the Lisbon Treaty), fundamental rights derive from both 
the Charter and the ECHR, while also being the product of member states’ 
shared constitutional traditions. As regards the organisation of source law, 
the rights guaranteed by the ECHR and those deriving from common 
constitutional traditions are equally part of Union law, as general 
principles.  
The ensuing model is not blindingly clear. Actually, now that the 
revision process has come to a close, on the one hand fundamental rights 
provided for in the Charter shall have constitutional rank (the Charter 
having been given the same legal value as the Treaties, as noted earlier), 
while on the other, rights guaranteed by the ECHR or derived from 
common constitutional traditions shall be deemed ‘general principles’, and 
therefore not have constitutional rank.  
Furthermore, the acknowledgement of the legal value of the Charter 
is surrounded by a number of cautionary statements – probably too many. 
Among them is the Protocol on the application of the Charter to Poland and 
the UK, which states that “whereas the Charter reaffirms the rights, 
freedoms, and principles recognised in the Union and makes these rights 
more visible, [it] does not create new rights or principles” (emphasis added). 
Yet, a number of rights contemplated therein are absolutely novel.  
8.  Protecting rights – The EU’s basic remit 
However significant these pending problems may be, clearly no legal 
system has developed a system entirely based on the rule of law and 
guaranteed fundamental rights on a par with the EU. More specifically, 
freedom, democracy and the solidarity made possible by a social market 
economy have become, in just a few decades, such a given and appreciated 
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as the positive outcome of a far-reaching policy. And yet nothing is as 
constructed and deliberate as this main connotation of the EU.  
The ‘rule of law’ and fundamental rights thus play a dual role: within 
the EU legal system they represent the system’s basic grounding, 
developing the premises for EU citizens’ new sense of belonging; 
externally, they act as a driver both for countries interested in joining the 
Union and for those who enter into relations with the EU.   
EU citizens now need to become aware that the EU is more than any 
other a system of actually functional and guaranteed freedoms. European 
identity has to be based on this pillar, which the Union itself has built, 
rather than on the dubious legacy of the past (that European inheritance 
that was the focus of so many arguments in 2004, on the occasion of the 
Constitutional Treaty).  
As noted above, externally the EU exercises its drive through the 
gradual extension – always the product of ‘gentle force’, never that of 
coercion – of democracy and common security. Thanks to the peculiarity of 
a European space that was not predefined, the EEC originally founded by 
six member states has extended in stages to its current 27 members, 
delineating for each and every one far-reaching adaptations. The impact of 
the EU goes well beyond its changing borders, positively influencing states 
interested in joining (from Turkey to the Balkans) as well as states linked to 
it through specific trade relations. The EU is hence becoming a ‘beacon of 
liberty’ for the world at large.   
It was therefore essential that in the ratification process of the new 
Lisbon Treaty, regardless of how formally centred it may have been on the 
role of national parliaments, that European public opinion (the most 
informed and sophisticated there is worldwide) was made aware of the 
crucial role of rights and the rule of law. A new ‘European citizenship’ will 
not come into being through complex institutional and economic 
mechanisms, but through the effectiveness of a system where “law 
determines power, and power does not determine law” (Pöttering, 2007). 
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12. DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
STEFANO MICOSSI* 
p until the early 1990s, the European Union’s popularity with its 
citizens had been on the rise, despite a lack of active involvement in 
European affairs; subsequently, it appeared to drop radically. The 
Maastricht Treaty ratification had to overcome widespread resistance from 
various quarters: public opinion, national parliaments, the German 
Constitutional Court. The impasse in the 15 years of negotiations on 
institutions that followed the Maastricht Treaty projected an image of 
paralysed decision-making. A new wave of discontent and anti-integration 
sentiment has followed the accession of 12 new member states in 2005-07. 
The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch 
referendums in 2005 and the difficult ratification of the subsequent Lisbon 
Treaty in 2008-09 have appeared to confirm the detachment of public 
opinion in Europe from the institutions of the Union. The ‘permissive 
consensus’ that had until then entrusted European elites with developing 
integration seems to have evaporated. To some, this foreshadowed a 
collapse of the Union and a return to intergovernmental forms of 
cooperation.  
According to many observers, the reason lay in a lack of democracy: 
in the dual sense that common policies had diverged from voters’ 
preferences (output legitimacy) and that decision-making mechanisms 
appeared to lack the basic requirements of transparency, accountability and 
democratic involvement (input legitimacy). The issue of democracy has 
taken on greater prominence since the Maastricht Treaty, which set up the 
Union and extended its scope to monetary affairs as well as to two new 
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political ‘pillars’ for foreign policy and internal security: areas that had 
until then been the jealously guarded prerogatives of member states, under 
national parliamentary control. 
In the 15 years since Maastricht, however, integration has moved 
forward at a fast clip, with enlargement to ten new member states and the 
achievement of monetary union. Major progress has also been made under 
the so-called ‘second pillar’, with strong support from public opinion: the 
Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties have extended application of the 
Community method of decision-making to matters of border control, civil 
and criminal justice and law enforcement affairs; Europol has been made a 
European agency. Finally, despite a drawn-out slowdown in growth, the 
past decade has witnessed the full implementation of the Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP) and the approval of the services Directive, which 
covers on a residual basis all economic activities not yet liberalised under 
internal market legislation.  
Two years down the road from the disastrous referendums in France 
and the Netherlands, member states have reached, with the Lisbon Treaty, 
an agreement on institutions that upholds the main innovations laid out in 
the Constitutional Treaty – albeit without the ‘signs and symbols’ of a 
constitution, which were strongly opposed by public opinion in quite a few 
member states – and basically settles political issues left pending, after 
Maastricht, in the operation of common institutions. The Treaty has thus 
specified the allocation of competences between the Union and the member 
states, the balance of powers between the Council, the Commission and the 
European Parliament, as well as rebalanced, within the Council, the voting 
weights of large and small countries. It has also put an end to the rotating 
Presidency of the European Council, strengthened the powers of the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and vastly 
increased the number of topics subject to majority voting. 
Thus, it appears that feelings of paralysis in decision-making may be 
widespread in the media and public opinion alike, but they are not 
confirmed by fact. Nor has the pace of decision-making been slowed by the 
accession of new member states, although some complain about the 
increased complexity of Council decision-making. 
Public opinion support for European institutions plummeted after 
Maastricht, but has recovered somewhat since the middle of the 1990s: as 
shown in Figure 1, up until 2008 over 50% of respondents to a 
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positive (although a drop in support below 50% is expected due to the 
current deep economic crisis, which is feeding disillusionment with the 
Union’s ability to respond effectively). Opinion polls also show that among 
national and Community institutions, the European Parliament continues 
to enjoy considerable prestige, although declining voter participation in 
European elections might seem suggest the contrary. 
Figure 1. Public opinion on participation in the EU* 
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Union is a good thing? 
Source: Eurobarometer. 
That said, the issue of democracy is perhaps better addressed in 
terms of adjusting a political system that has very considerably extended its 
scope and thus requires a corresponding extension in the scope of its 
democratic controls; but the lack of democracy does not appear to be the 
main cause of a crisis that, as will be argued, may well have stemmed more 
from the weakness of governments than from the opposition of the 
governed. Nor should one expect an extension in the scope of democratic 
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unemployment to immigration, exclusion and security, in a world where 
the pace of change is controlled neither by individual states nor by the 
European Union.1 
1.  The need for democratic legitimisation  
The Union is a peculiar polity, without the powers of coercion and linkage 
to a geographical territory typical of nation states; its powers are spread out 
over a number of institutions and procedures, each of which has its own 
legitimisation mechanisms (Lord & Magnette, 2004). These powers have 
been bestowed by the member states, which have democratic institutions 
and control the Union’s activity through the European Council of Heads of 
State and of Government and the Council of Ministers. One must therefore 
first of all seek to clarify what is meant by the requests for more 
legitimisation channels.  
The original design of the European Communities’ competences and 
decision-making mechanisms reflected a technocratic and functionalist 
approach, under which Europe’s higher interests were embodied in the 
European Commission, a non-democratic body with exclusive powers of 
legislative initiative and entrusted with the impartial custodianship of the 
Treaties. The Council was the necessarily opaque forum for political 
compromise among the member states; direct democratic legitimisation 
was confined to the European Parliament, initially assigned weak 
consultative powers, but later endowed with full co-decision of legislative 
measures in most EU matters (including, after the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 
multi-annual financial perspectives and yearly budgets). 
One problem has been that decisions on the extension of the Union’s 
functions were hidden behind the veil of small incremental steps justified 
by functional requirements – a solution devised by Monnet to pursue the 
European construction following the rejection of the European Defence 
Community by the French National Assembly in 1954. This intrinsically 
undemocratic strategy was facilitated by the integration process’s 
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indeterminate finality, which allowed supporters of the political union 
concept to co-exist with those who simply wanted a large open market. The 
fall of the Berlin Wall added further uncertainty regarding borders, as 
vagueness prevailed as to where the enlargement process would stop 
(Majone, 2005). 
Developments in the wake of the failed Constitutional Treaty 
referendums in France and the Netherlands have radically changed this 
picture. First of all, decisions on enlargement were shifted to the 
political/constitutional level as a number of countries decided that they 
will in the future submit all enlargement issues to popular referendum; 
moreover, in the Lisbon Treaty political discretion in decisions to admit 
new members will be constrained by the need to respect the so-called 
‘Copenhagen criteria’ (Article 49 TEU). 
More importantly, the Lisbon Treaty has somewhat set in stone the 
attribution principle. It has established member state residual jurisdiction 
in all matters not explicitly devolved to the Union (Articles 4 and 5 TEU) 
and – through new Protocols on the role of national parliaments in the 
European Union and the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality – it has introduced political and judicial procedures to keep 
in check the Union’s competences. The risk of jurisdiction ‘creep’, eluding 
democratic control, now appears to be very much a thing of the past. 
Furthermore, by removing the ‘signs and symbols’ of a constitution, the 
Lisbon Treaty has also removed indeterminate finality from the picture: it 
is now clear that the Union is not destined to become a state and that the 
current balance between federal and confederal dimensions is here to stay. 
Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty has removed a number of obvious flaws in the 
Union’s democratic legitimisation. 
Some have claimed that democratic legitimisation of Union decisions 
is not possible, as there is no demos, no common identity or sufficiently 
shared values to guide institutional and political action (Dahrendorf, 2001 
and Schmitter, 2000). True, a weak common identity makes it difficult to 
refer back to a single popular support base; but it does not preclude the 
development of partial mechanisms legitimising individual decisions or 
decision-making processes; nor does it preclude forms of legitimisation 
linked to the output of common action, insofar as said action meets voters’ 
needs that individual nation states are no longer in a position to satisfy. 
The lack of demos is mirrored in the restrained use of majority 
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achieving consensus legitimise decisions that would not be acceptable were 
they imposed by a majority of member states upon a minority of dissenting 
member states. 
Moravcsik (2006), conversely, has claimed that further channels of 
democratic legitimisation are not required, for two main reasons. Firstly, he 
sees the European Union as the product of an intergovernmental 
agreement, embodied in the Treaties, that is “pragmatically efficient, 
normatively attractive and politically stable”: a satisfactory negotiated 
equilibrium, periodically modified when the need arises, and otherwise 
reconfirmed, and that therefore reflects the requirements of participating 
states. Secondly, he maintains that increasing the opportunities to 
participate and make decisions does not necessarily generate more 
participation, nor does increased participation always generate more 
legitimisation. In fact, in his view, declining voter participation in elections 
to the European Parliament may confirm that the greater scope for 
democratic participation provided for by the Treaties has largely been 
unused; and where and when it has been used, this has been to express 
dissatisfaction with the domestic policies of national governments (a point 
also made by Bogdanor, 2007, Hicks, 1999 and Schmitter, 2000). 
Moravcsik considers that this is due to the nature of the tasks 
undertaken by the Union, which at least originally were of a mainly 
technical nature, with low general political salience for most citizens: 
international trade, development assistance, agriculture, safety standards 
for manufactures and services. 
This is a minority view, however. A majority of political scientists 
and constitutionalists conversely stress that the Union’s institutions have 
now taken on an autonomous role, even vis-à-vis the member states, in 
defining the rights and political, economic and social conditions of 
individuals; they go on to assert that these powers cannot be taken back by 
the member states, inter alia, because of the unanimity requirement for 
Treaty revision; and precisely for this reason deem that the accumulation of 
powers in Union hands has already exceeded the threshold requiring 
autonomous safeguards against possible abuses (Schmitter, 2000; Lord, 
2004; Lord & Harris, 2006 and Schmidt, 2006). Such possible abuses concern 
first and foremost the Council, insofar as it can elude national 
parliamentary control when ruling at the Union level. 
Moreover, as has been mentioned, further expanding the Union’s 
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possible. Further political and institutional progress can only stem from 
deliberate decisions on the part of member states acting in full 
accountability vis-à-vis their public opinions and parliaments. 
The co-existence within the Union of two distinct levels at which 
public institutions exercise their power – federal and confederal – generates 
an intrinsic need for corresponding democratic legitimisation mechanisms 
and channels, focusing on the one hand on member state representation in 
the Council, and, on the other, on citizen representation in the European 
Parliament. This dual representation has now been explicitly incorporated 
in the Lisbon Treaty (new Article 10, para. 2, TEU).  
At the member state level, national parliaments and the public at 
large need to be informed of the decisions to be taken within European 
institutions and be able to influence the positions of their own national 
representatives to the Council. Separate control and legitimisation channels 
are also required at the Union level since its acts and decisions acquire 
autonomous value with respect to individual member states’ inputs: 
because of the use of qualified majority voting in the Council, and the 
attendant need to reach compromise solutions that may partly sacrifice 
national interests; because of the constitutional weight of principles of 
primacy and direct effect of community legislation; and because of the role 
the Community judicial system can play in the defence of individuals’ 
rights, even vis-à-vis the member states. 
The revealed preference theorem that is at the root of Moravcsik’s 
analysis of negotiated equilibrium among Union countries supports this 
conclusion. Over the last three decades there has been a constant increase 
in the Union participation and control mechanisms, through the European 
Parliament and national parliaments alike, which have supplanted and 
taken over the role initially played by organised economic interest groups. 
Various other channels have been opened that provide individuals with 
direct access to European institutions: examples include the European 
Ombudsman and the right to petition European institutions in one’s 
mother tongue, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, and broader rights for 
individuals to institute proceedings before the European Court of Justice. 
The new Title II of the Treaty on European Union adopted in Lisbon, 
“Provisions on democratic principles”, while carrying over from the 
previous Treaty provisions on citizenship, specifies new rules on the right 
of Union citizens to take part in its democratic life, including the right of 
legislative initiative (Art. 11, para. 4, TEU). This same section also contains DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 221 
 
detailed provisions regarding national parliament participation in the 
functioning of the Union (see Art. 12). 
A mapping of decision-making procedures in the various areas of 
common action confirms a growing demand for democracy at Union level 
that has been met. The extension of qualified majority voting in new areas – 
which reduces the control exercised by individual member states over 
Council decisions – was always matched by an extension of European 
Parliament powers. This occurred with the Single Act, which applied 
majority voting to decisions regarding the internal market, subsequently 
leading, in the Maastricht Treaty, to the introduction of co-decisions 
between the Council and Parliament; it also occurred with the Lisbon 
Treaty when issues of immigration, justice and law enforcement came 
under Community jurisdiction and co-decision was made the normal 
decision procedure. 
Similarly, the Commission’s exclusive right of legislative initiative 
has mainly applied to ‘negative’ integration, i.e. decisions that remove 
barriers to the internal market (Majone, 2005), while in matters such as the 
coordination of economic policies or foreign and security policy, the 
initiative has remained in the hands of member states, safeguarding the 
prerogatives of national parliaments. The Lisbon Treaty has decided that in 
“specific cases provided for by treaties” procedures followed for the 
adoption of directives, regulations or decisions may waive Commission 
participation (Article 289, TFEU). 
Nor do facts confirm low public opinion interest in Union decisions. 
Public debate on issues such as the EU Directive on services, the accession 
of Turkey or the mention of Christian values in the Preamble to the 
Constitutional Treaty elicited active involvement of intellectuals, political 
parties and large segments of European society.  
2.  Control and democratic legitimisation mechanisms  
There is widespread feeling that the existing democratic control 
mechanisms within the Union are weak and inadequate; as mentioned 
above, criticism has focused both on the input into the decision-making 
dimension and the substance of decisions, or the output dimension. Let us 
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2.1  Elections and referendums  
The main mechanism of democratic participation lies in popular voting in 
elections and referendums. As noted above, voter participation in elections 
to the European Parliament is not high, at under 50% of the electorate, and 
it dropped by about twenty percentage points between 1979, the first 
election, and 2004.2 Furthermore, voter positions on European matters have 
appeared to strongly correlate with the popularity of national governments 
in office: so much so that some observers have characterised European 
elections as ‘second-round’ elections, used to send signals on domestic 
rather than European politics (Hicks, 1999 and Schmitter, 2000). 
Low voter participation may however stem from reasons other than 
disaffection from Community institutions (Lord, 2004): it may for instance 
reflect the fact that these consultations have little impact on the general 
thrust of European affairs and the identity of those who will be chosen to 
govern. Alternatively, in a more positive view, low voter participation may 
reflect the basic consensus of leading political groups as to the general 
direction of European affairs: when positions advocated by parties and 
candidates appear to be sufficiently aligned with the preferences of the 
median voter, the incentive to go out and actually vote is reduced. In fact, 
the remoteness and complexity of European issues tends to generate 
concordant positions of national parties, with little role for the traditional 
left/right cleavages (see also Bastasin in this volume).  
That said, the central issue remains the absence of a unified public 
space at the European level where it would feel relevant to express one’s 
personal preferences. This weakness in the European political system is not 
going to be remedied overnight; it can only fade gradually with the 
emergence of European political parties and an increased perceived 
relevance of European issues in everyday life.  
In fact, European political groupings have turned into stable 
organisations over recent years and have begun to focus their meetings on 
specific European issues, according to timelines linked to those of the 
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European Council. In their comprehensive study of the voting behaviour of 
members of the European Parliament, Hix et al. (2007) conclude that 
“voting along supranational party lines gradually replaced voting along 
national party lines”.  
The process could be speeded up – based on the new powers 
bestowed on Parliament by the Lisbon Treaty – if national parties were to 
take the opportunity of European electoral campaigns to make explicit their 
preferences regarding the Union’s budget and other Union policy issues; 
alas, this did not happen in the course of the June 2009 European elections.  
Conversely, the idea that the President of the Commission should be 
elected directly by voters seems unconvincing: politicising the Commission 
would be incompatible with the Commission’s function as arbiter of Treaty 
application and its exclusive power of legislative initiative, which also 
assumes a shared, non-partisan vision of the integration process. For the 
moment, no such radical change in the institutional equilibrium of the 
Union seems imminent.3 
Equally unconvincing is the idea that the democratic gap could be 
bridged by resorting more frequently to referendums: the dangers inherent 
in the recourse to direct democracy for the settlement of complex issues are 
increased, in the case of European issues, precisely by the lack of demos and 
the absence of strong collective identification with European institutions.  
2.2  The role of national parliaments 
At the member state level, what matters is adequate control by national 
parliaments over the actions of governments and administrations within 
the Council, which constitutes an indirect channel of democratic control by 
citizens over Union decisions.  
National parliaments play a central role in the approval of Treaty 
modifications, which constitute the Union’s primary law; in many member 
states this approval comes under constitutional procedures. Similarly, 
decisions on the Union’s financial resources require ratification under 
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national fiscal procedures since they imply funding by state budgets. 
Clearly, national parliaments’ powers are greater for Council decisions 
adopted under the unanimity rule, where European Parliament 
involvement is weaker. Since such decisions have considerable political 
and institutional significance, powers of scrutiny are usually exercised with 
high degrees of incisiveness and often with active public opinion 
participation. Conversely, national parliament control is inevitably weaker 
over Council decisions regarding Union directives or policies where 
majority voting is the rule.  
This is why some observers have claimed that transferring functions 
to the Union implies shifting the balance of powers towards executive 
powers, which can avail themselves of considerable discretion when 
negotiating compromises within the Council, as well as towards 
bureaucracies, which cooperate in the implementation of Community 
norms within Council Committees. Both sets of institutions, far removed 
from the public eye, can collude with the Commission and with segments 
of the organised interest community, according to vertical filières that can 
use the Union to bring about decisions that would not be feasible at 
national level (Chryssochoou, 2003 and Maurer et al., 2000). 
Some member states – in particular Denmark and the United 
Kingdom – have addressed this issue by adopting tight procedures to 
provide guidance and oversight for government behaviour within 
European institutions, while in other cases parliamentary procedures 
appear less incisive and could be strengthened (Hicks, 1999 and Lord, 
2004). 
That said, majority voting within Council and co-decision with the 
European Parliament rule out rigidly binding mandates that would 
preclude all compromise; similarly, any direct intervention by national 
parliaments in European decision-making would surely entail decision-
making paralysis (see Manzella elsewhere in this volume). Democratic 
control must therefore be resolved through the Union’s mechanisms, that 
is, mainly via scrutiny by the European Parliament.  
One noteworthy exception to this conclusion concerns the role of 
national parliaments in defending subsidiarity, as in the Treaty of Lisbon: 
violation of the subsidiarity principle would indeed amount to an 
infringement of member state prerogatives by Community institutions, 
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arise and not lend themselves to settlement, the European Court of Justice 
will have the last word. 
2.3  Control and democratic legitimisation at the Union level  
The Union is a peculiar polity where power is spread out over multiple 
centres and is exercised through various decision-making procedures – 
which currently number about thirty.4 It features not only frequent 
dissociation of territorial and functional jurisdictions, but also variability in 
the criteria defining insiders and outsiders with respect to the exercise of its 
powers, both functionally and territorially (Schmitter, 2000). For this 
reason, as pointed out earlier, it has been described as a polity with 
undefined borders. The European Parliament, the main expression of 
popular will at the Union level, has up till now only fully intervened in 
decisions regarding the so-called first pillar, but this will change, as has 
been described, with the Lisbon Treaty. 
In addition, debate on European issues tends to elude the left/right 
divides typical of national political systems and break up on a case-by-case 
basis into different member state and interest group coalitions: this does 
not favour linkages between national political debates and decisions to be 
taken at the European level. In fact, voting patterns in the European 
Parliament reflect motivations that can rarely be traced back to traditional 
political stances within member states; and national public debate on 
European issues tends to run along pro- and anti-European lines, which are 
also poorly correlated to traditional party divides (see Hicks, 1999 and 
Bastasin in this volume).  
Finally, as noted by Majone (2005), the Union is not organised 
according to the division of powers paradigm typical of Western 
democracies, but according to a model where powers are shared among 
stakeholders, as in pre-modern European polities: member states, the 
European Parliament, Community technocrats, social groups standing for 
organised interests and even magistrates participate variously in decision-
making and procedures, depending on the topic and the coordination 
problem to be resolved. 
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The two most emblematic illustrations of this model are the so-called 
‘Community decision method’ and the ‘networked’ participation of 
organised interest groups in decision-making processes. Under the 
Community method, the Commission puts forth proposals for directives 
and decisions, Council and Parliament reach decisions together according 
to procedures that combine varying degrees of majority voting and 
consensus, depending on the intensity of national preferences. If the 
Commission does not agree to the amendments agreed by Council and 
Parliament, it may withdraw its proposal; absent such a text, Council and 
Parliament cannot reach a decision. In practice, each of the three bodies 
needs the other two to come to a decision.  
In the exercise of its power of initiative, as in that of guardian of the 
Treaty, the Commission’s function can perhaps best be understood not as a 
supra-national independent interpreter of shared public interests, as 
envisaged by its founding fathers, but as a technical power: in other words, 
the Commission can be seen more as an executive agency and a judge, than 
a government. And in fact, its powers are specifically defined by the 
treaties and in many cases are exercised on Council delegation of authority. 
With the extension of the Union’s ‘political’ remit, there has been a constant 
increase in the Council’s and Parliament’s weight in decision-making, 
whereas the Commission’s role has been limited to one of technical support 
and secretariat. 
Nor is the Commission’s power of initiative exercised as if it were 
absolute: in fact the Commission responds to requests from member states, 
organised interest groups and Parliament. Over the last few years, the 
balance of such influence has shifted significantly towards Parliament, 
which approves the Commission when it is appointed, may dismiss it with 
a vote of no-confidence and controls its budget.  
As for networks, the Euro-polity has from the very onset bestowed a 
privileged status on associations representing organised economic interests 
at the European level; it has often encouraged and financed the setting up 
of such bodies. Over time, producer organisations were joined by trade 
unions, consumers, environmentalists and ‘single issue’ advocacy groups; 
many regions have set up representation offices in Brussels. These 
organisations have become the focal point for networked, extended 
communities of interests in the member states, which rely on the network 
to take part in Commission and Parliament consultation processes, publicly 
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in on the drafting of legal provisions, to which they may contribute with 
their technical input. 
Similar developments have targeted public administrations and 
agencies as well, following the Single Act. Within the Union, the 
application of common legislation is entrusted to the member states (Article 
10 of the Treaty establishing the European Community). Qualified majority 
voting was introduced in the Council for internal market measures in 
parallel with the setting up of Council Committees made up of member 
state representatives and (as a rule) chaired by the Commission, entrusted 
with coordinating the application of common legislation. These 
Committees went on to become the hubs of national public 
administrations’ specialised functional networks; through these, vast 
swathes of civil servants have become the voice of national interests within 
Community institutions and the voice of the Community within national 
bureaucracies. The European Parliament has gradually developed powers 
of scrutiny geared to their activities, thereby controlling the exercise of the 
powers delegated to them and politically impacting their work. 
Regulatory agencies – set up to provide continuity and independence 
to the executive in fields such as competition, financial market supervision, 
food and environmental security (Majone, 1996) – have also established 
their specialised networks, the hubs of which are the committees of 
national regulators where officials define regulatory guidelines and review 
implementation issues. European Parliament involvement in this area has 
been considerably less, as independence from political interference is an 
essential rationale for such agencies.  
This increasing number of networks has contributed in no small 
manner to the legitimisation of Community institutions vis-à-vis various 
constituencies, through widespread participation, the emergence of 
broader bases for consensus on Community institutions’ legislation and 
decisions, and the introduction of counterweights to the various decision-
making centres. To some extent, this may weaken the European 
Parliament’s powers of guidance and control. But the increase in the 
number of legitimisation channels thus brought about does strengthen the 
Union (see Cassese, 2002 and elsewhere in this volume), in a complex 
transnational system where the development of channels of representation 
and communication between representatives and those they represent 
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Potential conflict between various legitimisation channels in turn 
induces adjustments in the way the system operates, through a continuous 
process of ‘constitutional deliberation’, a salient feature of European 
institutions (Lord & Magnette, 2004 and Cassese in this volume). Public 
opinion regarding the impact of internal market common policies was thus 
taken on board as of the Amsterdam Treaty, through a revision of Article 
95, which constitutes the main legal basis for internal market legislation, 
and the introduction of the new Article 16A on public services, which 
extended the scope of national public interest protection with respect to the 
application of common legislation.  
An apparent blow to the democratic legitimacy of the Union has now 
come from the German Constitutional Court decision that has declared the 
compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the constitution,5 but which has 
(re)asserted that the Union is not a federation, that sovereignty only lies 
with the member states and that the European Parliament cannot claim to 
represent European citizens, due to its skewed representation formula that 
favours small member states. In reality, these positions are not new, they 
were already stated in the decision that opened the way to ratification of 
the Maastricht Treaty, and they do not contradict the normal functioning of 
European decision-making. Their real significance lies in the enhanced 
safeguards that they posit for the possibility, opened by the Lisbon Treaty, 
to change decision-making procedures by unanimous deliberation of the 
European Council: the German Constitutional Court has indicated that any 
such decisions will have to be ratified by the national parliament – 
although it is not clear under what procedures, constitutional or ordinary. 
But such passage would in all likelihood have been inevitable anyway, 
since under the Lisbon Treaty any national parliament would be able to 
oppose such a change.  
2.4  Popular legitimisation and constitutionalism  
Mény (2002) has argued that popular dissatisfaction with democracy has 
increased because of the larger role played by ‘constitutionalist’ or ‘non-
majoritarian’ mechanisms in the exercise of public powers; this concerns 
member states as much as the European Union. Over the last few decades 
                                                      
5 Cf. Federal Constitutional Court , Judgment of 30 June 2009, (2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 
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these independent powers have taken on particular significance in market 
regulation, through the setting up of independent agencies (Majone, 1996). 
The paramount example is monetary policy management that has been 
entrusted exclusively to central banks, thereby removing it from the sphere 
of possible inflationary manipulation by governments.  
However, central banks and regulatory agencies were set up by 
parliaments, which defined their goals and instruments in the law; and in 
the exercise of their powers, they were typically made independent from 
the executive but not from parliamentary scrutiny. Their legitimisation is 
secured not only by their political and parliamentary mandate, but also by 
procedures defining how decisions must be taken for the protection of the 
collective and individual interests they are responsible for upholding (Lord 
& Magnette, 2004). 
A significant aspect of European Union activity does indeed concern 
market regulation, with a view to removing barriers to free circulation and 
competition. When it comes to implementation, the Commission operates 
as an independent agency, sanctioning states and individuals for violations 
and obliging them to put an end to prohibited behaviour. Decisions may be 
corrected through appeals to the European Court of Justice, but as a rule 
not by national or Union political powers. Some have claimed that the 
European Central Bank (ECB) enjoys even greater independence than do 
national central banks, as neither the Council nor the European Parliament 
provides an actual political counterweight. The ECB’s mandate is treaty-
defined, and therefore can only be modified via a unanimous vote of the 
member states, whereas in most countries the central bank’s mandate is 
defined by ordinary legislation.  
The loss of political control can generate unpopularity – 
understandably, insofar as public opinion may not perceive the efficiency 
benefits in economic policy management linked to this 
‘constitutionalisation’ (Eichengreen, 2007). Unpopularity may also stem 
from the very attitude of national governments, which sometimes have 
shown no hesitation in blaming the Union for unpopular policies they had 
voluntarily agreed to implement within the Council. Unpopularity can also 
feed on the rising intensity of forces for globalisation and technological 
change, as these reduce the effectiveness of traditional tools of economic 
management and income distribution (Dahrendorf, 2001; Scharpf, 1999 and 
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The most significant contribution in terms of restoring government 
and Union popularity would come from better designed economic policies, 
able to address the challenges of global markets, which is the topic of the 
following section.  
3.  Legitimisation through substantive Community action  
Public institutions are established to meet needs that cannot be met 
through individual action and thereby require forms of collective action. The 
quality of collective action plays a significant, and in the long run, crucial 
role among legitimisation processes. This applies to the European Union’s 
institutions as well: all the more so, as democratic legitimisation through 
decision-making processes is weaker there (Schmitter, 2000 and Scharpf, 
1999). 
Various authors have considered this to be a leading cause of Union 
unpopularity: they feel that integration policies reduce the latitude national 
policies may have to achieve redistribution goals, thereby contributing to a 
‘race to the bottom’ in terms of public welfare and public services (e.g. 
Dahrendorf, 2001 and Scharpf, 1999). Mény (2002) underscores the Union’s 
role in shifting the balance in economic policies in favour of market forces. 
These conclusions call for some qualification. First of all, as pointed 
out earlier, the loss of control suffered by national policies has to be 
assigned to globalisation more than to specific action on the part of the 
Union; the Union, and the member states for that matter, can do nothing 
but adapt to processes that elude control by all governments. The criticism 
therefore concerns the operational difficulties encountered by democratic 
systems in general, and not only by European institutions. Examples 
include difficulties in responding adequately to economic insecurity or to 
national welfare system strains linked to population aging. Moreover, 
during slow-growth years, weak and irresolute national governments did 
not hesitate to blame Europe for events that stemmed from their inability to 
reach decisions, thereby feeding hostility towards European institutions.  
It is also worth noting that many Union initiatives have constrained 
state action, but to the benefit of citizens: for instance, by strengthening the 
defence of consumer interests through competition policy or transparency 
and quality requirements in the provision of public services.  
Finally, empirical evidence confirms convergence in the fundamental 
philosophy of macroeconomic policies, in the sense that neither monetary 
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lasting improvements in growth and employment. The data, however, do 
not confirm the existence of a general constraint on national policies 
precluding the pursuit of autonomous goals of equity and solidarity.  
Mosley (2004) has shown that pressure exerted by financial markets 
on governments with a view to having them reduce deficits is not related to 
the adoption of the single currency. In general, empirical evidence confirms 
that countries of very different state size and resulting tax burdens can 
p e r s i s t  s i d e  b y  s i d e  i n  a n  e n v i r o n m e n t of integrated capital markets. In 
other words, different collective preferences in terms of public intervention 
need not be incompatible with integration and globalisation.  
Similarly, a whole body of literature has identified sustainable 
unemployment benefit schemes as well as inefficient schemes, which are 
unsustainable in an open and integrated environment (Sapir, 2006). Insofar 
as they encourage risk-taking, efficient systems that insure against the risk 
of losing one’s job can increase growth, rather than dampen it (Ferrera & 
Sacchi in this volume). Gros & Micossi (2006) have called for common 
labour market policies that would facilitate the integration of immigrants 
while limiting the impact of wage undercutting for nationals.  
As a rule, responsibility for economic and social policies lies with the 
member states, and this should be acknowledged publicly. That said, a 
sharing out of tasks between the Union and member states that would 
assign the former responsibility only for ‘negative integration’ policies – i.e. 
establishing a common market and removing barriers to free movement – 
would be necessarily unpopular and untenable in the long run. This is why 
the identification of appropriate ‘positive integration’ policies, taking on 
board public opinion demands – for social cohesion, security, effective 
management of migration flows – remains a crucial element of 
legitimisation. 
3.1  Opening new areas for decision-making in the Union’s policies  
The Lisbon Treaty has kept the name of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), while modifying that of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, which will now be called the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). The name change is substantive: many rules 
regarding the functioning of what was previously called the second and 
third pillar are now included in this second part. 
More important, this partition could also foreshadow a distinction 
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countries. This interpretation is confirmed by the simplified revision 
procedures applicable to the provisions ”relative to the internal policies 
and actions of the Union” (cf. Article 48 of the Final Provisions of the Treaty 
on European Union). These procedures envisage that the Council shall 
decide treaty changes in those areas unanimously, after having consulted 
the European Parliament and the Commission. Convening an 
intergovernmental conference will no longer be required.  
The issue is addressed in a more general context by Tosato in this 
volume. Suffice it to say that this change has potentially significant 
implications for the Union’s democratic legitimisation: common policies 
can now be changed without challenging the institutional framework of the 
Union. The policies in question have indeed become just that: common 
policies, about which political differences may appear, according to 
traditional left/right lines or to new divides specific to the European public 
arena. In other words, new spaces have been opened for public debate and 
political action at Union level; if they are used, the Union’s democratic 
legitimisation may become stronger.  
With new tasks to undertake and new public spaces for political 
debate at a transnational level – that of democracy “beyond States”, to 
quote Lord & Harris (2006) – the politicisation of the Union’s institutions 
seems bound to take up greater scope. The process will however need to 
take into account the specificities of European construction, where many 
authorities have been established to guarantee the impartial 
implementation of common rules: in order to survive, there is a need to 
preserve the areas of impartiality, free of partisan political influences.  
4.  Conclusions 
The European Union is not a state, so comparisons with state-type models 
of democratic legitimisation may well prove misleading. Nor is the 
discussion about intervening ex novo to introduce democratic accountability 
within an organisation which did not previously know it. The first direct 
election to the European Parliament took place close to 30 years ago; since 
then, the Union’s institutional system has continued to evolve, establishing 
in the process significant areas for democratic participation and control. 
Once the Union is recognised for what it is – an innovative polity, 
where power is shared by a large number of players, with many 
mechanisms for participation and wielding influence, constantly adapting 
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apparent that on the whole it complies with democratic legitimisation 
standards no worse than do member states (Mény, 2002), even if multiple, 
and potentially conflicting legitimisation channels and principles may 
confuse observers. 
In the end, the Union will be strong in the eyes of public opinion and 
member states alike if it manages to come up with solutions to the 
challenges of globalisation, external and internal security, energy and the 
environment. In this respect, there is no reason why the difficulties 
encountered over the last decade should last, to the extent that they were a 
systemic consequence of poor Union functioning. On the contrary, we are 
perhaps reaching the end of a long and painful adjustment process to an 
exceptional series of real and financial shocks, generated by the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. Time will no doubt tell. 
For the time being, what saliently needs to be kept in mind is that the 
member states and EU citizens, however mangled by crises and difficulties, 
continue to turn to the Union when seeking solutions to problems that 
cannot be solved nationally, and that there is an extraordinary proliferation 
of subjects and channels providing participation in European debates and 
decisions, in new and ever-changing ways. 
Of course, this continuous adaptation process has not been without 
consequences for institutional balance. The founding fathers’ initial idea of 
a supranational polity has been scaled down to accommodate a more 
realistic view of power attribution and sharing. With the extension of the 
Union’s scope, and its increasing politicisation, the weight of the Council 
and the Parliament in decision-making has increased; the Commission has 
strengthened its technical prerogatives in matters of treaty implementation 
and enforcement, while its right of initiative has been curtailed.  
Through this continuous adjustment process, the Union has 
continued to design new legitimisation solutions for multi-level and 
transnational political structures, which may well represent the future of 
democracy in a world of increasingly integrated manifold communities.  
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13. TRAIL-BLAZING DEVELOPMENTS IN 
JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 
GIACINTO DELLA CANANEA* 
ver since the collapse of the Soviet system, capitalist market 
economies have prevailed worldwide, based on economic 
institutions such as prices, markets and businesses. However, market 
economies require a number of corresponding legal tools, such as property, 
contracts and judicial protection of rights. They also require ‘public goods’, 
such as security and public order, defence and civil protection, which 
public institutions are expected to deliver.1 The importance of such goods 
has become even more evident during the last 10 years, due to the growing 
awareness that individuals and groups may jeopardise the ability of states 
to produce and provide those ‘goods’ that are essential to an ordered 
society. In order to preserve this ultimate value – a legally unchallengeable 
goal,2 regardless of the modalities of its achievement – a dual line of 
analysis must be developed, by identifying the terms of the problem and 
specifying the constructs required to work out a solution. The first of these 
lines is not addressed fully in this paper. Rather, the paper focuses on the 
achievements at the level of the European Union and on their future 
                                                      
* The author expresses his thanks to Sabino Cassese, Stefano Micossi and Gian 
Luigi Tosato for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 
1 The term ‘public institutions’ is used here in the broad sense, including both 
supranational agencies and sub-state-level authorities, such as territorial bodies 
(regions) as well as legal entities that are formally private but that exercise public 
functions.  
2 According to Ziller (2007, p. 55), “research to date shows that citizens of all 
Member States expect the Union to provide protection in those fields that are of 
direct relevance to their everyday lives”, as is the case with justice and home 
affairs. 
E TRAIL-BLAZING DEVELOPMENTS IN JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS | 237 
 
prospects. It briefly describes less recent developments, in order to 
concentrate on the more recent.  
1.  The problem: Losing control over territory and individuals  
The starting point is that the authority once exercised by the institutions 
that are used by states to exercise authority over territory and people has 
been undermined and eroded, even where state organisation is efficient. 
There is not a single cause for this, but, rather a plurality of causes, which 
often interact with one another.3 
Territorially defined jurisdiction. Criminal organisations increasingly 
operate transnationally. Criminals, goods (drugs, weapons, hazardous 
waste) and the proceeds of illegal activities move around the world 
unhindered, including among European countries whose borders are 
‘porous’. A further impact derives from the gradual increase – brought 
about by conflict and famine – in the number of immigrants who attempt to 
‘illegally’ enter EU member states. Public institutions thus find it 
increasingly difficult to prohibit specific deeds or activities, even when they 
resort, under extreme circumstances, to the use of force.4 Meanwhile, 
various groups (separatists, terrorists, religious fanatics) are mounting 
deliberate attacks on collective security. Thanks to modern technology, the 
availability of funding and easy access to military weapons, these groups 
are now in a position to inflict unprecedented damage on property, persons 
and law-abiding society. They are challenging the ability of specialised 
agencies to exercise functions of intelligence-gathering and policing, as 
territorial separation constrains what these agencies may do.  
Failures in information-gathering. The responsiveness of state 
bureaucracy is not only constrained by national borders. The information 
available to such bodies is also limited and its processing is costly. It is 
therefore partial, at times distorted and often obsolete. When 
administrations in charge of intelligence-gathering or policing are poorly, 
                                                      
3 The issues covered here have been the focus of much work. For a global view, see 
Peers (2008). 
4 In the sense that the hallmark of the state – according to Max Weber’s well-known 
analysis – is its monopoly over the legitimate use of force, as opposed to the use of 
force per se (see Giannini, 1990, p. 224). 238 | GIACINTO DELLA CANANEA 
 
insufficiently or belatedly informed, decision-making is inevitably affected 
by these shortcomings. Expected outcomes cannot be delivered.  
Discrepancies in focus and organisation. In addition to often not being in 
a position to fully exercise control over their territory and not having access 
to adequate information, state bureaucracies follow different approaches. 
Such differences to a large extent reflect political ideas, but depend also on 
national administrative styles. Consider, for example, the plurality of police 
force structures, as one finds in Italy.5 Such asymmetries risk further 
eroding the ability of states to achieve territorial control. For example, if 
Spanish police forces go so far as to use extreme force in refusing entry to 
illegal migrants, while Italy and Greece let them in, this may be viewed as 
an incentive by migrants. 
Insufficient cooperation. Although the need for more stable and prompt 
cooperation is now broadly acknowledged, many obstacles remain. 
Language is one, especially if vehicular languages, such as English, are not 
yet diffuse even between senior officers. Technology is another obstacle. 
Not only assuming information is not an easy task, but it may prove 
difficult to interpret it properly, especially if different technologies are in 
use. Last but not least, all state bodies are generally reluctant to accept 
external constraints, to coordinate the work they do in various areas with 
that of similar bodies in other countries, to take joint decisions. This is 
hardly surprising, however, when considering that only at the end of the 
first quarter of the 20th century did the United States set up a Federal 
Bureau to fight against crime.  
These inadequacies lead to inefficiencies in the use of the inevitably 
scarce resources that states can muster in order to ensure the rule of law 
and protect the interests of the community they represent. Not only does 
this prevent the development of joint strategies, but it can even lead to the 
misuse of state powers. Moreover, often it is hard for them to reconcile 
security with safeguarding liberties and rights.  
2.  The European rescue of police powers? 
In order to reduce the asymmetry vis-à-vis individuals and groups, the 
states cooperate in many forms. Governments and administrations 
                                                      
5 For more on these discrepancies, see Cassese (1997). TRAIL-BLAZING DEVELOPMENTS IN JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS | 239 
 
increasingly engage in the exchange of information and assistance beyond 
what is required by their respective legislation, for example in the fight 
against terrorism. Sometimes, even the courts affirm their jurisdiction over 
events that have occurred elsewhere. The rulings of the British House of 
Lords, in a matter initiated by a Spanish magistrate regarding former 
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, are only the best-known illustration of 
this development.6 As far as the European arena is concerned, cooperation 
with regard to public order has taken on a variety of different forms that 
ultimately can be traced back to three paradigms. These paradigms are not 
logically linked to one another, nor are they sequentially connected, in the 
sense that one follows or is replaced by another. Rather, they have co-
existed and to a considerable extent still do. The three are straight vanilla 
intergovernmental or ‘voluntary’ cooperation with or without multilateral 
agreements, cooperation among all EU member states and enhanced 
cooperation among some of the latter.  
Up until the mid-1980s, intergovernmental cooperation took place 
entirely outside Community provisions. It covered a variety of different 
subjects: initially immigration and asylum rights, then terrorism and the 
fight against transnational crime. Cooperation implied adopting legally 
binding agreements or significant – albeit non-binding – texts such as 
conventions and recommendations. It also meant developing information 
exchange, and setting up structured counterpart panels of national experts. 
Other changes occurred during the years 1985-86. First, the European 
Single Act strengthened the constitutional status of individuals’ freedom of 
movement whilst codifying the widening of the competences of the 
European Community. Second, the Schengen Agreement was enacted by a 
few countries (five of the six founding countries, with the initial exception 
of Italy). It aimed at eliminating internal border controls and strengthening 
controls at the external border level. The agreement was subsequently 
extended to other countries several years later, when they adapted their 
administrative systems. Eventually, the Community itself extended the 
scope of its own jurisdiction with a view to include this agreement within 
its institutional framework.  
                                                      
6 See Volcansek & Stack (2005) and Bianchi & Naqvi (2004). See also Slaughter 
(2005) for the thesis that the global interaction between judges and administrators 
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Ever since 1992, EU member states have been actively involved in the 
establishment of the Freedom, Security and Justice Area provided for by 
Article 2 of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU). As a result, the treaty covers a 
broad range of fields, including asylum and immigration policies, 
combating drug addiction and customs and police cooperation,7 which 
regard the compétences régaliennes, a domain that states jealously retain. This 
explains the specificities of the action of the Union. First, its functions are 
carried out in a partially distinct legal and political environment, as it 
emerges by the ‘third pillar’ metaphor (the second being that of foreign and 
security policy). Second, decision-making procedures are based on 
unanimity, instead of majority-voting. Third, and also its final outcome, 
namely the acts differ from those of the EC, including common positions, 
conventions and other documents. Fourth, it was found that genuinely 
supranational institutions, such as the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice, enjoy only a marginal role.8 
3.  An area of freedom, security and justice 
At the end of the 20th century, a further constitutional change was 
introduced through the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). Various fields or sub-
fields were shifted from the third to the first pillar: policing of external 
borders, asylum and immigration and judicial cooperation in civil cases, 
which is the focus of a recently adopted convention involving third-party 
countries such as Switzerland. For other fields, the role of the Community 
has been specified (Article 29 of the TEU).9 The salient change is that public 
functions in the field of justice and home affairs are legally and not only 
politically determined by the goals and rules established by the European 
Union.10 This does not mean, however, that the states concerned have 
renounced pursuing their own active policies in these fields. Rather, it 
implies that national authorities have to abide by common rules and 
decisions. Closer cooperation is thus made possible not only by the sounder 
                                                      
7 See Monar (2003, p. 497) and also Delmas-Marty (1996). 
8 See Tosato (2000, p. 331). 
9 See Adam (1999, p. 225) and Alvarez (2005, p. 27).  
10 Drawing a line between the ‘territory’ concept (once considered an essential tenet 
of the state, on par with the ‘people’ and ‘sovereignty’) and that of ‘area’ is 
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legal basis provided by the treaty, but also by the definition of new 
categories of legally binding acts. For example, framework decisions are 
binding as to their goal, as are directives, but with no direct effectiveness. 
These new instruments, together with ‘Decisions’, supplement common 
positions and conventions, the adoption of which is recommended to 
member states. The latter may enter into force in the adopting member 
states, unless otherwise specified, once at least half of all member states 
have indeed adopted them. No attempt has been made even partially to 
unify national legal systems: constitutional traditions proved far too 
different for that to be contemplated (the centrality of trial by jury in 
common law countries is but one of the most evident examples). If 
anything, this may emphasise the need for some measure of convergence 
among national parliaments, through the removal of structural obstacles.  
Further progress has been made in recent years.11 As regards 
organisational issues, several steps have been taken to strengthen the action 
of Europol, an agency set up in 1995 with a view to coordinating the 
operations of national administrations. The head of Europol is now 
authorised to enter into external agreements. A European judicial network 
has been put into place12 – and acknowledged by the 2001 Nice Treaty – 
which has Eurojust at its centre. New networks have thus been added to 
pre-existing Community and national structures. At the same time, the 
principle of information availability has been stressed. This means that the 
information available to specific bodies in a given state must be provided to 
counterpart bodies in other states. A further requirement has been added: 
to the extent possible, information thus exchanged must be sent using 
modern technology. Even more important from a legal standpoint has been 
the replacement of traditional extradition procedures with the European 
                                                      
11 This has been acknowledged, albeit critically, in a European Parliament 
Resolution on “Progress made by the EU in creating an area of freedom, security 
and justice”, adopted 30 November 2006.  
12 Joint action No. 98/241/GAI. The Justice Ministries are clearly involved in a 
number of different cooperative projects, as evidenced by the fact that  they 
participate in meetings of the following groups and committees: a) committee on 
Article 36, b) multidisciplinary group (justice and home affairs) on organised 
crime, c) horizontal group on narcotics, d) group on cooperation in criminal law 
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Arrest Warrant (EAW).13 This is a streamlined procedure that the judiciary 
may use to obtain the handing over of convicts or suspects. For a number of 
explicitly listed crimes, this handing over is possible regardless of dual 
criminality considerations, provided that the maximum sentence to be 
incurred is at least three years. Thus, not only has cooperation between the 
states extended to the power to punish, but their legal systems now 
increasingly practice mutual recognition (as reiterated in TEC Articles 61 
and 61 C, as modified by Treaty of Lisbon (hereafter, ToL) Article 64).  
This approach, initially used to build the single market, presupposes 
and strengthens principles that are part of a shared constitutional heritage. 
At the very core of this heritage lies the principle of the legality of crimes 
and punishment. Interpreted in the light of mutual recognition, it allows 
for exceptions to the dual criminality rule. The basic assumption is that the 
high degree of confidence established among public institutions is such that 
the criminal law of any given country is deemed to constitute a valid legal 
basis for the exercise of legal proceedings in another. A second shared 
principle is that of equality and non-discrimination. This is safeguarded by 
the list of crimes published in the Framework Decision, which ensures legal 
certainty, at least to a certain extent. It does not, however, rule out there 
being different implementations in different countries. On the other hand, 
the Framework Decision admittedly does not aim to harmonise substantive 
criminal law in member states.14 A third principle, which is usually referred 
to as ne bis in idem, prevents the possibility of sentencing someone twice for 
the same crime. According to the European Court of Justice, the rationale 
for this stems from the need to avoid having the same individuals taken to 
court for the same sets of facts in more than one member state, as this 
would impose an excessive limitation on their freedom of movement. Thus 
                                                      
13 Framework Decision No. 20027584/GAI, of 13 June 2002. The uniform 
implementation of the framework decision was called into question following a 
ruling handed down by the German Constitutional Court in the Darkanzali case, 
which partially voided the national implementing regulation, stating that it 
conflicted with constitutional principles of the rule of law. Cases concerning 
Belgian and Polish constitutional courts are reviewed in Siegel (2008). 
14 European Court of Justice, 3 May 2007 ruling, Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de 
Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad. The convergence of criminal legislation is 
granted  if necessary under new TEC Article 61, while recourse to legislative 
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defined, the principle applies not only to cases where individuals have 
been deemed not guilty as to substance, but also when the non-guilty 
ruling has been handed down for reasons relating to statutes of 
limitations.15 
4.  From the Laeken Declaration to the Lisbon Treaty 
A further development in the definition of the Union’s new constitutional 
framework was initiated in December 2002, at the European Council 
meeting in Laeken. On this occasion, member states expressed their 
intention to further strengthen their cooperation, including through the 
adoption of new institutional provisions. A revision process of both the 
Treaty of Rome and the Treaty setting up the European Union thus begun 
and gave rise to the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, which 
clarified the functions of the EU, identified new instruments and corrected 
a number of rules relative to decision-making.16 However, the Treaty was 
rejected by some countries (France and the Netherlands, following the 
failure of referendums) and eventually did not enter into force.  
Following further negotiations, some of the more significant 
innovations agreed in 2003 were included in the Treaty entered into in 
Lisbon on 13 December 2007, which modified the constitutional rules of the 
European Union as well as those relative to its functioning. Provisions 
regulating Union jurisdiction in the fields under review have not been 
changed. The legal principles and goals to be pursued by public institutions 
have however been restated, and new principles introduced. All this will be 
considered from two points of view, which aim at identifying the more 
relevant changes introduced and shedding some light on the substantive 
logic that underpins them, respectively.  
The first change concerns the Union’s goals. The new treaty specifies 
that within the area of freedom, security and justice, the freedom of 
movement of persons shall be safeguarded, and the adoption of 
appropriate measures to ensure external border control, asylum, 
immigration, as well as the prevention and combating of crime (TEU 
                                                      
15 European Court of Justice, 28 September 2006 ruling, Case C-467/04, G.F. 
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Article 2, as modified by ToL Article 4), guaranteed. Responsibilities taken 
on vis-à-vis citizens and third-party nationals are significant: the Union is 
“to ensure a high level of security” (TEC Article 61, as modified by ToL 
Article 64). 
The second change derives from the relinquishing of the three-pillar 
approach to the European Union’s powers. This is further demonstrated by 
the fact that legal safeguards are to be provided for in the framework of 
administrative measures taken to prevent or combat terrorism, while 
directives are contemplated to facilitate cooperation between police and 
judicial authorities, in addition to the mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions (TEC Arts. 61 H and 69 A, as modified by ToL Article 64). 
These developments do not imply that the specific features 
mentioned earlier with regard to decision-making procedures do not exist 
anymore. A number of changes to those rules have nevertheless been 
defined. Some are of a very general nature, and focus on the establishment 
of enhanced cooperation (§8). Others are more specific, and can be quite 
relevant: in order to protect the financial interests of the Union, including 
against crime, the Council may adopt regulations on a unanimous basis. In 
the absence of unanimity, however, a group of at least nine member states 
may request that the matter be referred to the European Council. If no 
consensus emerges within four months, and should the nine member states 
wish to proceed with enhanced cooperation, they shall notify Union 
institutions accordingly and “in such a case, the authorisation to proceed 
with enhanced cooperation (…) shall be deemed to be granted” (TEC 
Article 69E). 
The essence of this new legal framework is characterised by two 
features. First, the task to strike an appropriate balance between authority 
and liberties is no longer the exclusive responsibility of the member states. 
It is shared with the EU. Second, however, the new legal framework allows 
national public institutions (governments, administrations, judiciary) to 
operate in a context that is clearly more favourable than that which prevails 
outside the EU. Such a legal framework does not preempt state jurisdiction, 
nor does it erode their legal – or political – responsibilities. In particular, 
coercive powers remain the province of national authorities even though 
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bears the mark of the European Union’s rules and operations.17 In other 
words, this new development has further stressed the fact that the Union 
has taken an increasingly administrative turn, and that progress has been 
far less marked in terms of political consolidation. Time will tell whether 
one dimension can develop independently of the other and if so, to what 
extent.  
5.  Issues of efficiency and safeguards 
After this cursory review of the new legal framework, two different sets of 
questions may be considered. The first is whether interactions between new 
and old holders of authority, i.e. the European Union and its member 
states, are likely to offset the asymmetry that leaves private players in a 
disadvantageous situation, in particular transnational organised crime. 
Clearly, the ability to exercise control over private players cannot be 
assessed solely as a zero-sum game between public institutions. It may be 
more than that, or less. The issue, however, is whether cooperation within 
the EU limits the undermining of state bodies’ powers. This issue must be 
reviewed separately from another, which is more frequently addressed in 
government studies. Improving the ability of government officials and 
government bodies and departments to reach and implement decisions 
beyond national borders may lead to a gradual qualitative and quantitative 
drop in the safeguards provided by public legislation.18 There are different 
views as to the scope for strengthening such safeguards within states, as 
opposed to rebuilding them within European law. However, one point 
should be absolutely clear: not only are safeguards needed as regards the 
exercise of such powers, but also adequate forms of accountability, 
according to the principles of constitutional government.  
On the first of these levels of analysis, that of public decision-making 
and implementation effectiveness, there are several obstacles. The very fact 
that decisions have to be reached with several member state governments 
implicitly entails a number of heavy burdens, which add on to the specific 
constraints and limitations that justice and home affairs departments have 
to contend with, and that have no EU equivalent. The Commission’s ability 
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to take initiative, to set the agenda of the EU or to mediate between specific 
interest groups and governments is far less developed than that of states. 
As regards international agreements, for instance, it can at best support the 
Presidency in the launching of negotiations.  
Furthermore, the fact that the Community has not one, but a number 
of different decision modes (different types of majority, unanimity, 
consensus) ensures the prevalence of dialectics, and can be construed as 
positing efficiency in their use. Justice and home affairs decisions, however, 
remain bound by rules of unanimity. This is not necessarily a bad thing. 
Unanimity requirements may ward off overly hasty decisions that do not 
properly take into account specific interests and circumstances. This may 
lead to trade-offs and the emergence of comprehensive agreements among 
national governments, provided that the Commission acts as an efficient 
and impartial mediator. But unanimity may also jeopardise the adoption of 
indispensable decisions or at the very least, postpone them. A way out 
exist, anyway, with so-called ‘bridge’ provisions allowing for unanimity-
based votes to rule on shifts to majority voting. This has however remained 
largely theoretical. As a result, many of the proposals put forth have 
proved difficult to translate into actual concrete decisions and action.19 
If the Union’s decision-making ability is thus constrained, that of 
individual member states appears even further weakened.20 The accession 
of 14 new member states between 2005 and 2007 has extended freedom of 
movement to their citizens and eliminated internal borders. As always, this 
generates both opportunities and risks. The opportunities resulting from 
this extended freedom of movement can hardly be assessed. Nor is it 
possible to rule out the possibility that risks may yet materialise, in 
particular in the form of increased security gaps. Governments and 
parliaments may thus be tempted to move away from the high ground of 
cooperation or, at the very least, to add new conditions and limitations to 
                                                      
19 On this point, criticism voiced in the European Parliament Resolution on 
“progress made by the EU in creating an area of freedom, security and justice” 
mentioned above, i.e. multiple legal bases, delays in the activation of ‘bridges’, lack 
of genuine democratic controls, has certainly retained its topicality – if one 
disregards some of the democratic deficit rhetoric. 
20 The nature of this paper does not allow me to address the distinctive features of 
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existing cooperation schemes. Clearly, conditions and limitations may be 
imposed by national courts on EU legislation, as happened in the UK 
legislation with respect to the European Arrest Warrant. But this may also 
elicit further reaction from national politicians faced with what they feel is 
undue interference on the part of non-elected magistrates and the 
European law they uphold.  
In the meantime, obstacles continue to preclude the full realisation of 
those ‘values’ on which the European Union is based. At the heart of such 
values lie the preservation of democracy and the rule of law, the protection 
of rights and fundamental freedoms (TEU Article 6). They have a two-fold 
meaning. Insofar as they are absolute prerequisites for Union accession, 
states that do not meet either of these criteria will not become members. 
Moreover, Community institutions are designed to promote and pursue 
these values through their work.21 And yet, from the point of view of 
effectiveness, the relevant Treaty provisions contain a number of enduring 
inadequacies. 
The most salient inadequacy regards mechanisms designed to ensure 
that policy-makers are accountable. National parliaments have very 
different levels of effectiveness in terms of the checks and balances they 
enforce vis-à-vis their individual governments. Moreover, they are ill-
suited structurally to engage in checks or the supervision of decisions 
reached at the European level. This applies particularly to decisions taken 
by majority vote. As regards the European Parliament, it may well have 
general consultative jurisdiction, but this does not adequately offset the 
Council’s right to reach binding decisions.22 
More significant progress has been achieved with regard to judicial 
safeguards. The Court of Justice not only has jurisdiction over compliance 
with Community powers;23 under TEU Article 35, the Court has ‘consistent’ 
                                                      
21 See von Bogdandy (2006). On issues of immigation and asylum, see an 
interesting clarification in Guild & Harlow (2001). 
22 See Satta (2003, p. 254). For a general assessment of the various forms of 
accountability, see Peers (2005, p. 253). 
23 Moreover, the Court has asserted jurisdiction in matters pertaining to 
infringement of Community powers in its 12 May 1998 ruling, Case C-170/96, 
Commission v. Council. It has furthermore ruled that framework decisions are 
binding in its 16 June 2005 ruling, Case C-105/03, Pupino. For a critique of the 
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powers, which include preliminary rulings regarding the validity and 
interpretation of framework decisions, decisions and relevant measures of 
implementation. The exercise of such power is optional, however, and 
subordinate to specific requests expressed by one or several member states. 
Accordingly, a potential wedge has been introduced among legal 
safeguards. The fact that most member states have so far agreed no doubt 
attenuates the problem, but the issue still remains. In addition, the 
jurisdiction of the Court does not include any review of the validity and 
proportionality of the measures taken for purposes of law enforcement and 
domestic security. An equally serious flaw concerns individuals’ and 
groups’ legal standing. In the framework of the EC, though these players 
have a less favourable position than Community institutions or member 
states, they have the right to challenge both decisions that are of direct 
relevance to themselves and regulations that contain concealed decisions. 
By contrast, in the field of justice and home affairs, a similar right does not 
exist.24 For those who hold that legal remedies are by far more significant 
than solemn declarations of rights, since the former ensure the effectiveness 
of the latter, this shortcoming is more serious than the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ lack of binding legal effects, let alone the fact that 
access to justice is included by the ECJ within the general principles of 
Community law that it draws from member states’ shared constitutional 
traditions, as well as from the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
question thus arises whether EU courts are ready to show that they are 
aware of the need to uphold such principles even when law enforcement 
and collective security interests are at stake. While the first decisions taken 
by the lower court with regard to anti-terrorism measures raised serious 
concern, the ECJ has argued that the noyeau dur of fundamental rights must 
be protected even in such cases.25 
                                                                                                                                       
allegedly inadequate innovations introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (“a 
missed opportunity”), see Guild & Peers (2001, p. 284). 
24 Court of First Instance, Case T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedins du peuple de 
l’Iran v. Council. 
25 See CFI, Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council of Ministers and Commission and ECJ, 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05, with comment by della Cananea (2009, p. 
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6.  Future Prospects: ‘Choral’ cooperation and trail-blazing 
initiative 
The observations made thus far imply that inadequacies remain not only 
regarding specific checks and balances, but also with regard to the general 
structure of the system as well. Such inadequacies concern the ability to 
choose, decide and act, as well as the corresponding safeguards. Defining 
the way forward on the basis of this analysis, however, is not obvious. 
There may be some consensus among institutional and academic circles 
regarding the very existence of such inadequacies, but the way in which 
they might possibly be remedied elicits dissent. At the cost of somewhat 
oversimplifying the issue, two opposite positions may be identified.  
The first of these positions coincides with the ‘official’ stance taken by 
the Union, as evidenced in particular by political documents produced by 
the Commission and the Parliament. Moving towards a more united 
Europe is a wish solemnly underscored by all national policy-makers, even 
regarding the two major areas where intergovernmental cooperation has 
prevailed over the so-called ‘Community method’. In fact, member states 
often do not follow traditional avenues. They have often opted for specific 
solutions, but this has not appeared to alter the basic political choice (and 
the underlying mutual trust) of European leaders to proceed together 
towards a closer Union. Removing obstacles to trade and competition 
seems to have yielded, over the 50 years spanning the shift from ‘common’ 
to ‘single’ market, considerable benefits in terms of efficient resource 
allocation. Centralised currency management has further contributed to 
guaranteeing stability and protecting European economies from the 
turmoil of this last decade, despite the severity of the last financial crisis. 
According to this line of reasoning, choosing to move together towards 
ever-closer ties is by far the best way forward. Otherwise, further benefits 
of cooperation among member states may be at risk. Even current benefits 
could be jeopardised, should institutional issues become increasingly 
complex, unity increasingly frail and the public’s understanding of these 
issues ever dimmer. 
The opposite position underscores the advantages of differentiation – 
strengthened cooperation and avant-garde initiative.26 The basic assumption 
                                                      
26 For an analysis of enhanced cooperation, see Ehlermann (1997, pp. 51-90). An 
updated analysis of the logic of differentiated integration is to be found in Klliker 
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is that the institutional structure of the European Union may be singularly 
complex, and its processes at times lacking in transparency. However, 
nation states, simpler in their uniformity and centralisation, are not an 
adequate source of benchmarks. Empirical analysis provides some 
evidence. Consider Economic and Monetary Union. Economic theory does 
not single out unassailable potential pros and cons. Implications for 
national interests are perceived in different ways not only by national 
governments, but by public opinion as well. Choosing to differentiate 
accession paces and modalities has thus helped some countries improve 
their position, while others were granted the right to wait for better 
conditions or circumstances. Further proof of the value of this method is 
provided by the Schengen Treaty. Initially entered into by five member 
states, and thus positioned outside the purview of the European 
Community, the Treaty was later signed on to by other countries. It does 
not rule out exemptions, in special circumstances. Yet further proof is 
provided – should any be required – by the Prüm Treaty. Entered into on 
27 May 2005 by five of the six founding member states, Austria and Spain, 
the instrument remains open to general accession. It aims at enhancing 
trans-border cooperation, to fight against terrorism, organised crime and 
illegal immigration. It permits a level of cooperation unthinkable until few 
years ago, including organising and exchanging information on DNA, 
fingerprints, introducing air-marshals and repatriating illegal immigrants. 
Cooperation between and among trail-blazing countries thus allows public 
authorities to take steps that are more effective. They can use confidential 
information, gradually made available to all those concerned, on the basis 
of bilateral relationships.27 
Such positions should not, however, be regarded as conflicting, but as 
complementary. The complementarity stems, first, from the fact that the 
political and institutional paradigm of Europe cannot be the same as had 
been designed initially, under very different circumstances. So many 
sudden and unexpected events occurred: the collapse of the Communist 
                                                                                                                                       
(2005). New rules applicable to enhanced or strengthened cooperation can now be 
found in TEC Section III, as modified by ToL Articles 277 and 278. 
27 See Brady (2005). There are further references to conventions entered into by 
member states in the field of judicial cooperation and law enforcement in Amato 
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bloc, growing domestic opposition in Islamic countries, the proliferation of 
international terrorism. The initial framework must in addition be adapted 
to the changing nature of a polity that was adequate for the six founding 
countries, but already proved inadequate in 1995. It is still more inadequate 
after the last enlargement, including countries that are both different from 
one another and especially with regard to the founding member states. 
Believing that all Western European countries would immediately agree to 
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman’s project28 was not a realistic 
proposal in 1952. Expecting all 27 member states to always agree on 
essential policy choices is not realistic today. Conversely, should a limited 
number of countries engage in various forms of innovation, they may hit 
upon different solutions and develop closer, albeit non-exclusive ties. There 
appear to be no legal or political obstacles thereto, insofar as basic 
government principles (such as the separation of powers or unitary 
administrative organisation) devised for states at the acme of their 
development do not apply to the European Union. Lawyers and political 
scientist are aware that the Schengen Treaty experience shows that states 
may embark on the high road of integration together, and yet do so at 
different paces and according to different modalities.29 This line of 
reasoning can be taken one step further still, so as to assert that a number of 
valid reasons, both ideal and pragmatic, today call for a parallel deepening 
of Community method-based integration and consistent trail-blazing 
developments in justice and home affairs cooperation. Though one should 
not rule out, for that matter, the activation of decision-making processes 
deriving from the Community’s traditional method. 
7.  Implications for checks and balances 
The above-mentioned way forward – a combination of united progress and 
initiative by an avant-garde – has several implications, some of which 
                                                      
28 See Monnet (1976). 
29 Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland do not fully take part in a set of 
decisions concerning justice and home affairs, or they take part under specific 
circumstances. Thus the United Kingdom and Ireland are not party to Schengen 
provisions relative to the freedom of movement of persons, external border 
controls and visa policy. At the Council level therefore, representatives of these 
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require proper clarification. These relate both to safeguards, and to that 
other area of intergovernmental cooperation, i.e. the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy.  
What is required is both discretion and flexibility. Discretionary 
powers are necessary to assess the solutions best suited to preserve 
collective interests in the fields of enforcement and security. Flexibility is 
necessary in the selection of legal instruments and effects. Historically and 
logically, discretion and flexibility first appeared in the framework of 
states’ public order functions for at least two reasons. The first of these is 
functional by nature. Preventing and punishing forms of behaviour that are 
a threat to collective interests assumes the ability to adapt and respond to 
trends and events that are only partly foreseeable and unlikely to fit into 
preordained models. The second reason is perhaps more important, from 
the point of view of the institutional framework. It has to do with 
jurisdiction and authority among the higher echelons of executive power, 
the exercise of which has to be contained by a number of specific doctrines, 
limits and controls. 
The need for these checks and balances is particularly keen regarding 
interstate activities. The establishment of organisational and procedural 
agreements to acquire, process and share confidential information, 
regarding the more sensitive data available, can prove risky both to those 
receiving this information and to national governments, for reasons of 
comprehensive transparency. Developing special relationships among and 
between public administrations, beyond the scope of regular diplomacy, 
will strengthen government over parliament. New legal instruments such 
as the European Arrest Warrant undermine the traditional safeguards 
provided by ad hoc procedures devised to check that requirements for 
extradition are indeed met.  
The range of institutional safeguards must therefore be extended in 
different ways. Should the British approach based on administrative and 
judiciary remedies (ombudsmen, tribunals and boards) prove overly 
informal – and the French, grounded in the assertion of Treaty-enshrined 
rights, overly formal – a median solution could usefully be sought out in 
two ways: through explicit reference to the European Convention of 
Human Rights, which is what Article 6 of the Treaty of Lisbon does. A 
further positive innovation would be a clear mandate to the Court of Justice 
to assess on a case-by-case basis the balance of interests thus achieved 
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Court of Human Rights. This would both allow for rigor in terms of general 
principles, because of the reference to the norms of the ECHR, and provide 
flexibility. Additional and supplementary steps would then to be adopted, 
in particular regarding compensation to be provided to individuals and 
associations, not to mention the possibility of voiding legal instruments 
that have entailed said compensation claims.30 
Although this would increase the level of safeguards provided to 
individuals and groups, one must not forget the more general requirement 
of reconciling flexibility and discretion on the one hand, and transparency 
on the other. Transparency or rather disclosure per se is positive and 
therefore cannot be renounced. It is the distinguishing feature of 
democratic, as opposed to authoritarian regimes.31 It supports and lends 
legitimacy to flexibility and discretion. For functional reasons, it is not 
possible to exclude that public policy implementation, especially regarding 
home affairs, may have its times of opaqueness. However, should this 
prove persistent and prevalent, in the long run, public policy 
implementation would lose its very rationale. Clearly, disclosure is not 
tantamount to adherence to strict, predetermined rules. But it must at the 
very least mean that policy guidelines and concrete measures are subject to 
ex post checks, on the basis of unambiguous criteria. This is the prerequisite 
of accountability.  
8.  Implications for the Union’s Foreign Policy  
Strengthening cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, even 
through avant-garde initiatives, also has implications for the Union’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
The global dimension of issues arising in the field of enforcement and 
security requires that parallel strengthening be undertaken in the external 
dimension of the European Union. This can be achieved through both 
informal and formal agreements through special agreements with third-
party countries, as with the United States in the weeks that followed the 11 
September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. Much has already 
been achieved, but much remains to be done in this field, including with 
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other NATO member states, and in particular with Turkey (this might, 
incidentally, help develop cooperation with a view to possible accession). 
At the same time, the Union can, and probably should, exercise jurisdiction 
by promoting agreements with other third-party countries as well as with 
intergovernmental bodies,32 within which the common position of member 
states would be defined, as specified in TEU Article 37 (former Article K.9).  
Thanks to the Amsterdam Treaty, there are no doubts as to the ability 
of member states to enter into such agreements under the Third Pillar. The 
issue is rather whether all member states are automatically bound by such 
agreements. One possibility could usefully be explored and expounded 
upon by other fora: it involves the opting-out provision of which member 
states may avail themselves for specific reasons linked to their Constitution 
(TEU Article 24, former Article J.14), when specific agreements are entered 
into. This allows for agreements with differential implementation and for 
developments in line with a mix of united progress and trail-blazing 
initiative. One may therefore assume that countries agreeing to cooperate 
more closely in order to exercise public order functions will also enter into 
agreements with third-party countries. Obviously, customary validity 
requirements will need to be met: non-interference with the interests and 
functions of the Community, compliance with the general principles of 
Community law, opening of accession procedures to all member states 
with the political will to do so, provided they meet the requisite criteria and 
preconditions specified by contracting parties.  
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14. THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC LIFE OF THE UNION 
ANDREA MANZELLA 
1.  The democratic principles of the Union and national 
parliaments within the European parliamentary system 
The role of national parliaments in the ‘proper functioning’ of the Union is 
considered in the new Treaty of Lisbon as an informing principle of 
European democracy. Together with the principles of democratic equality 
(the ‘equal attention’ shown to all citizens by Union institutions), 
representative democracy (the ‘direct representation’ of citizens in the 
European Parliament) and participative democracy (legislative initiative, 
consultation, citizens’ dialogue with the Union’s institutions), we now have 
this principle of national parliamentary democracy, which is generally 
anchored to the guiding concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality, and 
more specifically linked to a variety of co-decision procedures regarding 
the area of freedom, security and justice, constitutional revision and new 
member state accession. 
Deciding to give national parliaments a direct role (without 
government intermediation), which is listed among the fundamental 
principles of European Union action, meets a political requirement. 
Opposition to the Union’s oft-mentioned ‘democratic deficit’ did in fact 
reach its acme with the French and Dutch referenda. A visible and popular 
way of increasing the European constitution’s ‘democraticity rate’ 
somehow had to be devised. Granting more power to national parliaments 
was the easiest way forward, for a double, reassuring reason.  
First of all, this helped convey the message that the ‘distant 
constitution’ (a symbol, however, of countless perils such as the 
dismantlement of the welfare state, the free circulation of out-of-control 
migration, industrial relocation...) was being subjected to the supervision of 
age-old, familiar national parliaments. Secondly, this helped reduce, 258 | ANDREA MANZELLA 
 
through ‘parliamentarisation’, the scope of ‘handed-down’ institutional 
innovation and its constitutional features, in an attempt to avoid further 
recourse to referendum-based adventures (always dangerous when 
ratification of international treaties is at stake;  it is no accident that this is 
an area non-eligible for referendum in Italy’s 1948 Constitution).    
The anti-referendum function was the dominant reason 
underpinning the Union’s decision. The “no” of French and Dutch voters 
had in fact first and foremost been a disavowal of national governments 
and parliaments – who favoured, by an overwhelming majority, the 
Constitutional Treaty. A further refusal by referendum therefore risked 
challenging the very representativeness of national governments and 
parliaments. In other words, by taking on a direct safeguard role in the 
EU’s decision-making mechanisms, the latter were in the end protecting 
themselves against a domino effect of de-legitimisation.  
These substantial political reasons are however not equally valid in 
institutional terms, insofar as the powers granted to national parliaments 
can actually produce a blocking effect in the EU’s already laborious 
decision-making process.  
The new role given to national parliaments in the Union has in fact 
two different dimensions corresponding to two different – actually, 
opposite – views of democracy in Europe. It therefore all depends on 
whether the Union’s ‘democracy’ is to be measured by the yardstick of 
systematic connections between various democratic legitimacies 
(governments, the European parliament, national parliaments) taking part 
in Union decisions, or conversely by a parameter linked to old strictly 
national decision-making powers conferred to national parliaments on 
community issues, or to pre-federal concepts (direct election of the 
President of the European Commission, transnational lists for the European 
parliament, European referendums...). As the old convergence-of-extremes 
rule would have it, these two opposite concepts have in fact both 
contributed to the birth and growth of the democratic deficit myth: which 
clearly appears impossible to correct if one reasons in terms of such 
parameters, and not in terms of European Union history and institutional 
status.  
Regarding the first aspect, the role of national parliaments takes on 
three different modalities, concerning: 
a)  the powers granted to national parliaments in specific procedures. 
The principal innovation consists of the right to take part in the THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC LIFE OF THE UNION | 259 
 
‘conventions’ for Treaty revisions. Of higher strategic significance 
because of their impact on the ‘ordinary’ integration motors appear 
the powers of national parliaments related to the flexibility provisions 
inserted into the Treaty: the bridging clauses leading to simplified 
revision and voting procedures (Article 48 of TEU) and the 
“historical” clause permitting an extension of the Union powers 
(Article 352 TFEU); 
b)  the right of national parliaments to receive Community information 
directly; and 
c)  their right to exercise advisory and policy orientation functions either 
through COSAC, the body bringing together the national parliament 
committees dealing with Union policies, or more importantly 
through ‘effective’ and ‘regular’ inter-parliamentary cooperation 
involving national parliaments and the European Parliament. 
As to point a) above, the German Constitutional Court has evidenced, 
by means of  its recent decision of 30 June 2009, how the involvement of 
national powers may significantly aggravate the European integration 
process in its entirety. The Court has confirmed the openness to Europe of 
the German constitution and what may be described as the ‘communicating 
vases’ theory (the powers taken out of national parliaments can be 
compensated by those vested in the European Parliament). Nevertheless, 
the stringent request for prior approval of the German parliament will 
cause an ‘indirect’ rigidity of European decisions on numerous areas. 
As to points b) and c) above, these are powers and rights not only 
appropriate to the Union’s multi-tiered constitutional model but actually 
essential to the Union’s proper functioning. Joint and equal institutional 
communication is indeed indispensable in order to give actual substance to 
the interplay between various institutions. Each institution requires 
channels of interference with all the others, as this is how the Union’s 
decision-making process fully and seamlessly acquires legitimacy. 
Likewise, the principle of loyal cooperation among various institutions 
within the system requires visible inter-institution connections and 
interfaces (through ‘inter-parliamentary conferences’, short-hand for which 
could be the ‘COSAC formula’, where special delegations from the 
European Parliament and relevant national parliamentary committees meet 
with a view to expressing a majority opinion on specific topics). On this last 
point, the most significant from the point of view of the system’s 
institutional equilibrium, the new “Protocol on the role of national 260 | ANDREA MANZELLA 
 
parliaments” interestingly includes an indirect broadening of European 
Parliament jurisdiction to issues of “common security and defence 
policies”. Organising inter-parliamentary conferences on such topics with 
the specialized committees of national parliaments actually confers to the 
European Parliament a potential right to scrutinise areas that the treaties 
still consider to be the exclusive prerogative of national parliaments (as 
shown by a later and almost maniacal statement according to which treaty 
provisions regarding CSDP do not prejudice the specific nature of member 
states’ security and defence policies).1  
Setting aside specific problems, the Protocol’s mention of inter-
parliamentary conferences is in line with the interaction required for 
effective cooperation, typical of multi-tier constitutional systems. Clearly 
this multilateral consultative participation in the decision-making process 
is the key to the Union’s democraticity, insofar as it specifies the 
connections of the various democratic legitimacies exercising different 
powers but equally ‘responsible’, through their different investiture 
mechanisms, vis-à-vis Europe’s voter constituency.  
Regarding the second aspect, national parliaments’ role under the 
new Protocol involves procedures regarding the appropriate application of 
the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. These procedures may 
include, depending on the number of national parliaments supporting any 
given initiative, simple checks leading to requests for review (with a 
quorum of one third of national parliaments) of draft legislative acts 
(proposals by the European Commission, initiatives from a group of 
member states, initiatives from the European Parliament, requests from the 
Court of Justice or recommendations of the European Central Bank). But 
they may tantamount to the exercise of an actual veto right, however 
                                                      
1 One should add that if these ‘conferences’ were to be held with the degree of 
regularity generally called for in the Protocol, the survival of the already weakened 
WEU Parliamentary Assembly would become very difficult to justify within the 
general framework of European bodies.  As to the Union itself, providing for 
future “structured cooperation in the field of defence”  raises issues regarding the 
participation of members of the European and national parliaments representing 
member states not party to this cooperation (clearly a sensitive institutional issue 
for all ‘enhanced cooperation’ groups, even if cooperation in the area of common 
defense is only open to states with significant military capacities).   THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC LIFE OF THE UNION | 261 
 
‘concealed’ by a cumbersome procedure (the quorum required then is a 
majority of national parliaments) with respect to draft legislative acts 
subject to the general co-decision rule. The two procedures are obviously 
radically different. While monitoring through requests for review is a 
mechanism perfectly consistent with the Union’s specific multi-tier 
constitutionalism, the same cannot be said of the ‘veto’ powers, which are 
de facto connected to the emergence of a majority among national 
parliaments (that is, to quantitative data, two votes per parliament, no 
weights for national demographics – however relevant they are to the 
Union’s institutional organisation).  
The fact that national parliaments could block a draft legislative act 
being processed according to the regular legislative co-decision rules does 
indeed disrupt the multi-tier constitutional balance. Under an albeit 
complex procedure, concealed behind Community legislation’s coactus 
tamen volui, one of the system’s components has thus been granted an 
improper right to interfere in decision-making. Clearly this interference 
cannot be mistaken for the regular, cooperative version typical of modern 
constitutional systems (national systems included, where under the 
probable influence of EU procedures such ‘federalist’ practices are 
becoming increasingly common). On the contrary, this is a genuine 
invasion of the Union’s decision-making ground, which does indeed upset 
the system’s balance by assigning to national parliaments the (albeit 
indirect) power to paralyse the highly sensitive area of legislative initiative. 
An area where the appreciation of Community-wide public interest and the 
need for Union legislative action can best be grasped by the current 
initiative incumbents (first and foremost the Commission, but also the 
European Parliament, as well as groups of member states who in their 
collegiality do express views that are not strictly nationalistic) – certainly 
more so than by a majority of national parliaments, and their chance 
convergence on a negative blocking stance. One could add to this, as some 
have done, a number of pointed observations on the deficiencies of 
enhanced parliamentarisation as a yardstick for Union democratisation. Or, 
to put it differently, as a means of appraising a system where interest 
representation is organised through checks and balances combining 
legitimacy and efficiency – a model far removed from the parliamentary 
one currently prevalent in Europe.  
One can however object - and this should be borne in mind for any 
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check only applies in areas where the Union does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction, but shares authority with member states. Well, even taking this 
objection on board, it is quite clear that (national) parliamentarisation of 
decision-making in such areas corresponds on the one hand to a hollowing 
out of the Union’s legislative powers – and more specifically of the role 
played by governments within the (European) Council of Ministers – and 
on the other, to the slotting in, albeit with negative powers, of a third 
legislator figure within the EU’s complex institutional balance. The 
resulting imbalance is clear to see, even disregarding the perils of decision-
making paralysis entailed by the new procedure in an already ‘stressed-to-
the-limits’ system (knowing that waning of legitimacy always comes in the 
wake of a loss in efficiency...).  
The procedure moreover does nothing to increase the Union’s 
democraticity rate. National parliaments are already entitled to resort, 
within their national systems, to effective instruments to control and 
possibly block their governments-acting as co-European legislators (think 
of Italy – but not only – where the ‘parliamentary reservation’ argument 
can be used against the government upstream of all European decisions...). 
The procedure clearly impacts the fullness of player legitimization however 
(European Parliament, Council, European Commission) within the regular 
legislative process. In other words, this is a negative sum game especially 
as regards the so-called democratic deficit that it somehow set out to 
correct. 
2.  The political nature of the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles 
The above comments yield an even direr conclusion when one reflects on 
the eminently political nature of the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles. This intrinsic political nature is first of all linked to the 
fundamental role played by the subsidiarity principle in the concrete 
identification of the most appropriate level of government for a given task 
(the bias favouring ‘close to the citizen’ political action is nothing but a very 
general base criterion, always open to waivers for the higher levels of 
government, in order to accommodate requirements of provision scope and 
efficiency). The displacement of decision-making levels is clearly a political 
act per se, and one of the more significant ones.  
This reading is emphasised by the absolutely political criteria that run 
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‘sufficiency’ of member state action, of better achievement by the Union of 
its goals, of decision scale and effects assessment and, as regards the 
proportionality principle (which must however be viewed as an internal 
limitation of the subsidiarity principle, as we shall see later in more detail), 
the requirement that Community action not go “beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives (of this Treaty)”. These are all parameters the legal 
effectiveness of which is deeply dependent on their strictly political 
appreciation.  
One element however provides at least a partial corrective to this 
primacy of the political sphere, namely the jurisdiction given (under 
Protocol Article 8) to the Union’s Court of Justice. The Court shall indeed 
have jurisdiction in actions on grounds of the subsidiarity principle 
infringement brought by member states or transmitted by states on behalf 
of their parliaments. This provision, which should take on a key role in the 
system, calls for at least three comments.  
The first concerns the fact that the Court of Justice (following the 
tested road taken by authoritative constitutional case law at the national 
level) may decide it is the ultimate judge of the appropriateness of levels at 
which decisions are made. Even if the legal system assumes that appeals 
come from below, it is quite obvious that the Court of Justice can provide 
(as in a boomerang effect) legitimisation and consolidation to the Union’s 
decision-making over that of appealing states (and their parliaments).  
The second comment concerns the possible juridification via case law 
of criteria that are per se open to considerable political discretion. The 
Court is indeed the authority that can provide legal meaning to the 
justification requirement (stated in Protocol Article 5) imposed upon those 
bodies entitled to put forth draft legislation. Creative constitutional case 
law is indeed the only way to provide legal certainty and finality to 
requirements to submit “detailed statements”, “qualitative and wherever 
possible, quantitative indicators”, not to mention the taking into account 
“of the need for any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling 
upon various levels of government as well as “economic operators and 
citizens” to be minimized, etc. These requirements, were they to remain 
entrusted to political decision-makers, would lend themselves to very 
volatile and ambiguous application.  
The third comment concerns the peculiarity of a provision – the text 
and context of which are both based on the elimination of member state 
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Justice, that member states are empowered to seek legal remedies (or 
e m p o w e r e d  t o  d o  s o  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h eir parliaments, should parliaments 
take the initiative of an appeal under the subsidiarity principle).  
In other words, it is only on the Court’s very threshold that the 
subsidiarity principle eludes the rules of an entirely political game, with 
decisions taken on the basis of the balance of power struck at a given point 
in time among Union bodies and national parliaments. At the current 
juncture in the ups and downs of European integration the pendulum’s 
swing seems to be favouring, at least at symbolic moments, the granting of 
decision-making powers to national parliaments, including in matters of 
community significance. A provision such as Protocol Article 8, isolated in 
its ‘orthodoxy’, provides a measure of the political and re-nationalisation 
effects inherent in the rest of the mechanism.   
3.  The irresistible political expansion of proportionality control 
National parliament monitoring is exercised solely over draft legislative act 
compliance with the subsidiarity principle (Articles 6 and 7). But all Union 
institutions shall ensure constant respect for the principles of both 
subsidiarity  and proportionality (Article 1). And draft legislative act 
justification concerns both the subsidiarity and the proportionality 
principles (Article 5). That said, both the title and the ‘whereases’ of the 
Protocol speak indifferently, when addressing “application” and its 
monitoring system, of both principles.  
Another very relevant factual clue has to be borne in mind. Namely 
that during the preliminary try-outs of the new monitoring system 
promoted by COSAC, the reasoned opinions of participating national 
parliaments frequently invoked proportionality, as a principle of political 
conditionality applicable to positive assessments of subsidiarity, with quite 
stringent provisions – inspired by national concerns – regarding Union 
action.2  
                                                      
2 Trial subsidiarity and proportionality checks performed under COSAC auspices 
on 17 July 2006 and 31 October 2006 focused on the draft directives regarding 
applicable law and jurisdiction in matrimonial matters, COM(2006) 399, and postal 
services liberalisation COM(2006) 594.Twenty-two national chambers from 17 
member states took part in the first check (on law and jurisdiction in matrimonial 
matters). Almost all, with the exception of the Dutch House of Parliament and the 
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In the face of these formal and substantive elements, one wonders 
whether limiting national parliament monitoring solely to subsidiarity3 is 
really defensible. And whether conversely the ‘release’ provided by 
comments concerning proportionality couldn’t actually be seen as a 
contribution – clearly more political still – to the drafting of legislative acts: 
but without the delays and other problems connected to the exercise of 
subsidiarity checks per se.  
In all fairness one has to bear in mind that the proportionality 
principle plays out in a field that can in no way be reduced to a legal 
dimension, and dealt with solely by the courts. As an internal and 
subsequent criterion for the review of ‘subsidiary’ legitimacy it aims in fact 
to check that the content and form of action do not go “beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives” of the Union. It therefore recalls, in this 
matching of means and end, of power and abuse thereof the basic tenets of 
a rigorous administrative judicial process, per se irreconcilable with the 
‘constitutional’ review of competences, covered by Protocol Article 8 (laden 
as it is with other difficulties, regarding access and reference parameters...).   
That said, practical experimentation in any event suggests the 
advisability of an ‘extensive’ reading of the Protocol: on the one hand, there 
is this rigorous fencing in of legally effective controls (whether ex ante and 
political, or ex post and juridicial) to the sole area of subsidiarity, while on 
the other there is the admissibility, in the absence of any specific legislation, 
of a parliamentary practice of ‘observations’ based on the proportionality 
                                                                                                                                       
Lower House of the Czech Republic, expressed favourable opinions with respect to 
the proportionality principle. The second trial check (on postal services) elicited 
participation by 27 national chambers representing 21 member states. Luxemburg’s 
Chambre des Députés was the only parliament to raise an issue of subsidiarity 
principle breach, while 5 chambers pointed out the inadequacy of the 
Commission’s justifications in this respect. Seven chambers pointed out a breach of 
the proportionality principle and expressed corresponding reservations.  
3 This limitation is the outcome of the reasoned confrontation between 
‘reductionists’ and ‘amplifiers’ that took place within the Giscard d’Estaing 
Convention’s Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity (see, in this 
connection, the Group’s report to the Members of the Convention, CONV 286/02, 
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principle, with an obligation for the institution submitting the draft 
legislation to respond to such observations in its final justification.  
The rationale for this would appear to be the need to avoid having 
national parliaments transform their comments on a given project’s 
‘proportionality’ into observations regarding its ‘subsidiary’ legitimacy, for 
fear the former would not properly be taken into account. The setting up, 
through practice, of a parallel and soft procedure regarding proportionality 
could therefore be an appropriate counter-measure geared to a trend that 
has begun to emerge (as an early warning sign...) in national parliamentary 
practice. This trend is well-known to some aspects of administrative law 
when it comes to fuzzy lines separating excess of power and legality vices.  
4.  The improper interaction of quorums 
The main threat of divergence from the legal paradigm that, through crises 
and standstills, has nevertheless allowed unprecedented inter-state 
integration does not however come from individual national parliaments. 
The new Article in the Treaty on European Union regrouping the 
previously scattered powers bestowed upon national parliaments provides 
them with an enhanced configuration. The powers concerned correspond 
however to areas of community law of intergovernmental relevance and 
national parliament intervention here ‘mirrors’ that of corresponding 
governments.  
This applies in particular to participation in the mechanisms geared 
to assessing Union policy implementation in the area of freedom, security 
and justice, with a view to encouraging the full application of the mutual 
recognition principle. In this same ‘area’ national parliaments are said to be 
“associated” to the monitoring of Europol activities and to the evaluation of 
judicial cooperation activities performed by Eurojust. Similar 
considerations also apply to the normal Treaty revision procedure. In this 
framework each national parliament has the power to ratify or reject. The 
same also applies to national requests of accession to the Union.  
The specificity introduced by the mechanisms signalling subsidiarity 
(or proportionality) infringements – to the breaking point of the system’s 
logic – stems from the collegiality requirement they set for national 
parliament action. The legal effects of compliance checks as performed by 
individual parliaments are in fact dependent on there being a quorum of 
national parliaments. This necessary collegiality has echoes of a yet un-
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European Council of Ministers). And the quorum requirement in an area 
where the political rate is extremely high, as mentioned earlier, is what 
risks upsetting the Union’s unified institutional make-up.  
The concern continues to apply even when the 1/3 of national 
parliament votes quorum4 simply allows for a check resulting in a request 
for review. This may apply to all draft legislative acts (proposed by the 
Commission, the European Parliament, a group of member states, the 
Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the European Investment 
Bank). The concern however takes on far more serious relevance when a 
quorum equal to a majority of national parliaments can ultimately block 
draft legislation, because of the ‘politically’ unstoppable trigger of a simple 
majority of national parliaments deciding to oppose a draft5 under the 
‘regular legislative procedure’ that is, the basic co-decision procedure 
giving the Commission a monopoly over initiative and where the 
‘European legislator’ is made up of the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament.  
If the Commission then upholds its draft, despite a contrary vote by a 
majority of national parliaments, review of the project does get blocked, in 
the case of a procedural – not substantive –vote of 55% of all members of 
the Council of Ministers or a majority of expressed votes in the European 
Parliament. 
Requests for a ‘third Chamber’ made up of national parliamentary 
delegations and designed to be a ‘subsidiarity Chamber” have been 
recurrent in the ongoing controversy over the Union’s democratic deficit. 
They have however run into strong doctrinal and practical objections, as 
reflected in the following passage:  
The setting up of a new institution representing national 
parliaments would not increase the system’s democratic 
legitimacy. On the contrary, it would risk reducing it. This 
“chamber” would indeed be made up of national representatives 
elected by the parliaments of individual Member States. It would 
                                                      
4 Currently at 54 votes: one third therefore equals 18 votes, that are brought down 
to 13, i.e. one quarter if the topic is the area of freedom, security and justice.  
5 In the current 54 vote configuration this majority would be equal to 28 votes, 
corresponding to 14 member states: Protocol provisions make no mention of any 
computation of the corresponding population.  268 | ANDREA MANZELLA 
 
therefore not have a direct popular mandate, as does the European 
Parliament, but some sort of “democratic legitimacy of second 
degree”, as does the Council. This would therefore increase the 
system’s complexity without any real counterpart. Conversely, it 
would almost certainly engage in competition with the European 
Parliament.6 
On the basis of the legitimisation inferred from the new subsidiarity 
monitoring mechanism, the ‘third Chamber’ might thus take on a ‘diffuse’ 
form, its variable geometry changing from time to time, with one quorum 
for review requests, and another for procedural blockage. There actually is 
a forum for the convergence into legal quorums of individual 
parliamentary positions (a forum actually set up to encourage such 
operation). This is the COSAC Secretariat, which despite strong resistance 
on the part of successive Italian delegations in recent years (only initially 
supported by European Parliament delegations) and the objective 
limitations that have thus been brought to bear on both its numbers and its 
functions, nevertheless is a sufficient forum for the bringing together (if not 
the promotion) of the requisite quorums.7  
                                                      
6 See.Verola (2006, pp. 206-207). 
7 See COSAC Rule of Procedure 11bis, in the latest version submitted to the Lisbon 
Conference, 15-16 October 2007: “The COSAC Secretariat shall be composed of 
officials from the Parliaments of the Presidential Troika, and a permanent member 
who supports the Secretariat in its activities. The officials from the Parliaments of 
the Presidential Troika shall be appointed by each of the relevant Parliaments for a 
non-renewable period of eighteen months. The permanent member shall be 
appointed by the COSAC Chairpersons on the proposal of the Presidential Troika. 
He or she shall be an official of a national Parliament and shall remain in office for 
two years with the possibility of one renewal. The COSAC Secretariat shall assist 
the Presidency and the secretariat of the host Parliament in all its tasks. The 
members of the COSAC Secretariat shall perform their duties under the political 
responsibility of the COSAC Presidency and the Presidential Troika or according 
to the decisions taken by COSAC meetings. The permanent member shall 
coordinate the activities of the COSAC Secretariat under the direction of the 
Parliament holding the Presidency. The cost for seconding the permanent member 
of the Secretariat to Brussels and other necessary technical costs of the Secretariat 
are jointly borne by Parliaments wishing to contribute.” (According to the report 
submitted by the Working group on the co-funding of the permanent member of 
the COSAC Secretariat, dated 11 September 2006, there is an agreement providing 
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In this context the issue of whether the mechanism “should be 
activated by subsidiarity challenges to different points in the proposed act, 
or whether a quorum is required on the same point” takes on considerable 
significance8.  
All things considered, subsidiarity checks cannot be equated with 
point checks of draft legislation. Contrary to the proportionality principle, 
which lends itself more readily to point assessments, the subsidiarity 
principle – in this specific case focused on the appropriateness of the 
proposed level of public decision-making – per se only implies a 
comprehensive assessment of finalities. In both letter and spirit, provisions 
relative to subsidiarity checks therefore rule out a blow-by-blow analysis of 
the various provisions making up any draft legislation, unless the process 
is geared to clarifying the goal pursued by the draft.  
All in all, under subsidiarity checks, the assessment parameter – here 
too exquisitely political – lies in the draft legislation justification rather than 
in the rules contained in the draft per se. If anything, the rules serve as 
counter-proof (to strengthen or weaken justifications, depending on 
governments’ likes or dislikes...) for the actual goals pursued. But this is a 
teleological element, to be used in the end to support the decision-maker’s 
legitimate choice. Clearly, a goal-oriented assessment along these lines 
therefore refers to the draft in its entirety, which rules out any point-by-
point analysis. And this provides an argument additional to the one put 
before, regarding the practical usefulness of opening a channel for 
observations relative to proportionality, so as to avoid their ‘emergence’ – 
politically possible, however inappropriate – into the area of subsidiarity.  
                                                                                                                                       
for the co-funding of COSAC administrative expenditure. This includes computers 
and telecommunications, stationery... The European Parliament puts furnished 
premises at COSAC’s disposal, free of charge. It has been agreed that the total 
amount of cost contributions linked to the permanent member should not exceed 
€80,000 a year).  
8 The question appears in the following document: “Il progetto di mandato alla 
Conferenza intergovernativa per la riforma dei Trattati europei”, Italian Senate, 
Relations with the European Union Division, No. 59, 16 July 2007, p. 12. 270 | ANDREA MANZELLA 
 
5.  Conclusions: Early warning for the early warning 
In order to conclude this analysis very briefly, one could say that a breach 
has clearly been opened with the subsidiarity monitoring mechanism, 
which could allow neo-nationalistic positions to erupt both in the Union’s 
values and in its multi-tier constitutional system. This system requires and 
multiplies functional interferences with a consultative purpose, but would 
however rule out any impingement on decision-making powers – whether 
positive or negative – as laid out in the treaties.  
The mechanism introduced is clearly influenced by public opinion 
sentiment assigning to difficult Community-wide decisions – with obvious 
factual misrepresentations – a whole set of political and social problems 
that have almost always been due – in terms of severity – to causes external 
to the Union. The preferred solution has been to address the lingering 
democratic deficit issue not through more mature controls to be exercised 
by national parliaments over governments and by the European Parliament 
over the action of the Union as a whole, but rather through direct national 
parliament activism with respect to community legislative procedures 
In order to restore balance, governments will therefore have to 
exercise ‘control’ over their parliaments, and if necessary, rein them in. This 
shows how choosing the wrong tack to combat the so-called democratic 
deficit can lead to a democratic paradox. If the Union’s institutional balance 
is to be safeguarded, with a view to exorcising the peril of a fragmentation 
of its decision-making processes by national parliaments – of all perils, this 
is certainly the most severe.  
References 
Senato della Repubblica (Italian Senate) (2007), Il progetto di mandato alla 
Conferenza intergovernativa per la riforma dei Trattati europei, Ufficio dei 
rapporti con le istituzioni dell’Unione europea (Relations with the 
European Union Division), No. 59, 16 July, p. 12. 
Verola, N. (2006), L'Europa legittima, Florence: Passigli Editore. 
 | 271 
 
 
15. THE SHAPE OF POST-LISBON EUROPE 
GIAN LUIGI TOSATO 
1.  The new Treaty’s structure 
The Lisbon Treaty’s structure is the result of a compromise between 
opponents and supporters of the previous Constitutional Treaty. Its 
opponents gained the upper hand with regard to form and its supporters 
with regard to content. Formally, what we have is a revision treaty, like 
those of Amsterdam and Nice. It simply modifies existing treaties (the 
Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community), without replacing them; it is, as its official description reads, 
a ‘Reform Treaty’. In substance, the new treaty includes many of the 
innovations of the Constitutional Treaty rejected by the French and Dutch 
referenda. The nature and number of changes are such as to have a 
profound effect on the existing treaties.  
Form and substance do not mesh well in the new treaty in view of the 
clear contrast between container and content. The container, a mere 
amending instrument, seems unsuited to accommodate the content that has 
been poured into it, in view of the scale and significance of the reforms. The 
immediate consequence is that the new treaty is difficult to decipher. The 
document produced is long and complex and requires a labourious 
comparison between the new revision text and the old amended texts, and 
between the latter and a text (the constitutional text) that has formally been 
abandoned. The document’s meaning is all the more difficult to grasp as it 
is supplemented by several additional protocols and declarations intended 
to supplement, clarify and sometimes even depart from the text’s 
provisions. Two significant examples are the goal of free and fair 
competition, initially eliminated from the text, then salvaged in an 
additional protocol; and the primacy of Union law over domestic law, also 
removed initially and later slipped back in through a declaration, which 
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These aspects of the treaty have elicited an avalanche of criticism. 
Initial commentators spoke of its labyrinthine nature, rife with cross-
references and legalisms: just the opposite of the calls contained in the Nice 
and Laeken Declarations on the Future of Europe (in January and 
December 2001). Simplification and transparency, two key words in these 
d o c u m e n t s ,  w e r e  t o  h a v e  b e e n  t h e  guiding principles for the future 
development of European integration. Instead, after a labourious gestation 
of over six years, what has been delivered is a text that is neither simple nor 
transparent and which is certainly difficult to understand for the European 
citizens it was intended for. 
It is hard to deny that this criticism has a point; the new treaty is 
really obscure and tortuous. One should however not dwell only on these 
more visible aspects of the new treaty. The criticism summarised above 
only reflects a first level of analysis. Going beyond the revisional method 
used and looking at the new Treaty not in itself, but rather from the point 
of view of its impact on the existing treaties and the overall architecture of 
the Union, a different picture emerges, which marks substantial progress in 
the areas of simplification and re-organisation of the current system.  
2.  A simplified and re-organised system 
After Lisbon, two founding treaties still remain. But previously, each 
related to a different entity (Union and Community), and a distinct legal 
system (Union law and Community law), not to mention the three pillars 
(two inside the Union and the third represented by the Community). Now, 
despite there still being two treaties, we have a single entity (the Union), 
with a single system and a single set of institutions, where the distinction 
between pillars has been (almost) abolished. This marks the end of the 
absurd dualism between Union and Community produced by the 
Maastricht compromises, the elimination of which was long overdue.  
This represents a significant simplification of the European 
architecture. Of course the approach had already been included in the 
Constitutional Treaty and thus to some extent can be considered as already 
having been accepted. But it is a good t h i n g  f o r  i t  t o  h a v e  b e e n  g i v e n  
further and, one hopes, final endorsement. The Treaty of Lisbon introduces 
another new ingredient in the re-organisation of the system, which goes 
beyond the Constitutional Treaty and holds potential for promising future 
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As just mentioned, despite the fact that there are still two founding 
treaties, they now refer to a single entity. The primary rules of the Union 
are thus distributed between two distinct texts: the Treaty on the Union 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union. And even though it is 
pointed out that both have equal legal value, in fact they differ in terms of 
content and formal legal regime. 
The first treaty contains the principles and fundamental rules of the 
Union; it establishes its goals, values, competences, institutional structure, 
relations with member states and with European citizens and procedures 
for amendment, accession and withdrawal. The second treaty lays down 
the rules under which its various bodies will operate, the way in which the 
domestic market is regulated as well as provisions governing the 
implementation of common policies. The provisions of the second treaty 
concerning policies and deliberative procedures are subject to a simplified 
amendment procedure. The intergovernmental conference stage is by-
passed and, in the case of deliberative procedures, internal ratifications are 
considered as granted unless individual national parliaments formally 
dissent. One could borrow a term used for the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) to define this simplified procedure as ‘small revision’, 
to distinguish it from regular and solemn amendments.1 
Admittedly, the way provisions are distributed between the two texts 
is not always consistent. Some of the provisions of the Treaty on the Union 
should really have been placed in the other treaty, like the ‘specific’ rules 
relating to common foreign and security policy. Greater simplification of 
the ‘small revision’ procedure would have also been preferable. The 
simplified procedure only applies to some of the provisions of the second 
treaty, and yet it still requires approval on the part of all member states at 
government and parliamentary level. Nevertheless, we find ourselves with 
a major innovation. The Union’s primary rules are not only grouped into 
separate documents, they are also distinguished by significant differences 
of a substantive and formal nature.  
Ever since its inception, the process of European construction 
featured the intermingling within the same treaty of basic institutional 
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elements together with rules applicable to specific sectors. This may have 
been justifiable at the time of the ECSC, which dealt with a clearly defined 
sector, but became increasingly pointless with the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Union and the progressive extension 
of their competences.2 The Constitutional Treaty provided no remedy to 
this problem, which now seems in the process of being solved. 
We now have on the one hand a basic treaty, the Treaty on the Union, 
the provisions of which establish its fundamental law; and on the other 
hand an implementing treaty, a kind of ‘organic law’, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the Union. This gives rise to a two-tier system, with the 
implementing treaty in a subordinate position to the basic treaty. In view of 
their nature, the provisions of the basic treaty (fundamental law) require a 
more stable consensus over time; they therefore should not be open to opt-
outs on the part of individual members and it is reasonable that they 
require a more stringent amendment procedure. On the other hand, the 
provisions of the implementing treaty (organic law) are such as to require 
more frequent adaptations, in line with changes in circumstances and 
prevailing political positions; in this case, therefore, there appears to be a 
rationale for a more flexible amendment and opt-out system.  
It is hard to say whether the system described is intentional. The 
concern addressed was likely of a different nature, connected to the 
ratification process and the referendum risk. Emphasis was deliberately 
laid on the discontinuity between the new treaty and the constitutional one, 
the former an amending treaty, the latter a treaty replacing its predecessors. 
As a result, two treaties remain, despite the fact that they refer to a single 
entity. But what might appear to be an incongruity, ascribable to 
happenstance rather than intention, ends up producing a positive 
innovation. It brings about the re-organisation and simplification of the 
system, basing it on two separate groups of primary rules. 
It will now be easier for the two groups of rules, and their respective 
treaties to evolve independently of each other. In particular, it will be 
possible to amend the sectoral regulations of the Union without affecting 
its institutional structure. This all leads to a double-positive effect – 
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endowing the system with greater flexibility and opening new areas to 
political debate. As has been rightly pointed out by Micossi (in this 
volume), the policies of the Union have become normal policies, and 
political divisions may now take shape around them, in line with 
traditional left/right divisions. This will certainly contribute to 
strengthening the Union’s democratic life (and thereby its legitimacy). 
3.  The ‘constitutional’ issue 
The new treaty eliminates any trace of constitutional names or signs. The 
terms ‘constitution’, foreign ‘minister’, ‘law’, ‘framework law’ are all 
banished; the symbols of the Union (flag, anthem, motto) are equally 
discarded, as is any explicit reference to the primacy of Union law. This is 
tantamount to a full-scale requiem for the European Constitution, almost a 
kind of damnatio memoriae. 
The countries that had rejected the Constitutional Treaty through 
referendum or that in any case were opposed to the text have thus been 
given the tangible sign they wanted of a break with the past. They can now 
tell their publics that the new treaty is radically different from its 
predecessor. On the other hand, countries that were in favour of the 
Constitution had to accept this ‘sacrifice’, because otherwise no agreement 
would have been achieved. But what is the real effect of deleting the 
constitutional names and symbols? A clarification appears desirable. 
The ‘constitution’ concept can be understood in a number of different 
ways.3 Some believe it has a very specific and highly circumscribed 
historical meaning; that its purpose is to identify the basic law of a political 
community with features specific to modern State systems. Outside of this 
context, it would be mistaken to use the term, as it would lose its distinctive 
nature and give rise to misunderstandings. If that is so, there is obviously 
no justification for using the term in a European context. As the Union is 
not a State, its founding act cannot be a constitution. And the fact that the 
term is used, as in the previous treaty, does nothing to change its nature: it 
remains a treaty and not a constitution.  
One can argue, however, that issues of modern constitutionalism also 
apply to supranational political entities endowed with authority over 
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member states and individuals. It would then be quite proper to recognise 
the constitutional nature of those Union norms that govern fundamental 
aspects of the Union (institutions, competences, procedures, guarantees, 
etc.). Therefore the European Court of Justice made no mistake in its past 
rulings (Les Verts judgement, 1986; SEE opinion, 1991) when it referred to 
the Community Treaty as a constitutional charter; and it is equally not 
mistaken to use the same term today with regard to the Treaty establishing 
the Union, despite the deletion of all and any constitutional terminology.  
So it all depends on which concept of constitution one takes as a 
starting point. Clearly, its applicability to the Union is to be ruled out 
assuming that there is an inseparable link between constitution and State. 
This only means, however, that the Union is not a State-type entity; and not 
that the Union can be equated with common international organisations, 
regulated by international covenants. Conversely, under the other line of 
reasoning, the founding act of the Union can be deemed to have a 
constitutional character, but this does not mean assigning State identity to 
the Union. The two issues – the nature of the Union and the definition of its 
founding act – remain separate.  
So far, we have examined the issues from a legal standpoint. 
However, signs and symbols also carry political weight. And as the 
adoption of constitutional terminology provided momentum for a closer 
integration of the peoples of Europe, discarding it now moves in the 
opposite direction. It signals a retreat back to national values and interests, 
or at least a moment of uncertainty with regard to the outcome of the 
process of European construction. That said, some symbols, such as the 
Union’s flag, remain solidly in place, despite the attempt to dispatch them 
with the stroke of a pen – a warning that reality is much stronger than any 
attempt to force matters through regulations. 
4.  Institutions and decision-making efficiency 
In the area of institutions, we had become accustomed to the Community 
trio or triangle: Parliament, Commission and Council. In the unified 
structure of the Union we now also have the European Council, which did 
actually already exist but without a clearly defined position. The trio has 
been converted into a quartet and the triangle into a rectangle. At the lower 
corners we find the European Parliament and the Council; at the upper 
corners, the Commission and the European Council. On one of the two 
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European Parliament and the Commission; on the other, inter-
governmental institutions – the two councils. Each institution interacts with 
all the others; relations therefore develop not only along the sides of the 
figure but also along its diagonals.  
The new treaty also ushers in a new player, national parliaments. For 
better or for worse (see Manzella, in this volume), the quartet thus evolves 
into a quintet. Hard to say exactly where the newcomer should be placed. 
Formally, this player is not one of the Union’s institutions, but it has 
become a stable part of its legislative procedures and may exercise a 
blocking influence on new legislation. It is also difficult to decide whether 
to position national parliaments on the supranational or the inter-
governmental axis. They contain a bit of both: as democratic bodies 
representing the people, national parliaments appear to be comparable to 
the European Parliament; at the same time they express national rather 
than supranational interests. What is clear is that the institutional dynamics 
of the Union now include a new player interacting with all the others. 
The picture just outlined is a mere sketch; it would require a detailed 
account of the tasks and duties of the various players. However, it 
delineates a particularly complex institutional system. Certainly this could 
be described in positive terms, as an increase in fora, scrutiny and 
guarantees within the Union. But if the yardstick is decision-making 
efficiency, the assessment may be somewhat different. What seems to be 
emerging is a consensus-based system, more effective at stalling decisions 
rather than facilitating them, and at encouraging deferral and (unavoidably 
small-scale) compromise solutions, rather than ensuring promptness of 
action and the prevalence of European interests. This is aggravated by the 
voting procedures in the two councils. All European Council decisions 
have to be unanimous and the same applies to major Council decisions. 
Furthermore, defining a new system for calculating majorities within 
Council is practically postponed until 2017, or even later because of  the 
reference to the ‘Ioannina’ approach. 
Summing up, the Union’s decision-making procedures feature a 
plurality of players and an unavoidable requirement for general consensus 
among national governments, with all the implications this has in today’s 
27-country Europe. Decisions are therefore likely to remain labourious and 
uncertain in outcome and the problem of decision-making efficiency (so 
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5.  Three candidates for the role of Mr (or Ms) Europe 
The discussion over institutions calls for an appendix, of not negligible 
importance. Who will be Mr (or Ms) Europe in the new Union structure? 
There are a number of candidates for the part. The three frontrunners are 
the President of the European Council, the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the Commission. As a 
matter of fact, one could also add the rotating President of the Council and 
the President of the European Parliament. But the position of the President 
of the Council is weakened because of the continuing half-yearly rotation. 
As to the President of the European Parliament, although the Parliament is 
certainly of increasing significance as a legislative and political body, it 
can’t as yet compete with the traditional governing institutions of the 
Union (Councils and Commission). Therefore the race can be narrowed 
down to the three main contenders. 
Each has both strong and weak points. The President of the European 
Council is backed by the weight of the most authoritative government 
institution, and will have the task of establishing the body’s agenda and 
implementing it. However, s/he does not have autonomous decision-
making powers. The President of the Commission can rely on the resources 
and structures of a well-established institution, on its prerogatives over 
foreign trade and a special relationship with the European Parliament. To 
some extent, it is the recognised voice of economic and supranational 
Europe. Major issues of foreign (and domestic) policy however remain the 
province of national governments and consequently of the councils 
representing them. As far as the High Representative is concerned, despite 
the change in name, s/he basically inherits the role and functions assigned 
to the minister for foreign affairs under the Constitutional Treaty. S/he will 
therefore be responsible for conducting the Union’s foreign, security and 
defence policy, taking advantage of his two hats as Vice-President of the 
Commission and President of the Council on External Relations, combining 
the functions of the two positions in his person. S/he will furthermore be 
able to make use of a dedicated structure, the embryo of a European 
diplomatic body. The position of the High Representative however appears 
to some extent subordinate to those of the President of the Commission and 
the President of the European Council. 
In light of the above considerations, two scenarios are possible: either 
that following a competition between the three figures, one prevails and 
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established between the three, so that Europe is represented by a troika 
rather than a single individual. Also possible are dual solutions, in which 
case the High Representative would hold the balance of power. It is 
difficult to predict how this will play out. It will in part depend on the 
personalities of the people chosen for the three positions and in part on the 
balance between governmental and supranational institutions; more 
importantly, the weight of facts and realities may well exercise a decisive 
influence. One can only hope that the three figures will not hinder each 
other in the pursuit of personal visibility and success and that a spirit of 
cooperation will prevail. Until we have one person jointly holding the 
presidency of the European Council and the Commission (something that 
is not ruled out in the new Treaty),4 the aforementioned troika could, if 
united and cohesive, provide a powerful engine for initiative and action. 
The Union stands in great need of such a boost in authority in order to 
overcome national resistance and take on a leading role on the world stage.  
6.  The market: Between competition and general interest 
Turning from institutions to the Union’s common policies, the list of open 
issues grows. One example, in the economic area, relates to competition 
policy.  
Market and competition rules have characterised 50 years of 
European integration, being its main driving force. But today competition 
has been removed from the list of Union goals. These now include 
sustainable development and balanced economic growth, more generally 
the economic and social well-being of its citizens. Competition has been 
downgraded to a mere instrument (together with others) in the pursuit of 
such goals. The importance of this instrument is however reiterated in a 
special protocol. One may thus wonder what the future role of competition 
will be.  
We need to understand whether the previous open and competitive 
market approach will continue to prevail, as would seem to be required by 
the protocol; or whether this is the beginning of a new season in the 
relations between politics and the economy, between the market and the 
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public interest, as would seem to be suggested by the elimination of 
competition from the goals of the Union. The Treaty of Lisbon gives 
contradictory signals in this area and future developments are not easy to 
predict. For the time being, we can but note the conflicting views of  those 
advocating greater flexibility in competition law implementation in order 
t o  g i v e  g r e a t e r  s c o p e  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  p o l i c y  g o a l s  a n d  p u b l i c  c o n c e r n s  
(environment, consumers, employment) and those who fear the onset of a 
new course featuring regulatory constraints that may hinder free market 
dynamics.  
The same question arises with respect to general interest services. The 
current Community Treaty has two provisions concerning these services: 
one has existed since the establishment of the Community (Article 86), 
whereas the other derives from the Amsterdam amendment (Article 16). 
The first establishes that enterprises providing public services must be fully 
subject to market and competition rules, provided this does not hinder 
their mission. Should this be the case, an exemption applies, which the 
Commission and the Court long interpreted very restrictively. The second 
provision, from the Amsterdam text, emphasises the importance of public 
services and urges the Community and its member states to ensure they 
operate adequately. Following the adoption of this provision, the 
exemption has been interpreted less restrictively. With the new treaty, the 
two provisions remain in force and a special protocol has been added 
thereto, which recognises national authorities’ broad discretionary powers 
in organising services of general interest.  
How should the protocol be read? It states that its provisions are 
purely interpretative, but in that case why insert them? This may be 
deemed nothing more than a redundancy in the new treaty without any 
concrete implications. Or it may be a signal akin to the elimination of 
competition from the goals of the Union. In which case the special regime 
for public services would be strengthened and such services would make 
up a sort of ‘free zone’ set aside for state jurisdiction and to a large extent 
unaffected by the constraints of EC competition rules.  
7.  A foreign policy for the Union? 
In foreign policy (and so we come to the heart of political Europe), 
uncertainties and ambiguities prevail regarding the respective powers of 
the Union and its member states. The treaty text appears to go in one 
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The treaty contains a number of significant innovations: the Union’s 
international legal personality, the occasional resort to majority decision 
and the creation of a figure entrusted with handling common foreign policy 
as a whole. We have already referred to the latter. Whereas the 
Constitutional Treaty spoke of a Minister for Foreign Affairs, the title is 
now more modest: High Representative. Its terms of reference however 
remain the same; they include submitting proposals to the Council on 
Foreign Relations, presiding over it, implementing its decisions and 
speaking on behalf of the Union before the United Nations. The High 
Representative will be supported by an embryonic European diplomatic 
service. All these measures are aimed at strengthening the ability of the 
Union to develop its own foreign policy and speak abroad with a single 
voice. 
The appended declaration, however, contains a number of caveats in 
defence of state prerogatives.  According to the declaration, treaty 
provisions do not affect the responsibilities and powers of individual 
member states in shaping and handling their own foreign policy, do not 
compromise their relations with other countries or international agencies, 
do not hinder the tasks and roles of its diplomatic representations, do not 
restrict the freedom of action of the holders of permanent seats on the 
Security Council and do not confer any new Common Foreign and Security 
Policy responsibilities on the Commission or the European Parliament.   
The emerging picture is contradictory. Which should we give more 
credence to: the treaty, which directs the Union to develop its own foreign 
policy or the declaration, which makes this goal very difficult to achieve? 
From a legal standpoint, declarations, unlike protocols, are not binding, but 
they do carry political weight. In this case, there is a risk that the CFSP will 
continue to be a separate pillar within the Union. A pillar that is rigorously 
intergovernmental in nature requires the unanimous support of all member 
states before any common initiative can be taken and leaves them freedom 
of action to protect their national interests.  
Hopefully the Union will succeed in asserting itself as a single entity 
on the international stage. But uncertainties still exist and concerns are 
justified. There is a danger that the Union will only be allowed to handle 
minor issues, with high-profile foreign policy matters remaining the 
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8.  Two conflicting concepts  
The examples of ambiguity and uncertainty described previously can 
(almost) all be traced back to the two conflicting concepts that have marked 
the process of European construction since the beginning: on the one hand 
a political (and not just economic) entity, with federal connotations; on the 
other, a confederal, intergovernmental institution mainly (though not 
exclusively) entrusted with economic matters.  
At times the first concept nearly prevailed: consider the Defence 
Community in the 1950s, Spinelli’s parliamentary project in the 1980s and, 
more recently, the Constitutional Treaty. But none of these initiatives 
succeeded. On the other hand, the repeated attempts at giving Europe a 
purely intergovernmental nature (the Luxembourg compromise, the 
creation of the European Council, the second and third Maastricht pillars) 
have also failed. Europe over time has maintained its ambiguity, setting it 
apart from all existing models; it combines federal and confederal, 
integration and cooperation, supranational and intergovernmental 
elements.  
Thanks to the many positive innovations introduced to the Nice texts, 
the Lisbon Treaty certainly marks a new step on the way to “an ever closer 
Union”. In this sense, Lisbon is in line with Maastricht, Amsterdam and 
Nice. But as its predecessors also did, it leaves the Union’s finality unclear. 
And pending the settlement of this basic issue, from which all others stem, 
ambiguity and compromise will remain unavoidable, as clearly explained 
by Giorgio Napolitano on 27 November 2007, in his Berlin lectio magistralis 
(see Napolitano, 2007). 
The reform process can therefore not be considered complete. It is no 
coincidence that the European Parliament, while endorsing the new treaty, 
immediately mentioned new amendment initiatives.5 More significant still 
is the establishment of a group of wise men to reflect on the future of 
Europe. A decision taken by the European Council, the very day the Treaty 
of Lisbon was solemnly signed.6 According to the Heads of State and 
Government, the wise men should not concern themselves with 
institutional issues. But they can hardly address the major issues of the new 
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century – sustainable development, the environment, energy, immigration, 
combating terrorism and international crime – without reasoning in terms 
of resources, structures and powers, in other words without considering 
which instruments will be best suited to the implementation of the policies 
required. Institutional issues appear unavoidable; and with them also the 
need to “overcome the deadlock between conflicting concepts of the 
European project” and “eliciting a new common political will”, as stressed 
by President Napolitano in the lecture cited above. 
9.  A look into the future 
The contruction of Europe is thus not complete; but what tools will one 
need to move ahead? 
Over the last two decades we have seen a continuing process of 
revision: the Single Act, followed by Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and 
now, by Lisbon. A series of revision treaties that have marked the 
successive stages of the integration process. The last stage proved 
particularly lengthy and laborious, characterised by a resounding failure 
(the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty) and the serious crisis that 
ensued. One can thus easily predict that member countries will think twice 
before embarking on a similar adventure again. Getting 27 members (or 
even more, if there is further enlargement) to agree appears extremely 
difficult; and, after all, the compromises and resources of diplomacy have 
their limits. Europe has not reached its final destination, but its method for 
solemnly revising the founding treaties may well have.  
In the future, changes will more likely be made solely to the second-
tier treaty, on the functioning of the Union. As mentioned earlier, such 
revisions can be addressed through simplified procedures that bypass the 
intergovernmental conference stage. But even the so-called ‘small revision’ 
will not have an easy time, as it requires the consent of all national 
governments and parliaments (which was not the case with the ECSC).  
Beyond formal revision procedures, instruments may over time be 
perfected within the Union, through inter-institutional agreements or case 
law. Inter-institutional agreements have in the past been used to introduce 
quite significant innovations in legislative and budgetary procedures, 
relations between institutions and the protection of basic rights. They may 
be used again in the future. Although one should not underestimate the 
fact that Council approval will be required, with the unanimous agreement 
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national parliaments, following the recent Lisbon judgement of the German 
Constitutional Court. 
As for case law, it is superfluous to recall its driving force in the 
integration process; and it is unthinkable that the evolving and creative 
interpretation of European judges could be somehow blocked. The new 
Treaty however establishes explicit barriers to the expansion of EU 
competences via judicial decision: from the meticulous re-assertion of the 
principle of conferral to the recurrent clarification that the legal personality 
of the Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, support competences and 
the residual competence under Article 308 in no way allow for new powers 
to be conferred upon the Union. In fact, European judges themselves have 
shown caution and restraint in recent times. 
And then there is differentiated integration – already a fact within the 
Union: consider Schengen, the euro or the defence policy. This 
phenomenon has expanded in the new Treaty, as illustrated by the opt-outs 
granted on issues of basic rights and in the area of justice and home affairs. 
In any case, the key issue is clear to all and cannot be eluded. On the one 
hand, some countries are not prepared to go for any further integration, 
whereas on the other, matters requiring a European response are 
increasingly pressing. It is therefore inevitable that if all do not feel ready, 
initiatives will be taken by smaller groups, either through enhanced 
cooperation within the Union (as in the euro approach), or through 
agreements outside the Union legal system (the initial approach to 
Schengen).7 
Increasingly, differentiated integration appears to be an appropriate 
way forward. The dissent of a few countries cannot be allowed to hold up 
all the others. Europe therefore faces a future of unity and diversity, as 
stated in the Constitutional Treaty. Admittedly, the two terms are difficult 
to reconcile. The tasks and challenges ahead are therefore clear: Europe 
must be allowed to move forward on a differentiated basis without 
compromising its unitary construction and without losing sight of its 
hopefully still common final goal.  
                                                      
7 On the euro model see Ciampi (2004).  THE SHAPE OF POST-LISBON EUROPE | 285 
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